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1 In search of a balanced contribution of entrepreneurial parties to mass litigation 
 
‘The current wave of deregulation and market liberalization in Europe has had major 
repercussions for the prospect of litigated forms of collective redress. (…) one would 
have to be almost churlish not to marvel at the liberalizing spirit sweeping the conti-
nent. And, yet, one need spend only a few minutes in conversations with European 
reformers before the proverbial ‘but’ enters the discourse, as in, ‘But, of course, we 
shall not have American-style class actions’. At this point, all participants nod sagely, 
confident that collective actions, representative actions, group actions and a host of 
other aggregative arrangements can bring all the benefits of fair and efficient resolu-
tion to disputes without the dreaded world of American entrepreneurial lawyering. And 
no doubt the American entrepreneurial ways must be resisted and will be resisted fully, 
in much the same way that Europe has held off the unwelcome presence of McDonalds 
or Starbucks in its elegant piazzas. To this dignified and self-assured conversation we 
bring a simple but unwelcome question: Really? (…) Our concern is that what appears 
as an apparent cultural revulsion at accepting the reality of legal enforcement as en-
trepreneurial activity may leave the reforms without the necessary agents of imple-
mentation.’1 
 
1.1 Research theme: context and background 
1.1.1 Three examples 
Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) is a private company that specializes in enforcing claims for damages that 
result from competition law infringements. It does so by purchasing claims from a multitude of cartel 
victims, aggregating these claims, and then, in its own name, asserting the joint claims in and/or out 
of court. In exchange for pursuing the claims and in the case of success, CDC receives a percentage of 
any damages it has obtained. In the case of loss, CDC bears the litigation costs, including the adverse 
costs order. Thus, CDC takes over the litigation risks. Since its establishment in 2002, CDC has filed 
bundled claims at various courts in Europe; inter alia, in Germany and the Netherlands. In both juris-
dictions, one of the questions that has arisen in court is whether CDC’s business model is consistent 
with national law. Whereas, so far, the Dutch courts have affirmed CDC’s practice, the German courts 
have deemed the assignments at hand to be contrary to public policy.2 
 
In 2006, the tanker Probo Koala illegally dumped 528 tonnes of chemical waste off the Ivory Coast, 
allegedly injuring thousands of residents. A few months later, around 30,000 claimants filed a group 
action (GLO) against the Trafigura group before the London High Court. All claimants had instructed 
the law firm that acted on their behalf on a conditional fee basis: if the claimants lost, they would pay 
no fee, if they won, the lawyers would claim their regular fee on an hourly basis including an uplift 
(success fee). In addition, to cover the risk of having to pay Trafigura’s costs in the case of loss, the 
claimants took out after-the-event insurance. At that time, under English law, claimants could recover 
both the success fee and the insurance premium from defendants in the case of success. In 2009, the 
                                                             
 
1 Issacharoff & Miller 2012, p. 37-38. 
2 The cases are discussed more elaborately in sections 4.5.5.2 and 6.5.3. 
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case was settled when Trafigura agreed to pay damages of £ 30 million. The court approved the terms 
of the settlement agreement, including those that stated, in short, that Trafigura would pay the claim-
ants’ costs. However, the bill of the claimants’ law firm ‘sent shockwaves through the profession’ as 
the costs were calculated at £ 105 million, including a 100% fee uplift of the £ 45 million lawyers’ fees 
and the ATE insurance premium of £ 9 million.3 Trafigura decided to contest the fees and discuss the 
bill before a costs judge. In 2011, the London Court of Appeal upheld the Senior Costs Judge’s ruling 
to cut the fee uplift to 58%, but to allow the recoverability of the ATE premium as billed.4  
 
In October 2009, a Dutch court declared the privately owned DSB Bank insolvent. Meanwhile, a num-
ber of interest groups had emerged, accusing the bank of misselling financial products such as endow-
ment policies. All of them stated that they wished to protect the interests of the aggrieved parties, but 
the manner in which they carried out this practice varied: from rendering support groups to drafting 
damage reports and individual or collective litigation. To fund their activities, some organizations 
charged membership fees and/or received donations, others (also) worked on a contingency fee basis. 
The organizations usually accompanied their activities by appearing in various media, such as the 
broadcasts of popular consumer programmes. The amount of claimants signing up with these interest 
groups was important, since they needed a critical mass to fund their actions and become the admin-
istrators’ most important negotiation partner. Hence, some organizations joined forces. In 2011, the 
administrators and three representative organizations reached a settlement, which the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal declared binding in 2014, pursuant to the Collective Mass Claims Settlement Act 
(WCAM). The settlement led to the dissolution of some organizations, while others set out to incite 
aggrieved parties to reject the settlement (opt out), claiming that they would receive better compen-
sation through individual actions.5 
1.1.2 The emergence of entrepreneurial mass litigation 
As the examples show, mass disputes can concern various areas of law and can be dealt with through 
a range of legal instruments. In the US, class actions have been an important instrument to resolve 
mass disputes since the amendment of Rule 23 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.6 Under 
the broader – and better marketable – heading of collective redress, the topic has been on the political 
agenda of the European Union for the past few decades. Nowadays, most European member states 
have introduced some type of collective redress mechanism. To undertake the pursuit of collective 
redress, the European Commission and many member states strongly rely upon non-profit (qualified) 
representative bodies, such as consumer organizations, as a more trusted alternative to the US entre-
preneurial lawyer. This focus is incited by, inter alia, the fear that commerce-driven parties may trigger 
an ‘American-style compensation culture’, as entrepreneurial lawyers are believed to primarily pursue 
their own interests. According to a passage in a DG SANCO memo: 
                                                             
 
3 ‘Leigh Day makes ‘staggeringly high’ costs order of £105m for Trafigura role’ (16 May 2010), The Lawyer.  
4 See Motto & Ors v. Trafigura & Trafigura Beheer [2011] EWCA Civ 1150 [2012] 1 W.L.R. 657 (CA). The case is discussed 
more elaborately in sections 5.3.5.2 and 5.3.5.5. 
5 The case is discussed more elaborately in section 6.5.4.2. 
6 For the history of American (and English) group litigation as from the 12th century, see Yeazell 1987. See also Hensler 




‘US style class action is not envisaged. EU legal systems are very different from the US legal system 
which is the result of "toxic cocktail" - a combination of several elements (punitive damages, contin-
gency fees, opt-out, pre-trial discovery procedures). (…) This combination of elements - "toxic cock-
tail" - should not be introduced in Europe.’7 
 
However, any mechanism is pointless without an initiator that pursues collective redress. In a study 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of existing collective redress mechanisms in the EU, one of the main 
conclusions was that the financing of collective actions is a significant obstacle for their use.8 For vari-
ous reasons, such as the high litigation costs and risks given the scale and complexity of mass litigation, 
potential intermediaries might not be able or willing to pursue (all) mass claims.  
 
Despite policy makers’ focus on consumer and other non-profit organizations, various types of entre-
preneurial parties have entered the European mass litigation market in recent years, attempting to 
seize the opportunities that collective redress might bring. These private parties have been breaking 
new ground by deploying already existing funding strategies to mass litigation, such as assignment or 
contingency fee arrangements. However, regardless of the type of entrepreneur, its mere presence 
adds another key actor to litigation, one that is or might be pursuing its own commercial interest. The 
concern that has been expressed is that this might be in conflict with the interest of (absent) group 
members, and/or defendants, and/or society at large. On the other hand, the literature suggests that 
a financial incentive for a (third) party to bring an action might be necessary for a well-functioning 
collective redress mechanism.  
1.2 Research design 
1.2.1 The aim of the research  
The funding of collective redress is a key factor for the mechanism’s development and practical func-
tioning.9 As a complement to (semi-)public enforcement, legal aid insurance and class members’ own 
resources, entrepreneurial funding might very well be part of the way forward. Although collective 
redress is a relatively recent phenomenon in Europe, it has created a market that entrepreneurial par-
ties have started to explore – the extent to which depending on national legal frameworks. Should 
courts and/or legislators (further) address this practice, and if so, how? Are they, as Hensler has put it, 
‘in the position of playing “catch up” with private actors’?10 The legal and political challenge seems to 
be to fulfil the objectives of collective redress mechanisms without also creating incentives for abusive 
behaviour. This debate predominantly builds upon American experiences, particularly the negative 
ones. These experiences obviously provide valuable information, but caution is required given the dif-
ference between the legal systems and cultures in the USA and Europe.  
                                                             
 
7 Commission of the EC – DG SANCO, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Questions and Answers, 27 Novem-
ber 2008, MEMO/08/741, under 9. 
8 Civic Consulting & Oxford Economic, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in 
the European Union. Final Report, Berlin 2008, p. 4 and 66 ff. 
9 See, similar, Tzankova 2012, Madaus 2012, Hodges & Stadler 2013, Voet 2015 and Stadler 2017. 




The body of literature on European collective redress and its funding mechanisms is growing, but there 
is considerable scope for further research.11 This research project will contribute to the body of 
knowledge by linking the merits and demerits of entrepreneurial funding with three European mem-
ber states’ legal regimes. As entrepreneurial mass litigation is a relatively new phenomenon and a 
moving target, it is impossible to paint a full picture. By mapping (potential) scenarios of entrepreneur-
ial mass litigation and exploring the German, English, and Dutch legal and practical context in which 
such scenarios would take place, the research project seeks to a) appraise the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation within the context of these European jurisdictions’ legal 
traditions, and b) inventorise the particular rules and features that might affect entrepreneurial mass 
litigation in light of the chosen objectives of collective redress. Therewith, the study aims to contribute 
to the political, regulatory or judicial process of accurately weighing and balancing the benefits and 
drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation. The targeted audience, in addition to the academic 
arena, are national and EU policymakers, as well as supervisory bodies or courts that monitor or assess 
(the performance of) entrepreneurial parties in a specific situation or case. The findings might also be 
of interest to entrepreneurial parties and lawyers involved in collective redress. 
  
The research is constructed on the assumption that there is a need for collective redress mechanisms. 
Although this need might be – and has been – challenged,12 policy makers are increasingly (exploring 
the possibility of) designing options for aggrieved parties to obtain collective redress to solve enforce-
ment deficits.13 The added value of such mechanisms is my point of departure.14 Furthermore, I as-
sume that thresholds such as litigation costs and risks impede the actual functioning of collective re-
dress mechanisms (and therewith the achievement of the underlying policy objectives), and that en-
trepreneurial parties may contribute to solving this threat.15 Obviously, other solutions are thinkable. 
For instance, the ‘loser pays’ costs shifting rules could be abandoned,16 parties could take out legal 
expenses insurance,17 organize a crowdfunding initiative,18 or the means and resources of (semi) public 
enforcers could be enhanced.19 Such solutions will be touched upon in a side note where relevant. The 
focus of attention is entrepreneurial funding and its particular (de)merits, examined for compatibility 
with the objectives of collective redress mechanisms on its own merits, not in comparison to alterna-
tives. Furthermore, as Silver has noted, ‘the class action will always be a political football’.20 This study 
                                                             
 
11 Cf. Hodges 2010, p. 718 and 725. 
12 See the European and national developments of collective redress as described in Chapter 2. 
13 Obviously there are other methods, such as public enforcement, small claims procedures, and ADR. See, for instance, 
Stuyck e.a. 2007, Hodges, Benohr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, Weber 2014, Kramer & Kakiuchi 2015 and Hodges 2015. 
14 See Chapter 2.  
15 See Chapter 3.  
16 See, for instance, Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010 and Visscher & Schepens 2010.  
17 See, for instance, Van Boom 2010a. 
18 See, for instance, Gomez 2015. 
19 See, for instance, Micklitz & Stadler 2005. In light of the currently predominant political climate, which with regard 
to civil litigation focuses on the principle of ‘the user pays’, this does not seem very realistic. See, similar, Madaus 2012. 
20 Silver 2003, p. 1429.  
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does not aim to prioritize or rank the objectives of collective redress. Ultimately, that is up to the 
political arena. 
1.2.2 The research question 
To achieve the project’s purpose, the research will address the following question: what conditions 
are relevant in assessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties contributing to the chosen objectives 
of collective redress? 
  
The research question is composed of the following elements. As a means to achieve policy objectives, 
collective redress mechanisms have been put into place. As mentioned, entrepreneurial funding can, 
as an additional means, contribute to the functioning of the mechanisms and thus to achieving the 
policy objectives.21 Means, however, usually come with both favourable and perverse (side-)effects. 
In this research project, the policy objectives of collective redress are used to qualify the potential 
effects of entrepreneurial funding as such. The research project does not answer questions such as 
what objective(s) should be pursued with regard to collective redress, what ‘too many’ cases in court 
are, or what ‘too high’ a remuneration for an entrepreneurial party is. These are either economic, 
moral or political questions. Rather, the research project takes a legal and practical approach. It de-
parts from the existing policy objectives of collective redress mechanisms, places the risks and benefits 
of entrepreneurial mass litigation in this context, and from thereon describes what is happening in the 
law and on the ground in the three selected jurisdictions. Therewith, threats and opportunities (rules 
and features of the selected legal regimes) are identified that might affect the beneficial or disadvan-
tageous effects of entrepreneurial mass litigation, which in turn can positively or negatively affect the 
objectives of collective redress mechanisms. 
 
The research question thus comprises the following sub-questions: 
1. What are the policy objectives of collective redress mechanisms in the selected jurisdictions 
and the European Union? 
2. What are the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation and how do they af-
fect the chosen policy objectives (positively or negatively)? 
3. Which legal rules and features are closely connected with entrepreneurial mass litigation, and 
what do they entail in the selected jurisdictions?  
4. To what extent do these rules and features (potentially) mediate the benefits and drawbacks 
of entrepreneurial mass litigation and affect the objectives of collective redress? 
 
Both collective redress and litigation funding are terminology minefields. The only way to fully grasp 
what they entail is by studying the various mechanisms of collective redress. This research helps to do 
so, following the methodology as will be described in section 1.2.4. The following section defines the 
concepts of collective redress, mass litigation and entrepreneurial litigation in order to further frame 
the scope of the research. 
                                                             
 




1.2.3.1 Collective redress 
In this research, I build on the definition of collective redress as introduced in 2013 by the European 
Commission. According to this definition, collective redress is a legal mechanism that ensures the pos-
sibility to claim the cessation of illegal behaviour (injunctive relief) or compensation (compensatory 
relief) collectively, by two or more natural or legal persons that claim to have been harmed in a mass 
harm situation or by an entity entitled to bring a representative action.22 In addition to this definition, 
I also qualify as collective redress a mechanism that can provide for declaratory relief (a statement of 
the legal relationship between parties). Such relief can provide the basis for (collective) settlement 
negotiations or individual litigation to seek monetary compensation and can thus result in compensa-
tory relief for the aggrieved parties. With a mass harm situation, I refer to one event or a multiplicity 
of events that allegedly has or have harmed two or more natural or legal persons (hereafter, the latter 
are also interchangeably referred to as aggrieved parties or class members). 
 
This research employs the term collective redress freely interchangeably with the term mass litiga-
tion.23 With these terms, I refer to the (semi-)court-based resolution of mass disputes. The disputes 
have arisen from domestic or cross-border infringements of private law, and are or can be brought by 
private bodies before a civil court with the intention of obtaining relief. Consequential to these limita-
tions, the research does not cover – the funding of – ADR mechanisms or public enforcement.24 As 
entrepreneurial parties make a recovery through awards of damages or financial settlement,25 the 
research encompasses the collective redress of economic or financial loss, both substantial and scat-
tered. Although the research also discusses disputes that have arisen from cross-border infringements, 
the research project does not discuss matters of private international law, international jurisdiction, 
cross-border recognition or forum shopping.26 
 
Collective redress is an umbrella term that covers a diversity of mechanisms that can resolve mass 
disputes. The mechanisms differ per jurisdiction.27 The definitions of the different instruments vary 
between the jurisdictions and between the different mechanisms, and a significant variety exists with 
                                                             
 
22 Recommendation 3 (a) of the Recommendation 2013/396/EU. 
23 The term collective action is applied with reference to certain specific actions, such as the Dutch collective action of 
section 3:305a BW, and the English collective action in competition law. Both qualify as a representative action, see 
hereafter, and section 2.2.4. 
24 Such as arbitration, partie civile, or dispute resolution by consumer or financial authorities, complaints tribunals or 
ombudsmen. See, for instance, Van Boom 2011, Hodges, Benohr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012; Voet 2013 and Weber 
2014.  
25 Cf. Hodges, Peysner & Nurse 2012, p. 103-104. See section 1.2.3.2. 
26 See on these topics in the context of collective redress, for instance, Stadler 2011, Fairgrieve & Lein 2012, Kramer 
2013, Stadler 2013a, Stadler 2014a, Bosters 2015.  
27 For an overview of the mechanisms in EU member states (but note that – to a certain extent – recent national reforms 
have rendered these overviews outdated), see Civic Consulting & Oxford Economic, Evaluation of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union. Final Report, Berlin 2008, p. 27 ff, and Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, 
IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16, p. 13 ff. For some recent information, see Hess 2017, in particular Chapter 4, section 2.  
8 
 
regard to their goals and design, such as their scope of application, binding effect, standing to sue, the 
types of available remedies, the competent court, and the technique of including class members (opt-
in or opt-out).28 There are court proceedings that have been designed specifically for the resolution of 
mass disputes: group actions and representative actions. The proceedings in which claims of class 
members are combined into one action, brought by two or more class members, will be referred to as 
group action (this includes the mechanisms of the joinder of parties and the consolidation of claims). 
Deviating from the EC Recommendation, I define as a representative action an action brought by any 
representative – one or more class members or a representative entity, public or private, certified or 
not, entrepreneurial or non-profit – that acts on behalf of two or more aggrieved parties who do not 
necessarily know about or participate in the action.29 Collective redress can also – formally or infor-
mally, depending on the national procedural rules – follow a test case in which one of the aggrieved 
parties brings a claim that is similar to many others. I also qualify as collective redress the action of a 
special purpose vehicle – with litigation being the special purpose – that has bundled two or more class 
members’ assigned claims and pursues these claims in its own name, whereas, strictly speaking, the 
Recommendation does not address this type of action.30 A combination of taking legal action both in 
and out of court is possible as well: pursuant to the Dutch WCAM procedure, the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal can declare legally binding an out-of-court settlement that holds rights to compensation for 
aggrieved parties.31 Finally, collective redress can take place through out-of-court (consensual) settle-
ment. 
1.2.3.2 Entrepreneurial mass litigation 
There are different ways to fund mass litigation. The funding techniques are closely related to the 
mechanism that is used to obtain collective redress,32 and do not necessarily involve an entrepreneur-
ial party. Aggrieved parties might share litigation costs, individually supported by legal aid, legal ex-
penses insurance or otherwise, or a representative body might raise money through donations, mem-
bership fees or subsidies.33 However, as mentioned, various types of entrepreneurial parties have en-
tered the mass litigation market in the past few years. If allowed by national law, class members may 
conclude contingency fee (alike) arrangements with attorneys, litigation funders, special purpose ve-
hicles or representative bodies. In return for investing in the action, such entrepreneurial party is (fully) 
remunerated only if the action is successful. 
 
                                                             
 
28 For an overview of the examined collective redress mechanisms and their main features, see section 2.5. 
29 Recommendation 3 (d) defines a representative action as an action which is brought by a representative entity, an 
ad hoc certified entity or a public authority on behalf and in the name of two or more natural or legal persons who 
claim to be exposed to the risk of suffering harm or to have been harmed in a mass harm situation whereas those 
persons are not parties to the proceedings. 
30 Cf. Stadler 2014, Tillema 2014 and Stadler 2017. See the first example in section 1.1.1. 
31 This action is qualified as a representative action, see section 2.5. 
32 Cf. Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules, 2 April 2008, SEC(2008) 404, consideration 45. 
33 See also Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 99. 
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This research opts for a definition of entrepreneurial mass litigation that captures the aforementioned 
spectrum of funding arrangements.34 It is defined as the non-recourse financing of (all or part of) the 
litigation costs by an entrepreneurial, private party that is otherwise unconnected with the mass dam-
age event, with the aim of pursuing class members’ claims that represent a monetary value, in return 
for i) a share of the proceeds of any award or settlement regardless of the amount of time it has spent 
in the case (quota pars litis), or ii) a normal, hourly fee uplifted with a percentage; either way, the 
(uplifted) fee is only payable upon success. This definition is similar to those of contingency respec-
tively conditional fees, which are used in the context of funding by attorneys.35 It is also similar to the 
definitions of third-party litigation funding.36 In essence, the techniques are the same, but the entre-
preneurial party differs.37 In this research project, the entrepreneurial party can be an attorney, a 
third-party litigation funder or a special purpose vehicle.38 Where necessary, the distinction is made 
between a funder that is involved in mass litigation as a party (a special purpose vehicle) and the one 
that is not (a third-party litigation funder or an attorney). This research does not address legal expenses 
insurance.39 
 
Due to the definition employed, the research is limited to the funding of creditors’ litigation costs; the 
funding of defendants’ costs is omitted.40 Creditors’ costs can be subdivided into attorneys’ fees, court 
fees, experts’ costs, witnesses’ costs, and secondary costs such as travel expenses. The costs covered 
may also include the costs award in case the claim is denied and the claimant is ordered to reimburse 
the defendant’s costs (the adverse costs order).  
 
The term lawyer is used to describe anyone qualified and authorised to practice law and provide legal 
advice. The term attorney is reserved for the lawyer that represents the claimant(s) in a case before 
the court. In Chapter 5 (England and Wales), the terms lawyer and attorney will, where necessary, be 
subdivided into solicitor or barrister. 
1.2.4 Methodology 
1.2.4.1 Theoretical study 
Two studies will be conducted to address the research question ‘What conditions are relevant in as-
sessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties contributing to the chosen objectives of collective 
redress?’ The first part of the research consists of a theoretical study that will establish a normative 
framework in order to qualify the rules and features of (entrepreneurial) mass litigation, which will be 
investigated in the second part of the research. This normative framework consists of the following 
two components.  
 
                                                             
 
34 The term entrepreneurial litigation is taken from Coffee 1987 and Coffee 2015. 
35 See, for instance, Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka 2010 and De Mot, Faure & Visscher 2017.  
36 See Van Boom 2011, Veljanovski 2012, Hodges, Peysner & Nurse 2012, Rowles-Davies 2014 and Pirozzolo 2014. 
37 Cf. Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 70, and Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2016, p. 20. 
38 See also section 3.3. 
39 See, for instance, Van Boom 2010a and De Mot, Faure & Visscher 2017.  
40 See, for instance, Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 64-66. 
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I will first describe the development of collective redress in the selected jurisdictions (see hereafter): 
which objectives and aspirations of policy makers underlie the various mechanisms? The European 
Union developments are included in this overview, as they are intertwined with those at the national 
stage. Subsequently, those in Germany, England and Wales, and the Netherlands are addressed. Out 
of this overview, which is based on policy documents and a synopsis of the literature that theoretically 
underpins collective redress, I will identify the objectives of collective redress. These objectives estab-
lish the first half of the normative framework, and will also serve to qualify the (potential) effects of 
entrepreneurial mass litigation, that is, to determine which particular effects are favourable and which 
are not. 
  
The second part of the research includes a literature study in order to describe the (potential) effects 
of entrepreneurial mass litigation; how might the incentives of third parties (mis)align with the inter-
ests of the aggrieved parties, defendants, and/or society? It includes legal doctrinal, law and econom-
ics, and empirical studies on entrepreneurial mass litigation in the USA and Australia (contingency fees, 
third-party funding and class actions). Their experiences will be used as a source of inspiration to fur-
ther set out the framework. For instance, in the USA, contingency fee arrangements and class actions 
have been investigated from different academic angles. Europe can take into consideration the lessons 
learnt in the USA, keeping in mind the substantial differences between the legal systems, cultures and 
traditions. For instance, the American class action regulations have a different design and concern 
different key players41 who operate in different legal regimes. This influences (the implications of) the 
incentives or behaviour.42 Notably, the following American rules and features affect the functioning of 
class actions driven by entrepreneurial lawyers, and do not, or to a lesser degree, exist in most Euro-
pean member states: no or one-way costs shifting, jury trial, elected judges, punitive or treble dam-
ages, elaborate – costly – discovery, the lack of public legal aid funding and less social security provi-
sions, a large focus on private enforcement, a variety of federal and state laws, and – possibly – a 
different attitude towards litigation.43 It is not always possible to attribute the incentive to the device, 
the legal system or the entrepreneur’s activity. Nevertheless, general observations can be made, par-
ticularly because in essence all forms of remuneration or funding concern the ‘own interest’ of the 
entrepreneurial party. Where necessary, the difference in design and the (potential) influence thereof 
on the functioning of the entrepreneurial party will be addressed.  
 
This second dimension will lead to a second set of review criteria, which serve as the other half of the 
normative framework to assess entrepreneurial mass litigation. The first and second set of review cri-
teria will be presented as a risk and benefit ‘checklist’ against the backdrop of the objectives of 
collective redress mechanisms. 
1.2.4.2 Legal study 
Since entrepreneurial parties do not operate in a vacuum and their functioning depends on the speci-
ficities of a national legal system, the second part of the research consists of a legal study that maps 
                                                             
 
41 Attorney/class counsel, lead plaintiff and (absent) class members. 
42 Other collective redress mechanisms exist, but will not be discussed.  
43 See, for instance, Yeazell 1987, Markesinis 1990, Hensler 2000, Coffee 2010, p. 291, Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2010, 
Hodges 2011, p. 103, and Coffee 2015, p. 9 ff. 
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and comparatively observes the context and structure of entrepreneurial mass litigation in Germany, 
England and Wales, and the Netherlands. Several European studies have inventoried the legal aspects 
of national collective redress mechanisms, but they hardly provide an insight into the available funding 
mechanisms within this context, how they are embedded in the existing legal systems, and their prac-
tical operation. This study describes the legal frameworks of three jurisdictions; a positive analysis of 
both the legal architecture of collective redress mechanism(s) and the aspects that are connected to 
its funding and actors.44 The three chapters can be consulted separately, for those interested in entre-
preneurial mass litigation within the context of one of the selected jurisdictions. In a way, the country 
reports furthermore serve as case studies, to collect various rules and features that describe or explain 
whether the benefits and drawbacks indeed (may) take place. By assembling these rules and features 
across the three selected jurisdictions, certain general notions, common themes and characteristic 
features of entrepreneurial mass litigation will be identified, as well as the threats and opportunities 
that elements of the legal systems may pose to the contribution of entrepreneurial parties to mass 
litigation.  
 
The choice of the legal regimes to be investigated has been based on the type of differences and sim-
ilarities the comparison might identify.45 First, they represent both the common law and civil law tra-
dition. They reflect different views on or the operation of the various legal elements that are con-
nected to entrepreneurial mass litigation, such as costs and funding rules and claim assignment. They 
represent variations of collective redress mechanisms and different approaches towards collective re-
dress.  
 
From this second part of the study, the review criteria that were established in the theoretical frame-
work will be refined by threats and opportunities that – potentially – affect the beneficial or disadvan-
tageous effects of entrepreneurial mass litigation, which in turn can affect (positively or negatively) 
the objectives of collective redress mechanisms.  
1.3 Structure of the book 
After this introductory chapter that has set out the thesis’ research theme, design and methodology, 
Part I of the book establishes the theoretical foundation against which the rules and features and prac-
tical operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation will be investigated. Within this part, Chapter 2 de-
scribes the policy objectives that underlie the design of collective redress mechanisms in the selected 
jurisdictions, as well as the European Union’s policy on collective redress (sub-question 1). Chapter 3 
concentrates on entrepreneurial parties that operate within the field of mass litigation. After a further 
description of the types of entrepreneurial parties, it explores their associated benefits and risks (sub-
question 2). Section 3.6 formulates the first checklist: which benefits and drawbacks can affect, posi-
tively or negatively, the objective(s) of collective redress mechanisms? 
 
In Part II, Chapters 4 to 6 further draw out the building blocks, that is, the rules and features that define 
the operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation in three European legal regimes: Germany (Chapter 
                                                             
 
44 For the selected key issues, see section 3.6. 
45 Cf. Siems 2014, p. 15.  
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4), England & Wales (Chapter 5), and the Netherlands (Chapter 6). It discusses the legal rules and fea-
tures that are closely connected with entrepreneurial mass litigation (sub-question 3) by analysing the 
relevant national rules, regulation and case law.  
 
Part III closes the research. The analysis in Chapter 7 highlights the similarities and differences among 
the selected jurisdictions and discusses to what extent the rules and features (potentially) amplify or 
reduce the benefits or drawbacks, and thus qualify as an opportunity or a threat to the functioning of 
entrepreneurial mass litigation (sub-question 4). Furthermore, it provides a framework for weighing 
and balancing the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, and therewith aims to 
answer the main research question: what the relevant conditions are in assessing the likelihood of 












2 Collective redress mechanisms and their policy objectives 
 
‘Dragged out of the litigative attic at irregular intervals to deal with exotic cases of 
travelling preachers, evicted congregations, recalcitrant unions, and groups of warring 
creditors, the class suit, as it had come to be called, was clearly good for something, 
even if no one could quite figure out what.’1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Without an initiator that pursues collective redress, the objectives of the mechanism are not achieved. 
Entrepreneurial parties undertake such action or enable it to be pursued and therewith might contrib-
ute to fulfilling these objectives. In order to establish to what extent such parties benefit or hinder the 
settlement of mass disputes, as a first step it is necessary to understand the underlying policy goals of 
the various mechanisms. This chapter aims to provide such insight by introducing those mechanisms 
and highlighting the underlying policy objectives. Specific rules and features of the mechanisms will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 4-6. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. It starts with a chronological overview of collective redress instru-
ments and their underlying policy objectives in the European Union and the three selected jurisdictions 
(section 2.2). Given the abundance of debates and studies on collective redress, the overviews present 
the highlights and main policy choices. To further help identify the objectives, the chapter continues 
with a synopsis of the literature that has laid the theoretical foundation for collective redress (section 
2.3). I will then identify the main objectives of the collective redress mechanisms that are examined 
(section 2.4). The chapter closes with a summarizing schematic overview of the national mechanisms 
and their main features and objectives (section 2.5). 
2.2 The development of collective redress in the EU and the selected jurisdictions 
2.2.1 European Union 
In the European context, the debate on collective redress stems from discussions on consumer pro-
tection in the 1970s and 1980s, which by then was no longer considered an exclusively national issue.2 
For instance, in 1972, the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution on misleading advertising, in 
which it noted that public bodies and consumer organizations could engage in adequate, rapid and 
efficacious repression of misleading advertising in order to protect consumers.3 In 1975, the first (pre-
liminary) European consumer policy programme of the EEC stated that consumers are entitled to 
                                                             
 
1 Yeazell 1987, p. 224, describing the origins of English and American group litigation. Yeazell traces the roots of the 
American modern class action back to the late twelfth century in England and Wales, noting that there might be other 
examples of (predecessors of) group litigation found all over medieval Europe. 
2 For an overview of EU (consumer) collective redress, see also the Commission’s Green Paper on consumer access to 
justice, COM(93) 576 final, Hodges 2009, Micklitz 2010, Wagner 2011, Hodges 2013, and Wrbka 2015. 




proper redress for injury or damage by means of swift, effective and inexpensive procedures.4 The 
ensuing debate and studies resulted, inter alia, in the obligation for member states to adopt means to 
prevent or cease infringements of various consumer laws. Such injunctive action could be brought by 
qualified organizations with ‘a legitimate interest’ in representing consumers’ collective interests.5 It 
was inspired by the German Unterlassungsklage, which was presumed to be an effective instrument 
to bridge the perceived enforcement gap.6 According to the Commission, the economic viewpoint of 
compelling wrongdoers to internalize the costs they had created was particularly important in con-
sumer cases, as consumers’ losses often did not justify engaging in costly litigation. The (mere exist-
ence of) preventive mechanisms would deter wrongdoers from displaying detrimental behaviour. This 
would render dispute resolution and compensation redundant.7 
 
Over time, however, it appeared that injunctive relief did not suffice in preventing mass infringements. 
This point of view emerged around 2000, after the Commission’s evaluation of the 1993 Unfair Terms 
Directive.8 Member states reported that unfair terms were not swiftly eliminated due to time-consum-
ing litigation, and that enforcement mechanisms to prevent recurrence, such as public fines for not 
complying with a court order, were not very practicable, because, for instance, the claimant would 
have to go to court once more. Thus, the difficulties of individual redress – due to high litigation costs 
and risks, complex and lengthy procedures,9 and diminishing publicly funded legal aid10 – and the (per-
ceived)11 incompleteness of injunctive relief slowly started to spark the debate on compensatory col-
lective redress. As part of the policy strategy to promote the retail internal market and consumer and 
retailer confidence, in 2007, the Commission announced its intention to consider options for compen-
satory consumer collective redress.12 As various EU institutions urged the Commission to approach the 
                                                             
 
4 Council of the European Communities, Resolution of 14 April 1975, OJ C 92, 25.4.75, and the annexed Preliminary 
programme, consideration 32. Follow-up policy documents include the Commission’s Supplementary Communication 
of 7 May 1987 on consumer redress, COM(87) 210 final (see on the role of consumer organizations, p. 3 and 4). See 
also, from the Council of Europe, the Recommendation on the legal protection of the collective interests of consumers 
by consumer agencies, adopted on 23 January 1981, Recommendation R(81) 2. 
5 This option was included in the 1984 Directive on misleading advertising (84/450/EEC), the 1993 Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC), and the 1998 Injunctions Directive (98/27/EC) (later repealed by Directive 
2009/22/EC). 
6 Micklitz 2010, p. 7. On the Unterlassungsklage, see sections 2.2.2 and 4.5.3.2. 
7 Commission’s Green Paper on consumer access to justice, COM(93) 576 final, p. 7. 
8 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Unfair Terms Directive, COM(2000) 248 final, p. 22-23, and p. 43 
ff, notably graph 7. See, similarly, the Commission’s Report on the application of the Injunctions Directive, COM(2008) 
756 final; considerations 25-27 refer to the limited impact of the (cross-border) actions. 
9 See the Special Eurobarometer 195 (October 2004), which also revealed that 67% of European consumers (of 15 
member states) would be more willing to defend their rights in court if they could join other consumers complaining 
about the same issue, p. 36 ff. 
10 Hodges 2013, p. 3. 
11 According to Micklitz there is little evidence available on the effects and effectiveness of the action for an injunction; 
Micklitz 2010, p. 7. 
12 Commission’s Communication EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013, COM(2007) 99 final, p. 11, with reference to 




topic with care,13 the ensuing Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress first assessed the state of 
the then available enforcement mechanisms. The Commission concluded that the current European 
redress and enforcement framework was ‘not satisfactory’.14 Consequently, a significant proportion 
of harmed consumers did not obtain redress and compensation, which jeopardized consumer trust. 
Despite criticism that the studies preceding the Green Paper did not encompass the (effects and ef-
fectiveness of the) action for an injunction in its analysis,15 the Green Paper resulted in a ‘three pillar 
policy’16 with regard to consumer protection mechanisms.17 This policy focuses on a mix of ADR, judi-
cial collective redress and public enforcement. For instance, private compensatory collective redress 
could complement administrative sanctions against consumer law infringements. Responses to mass 
claim cases would have to be based on ‘accessible, affordable and effective redress with minimal costs 
for all involved, providing compensation for legitimate claims, preventing unmeritorious claims and 
taking into account the legal traditions of the Member States’.18 At all times, though, all involved insti-
tutions stressed that Europe would have to refrain from adopting anything like the US class action with 
its undesired effects. Illustrative are two quotes from Commissioner Kuneva’s speeches in 2007: 
 
‘We are certainly not thinking about bringing a US style system of class action to Europe.’19 
 
‘To those who have come all the way to Lisbon to hear the words “class action”, let me be clear from 
the start: there will not be any. Not in Europe, not under my watch.’20  
 
Meanwhile, the debate on compensatory collective redress had started to gain ground in the area of 
competition law as well. Here, the Court of Justice of the European Union stimulated the debate on 
the effective enforcement of harmonized substantive rules – the current EC Treaty Articles 81 and 
82.21 In an area of law where public enforcement predominated,22 the ECJ emphasized that compliance 
                                                             
 
13 See the Council’s resolution of 31 May 2007, 2007/C 166/01, consideration 10; the Parliament’s resolution of 20 May 
2008, 2007/2189(INI), consideration 40; and the EESC’s Opinion of 14 February 2008, 2008/C 192/01. See also the 
OECD’s Recommendation of 12 July 2007, C(2007) 74. 
14 Commission’s Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008) 794 final, no. 17 and 19.  
15 See Micklitz 2010, p. 7, with reference to the 2008 Evaluation by Civic Consulting / Oxford Economics, and the 2008 
Study by GHK, Civic Consulting, Van Dijk Management Consultants. 
16 Hodges 2013, p. 4. 
17 See, for instance, DG SANCO’s Consultation paper 2009, and, discussed hereafter, the Commission’s Public Consulta-
tion Document of 2011, SEC(2011)173 final. 
18 DG SANCO’s Consultation paper 2009, considerations 3 and 5.  
19 Speech of 24 May 2007 by Commissioner M. Kuneva, Consumer policy has come of age, at the BEUC General Assembly 
in London. 
20 Speech of 10 November 2007 by Commissioner M. Kuneva, Healthy Markets Need Effective Redress, at the confer-
ence on collective redress for European consumers in Lisbon. 
21 The Van Gend & Loos judgment (ECJ 5 February 1963, case 26/62) has been declared to be the first signal of ‘adding 
the private pillar’ to complement public enforcement, see Paulis 2007, p. 8-9. 
22 See, for instance, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, which gave powers to the Commission and national competi-
tion authorities to take action upon infringements. 
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with competition rules should also be ensured by private enforcement before national courts.23 There-
fore, ‘any individual’ should be able to claim damages for harm suffered, otherwise ‘the full effective-
ness of Article 81 EC (…) would be put at risk’.24 National (procedural) laws would have to ensure that 
individuals could effectively exercise their European rights by bringing actions for damages. A lack of 
such laws would jeopardize the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.25  
 
The Ashurst study, commissioned by DG Competition, gave another impetus to the debate on the pri-
vate enforcement of competition law.26 Whereas the 1966 Batiffol study on the redress of damage 
caused by infringements of competition law had concluded that the (then) member states were suffi-
ciently capable of providing remedies and procedures for competition law infringements,27 in 2004, 
the evidence seemed to point in the opposite direction. Although the Ashurst study did notice a rise 
in (representative) injunctive actions in some jurisdictions, one of the main findings was the ‘total un-
derdevelopment’ of damages claims at national courts.28 Many obstacles to bringing such claims were 
identified, both substantive (such as the calculation of damages) and procedural (such as high litigation 
costs). In order to encourage private enforcement, the authors suggested introducing other types of 
actions, such as (US-style) class actions or claims by consumer organizations or public representa-
tives.29  
 
Many have criticised the Ashurst study, casting doubt on the finding that a low number of damage 
cases are adjudicated in competition law.30 Their main objection is that the study did not employ an 
adequate method because, for instance, summary proceedings, arbitration and extrajudicial settle-
ments were not included. Later studies seemingly reported more damages claims.31 Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s Green Paper (2005) that ensued the Ashurst study did not question the need for (more 
                                                             
 
23 ECJ 20 September 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 (Courage v. Crehan) and ECJ 13 July 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461 
(Manfredi). 
24 Courage v. Crehan, consideration 26; Manfredi, consideration 60. 
25 Manfredi, consideration 62, referring to Courage v. Crehan. Although member states enjoy procedural autonomy 
when it comes to the enforcement of substantive laws, they have to abide by these principles. Member states cannot 
render the enforcement of European law ‘virtually impossible’ or ‘excessively difficult’; ECJ 16 December 1976, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 (Rewe). 
26 Waelbroeck, Slater & Even-Shoshan 2004. The study on damages actions for a breach of competition law in the EU 
identified and analysed potential obstacles to private enforcement and suggested how to better facilitate damages 
actions. 
27 Deringer Report 1961 (for the EP) and Batiffol Study (for the EC), as summarized by Cumming & Freudenthal 2010, p. 
5. 
28 Waelbroeck, Slater & Even-Shoshan 2004, p. 2. 
29 Waelbroeck, Slater & Even-Shoshan 2004, p. 9-10.  
30 For instance, Van den Bergh 2006; Van Lierop & Pijnacker Hordijk 2007; Zippro 2009, p. 169; Hodges 2013; Hodges 
2014. 
31 Hodges 2013.  
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efficient) private enforcement of competition law.32 The Commission considered it desirable that vic-
tims of competition law violations are able to recover damages,33 and suggested facilitating compen-
satory collective actions as a possibility to ‘enable consumers to be viable litigants’.34 This would con-
tribute to the overarching aims of compensation and deterrence. In addition, in comparison to indi-
vidual litigation, collective redress would have the efficiency advantage of saving time and money 
through the consolidation of large numbers of claims. Moreover, it would diminish the free rider prob-
lem,35 and create equality of arms between ‘otherwise diffuse claimants’ and ‘well-organised and po-
tentially resource-rich defendants.’36 The subsequent White Paper (2008) expanded on these pro-
posals.37 The Commission reiterated that measures to facilitate damages actions were essential and 
that there was a ‘clear need for mechanisms allowing aggregation of individual claims of victims of 
antitrust infringements.’38 Otherwise, harmed parties would be left uncompensated, and harmed and 
complying parties rather than the wrongdoer would have to absorb the losses. It suggested introduc-
ing two complementary collective redress mechanisms: representative actions by qualified entities 
and opt-in collective actions by victims of anti-competitive behaviour. These mechanisms would en-
hance access to justice and contribute to an efficient administration of justice, as national courts would 
not have to deal with a multitude of (scattered low value) individual claims.39 Moreover, it would re-
duce the inequality between victims and infringers in settlement discussions.40 Contrary to the Green 
Paper, the Commission emphasized that – full – compensation was the primary guiding principle. The 
improvement of ‘compensatory justice’ would then ‘inherently’ benefit the objectives of deterrence 
and compliance.41 Consequential to this choice, actions for damages should not lead to overcompen-
sation (punitive damages); damages should correspond with the harm suffered.42  
 
The Green and White Paper provided the basis for the 2009 draft Directive on collective redress in 
competition law cases. However, the Commission withdrew the draft due to political reasons.43 The 
debate on collective redress did however continue on a new level: around 2010, the European Com-
mission abandoned the sectoral approach. The three Commissioners who now joined forces agreed 
                                                             
 
32 Commission’s Green Paper, COM(2005) 672 final. 
33 See the accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, no. 4. 
34 Commission Staff Working Paper 2005, no. 188. See also the Commission’s Green Paper, p. 3-4 and p. 9, options 25 
and 26. 
35 Claimants that await and benefit from the action of others before deciding to bring their own case, see also section 
2.3.  
36 Commission Staff Working Paper 2005, no. 193. 
37 Commission’s White Paper, COM(2008) 165 final, which was accompanied by the Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2008) 404, and an Impact Assessment, SEC(2008)405 and its Executive Summary, SEC(2008) 406. 
38 White Paper 2008, p. 4. See also the Impact Assessment, sections 2 and 5.2.5 and the Commission Staff Working 
Paper 2008, no. 39 ff. 
39 Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, no. 39, 40 and 43. 
40 Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, no. 41. 
41 White Paper 2008, p. 3, and Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, no. 14 and 15. See on this change Wagner 2011, 
p. 56. 
42 Commission Staff Working Paper 2008, no. 59. 
43 Micklitz 2010, p. 37, Hodges 2013, p. 6. 
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on the need for a horizontal and coherent European approach to collective redress.44 This new ap-
proach led to the 2011 public consultation, which aimed to identify common legal principles on collec-
tive redress that should guide any possible initiative for EU legislation.45 This resulted in the non-bind-
ing Recommendation and Communication of June 2013.46 The (political) support for a binding instru-
ment was insufficient.47 The Recommendation sets out basic principles that member states need to 
consider with regard to collective redress mechanisms, taking account of their own legal tradition. The 
accompanying Communication amplifies the Commission’s viewpoint and choices. Collective redress 
should pursue a threefold purpose: to facilitate access to justice, stop illegal practices and enable ag-
grieved parties to obtain compensation in mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted 
under Union law.48 Although private mechanisms may complement public enforcement, there is no 
need for EU initiatives on collective redress to go beyond the goal of compensation, such as pursuing 
public norms and controlling behaviour (punishment/deterrence). Deterrence is considered a possible 
side effect, but as a goal it is better achieved by public enforcement.49 Consequently, punitive damages 
are prohibited, also because such remedy is not part of the European legal tradition and carries the 
risk of abusive litigation.50 On an operational level, Recommendation 2 states that collective redress 
mechanisms should be fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibitively expensive. This is based on the 
consensus between stakeholders that any mechanism i) should be capable of effectively resolving a 
large number of individual claims for compensation of damage, thereby promoting procedural econ-
omy, ii) should be capable of delivering legally certain and fair outcomes within a reasonable 
timeframe, while respecting the rights of all parties involved, and iii) should provide for robust safe-
guards against abusive litigation and avoid any economic incentives to bring speculative claims.51 
 
On the same date as when the Recommendation and Communication were issued, the Commission 
issued its proposal for a Directive on damages actions for breaches of EU Competition law,52 which 
was signed into law in 2014.53 The Directive does not contain provisions on collective redress. It in-
structs member states to ensure that harmed parties have the opportunity to obtain compensation 
for their loss in the national courts, but focuses on individual actions: it explicitly states that it does 
not require member states to introduce collective redress mechanisms for the enforcement of Euro-
pean competition law.54 
 
                                                             
 
44 Joint Information Note of 5 October 2010 by Commissioner Reding (Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship), 
Almunia (Competition), and Dalli (Health and Consumer Policy), SEC(2010) 1192. 
45 Commission’s Public Consultation, SEC(2011)173 final, p. 5. Adopted by the European Parliament in its resolution of 
2 February 2012, 2011/2089(INI). 
46 Recommendation 2013/396/EU, and Communication COM(2013) 401 final. 
47 Rodger 2015. 
48 Recommendation, recital 1, Recommendation 1; see also Communication p. 2 and 3. 
49 Communication, p. 10, 15.  
50 Recommendation 31, see also Communication, p. 9-10.  
51 Communication, p. 6, 9 and 10. 
52 Proposal for the Antitrust Damages Directive, COM(2013) 404 final; accompanied by the Commission Staff Working 
Document 2013, SWD(2013) 203 final. 
53 Antitrust Damages Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014. 
54 Recital 13 of the Antitrust Damages Directive.  
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In the area of consumer law, in May 2017, the Commission published a so-called Fitness Check of 
consumer rights and advertising, a check wich included the Injunctions Directive.55 The evaluation, 
inter alia, emphasized the importance of the latter directive, but also revealed its shortcomings. In-
junction procedures remain underused, mainly due to the costs, length and complexity of the pro-
ceedings, the limited effect of rulings on, inter alia, individual consumer redress, and the difficulty of 
enforcing such rulings.56 Within the context of this research, an important finding is that ‘[c]lose to 
half of the responding qualified entities indicated that they did not initiate any injunction actions since 
June 2011, often because of insufficient financing.’57 Furthermore, member states identify the finan-
cial risk related to injunctions as the main obstacle to its use.58 These shortcomings limit the injunction 
procedure’s effectiveness in terms of reducing consumer detriment as well as its preventive, deterrent 
effect. The Commission therefore concluded that the procedure could be further harmonized in order 
to improve its use and effectiveness.59 An evaluation study led by the Max Planck Institute Luxem-
bourg, which was issued around the same time (in June 2017), advises to do so by means of targeted 
measures. More specifically, it recommends clarifying and strengthening the role of consumer bodies 
and harmonising the binding effect of the decision in collective proceedings, including injunctions.60 
The Inception Impact Assessment on the revision of the Injunctions Directive, led by DG JUST, subse-
quently listed a number of (non-)legislative options, including a targeted revision of the directive that 
also allows qualified entities to ensure collective redress for consumers.61 
 
Parallel to the developments in the area of competition and consumer law, in January 2018, the Com-
mission issued its report on member states’ practical implementation of the 2014 Recommendation 
and the application of its principles.62 It concluded that the Recommendation has contributed to fruit-
ful discussions and a reflection on collective redress across the EU, yet its impact by way of national 
legislation remains rather limited and unevenly distributed. Collective redress is available and/or of 
relevance mostly in the area of consumer protection.63 As a next step, the Commission intends to 
further promote the Recommendation’s principles and to carry out further analysis on aspects of col-
lective redress such as litigation funding. The topic of the potential contribution of commercial parties 
such as third-party funders is still approached with caution, given their potential to create unnecessary 
incentives to litigate.64 The Commission aims to follow up the assessment within the framework of the 
                                                             
 
55 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. Report of the Fitness Check on various EU consumer 
law, 23 May 2017, SWD(2017) 209 final. The evaluation was announced as part of the 2015 Commission Work Pro-
gramme; see European Commission, Annex 3 to the Commission Work Programme 2015 A New Start, 16 December 
2014, COM(2014) 910 final. 
56 Fitness Check on various EU consumer law, SWD(2017) 209 final, p. 31 and p. 101 ff. 
57 Fitness Check on various EU consumer law, SWD(2017) 209 final, p. 103; the findings are based on a survey.  
58 Fitness Check on various EU consumer law, SWD(2017) 209 final, p. 103; the findings are based on the online public 
questionnaire.  
59 Fitness Check on various EU consumer law, SWD(2017) 209 final, p. 31 and 105. 
60 Hess 2017, Chapter 4 (by S. Voet) and p. 29 and 33.  
61 Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, The revision of Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection 
of consumers' interests, 31 October 2017, Ares(2017)5324969.  
62 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Recommendation, COM(2018) 40 final. 
63 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Recommendation, COM(2018) 40 final, p. 4. 
64 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Recommendation, COM(2018) 40 final, p. 10 and 16.  
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New Deal for Consumers, and will focus particularly on strengthening the redress and enforcement 
aspects of the Injunctions Directive.65  
 
In April 2018, this ‘New Deal for Consumers’ was issued, including a proposal for a directive on repre-
sentative actions, and a proposal to amend four EU consumer law directives.66 The proposal on repre-
sentative actions aims to modernize and replace the Injunctions Directive, as to ‘improve the effec-
tiveness of the injunction procedure and contribute to the elimination of the consequences of the 
infringements of Union law which affect the collective interests of consumers.’67 
 
To conclude, despite decades of debate, the European Union’s policy on collective redress is of a cir-
cumspect nature. To define a set of common principles seems to have been a challenging task, both 
from a political and legal perspective. As a result, the Recommendation’s principles were non-binding, 
open to interpretation, and contain disclaimers such as ‘taking account of the different legal traditions 
of the member states’. The Commission’s horizontal approach towards collective redress now seems 
to have been abandoned with the proposed directive and the renewed focus on injunctions. Again, it 
focuses on consumer law specifically, in order to strengthen consumer trust – probably incited by mass 
harm cases such as the breast implant scandal, ‘Dieselgate’ and massive flight cancellations.68 It re-
mains to be seen to what extent further measures are feasible at the European Union level, if only due 
to the intense lobbying of various stakeholders and the diversity of the national procedural laws of the 
member states.  
2.2.2 Germany 
In Germany, individual action has long been a cornerstone of private law enforcement.69 Gradually 
and cautiously, the notion has expanded that private parties can pursue collective interests as well. 
Nowadays, Germany has the following types of sectoral collective redress mechanisms, spread out in 
various laws. With regard to consumer and competition law, for decades, Germany has focused on 
injunctive relief (Unterlassungsklage) by particular non-profit interest groups (e.g. Verbände, Ver-
bandsklagen). Such organizations may also skim-off ill-gotten gains from businesses that have violated 
competition rules (Gewinnabschöpfungsklage), or bring bundled assigned claims after an infringement 
of consumer law (Einziehungsklage). With the Capital Investors’ Model Proceeding Act (KapMuG), 
                                                             
 
65 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Recommendation, COM(2018) 40 final, p. 20-21.  
66 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on representative ac-
tions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, 11 April 2018, 
COM(2018) 184 final and European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council as regards better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules, 11 April 
2018, COM(2018) 185 final. The proposals are accompanied by a Communication; European Commission, A New Deal 
for Consumers, 11 April 2018, COM(2018) 183 final. 
67 Proposal for a Directive on representative actions, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1.  
68 Commission Work Programme 2018, COM(2017)650 final, p. 7. 
69 See also section 4.1. 
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harmed investors can obtain compensatory collective redress in the area of securities law. The addi-
tional instruments that have been employed in practice in order to obtain collective redress – bundling 
assigned claims by a special purpose vehicle – will be discussed in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.5. 
 
An important instrument of collective redress is the long-standing representative action for injunctive 
relief by interest groups.70 This Unterlassungsklage allows certain organizations to act on behalf of 
those who are affected by certain infringements. The representative action was first introduced in 
1896 in the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG).71 Various representative organizations as well as 
individual competitors were given the right to bring an injunction in cases of misleading advertising to 
protect the interests of competitors.72 Later, the courts acknowledged that such actions could also 
protect consumers.73 In this respect, in 1965, the German legislator extended the right to seek injunc-
tive relief to consumer organizations (Verbraucherverbände),74 which, as of 2002, fall under the cate-
gory of qualified organizations (Qualifizierte Einrichtungen).75 Nowadays, the protection of competi-
tors, consumers, as well as the public (Schutzzwecktrias) is explicitly mentioned as the UWG’s goal.76 
Nevertheless, the legislator has explicitly excluded individual consumers from bringing a claim for in-
junctive relief. This would question the high protection level of the UWG and could incite (too) many 
individual claims, which, in turn, could excessively burden companies and negatively affect the invest-
ment climate.77 
In 2005, the action for injunctive relief was added to the Act against restraints of competition (GWB). 
As a result, business organizations and qualified organizations were now allowed to have standing to 
bring a claim to cease and desist anti-competitive behaviour (Beseitigung und Unterlassung), next to 
individual competitors and other market participants.78  
In consumer law, the milestones are the 1976 Act on General Terms and Conditions (AGBG) and the 
2002 Act on Injunctive Relief (UKlaG). The former proved an influential source for the Injunctions Di-
rective (1998/27/EC),79 which, in turn, was implemented in the UKlaG – with a broader scope: the 
UKlaG also applies to domestic cases. Since the UKlaG, injunctions against any infringement of con-
sumer law can be brought by business organizations, chambers of commerce, and qualified organiza-
tions.80  
Over the years, the Unterlassungsklage by Verbände has found its way into other areas of law as well, 
such as human rights and administrative law.81  
                                                             
 
70 Micklitz & Stadler 2005, p. 19. 
71 Schaumburg 2006, p. 24, Baetge 2009, p. 126. 
72 For the types of organizations and the designation and qualification thereof, see section 4.5.3.1. 
73 Neuberger 2006, p. 7, who refers to German case law in the 1930s. See also De Vrey 2006, p. 158. 
74 UWG 21. Juli 1965, BGBl. I 265, § 13 UWG (old). See Neuberger 2006, p. 8 and Baetge 2009, p. 126. See for an overview 
of all types of Verbände, Meller-Hannich & Höland 2010, p. 36. See also Dürr-Auster 2017.  
75 With the introduction of the UKlaG, see hereafter. Qualified organizations are those that have been authorized by a 
public authority, the Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz). See section 4.5.3.1. 
76 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, p. 5 and 15. 
77 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, p. 22. 
78 § 33 GWB. 
79 See section 2.2. The 1998 Injunctions Directive was repealed by Directive 2009/22/EC.  
80 § 1, 2 and 4 UKlaG.  




The German legislator perceives injunctive relief by interest groups as an instrument to ensure en-
forcement and to obtain the ‘maximum effectiveness’ of legal norms.82 The norms protected by the 
various Unterlassungsklage address diffuse interests and do not necessarily provide for individual 
claims.83 Thus, these entities fulfil a public task if traditional instruments of control and law enforce-
ment fail; they aim to restore the functioning of the market after, for instance, unfair practices.84 The 
interest groups might not have an own interest or right but are statutorily allowed to act on behalf of 
aggrieved parties, who then might individually profit from the judgment’s reflex and precedent 
(Breitenwirkung).85 For UKlaG cases, the judgment has a binding effect against the same defendant(s) 
in similar claims.86 
  
In addition to injunctive relief, certain organizations can bring a claim to skim off ill-gotten gains that 
have been obtained by competition law infringers (Gewinnabschöpfungsklage). This mechanism orig-
inated from a 1977 study by the Max Planck Institute, which reported a competition law enforcement 
deficit.87 The following decades marked the exploration of various options to fill this gap, including by 
way of collective redress.88 The government deemed a reform of competition law to be necessary, 
particularly in cases in which consumers were not likely to bring actions for damages given the extent 
of the damage.89 The protection of consumers’ and public interest deserved a more prominent dis-
play.90 In 2004 (UWG) and 2005 (GWB), German competition law was reformed. To ensure that unfair 
competition would not pay off, designated entities were granted the right to bring a claim to skim off 
illegally obtained profits.91 The regulation does not allow competitors to bring such a claim, as dis-
gorgement is considered to be an administrative sanction, not a remedy. Nevertheless, the action has 
a civil rather than criminal or punitive character, as the sanction ‘merely’ provides for the skimming 
off of illegally obtained profits.92 The proceeds of the action benefit the public purse (the federal treas-
ury). 
                                                             
 
82 Deutscher Bundestag, AGB Gesetz, Drucksache 7/3919, 06.08.75, p. 54-55. 
83 Diffuse interests are collective or fragmented interests such as consumer and environmental protection. Individuals 
either do not have the right to address infringements of such interests, or the right concerns a negative-value claim. 
See Cappelletti & Garth 1978, p. 18, and section 2.3. 
84 Micklitz 2012, p. 80, Koller 2014, p. 42, with further references, and Geiger 2015, p. 29, with further references.  
85 Tamm 2009, and Stadler & Klopfer 2012. 
86 § 11 UKlaG. 
87 Neuberger 2006, p. 8, with reference to the study by Von Falckenstein, Die Bekämpfung unlauterer Geschäftsprakti-
ken durch Verbraucherverbände, Cologne 1977. 
88 Notably, the studies and discussion papers of Basedow e.a. 1999, Köhler, Bornkamm & Henning-Bodewig 2002 and 
Micklitz & Stadler 2003, summarized by Neuberger 2006, p. 12-19. 
89 Cases that concern Bagatellschaden cannot lead to claims for injunctive relief pursuant to § 3 UWG; see also 
Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, p. 17. Amounts are not mentioned, but Micklitz 
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90 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, and Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Änderung 
GWB, Drucksache 15/3640, 12.08.2004, p. 55.  
91 § 10 UWG and §34 and §34a GWB. For the types of organizations and the designation and qualification thereof, see 
section 4.5.3.1. 




The Gewinnabschöpfungsklage supplemented the traditional Verbandsklage to deter potential wrong-
doers.93 The aim of the procedure is to improve the enforcement of competition law in cases of trivial 
and small damage (Bagatell- und Streuschäden). In such cases, an enforcement gap exists due to ra-
tional apathy: a large number of persons have been harmed, which has caused a substantial aggregate 
loss, but individuals will not pursue their claim as their own damage is relatively limited.94 Further-
more, competitors might not have the right to do so.95 The action to skim off ill-gotten gains is intended 
as an alternative; a last resort if claims for individual damages or fines have not yet absorbed the illicit 
proceeds. It is an administrative sanction, to be applied in only ‘hard-core’ cases of intentional infringe-
ment that concern a large number of persons.96 Hence, it does not aim to compensate individual loss, 
but has a general and singular preventive function, justified by the fact that ‘liability law does not get 
to grips with individual claims for such minor damages.’97 
 
After an infringement of consumer law, compensatory collective redress can be obtained through the 
bundling of assigned claims from consumers.98 The claims are assigned to a qualified consumer organ-
ization, which then brings the action in its own name for collection purposes (Einziehungsklage). This 
possibility has existed since 2002, in order to stimulate the enforcement of negative-value claims.99 
  
The last addition to traditional two-party litigation is the Capital Investors’ Model Proceeding Act (Kap-
MuG). This mechanism has been designed – also – to obtain compensation, although the actual 
achievement of such redress entails individual assessment. In other respects, too, the KapMuG clings 
on to individual protection.100 In 2005, the KapMuG entered into effect, following the Deutsche Tele-
kom securities fraud case in which thousands of individual shareholders brought a claim at the Frank-
furt court of first instance.101 As a solution to concerns that the court would be congested for many 
years with these complex cases, KapMuG was put in place. In short, the procedure entails three 
steps.102 First, following an application to start the model proceeding, the court of first instance de-
cides whether the answer to the central question(s) in that particular case is relevant to many other 
cases. If so, and if within a period of six months at least nine other applications have been filed to 
conduct a model proceeding, the cases will be referred to the court of appeal. The court of appeal will 
                                                             
 
93 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, for instance, p. 24, and Deutscher Bundestag, 
Entwurf Änderung GWB, Drucksache 15/3640, 12.08.2004, p. 21. 
94 See also section 2.3. 
95 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf UWG, Drucksache 15/1487, 22.08.2003, p. 23. 
96 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Änderung GWB, Drucksache 15/3640, 12.08.2004, p. 55.  
97 Micklitz 2007, p. 14, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband 2011, p. 17. 
98 Meller-Hannich & Höland 2010, p. 18. If it is used, usually it is deployed as a test case. See Verbraucherzentrale 
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RBerG).  
100 See hereafter, and section 4.5.4. 
101 According to Stadler, it concerned more than 16,000 small investors, see Stadler 2010, p. 86. 
102 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Einführung KapMuG, Drucksache 15/5091, 14.03.2005, p. 1. 
26 
 
select a test case,103 and address the issue(s) as formulated by the court of first instance. The subse-
quent model case judgment (Musterentscheid) only concerns this test case, but binds all claimants. 
Subsequently, the court(s) of first instance will assess the remaining cases accordingly, but individual 
issues such as reliance or causation still need to be addressed.104 Originally, the duration of the Kap-
MuG was limited to 2012, but in 2012, the ‘experiment’ was prolonged to 2020.105  
 
The KapMuG aims to overcome not only procedural inefficiencies, but an enforcement deficit as well. 
According to the German legislator, the existing rules of civil procedure to join claims were inadequate 
in cases of small and scattered damage. Here too, as a consequence of rational apathy problems, 
wrongdoers were not – sufficiently – being held liable, thus liability rules would lose their function of 
guidance or deterrence.106 The improvement of effective legal protection against large corporations 
would ensure an efficient and trustworthy capital market. Feess and Halfmeier note that the drastic 
decline in investments (a backlash in shareholder confidence) may also have been a relevant incentive 
for legislative activity.107 The German government thus listed the four following objectives.108 First, the 
KapMuG has a regulatory objective (Ordnungspolitisch): it aims to strengthen the functioning of liabil-
ity rules; issuers are thereby reminded that they should follow the rules. The KapMuG emphasizes the 
complementary role of state-controlled supervision; where individual damage is suffered, harmed in-
vestors are given an essential role in enforcing market regulation. The second consideration concerns 
effective legal protection. As litigation through KapMuG is (cost-)effective, it will incentivize individuals 
to bring a claim, which restores the regulatory function of liability rules (Lenkungs- und Steuerungs-
funktion). The third objective is to ease the judiciary’s burden and mitigate the risk of diverging out-
comes. Moreover, the KapMuG saves resources and increases legal efficiency as, for instance, it re-
quires only one legal expert. Fourth, the introduction of the KapMuG modernises the German proce-
dure, which improves Germany’s position in the competitive European legal markets and puts a halt 
to forum shopping by German investors. This also prevents the extraterritorial effect of foreign legis-
lation.  
 
The aforementioned reforms were implemented in an otherwise individually-oriented legal landscape. 
In its response to the European public consultation on collective redress in 2011, the German govern-
ment expressed this focus on individual action and its hesitance towards a European instrument for 
collective redress.109 It recognized the importance of effective enforcement in order to achieve the 
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proper functioning of the internal market, but it emphasized the lack of evidence that national mech-
anisms fail to do so. According to the government, German consumers can access justice at a calculable 
litigation risk, moderate costs, with possibilities for legal aid funding and insurance, and the duration 
of litigation is short. The number of times claimants fail to bring a claim is unknown, and they have 
procedural mechanisms such as joinder and a test case at their disposal, which consumers seem very 
well capable of coordinating in the age of the internet. Furthermore, with the Gewinnabschop-
fungsklage, designated entities can correct competition law infringements in cases of scattered dam-
age, and improvements are currently being investigated. Finally, according to the government, the 
KapMuG provides a more effective and quick instrument to obtain a judgment in securities cases, and 
might be extended to other areas of law.110 In its response, the government is also adamant about 
private enforcement by individuals or groups that exceeds their own interests: they can only do so 
when they are designated to execute such a public function.111 In the area of competition law, one can 
even speak of a climate of public enforcement and a subordinate role for compensatory redress; with-
out public supervision and enforcement, follow-on actions are not possible. The government rejects 
the public enforcement of private compensatory redress, as it would go against party autonomy.112 
Consumer law enforcement, finally, is traditionally and fundamentally accepted to be the prerogative 
of privately organized consumer organizations. 
 
Despite the declared efficiency and effectiveness of the German legal regime, in 2014, the German 
Green Party submitted a legislative proposal for a group action (Gruppenverfahren).113 The main idea 
was that mass disputes demand that the exclusive focus on individual autonomy should be abandoned. 
Various substantive laws do not solely aim at private interests, but have a social or public function as 
well, and rational apathy creates an enforcement deficit that should not be ignored, according to the 
submitters of the proposal.114 The mechanism has three objectives.115 First, to generalize the KapMuG 
for other areas and to integrate it into civil procedure, and therewith create a more systematic collec-
tive redress regime. Second, it aims to lower the threshold for obtaining collective redress and, by 
doing so, strengthen enforcement. Third, it accomplishes an adequate dispute resolution mechanism: 
the settlement of common questions transcends the individual approach (überindividuelle Kon-
fliktlösung) which will render individual litigation superfluous. However, in October 2015, the German 
Parliament rejected the proposal.116 Notably, the limited option to comply with the fundamental right 
to be heard proved to be an insurmountable obstacle.117 Although some parties stated that the eval-
uation of the KapMuG in 2020 should be awaited, the government announced a further deliberation 
                                                             
 
110 Deutscher Bundestag, Stellungnahme im Rahmen der Konsultation Kollektiver Rechtsschutz, Drucksache 17/5956, 
25.05.2011, p. 4.  
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25.05.2011, p. 5. 
112 Deutscher Bundestag, Stellungnahme im Rahmen der Konsultation Kollektiver Rechtsschutz, Drucksache 17/5956, 
25.05.2011, p. 6.  
113 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Gruppenverfahren, Drucksache 18/1464 
114 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Gruppenverfahren, Drucksache 18/1464, p. 1, 13-14. 
115 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Gruppenverfahren, Drucksache 18/1464, p. 16. 
116 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung Entwurf Gruppenverfahren, Drucksache 18/64422. 
117 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung Entwurf Gruppenverfahren, Drucksache 18/64422, p. 4. 
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on a legislative proposal for a Musterfeststellungsverfahren. It announced that such a proposal should 
be expected in 2016, but it did not arrive, and some feared that further proposals for reform would 
disappear into a Schublade. 
  
At least that was the situation towards the end of 2016. By then, however, the Volkswagen scandal 
had reignited the debate on collective redress.118 Indeed, the German Ministry of Justice and Con-
sumer Protection stepped up to the mark. That is, in December 2016, it issued a Referentenentwurf, 
which the government discussed internally but rejected in early 2017.119 Nevertheless, it was followed 
by a public Diskussionsentwurf in July 2017. This draft legislative proposal introduces a model proceed-
ing (Musterfeststellungsklage).120 To a certain extent, the design is based on KapMuG and the Dutch 
WCAM.121 In order to avoid a claim culture, the draft only allows ‘UKlaG entities’ (business organiza-
tions, chambers of commerce, and qualified consumer organizations)122 to bring such proceedings.123 
They need to do so on behalf of at least 10 consumers or SMEs. They can only claim for declaratory 
relief. Claims for damages still need to be pursued individually, unless a model proceeding results in a 
court-approved and binding collective settlement.124 Declaratory relief will be provided by addressing 
a model case, just like a KapMuG proceeding does. The answer to the common question(s) needs to 
be relevant for the resolution of 10, 50 or 100 consumers or SMEs with a factually or legally similar 
dispute.125 The Musterfeststellungsklage is an opt-in mechanism. Consumers and SMEs can register 
their claim for a small court fee (€ 10), and therewith suspend the limitation period of their individual 
claim.126 The action turns into an opt-out mechanism if it results in a court-approved collective settle-
ment. In that case, the settlement is declared binding and individuals need to opt out within a month 
after the approval has been published in the claims register. Much like a KapMuG settlement, it is 
invalid if 30% or more of the registered class members opts out.127 The academic responses to the 
(earlier) draft are critical.128 The main critique is the mechanism’s expected lack of effectiveness, in 
particular for negative-value claims, as it still requires individual action in order to obtain damages. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the actual proposal will deviate from the draft. The new coalition 
has announced that it will soon bring the legislative proposal before Parliament, and that the act will 
go into effect before November 2018.129  
                                                             
 
118 See also section 3.3. 
119 Stadler 2018, p. 83.  
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2.2.3 England and Wales 
In this section, I will discuss the following English (semi-)court-based private mechanisms of collective 
redress. First, the representative action (CPR 19.6) and the group action through a group litigation 
order, GLO (CPR 19 III), are discussed. Both mechanisms cover all areas of private law. Subsequently, I 
will address the enforcement order that can be issued in consumer law cases. Third, I focus on three 
recently designed sectoral mechanisms: the opt-in and opt-out collective action and the opt-out col-
lective settlement action, all of which can be employed to challenge infringements of competition law. 
The possibility of obtaining collective redress by way of bundling claims through consolidation, joinder 
or a test case will be discussed in section 5.5.1. It is important to note that in England and Wales, public 
and private law are less strictly separated than in civil law systems, and that England and Wales have 
a strong focus on regulatory bodies that can also resolve mass disputes.130  
 
In the 1990s, English civil justice was said to be in a state of crisis. The focus on litigation was strong,131 
but there were also serious threats to having access to justice.132 This stimulated the debate on ADR,133 
and led to the seminal inquiry on access to justice by Lord Woolf. Among other topics of English civil 
procedure, the inquiry addressed multi-party litigation. In his report, Lord Woolf placed freedom of 
choice alongside efficiency. In order to balance both, group actions would require ‘a diminution, com-
promise or adjustment of the rights of individual litigants for the greater good of the action as a 
whole’.134 In his final report, Lord Woolf listed the following objectives for multi-party actions:135  
 
i) it should provide access to justice where large numbers of people have been affected by 
another’s conduct, but individual loss is so small that it makes an individual action eco-
nomically unviable;  
ii) it should provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods of resolving cases, 
where individual damages are large enough to justify individual action but where the 
number of claimants and the nature of the issues involved mean that the cases cannot be 
managed satisfactorily in accordance with normal procedure; and  
iii) it should achieve a balance between the normal rights of claimants and defendants, to 
pursue and defend cases individually, and the interests of a group of parties to litigate the 
action as a whole in an effective manner.  
 
                                                             
 
130 For instance, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, the former Financial Services Authority, FSA) and the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA) can approve a consumer redress scheme under the Financial Services Act 2010 (FCA) and 
the Competition Act 1998 as amended by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (FCA and CMA). Such resolutions are not in-
cluded in this research project, see section 1.2.3.1. 
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These objectives now underlie the two mechanisms of collective redress as laid down in 2000 in the 
Civil Procedure Rules: the representative action and GLO.136 Just as all English civil proceedings, the 
mechanisms need to be appreciated in light of the overriding objective that enables and requires 
courts to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost (CPR 1.1 and 1.2).137  
 
Under CPR 19.6, one or more class member(s) who has or have the same interest as other persons can 
initiate a representative action. Thus, the representative party needs to have a cause of action in its 
own right.138 If the court allows the representative to act in this quality, it will address the common 
issues at hand. The scope of the representative action is limited due to the courts’ narrow interpreta-
tion of 'the same interest' criterion.139  
 
The representative rule was first introduced in 1873,140 and originates from the medieval English Chan-
cery procedure.141 The representative action seems to have started as a practical and economical so-
lution to settle common questions, instigated by the Court of Chancery’s desire to make ‘one lawsuit 
grow where two grew before.’142 The representative rule was seen as ‘a tool of judicial economy and 
litigant convenience’, employed when parties were ‘so numerous that you never could “come at jus-
tice”’.143 The British government saw the representative action as an instrument that promotes effi-
ciency, cost-effectiveness, and access to justice for individuals.144 As an instrument to gain closure 
after a declaratory judgment, this efficiency was not in dispute.145 However, the aforementioned con-
straints on providing for compensatory collective redress incited calls for further reform.146  
 
Meanwhile, a series of large pharmaceutical multiparty cases led courts to develop management prac-
tices during the 1980s and 1990s.147 This practice provided the basis for the design of the GLO. By that 
time, there was wide agreement that it was necessary to implement a legislative structure to deal with 
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mass disputes.148 The GLO, a group action, enables English courts to deal with cases ‘efficiently, con-
sistently, with finality, with an equitable allocation of responsibility for costs, and with due speed’.149 
Courts achieve this by managing large numbers of similar claims and considering common issues col-
lectively or in (a) test case(s). As opposed to the binding effect of the representative action, where 
parties might be bound by the outcome of litigation without having been part of the said litigation, the 
GLO is an opt-in instrument.150 This approach ‘recognizes that the court and the parties necessarily 
have to make compromises in their traditional rights for the group to make the “orderly progress” that 
is required.’151 It is a ‘compact form of macro-justice’ in which parties are ‘shepherded into a single 
flock, travelling the long road to settlement without the separate consideration of a multiplicity of 
identical or similar issues.’152 
 
The Injunctions Directive 98/27/EC was implemented in the UK through the Stop Now Orders Regula-
tions 2001 (SNORs), which in 2002 was replaced by the Enterprise Act 2002. Part 8 of this act aims to 
strengthen consumer protection by giving enforcement bodies the authority to bring a claim for in-
junctive relief against businesses that do not comply with consumer law.153 With the CMA (previously, 
the OFT) as a coordinator, the claims can be brought by various enforcement bodies, subdivided into 
general, designated and community enforcers. The general enforcers are the CMA and the Weights 
and Measures authorities, and the designated enforcers can be authorised by the Secretary of State. 
Community enforcers are those that are enlisted pursuant to section 4.3 of the Injunctions Directive. 
As of 2015, the Consumer Rights Act has amended the Enterprise Act, extending the scope of the in-
strument by allowing the courts to attach (where this is just and reasonable) enhanced consumer 
measures to the enforcement order, including compensation or other redress.154 
 
In its further exploration of ways to obtain judicial collective redress, the UK has maintained its pref-
erence for a sectoral approach, in spite of the ‘evidence of need’ research conducted by the Civil Jus-
tice Council (CJC) in 2008.155 The CJC concluded that there was an unmet need for better access to 
justice in various areas (competition law, finance and banking, the pharmaceutical and medical sector, 
employment, and consumer transactions) and, thus, for generic reform.156 According to the CJC, a ge-
neric collective action would be important to both access to justice and judicial efficiency. While the 
Ministry of Justice accepted the need for reform, it rejected such a generic approach. It favoured a 
sectoral one instead, with the main reasons being the structural (regulatory) differences of the various 
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sectors,157 and the belief that economic and other impacts of a mechanism – such as abusive litigation 
– are better assessed at a sectoral stage. ‘If the overall assessment were to prove negative, that might 
prevent further progress altogether, even though there were potential benefits to be had in some 
areas.’158 In 2009, the British government took on the financial services sector as their first priority in 
this sectoral approach, with the draft Financial Services Bill.159 In the proposal, a collective action for 
financial services claims was introduced, to be brought by any suitable representative claimant. After 
approval, the court would decide whether to follow an opt-out or opt-in model. However, in 2011, for 
political motives (a general election), the collective action initiative was dropped and deleted from the 
Financial Services Bill.160  
 
In light of the aforementioned stance, it could hardly come as a surprise that the government’s main 
response to the EC’s public consultation on a horizontal approach to collective redress was rather 
sceptical. It reiterated its arguments for a sectoral approach, while noting that it supported a ‘strategic 
and holistic approach’ of only setting minimum standards.161 ‘[I]t is not necessarily appropriate to as-
sume that any area where injunctive relief may be obtained collectively will necessarily be suitable for 
compensatory redress.’162 Mechanisms should only be implemented where there is an added value, a 
proven need – after robust assessment – for such mechanisms, as in some areas there might be little 
or no demand, or well developed regulatory or other enforcement authorities. If such a need was 
found, court-based collective redress should be a last resort; ADR and regulatory measures should be 
the first consideration.163 The only area in which the government could foresee the need for a com-
pensatory collective redress mechanism was competition law.164 Also given ‘the currently somewhat 
fragile’ status of the economic climate and the risk of abusive litigation, the government claimed it 
would not support ‘any initiatives which it feels might damage business or the prospects of economic 
recovery generally.’165  
 
In the area of competition law, collective redress mechanisms developed as follows. In various studies 
and white papers, the enforcement of competition law was investigated – and deemed to be insuffi-
cient.166 In the discussion, the deterrent function of (the enforcement of) the Competition Act was 
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clearly separated from the compensation function. Deterrence was to be achieved by implementing 
criminal sanctions and fines against those that engage in unlawful anticompetitive behaviour. The ob-
jective of compensation would have to be improved by providing ‘real redress’ to those harmed. Thus, 
as of 2002, the Competition Act 1998 gives the British consumer association Which? the option to 
bring an opt-in collective action at the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) on behalf of at least two 
victims of anticompetitive behaviour that has created scattered damage (section 47B CA).167 The rep-
resentative action can only follow a decision from the CMA or EC that competition law has been in-
fringed. Consumers can also consent to assign their claim to Which? In addition, in cases concerning 
substantial losses, harmed parties can obtain ‘real redress’ through individual actions (section 47A CA). 
This would draw private resources into the enforcement process, leaving the public authorities to fo-
cus ‘on more important cases.’168 
 
In 2007, the UK department for economic growth (BIS) published a consultation on reform.169 This 
followed the OFT’s report on the effectiveness of redress in competition law, which showed that pri-
vate actions are the least effective aspect of the competition law regime. In its response, the govern-
ment stated that in certain situations, private actions could complement public enforcement and 
thereby help to strengthen the competition framework, to tackle growth-stifling anti-competitive be-
haviour and enable harmed consumers and businesses to obtain redress.170 Subsequently, the objec-
tives of compensatory redress and prevention motivated the government to reduce the barriers to 
pursuing private actions. The costs of anti-competitive behaviour were considered to harm both indi-
viduals and the public.171 The UK government deemed a reform to be necessary as the existing private 
actions regime was not functioning properly,172 and the public competition authorities ‘have finite re-
sources and cannot do everything’.173 To increase growth and level the playing field, those that infringe 
competition law should be held accountable. 
 
Thus, in 2015, as part of the Consumer Rights Act, a mix of instruments was introduced to improve the 
(complementary) private actions regime. The reform included the establishment of CAT as a competi-
tion actions venue by, inter alia, extending their jurisdiction and remedies (stand alone in addition to 
follow-on cases, and injunctions). Injunctive relief was introduced because in many cases it might be 
more important for businesses that the anti-competitive behaviour is halted, rather than obtaining 
redress and damages.174 Furthermore, the act introduced an opt-out collective action and – inspired 
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by the Dutch WCAM – an opt-out collective settlement regulation.175 This reform would have to ensure 
‘that the CAT has the jurisdiction and powers needed to process cases efficiently whilst ensuring pro-
cedural fairness for both claimants and defendants.’176 The aim of both instruments is to improve ac-
cess to redress for consumers and businesses.177 More specifically, the opt-out collective settlement 
aims to serve a threefold purpose: i) to obtain redress in an efficient (cost/time-effective) manner, ii) 
to provide closure for the infringer, both reputational-wise and financially, and iii) to help ‘ensure that 
litigation is the option of last resort’. 178 In addition, giving businesses standing would increase the 
deterrent effect, as it would increase the penalty for non-compliance and detection rates would in-
crease as businesses have a greater incentive to raise an infringement.179 
 
Collective redress through these actions may be pursued by private bodies, but only those that have a 
genuine interest in the case, such as trade or consumer associations (rather than only Which?) or those 
who have themselves suffered loss.180 The representative party must be certified by the CAT. All claims 
must raise the same, similar or related issues of fact or law under section 49B(6).181 Despite fierce 
opposition against enforcement by private parties, the UK government believed that enough safe-
guards were implemented to avoid abuse. This was another means to emphasize the government’s 
‘fundamental premise’ of empowering consumers and businesses to challenge anticompetitive behav-
iour and to facilitate their fundamental right to seek redress.182 Doing otherwise would also reduce 
the opportunities for the OFT (now: the CMA) to fulfil its ‘core remit’ of detection and deterrence. 
However, private parties such as legal firms, funders or special purpose vehicles are not allowed to 
bring such cases as they might be inclined to abuse the legal system. Here too, the government ex-
pressed its sectoral approach based on need, but presented another argument to limit the collective 
action instrument to competition law, namely, that it is novel.183  
2.2.4 The Netherlands 
Currently, the Netherlands has two general civil law mechanisms that have been designed specifically 
for judicial collective redress: the collective action (section 3:305a BW)184 and the WCAM (section 
7:907-910 BW and section 1013-1018a Rv). The functioning of both mechanisms and collective redress 
in general can be aided by the possibility for a court to refer a preliminary question to the Dutch Su-
preme Court (section 392-394 Rv). A bill to introduce a collective action for damages – supplementing 
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section 3:305a BW – is currently before Parliament.185 In addition to the general instruments, business 
and consumer organizations can bring an action for the assessment of general conditions (section 
6:240-242 BW and section 1003-1006 Rv). The instruments and policy on collective redress have 
evolved as follows.186  
 
From the 1970s onwards, Dutch case law and doctrine started to unfold the concept of collective re-
dress by representative organizations, and since 1980, various pieces of legislation authorized such 
organizations to bring claims in the interest of others.187 Gradually, the idea gained ground that certain 
parties should have capacity to litigate in order to protect the interests of others without having to 
enter into specific powers of attorney or comparable arrangements.188 For instance, in consumer law, 
the Misleading Advertising Act included the possibility for consumer organizations to apply for an or-
der to stop or rectify misleading advertising, and the Copyright Act allowed certain representative 
bodies to act in the interest of authors or their successors. The growing body of legislative mechanisms 
correlated with jurisprudential developments. Towards the 1970s, published case law from lower 
courts showed an increase in cases in the areas of labour, consumer, competition and environmental 
law that concerned a wider ‘audience’ than just the litigating parties.189 In 1983, the Supreme Court 
first gave standing to an association that represented other persons’ interests.190 Although it con-
structed standing on the association’s own interest, the court ruled that in the interest of due process 
it would be inefficient to require aggrieved parties to bring their claim individually. Yet, in this first 
stage of Dutch collective redress, bringing a claim as a representative organization was a risky endeav-
our, as the courts were still hesitant to allow them to have standing. To some extent, this improved 
after a landmark ruling in 1986, brought by three environmental organizations on the dumping of 
dredged material. For the first time, the Dutch Supreme Court held that, under certain conditions, 
foundations or associations could bring a collective action to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief in 
the interest of others without having their own interest – even without a specific regulation that al-
lowed them such ius agendi.191 The Supreme Court considered that the environment concerned many 
diffuse as well as unspecified individuals’ interests, and that the bundling of such interests by a repre-
sentative organization would provide efficient legal protection. 
 
Subsequently, two legislative instruments followed each other at short intervals. Both regulations are 
still in force and both are referred to as collective action (collectieve actie). First, inspired by various 
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European legislation,192 in 1992, the legislator provided The Hague Court of Appeal with exclusive ju-
risdiction to assess whether a specific term in general terms and conditions is unreasonably onerous 
(onredelijk bezwarend). This is the collective action pursuant to section 6:240 BW. Consumer or busi-
ness organizations can bring a claim to prohibit the use or promotion of (a) specific term(s). If the court 
orders such a prohibition, the term is (extrajudicially) voidable by any consumer. Second, in 1994, the 
aforementioned case law was codified with the introduction of the general collective action in section 
3:305a BW.193 Either a foundation (stichting) or an association (vereniging) with full legal capacity has 
the authority to bring such action to court. It may concern any type of civil claim and must represent 
the similar interests of other persons. With this collective action, injunctive or declaratory relief can 
be obtained, but the procedure rejects the possibility of claiming compensatory relief (see hereafter).  
 
With the introduction of the 3:305a collective action, the legislator revoked the aforementioned 
defragmented legislation, with the exception of the 6:240 BW collective action. The main reason for 
maintaining the latter was that its scope is more general and preventive; the judicial control concerns 
the use of general terms and conditions in future contracts and requires a more abstract assessment. 
By contrast, the 3:305a collective action has a more specific scope; the judicial control is repressive 
and – in cases concerning unreasonably onerous terms – concerns those terms that are applicable to 
an already concluded contract in a specific situation.194 Occasionally, the somewhat vague dividing line 
between both mechanisms gives rise to debate.195 
 
The promotion of ways to obtain collective redress in the Netherlands was incited by the growing 
awareness that individual litigation in mass harm situations in certain areas, specifically in public in-
terest matters, was incidental at most and, thus, substantive laws were not (sufficiently) enforced.196 
Individuals were either not prepared to or incapable of seeking redress, because their interests were 
insufficient or the litigation costs were too high. The legislator presumed that such thresholds for hav-
ing access to justice would not exist, or to a lesser extent, for representative organizations. Although 
the aforementioned collective actions differ, the underlying objectives are similar. The main objective 
is to improve the enforcement of substantive law that, in turn, is aimed at creating a preventive and 
an ordering effect.197 Furthermore, considerations of expediency and efficiency played a role.198 The 
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stimulation of self-regulation and negotiation, as expressed in the requirement of consultation, in-
tended to enhance efficiency and the preventive effect of the mechanisms.199 Hence, before bringing 
a claim, the representative organization and the user must have renegotiated the terms (6:240 (4) 
BW), or the representative organization must have made sufficient attempts to achieve the objective 
of the action through consultations with the alleged wrongdoer (3:305a (2) BW).200 
  
The possibility to claim damages was elaborately discussed during the parliamentary debate on the 
3:305a collective action. Ultimately, an amendment abolished this option.201 A collective action for 
damages would require – possibly complicated – individual assessment for which the action was not 
deemed suitable, whereas compensation could also be achieved through a voluntary settlement or 
individual action following the declaratory judgment. In practice, however, the need for compensatory 
collective redress remained. This need turned into legislation due to the DES case, which concerned 
pharmaceutical product liability claims.202 After years of litigation, the victims’ representative had 
reached an amicable settlement with the liable parties. In order to both compensate the victims and 
obtain finality, the parties wished to have the settlement declared binding. This led to the introduction 
of the WCAM regulation in 2005. In short, this procedure provides for one or more representative 
organizations, on the one hand, and the alleged liable party or parties, on the other, to submit a joint 
application to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal requesting it to declare legally binding a settlement that 
contains rights to compensation for the class members. The court assesses whether the interests of 
the class members are sufficiently guaranteed, in particular whether the amount of the compensation 
awarded is reasonable. In a nutshell, with the WCAM, the legislator has designed an enforcement 
mechanism that emphasizes efficiency (as to costs, time and finality) and consensual dispute resolu-
tion with ‘a certain’ deterrent effect.203 Furthermore, compensatory relief plays an important role. 
Aggrieved parties can obtain damages within a relatively short period, without the risks and grievances 
of lengthy litigation. As a trade-off for such efficiency, the WCAM might partly abandon the goal of full 
compensation and provide adequate rather than full compensation, particularly given the possibility 
of awarding damages through damage scheduling.204  
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In 2008, the WCAM regulation was evaluated.205 The evaluation revealed that the WCAM meets a 
need, but that an examination of additional measures to improve private enforcement remains nec-
essary.206 This resulted in a number of legislative innovations and amendments. As of July 2012, section 
392-394 Rv allows a district or an appellate judge to refer a preliminary question to the Dutch Supreme 
Court, on its own initiative or at the request of one of the parties.207 It can do so if the answer is 
necessary to come to a decision and is of direct importance to either a mass dispute or to the resolu-
tion of numerous other, factually similar civil disputes. The purpose of this instrument is expedient 
redress and to support consensual negotiations. Furthermore, in July 2013, the collective action and 
WCAM regulations were amended, including the introduction of the possibility to apply for a pre-trial 
hearing (preprocessuele comparitie).208 A request for such a hearing can be made a) by a representa-
tive organization that would be entitled to submit an application to have a WCAM settlement declared 
legally binding,209 b) by the alleged liable party or parties; or c) through a joint application. The court 
has a facilitative and guiding role – it cannot judge on (a) point(s) of dispute. It may assist parties in 
formulating the most important matters in dispute, discuss further case management, such as the 
desirability of bringing a collective action, and/or stimulate parties to enter into a settlement, for in-
stance with the aid of a mediator. Here too, the main objective is to stimulate parties to enter into or 
continue negotiations to conclude a collective settlement.210 
  
Despite the aforementioned innovations, the debate on collective redress continued. The main con-
cern was to bridge the gap between the 3:305a collective action and WCAM, particularly for those 
situations in which the (alleged) liable party is not willing to negotiate. In November 2011, the possi-
bility to collectively claim for damages was proposed by a member of the Dutch Parliament.211 In 2014, 
a draft bill was made public, but drew sharp criticism.212 After a significant revision of the draft, the 
minister introduced the legislative proposal for a collective action for damages in November 2016.213 
The aim of amending the current collective action is to enhance efficient and effective collective re-
dress, by which a balance is struck between realizing individuals’ rights to damages and protecting the 
justified interests of those held liable. One of the main features is to stimulate collective settlements 
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by improving the quality of the representative parties (their governance, financing and representative-
ness), the coordination of collective actions (judicial case management and the appointment of an 
exclusive representative organization), and the finality of a settlement agreement or judgment (opt-
out technique). A settlement remains the preferred route to obtain collective redress.214 The main 
motive for supplementing the current collective action with a claim for damages is to provide a ‘stok 
achter de deur’ : the threat to cross swords in court if an alleged liable party is not willing to negotiate, 
and to prevent prolonging the settlement of mass damage because aggrieved parties need to bring 
individual actions after a declaratory judgment. Despite – a revisited – debate on the question of need, 
the minister deems such a need to be present. Particularly in cases of scattered damages, where 
wrongdoers might withhold settlement negotiations because they expect that aggrieved parties are 
not inclined to bring an individual action given their relatively minor damage. The legislative proposal 
is in line with the Dutch stance on collective redress as stated in its response to the 2011 European 
public consultation. There, the government stated that private collective redress first and foremost is 
complementary, not an alternative aimed at reducing the burden on public regulators and, second, 
that a claim culture should be avoided. Its primary aim is to provide effective and efficient compensa-
tory or injunctive relief; the objective of deterrence and punishment (in particular through punitive 
damages) should be the primary task of public enforcers, which are better equipped to detect infringe-
ments.215 
2.3 Theoretical underpinning of collective redress 
In the overview of the policy considerations, two main problems can be detected that have spurred 
the development of collective redress: inefficient and ineffective enforcement. These problems are 
not limited to a European context and have been a recurring theme in the literature of both legal and 
law and economics scholars, long before the surge of collective redress in Europe. In the following, I 
will touch upon some highlights of this body of literature to underpin and help clarify the European 
developments and the main policy objectives of collective redress. 
 
The problem of inefficient enforcement concerns the use of already scarce (judicial) resources. If all or 
a large number of individual claims are pursued after a mass damage event, problems might arise such 
as case backlogs and inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Efforts and costs might be (partially) 
duplicated.216 This will occur particularly with regard to positive-value claims, which concern substan-
tial rather than trifle losses; in theory, such claims are worth pursuing individually as the potential 
outcome justifies the investment.217 The aggregation of claims and the resolution of common issues 
might resolve this inefficiency, as illustrated by Yeazell with a quote from Chafee on the American class 
suit as early as 1932:  
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‘Avoidance of multiplicity of suits saves the parties from needless expense and vexation, economizes 
the time of judges (…), and frees the dockets for the affairs of other litigants.’218 
 
A mass litigation device operated by a public or private body supplements the more traditional meth-
ods of joinder and consolidation, which ‘presupposes the prospective plaintiffs’ advancing en masse 
on the courts’, which is not likely to happen where class members are ‘isolated, scattered, and utter 
strangers to each other.’219 More efficient dispute resolution through any mass litigation device thus 
concerns efficiency in the administration of the court system (administrative efficiency),220 as a: 
 
‘species of judicial vacuum cleaner, collecting into a litigative dust bag identical bits of lawsuit and 
thereby tidying up the courts’ caseload’.221 
 
In addition, it improves cost-effectiveness with regard to the time and resources spent by claimants 
and defendants (economies of scale).  
 
The efficiency argument only partly explains the benefit and rise of aggregate litigation. Ineffective 
enforcement is the other driver. According to Yeazell, this additional and more substantive justification 
can be found in what he describes as ‘the boldest vision’ of representative litigation that became ‘a 
leading justification for the modern class action’: that of Kalven and Rosenfield.222 In 1941, they linked 
the importance of the American class suit as incited by (the attorney of) private litigants to the gov-
ernment’s inability to sufficiently regulate large, diffuse markets and harmed individuals’ lack of 
knowledge and incentives to bring individual claims against wrongdoers in this market, thereby creat-
ing an enforcement gap.223 Individuals were unaware of the infringement and/or their rights in that 
respect, and/or the fact that many others had suffered a similar loss. The individuals’ lack of incentives 
to sue has become well-known as rational apathy or rational disinterest, and is linked in particular to 
negative-value claims. Due to a negative individual cost-benefit analysis (the investment in a claim 
versus the expected outcome) such claims are not likely to be pursued. 
 
Similar obstacles were identified in the access to justice debate, to which the Florence Access to Justice 
Project (1975-1978) made an important contribution. This project included a world survey on access 
to justice, and identified various legal, economic, social and psychological obstacles that impede the 
individual resolution of claims, including after a mass damage event. An important hurdle that was 
identified, other than the costs of litigation, is party capability. Therewith, Cappelletti and Garth refer 
to litigants’ financial resources, legal competence (the ability to recognize and pursue a claim) and 
experience (one-shotters versus repeat players).224 Just as Kalven and Rosenfield had done, Cappelletti 
and Garth observed that these barriers were particularly limiting with regard to diffuse and negative-
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value claims.225 Diffuse interests are fragmented interests with a general rather than a mere individual 
scope, such as civil rights and consumer and environmental protection. Individuals either do not have 
the right to address infringements of such interests, or the right concerns a negative-value claim.226 
For reasons explained hereafter, an enforcement gap is unfavourable when the sum of such claims 
represents a large loss. Cappelletti and Garth ascertained that the governments’ approaches to pro-
tecting those interests (incited by a reluctance to allow private bodies to do so) had not been very 
successful. Public bodies were inherently bound by restricted traditional roles, were susceptible to 
political pressure (‘a grave weakness given that diffuse rights frequently have to be asserted against 
political entities’) and they lacked expertise.227  
 
The impediments as identified in the aforementioned studies obstruct effective access to justice, 
which is ‘the most basic’ social right and a necessity for a modern legal order.228 Ineffective access to 
justice with regard to fragmented and meritorious claims is deemed problematic not only on an indi-
vidual level, but also for society at large as it leads to underenforcement and therewith endangers the 
objectives of substantive rights to regulate, prevent and/or compensate.229 From a law and economics 
perspective, the enforcement deficit (a market failure) is problematic because wrongdoers are not 
incentivized to comply with the law and do not internalize the negative externalities (damage to indi-
viduals and society) that they have created. In order to optimally achieve the deterrent and preventive 
function of law – and thus to increase social welfare – the wrongdoer needs to redress this damage in 
full.230 Basically, the legally desired behaviour will occur when misbehaving is more expensive than 
behaving. The prospect of liability will incentivize potential wrongdoers to comply with the law and 
take precautions against causing harm.231  
 
Collective redress mechanisms aim to overcome – part of – this enforcement gap.232 From the legal 
point of view, this improves access to justice and provides individuals with a (cost-effective) tool to 
obtain redress. From the perspective of law and economics, collective redress provides a potentially 
powerful device to promote social welfare.233 It can redress the imbalance of power between and 
distribute wealth among the various social actors, such as large corporations and consumers. There-
with, collective redress pursues the common economic objectives of (cost-effectively) correcting mar-
ket failures, bridging the gap that individual litigation and regulation have left uncovered, and deter-
ring wrongdoers from (future) misconduct.234 ‘This, in the economic analysis of law, is not regarded as 
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merely a desirable side-effect of civil litigation, but as its main goal. The desire to improve the acces-
sibility of civil litigation is hence not only important in the legal view focusing on fairness, but equally 
so in the welfare-oriented economic view.’235  
2.4 The objectives of collective redress mechanisms 
2.4.1 Modify behaviour, individual (compensatory) redress, and efficiency 
The policy objectives of collective redress mechanisms are not always well defined, uniformly de-
scribed or interpreted.236 This is illustrated by the plethora of terms that national and European policy 
makers employ to describe the objectives of collective redress mechanism. Various scholars, too, have 
described the objectives in various wording or interpretations.237 This variety correlates with the de-
sign of the mechanism, such as its scope, the type of law it addresses and the relief it provides, and 
other specific characteristics. The complexity of filtering the objective(s) also lies in the fact that col-
lective redress embodies more than the protection of amalgamated individual interests. It is hybrid, in 
the sense that it addresses or even merges private and public interests. Thus, it sometimes focuses on 
a mix of the objectives of the norms that protect those interests and the ensuing enforcement tech-
niques.238 Collective redress mechanisms blur the traditional division between private enforcement 
(of norms that are) aimed at individual redress (compensation/restoration), and public enforcement 
(of norms that are) aimed at controlling or modifying behaviour (prevention and deterrence). This 
‘stage sharing’ of objectives has also raised the question of which enforcers are (or should be) allowed 
to pursue them. In the US, private enforcement of public interests through litigation (in particular, 
class actions) has long been considered a regulatory instrument.239 Hence, entrepreneurial initiatives 
might have encountered less opposition as they have in Europe, even though aggregate litigation is 
clearly not only the bearer of good news.240 In the European debate, however, the (alleged) drawbacks 
of the US-approach lie at the heart of the resistance against or the straightforward rejection of a US-
style class action. Now that collective redress is nevertheless gaining a more prominent role in Euro-
pean jurisdictions, and private techniques that also enforce public interests have been adopted to 
complement public enforcement, a tension emerges as to private (entrepreneurial) parties. Assessing 
the pros and cons of such parties first of all requires a consensus on the main objective(s) that a mech-
anism aims to pursue. Based on the previous sections, three common objectives can now be identified. 
 
The traditional mechanisms of collective redress centre on addressing and modifying wrongdoers’ be-
haviour (prevention and deterrence) and incentivizing them to comply with, for instance, consumer 
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law.241 This objective focuses on the interests of society at large rather than providing individual re-
dress. Such collective redress mechanisms developed in the second ‘wave’ that followed the recogni-
tion of enforcement problems in the development of the welfare state.242 The primary chosen remedy 
to achieve the objective of modifying behaviour was injunctive relief, brought by (semi) public enforc-
ers. As mentioned by the EC, such an instrument would render dispute resolution and compensation 
redundant.243 The most notable example is the German Verbandsklage, which primarily serves to pro-
tect non-individual (abstract) interests, thereby fulfilling the public or social function of enhancing legal 
protection and welfare.244 
 
The objective of modifying behaviour, the chosen remedy and/or the utilization thereof by (semi-)pub-
lic enforcers appeared insufficient, and consequentially the enforcement gap was not sufficiently 
bridged. This incited the focus to slowly shift towards compensatory relief. It is relatively recently that 
providing individuals with the opportunity to obtain compensation has gained ground as an objective 
of collective redress. Previously, the right to seek redress was an individual’s prerogative, related to 
the concept of private law that ‘adheres to individual entitlement and responsibility as the foundation 
of private law relationships’.245 The shift towards this (additional) objective is visible, inter alia, in the 
Dutch instruments WCAM and – if it passes into law – collective action for damages, and the English 
collective actions in competition law cases. In principle, such mechanisms are said to follow substan-
tive law, in particular the law of damages that centres on the principle of full compensation – but see 
section 2.4.3 hereafter.246  
 
The third objective of collective redress mechanisms, efficient dispute resolution, has developed inde-
pendently from the former two, incited by inefficient rather than ineffective enforcement. With this 
objective, the procedural device is not merely a means to enforce substantive rights but serves its own 
social function as well.247 As mentioned, the efficient resolution of mass damage entails administrative 
efficiency: a large number of claims or essential questions that relate to these claims are adjudicated 
in aggregation, overflowing court dockets are avoided and uniformity in judgments is improved. More-
over, aggregation aims to result in adjudication within a reasonable period of time at decreased costs 
and efforts due to economies of scale. Third, it provides closure, peace or finality for all parties in-
volved. Hence, this objective serves both individual and public interests. These efficiency purposes are 
most visible in the mechanisms that were created after mass disasters or mass exposure events: the 
German KapMuG (created against the backdrop of the Deutsche Telekom case), the Dutch WCAM (DES 
and Dexia cases), and the English GLO (pharmaceutical cases). 
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2.4.2 The three main objectives and access to justice 
The following three main objectives of collective redress mechanisms will serve as a starting point for 
the analysis of entrepreneurial mass litigation: 
 
i) Modify behaviour: prevention and deterrence (by way of the internalization of the harm 
caused) – aimed at the wrongdoer and at protecting society (social welfare) 
ii) Compensatory/restorative redress – aimed at enabling the individually aggrieved parties 
to be restored to the position they would have been in had the wrongful behaviour not 
occurred (do justice, resolve the conflict) 
iii) Efficient dispute resolution: timely, final, cost-effective and consistent administration of 
justice – aimed at all parties involved: the aggrieved parties, wrongdoer(s), judiciary and 
society. 
 
On various occasions in both the European and national debates, access to justice is presented as a 
separate policy objective of collective redress. Its specific content or meaning in the context of collec-
tive redress, however, is often ambiguous. As observed by Cappelletti and Garth, access to justice is a 
vague notion that can be approached from various perspectives, but in essence focuses on the core of 
a legal system: one that is equally accessible to all and leads to results that are individually and socially 
just.248 Later, legal scholars further clarified the concept by distinguishing justice in the formal, proce-
dural or non-value sense (access to dispute resolution mechanisms and legal services) and justice in 
the substantive or value-oriented sense (access to just and fair dispute resolution).249 Both perspec-
tives can be recognized in the policy documents on collective redress. In the following, access to justice 
will not be considered to be a separate objective, but as an overriding objective or a means to an end 
in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives.250 Inasmuch as access to justice is not yet ad-
dressed by the mere existence of a collective redress mechanism (effective access to a remedy) and 
its design (fair process, such as the right to be heard, the review of a collective settlement, and so on), 
the procedural side of access to justice is considered part of the objective of efficiency (timely and 
affordable access, rectitude of outcome). The substantive side of access to justice can be recognized 
in the objective of justice and individual compensation as a means of fair redress. Access to justice will 
also be addressed in the discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial parties, as they 
potentially enable claimants to file a claim and improve or deteriorate fair dispute resolution (equality 
of arms and abusive litigation).  
2.4.3 Clustering the objectives, and trade-offs 
As observed in section 2.2, most collective redress mechanisms choose to serve more than one objec-
tive. With the emergence of the objective of compensation, the objective of modifying behaviour did 
not become deleted, but was relocated instead. For many mechanisms, deterrence can now be said 
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to occupy ‘the backseat (…) as a welcome “by-product”’.251 Even if the primary objective is compensa-
tion, deterrence and prevention can still be strived for: the larger the total amount of damages 
claimed, the larger the internalization by wrongdoers, the larger the potential deterrent effect.252 Pol-
icy documents on the private enforcement of competition law provide an illustrative example of clus-
tering objectives and listing them in the order of priority. In 2005, the Commission equated the objec-
tive of compensating harmed parties with that of deterring unlawful behaviour. This was met with 
fierce criticism and in 2008, a hierarchy was arranged: (full) compensation was to be considered the 
primary guiding principle, which, in turn, would benefit the objective of deterrence.253 The latter re-
mained the primary objectives of public enforcers. This approach recurred in the 2013 Recommenda-
tion. Due to its association with punitive damages and ‘American situations’, deterrence was ranked 
as an inherent benefit or positive side-effect rather than a primary objective. The principle of full com-
pensation requires that damages should cover, but not exceed, the harm suffered by a private party.254  
 
Nevertheless, as a result of clustering, trade-offs might take place. This is visible, for instance, in the 
choice of technique to include or exclude class members. Most mechanisms, so far, employ an opt-in 
technique. Hence, class members need to activate their participation in the action, whereas the opt-
out technique requires a class member’s active withdrawal and if not (properly) done so, the individual 
loses its right of action. The opt-out technique thus trades off part of the concept of individual auton-
omy, which corresponds with the objective of compensation, for that of efficiency and deterrence. 
Furthermore, when the mechanism allows for damage scheduling, such as the WCAM, the principle of 
full compensation is traded off for the objective of efficiency. 
2.5 Summary: the collective redress mechanisms and their objectives 
To conclude this chapter, Table I summarizes the current collective redress mechanisms as described 
in section 2.2 and their main features. The overview is based on (my interpretation of) the policy doc-
uments and the mechanisms’ legal features. The details of the rules will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 4 to 6.  
 
The overview first shows the type of party that is allowed to initiate the specific action and the way 
this representative party is qualified and/or assessed: by law, court, and/or public authority. Further-
more, it shows the technique that determines the formation of the group or class. By way of the opt-
in or opt-out technique class members are included or excluded from participating in the action and 
from being bound by the decision (res judicata). Normally, a group action requires class members to 
opt in; for instance, the English Group Litigation Order and the German KapMuG. A representative 
action can employ (n)either technique. For instance, the Dutch WCAM and the English collective pro-
ceedings are opt-out mechanisms, where class members have to actively withdraw from the action or 
settlement if they do not wish to be bound by it. Representative actions that address a common good 
and/or do not serve identified persons but a public interest employ neither technique; for instance, 
the German skimming-off procedure. Although the damage might be individual, it is of such a value or 
                                                             
 
251 Wagner 2011, p. 59. 
252 See, for instance, Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 61 and Koch 2014, p. 161.  
253 See section 2.2.1. See also Wagner 2011, p. 56-57. 
254 See, for instance, Communication COM(2013) 401 final, p. 9-10.  
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diffuse nature that compensation is deemed unnecessary, impossible or inefficient. The Dutch 3:305a 
action is a somewhat hybrid mechanism: individual class members are not formally bound by the ac-
tion, yet they can object to it. Since a judgment does have an informal binding authority, the collective 
action can turn into an opt-in mechanism once the outcome leads to a settlement.  
 
The overview also shows the scope of the instrument, the type of relief it can provide for (injunctive, 
declaratory and compensatory relief) and the type of damage it addresses. The type of damage and 
relief often correlate with the mechanism’s pursued objective. The ones that allow for the pursuit of 
negative-value claims will serve the objective of deterrence, whereas positive-value claims such as 
mass torts will strive for efficient dispute resolution and compensation for the aggrieved parties. The 
pursuit of a common good aims to serve the objective of modifying behaviour (compliance/preven-
tion/deterrence) by providing for injunctive relief. 
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Table I: Overview of the current private judicial collective redress mechanisms in the Netherlands, Germany and England & Wales 
3 Entrepreneurial mass litigation and its potential benefits and drawbacks 
 
‘There is a real sense that Europe does not want its market regulation to fall into the 
hands of profit-motivated intermediaries who have an incentive to increase litigation 
for its own sake. (…) Whilst one would not want this to become a charter for bounty-
hunters dressed up as consumer activists, equally, there is a risk that [a collective re-
dress] mechanism will not be used in practice if consumer organizations cannot be in-
centivized to invoke the procedure.’1  
3.1 Introduction 
As Chapter 2 has shown, the three selected jurisdictions, as well as the European Union, traditionally 
authorize designated or qualified (non-profit) bodies to pursue collective redress. Nevertheless, vari-
ous types of entrepreneurial parties have entered the European mass litigation market. These parties 
are the focus of attention in this chapter. This chapter addresses the potential benefits and drawbacks 
of entrepreneurial mass litigation and how they affect the chosen policy objectives. Before addressing 
that question, section 3.2 briefly sketches the development of entrepreneurial mass litigation and sec-
tion 3.3 describes the types of entrepreneurial parties that currently operate in the mass litigation 
market in Germany, England and Wales, and the Netherlands. Both sections provide general over-
views; specific rules and features of the parties and the market in which they operate will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 4-6. The chapter subsequently examines the advantages and disadvantages 
of entrepreneurial parties (sections 3.4 and 3.5). What does legal doctrinal, law and economics and 
empirical literature tell us about the – potential – incentives that an entrepreneurial interest in litiga-
tion creates? And how might these incentives influence the objectives as described in Chapter 2? The 
answers to these questions are mainly based on the literature on overseas experiences (the USA and 
Australia), which provide experiences that can be used as a source of inspiration.2 The chapter con-
cludes with a summary in section 3.6. 
3.2 The development of entrepreneurial mass litigation 
3.2.1 The origins  
The term entrepreneurial litigation or lawyering stems from the USA.3 Within the context of this book’s 
topic, it refers to attorneys who act as risk-taking entrepreneurs by investing in class actions with the 
aim of obtaining a profit. The main route for doing so is by obtaining part of the class action proceeds 
(common fund, see hereafter). Historically, American courts deemed contingency fee contracts to be 
void and unenforceable due to the common law rules on maintenance and champerty.4 Champerty is 
defined in the USA as ‘[a]n agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by 
which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any 
                                                             
 
1 Fairgrieve & Howells 2009, p. 383 and 408.  
2 See section 1.2.4.1. 
3 See, for instance, Coffee 1987 and Coffee 2015.  
4 Radin 1935, Karsten 1998, p. 234 ff, Coffee 2015, p. 19 ff. 
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judgment proceeds’.5 Whereas, to date, these doctrines continue to play a role in English litigation 
funding,6 in the USA they started to lose ground in the 1800s, that is, where it concerns contingency 
fees.7 Around the 1850s, certain states had authorized contingency fee arrangements, and courts had 
increasingly acknowledged the benefit of contingency fee arrangements for ‘those of modest means’. 
By the late 1800s, attorneys and their clients would use contingency fee arrangements in various types 
of cases, including personal injury litigation, and the Supreme Court regarded such an arrangement a 
‘legitimate and honourable professional assistance’.8 Karsten offers three explanations for this ac-
ceptance: procedural reforms, political developments (democracy, distrust of corporations) and the 
religious nature of ‘antebellum Americans [who] were “awash in a sea of faith”’.9 In this Age of Jackson, 
‘an era of populism that celebrated the common man’, access to courts was simplified and contingency 
fees were increasingly accepted, particularly in states with politically accountable judges who feared 
political repercussions.10 Moreover, courts argued that contingency fees ‘constituted a better guaran-
tee for fidelity, energy and proper zeal from one’s attorney than the fee certain.’11 The focus on access 
to justice and the deregulation of attorney fees under the ideology of laissez fair also incited exchang-
ing the English rule of ‘the loser pays’ for the American rule that parties would bear their own litigation 
costs, regardless of the outcome.12 To date, the American rule prevails, but due to contract practices 
and statutory provisions that allow for one-way costs shifting in the claimants’ favour (only the de-
fendant can be ordered to pay adverse costs), the rule is said to ‘resemble a Swiss cheese’.13 
 
Over time, various scandals and problems led to restrictions on contingency fee arrangements within 
the context of class actions. Whereas fee arrangements in individual litigation have remained largely 
unregulated, nowadays, the class attorney is not allowed to enter into a fee arrangement with the lead 
plaintiff in class actions. This restriction aims to avoid distorting the latter’s incentive to represent the 
absent class members’ interests.14 Instead of individual contingency fees, the common fund doctrine 
provides the economic engine that drives class actions. In the case of success, the class counsel re-
ceives a ‘reasonable fee’ out of the successful action’s proceeds (the common fund).15 This remuner-
ation structure aims to avoid conflicts of interest between class members and to resolve the free-rider 
                                                             
 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary 2009 (Ninth Edition), p. 262.  
6 See section 5.4.2. 
7 The doctrines remain relevant with regard to third-party funding and the alienability of claims, see Sebok 2011.  
8 Karsten 1998, p. 249, with reference to Wright v. Tebbits, 91 U.S. 252, 254 (1875). 
9 Karsten 1998, p. 244 ff.  
10 Coffee 2015, p. 19. 
11 Karsten 1998, p. 241.  
12 Coffee 2015, p. 22 ff.  
13 Coffee 2015, p. 25-26. The statutory one-way costs shifting rule has been implemented for many types of socially 
desirable aggregate litigation, for instance, regarding civil rights and environmental law. See also Hensler 2010, p. 157. 
14 See Jones 2008, Hensler 2010, p. 155 and 157, and Coffee 2015, p. 64-77 on the Milberg, Weiss scandal, where four 
attorneys, specialists in securities class actions, were imprisoned for paying ‘kickback payments’ to their ‘in-house’ 
plaintiffs in order to incentivize them to act as lead plaintiff and to improve their chances of being selected as class 
counsel. 
15 The rationale of the common fund doctrine lies in the principle of unjust enrichment, as decided by the US Supreme 
Court in two railroad insolvency cases: Trustees v. Greenough 105 U.S. 527 (1881) and Central Railroad & Banking Co. 
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problem. The judicial supervision and determination of the attorneys’ remuneration are considered 
crucial elements of an effective class action/settlement regime.16 The court reviews and awards the 
fee and informs the class members, who are entitled to raise their objections against the proposed fee 
award.17 The fee is calculated either by determining a percentage of the proceeds (a percentage-of-
the-settlement approach), or by awarding a reasonable hourly fee, possibly uplifted by a multiplier 
(the lodestar approach). The percentage or multiplier chosen depends on factors such as the result, 
type, complexity and duration of the action and the amount of the proceeds (the percentage declines 
as the proceeds increase).18 If the percentage approach is followed, a lodestar cross-check can take 
place. Some courts apply a fixed benchmark percentage, others consult historical statistics in compa-
rable cases and/or market rates. The percentage is based on the proceeds or on the amount actually 
distributed. Both the percentage and lodestar approach have been criticised. The percentage ap-
proach because it might create a disproportionate fee in relation to the attorneys’ time spent and the 
effort made; the lodestar approach because it incentivizes attorneys to spend too much time on the 
case. Although the method for calculating the award is subject to judicial discretion and depends on 
the circumstances of the case, nowadays, the majority of the courts dealing with common fund cases 
are said to prefer the percentage approach.19 The lodestar approach is mainly employed in cases under 
fee shifting statutes, such as consumer actions, or when the percentage approach cannot be applied 
or would lead to an unfair result.20  
 
So far, third-party litigation funding is limited in the US class action market,21 although it is increasingly 
sprouting in some states.22 This type of litigation funding has its origins in Australia, where it has de-
veloped into an accepted form of litigation funding in the past 20 to 25 years.23 Here, it is not the 
attorney but a third-party investor that is the beneficiary of part of the proceeds of a funded claim. In 
Australia, too, such funding used to constitute a crime and/or tort due to the rules of maintenance 
(encouraging litigation) and champerty (funding litigation for profit). Nowadays, the concepts are ob-
solete as crimes in common law, and various Australian jurisdictions have abolished them as statutory 
crime and tort – although courts can still find contracts to be contrary to public policy or otherwise 
                                                             
 
of Georgia v. Pettus 113 U.S. 116 (1885). See Coffee 2015, p. 18, 26 ff, Hensler 2010, p. 158, and Dawson 1974, p. 1602 
ff. 
16 Eisenberg, Miller & Germano 2017, p. 938. 
17 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h); on the origins thereof see the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, September 2002, p. 19-21 and the Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
(Appendix B), p. 116-122; available at <uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/reports-judicial-con-
ference-september-2002>. 
18 Eisenberg & Miller 2004a; Eisenberg & Miller 2010, Fitzpatrick 2010, and Eisenberg, Miller & Germano 2017. See also 
the landmark ruling in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
19 Fitzpatrick 2010, p. 831-832.  
20 See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 2010, § 3.13, and Gensler 2017, Rule 23, 
Class actions.  
21 Hensler 2011, p. 323, Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 95, Issacharoff 2014, p. 576 ff. On the difference 
between the ‘first wave’ and ‘second wave’ of litigation funders (lenders respectively institutional investors) see Garber 
2010 and Steinitz 2011. 
22 Hodges, Peysner & Nurse 2012, p. 43 ff, Morpurgo 2014, p. 22 ff, Liston, Patchen & Plochocki 2016. 
23 Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 96 ff, McGovern e.a. 2010, p. 69, De Morpurgo 2014, p. 19.  
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illegal.24 Third-party funding was first allowed and used in insolvency cases in 1995,25 and has ex-
panded to class actions from around 2004 onwards, in particular in securities and competition law 
cases.26 The ‘entrepreneurial spirit of the legal profession’ first found its way into class actions through 
law firms that would pursue such actions by entering into conditional fee arrangements with individual 
class members.27 However, such a funding construction turned out to be insufficient to fund class ac-
tions, and third-party funders entered the scene.28 Whereas two law firms have long been the main 
suppliers of class actions, this is now gradually changing, also due to the availability of third-party 
funding.29 The acceptance of third-party litigation funding in Australia is said to stem from austerity 
cuts that decreased public legal aid funding, and from funding difficulties in class actions: a lack of the 
necessary means to pursue such litigation and the cost risk that arises from the loser pays rule.30 As 
the other class members enjoy immunity from adverse costs orders, parties are disincentivized to act 
as a representative party. If they nevertheless do so, the immunity of class members leaves successful 
defendants in an unfavourable position as their opponent, the representative party, might not have 
sufficient means to pay the costs order. Nowadays, third-party litigation funding is the main enabler 
of Australian class actions.31 As, in general, the assignment of a bare right to litigate is not allowed, the 
funders receive a percentage of the proceeds from the class action. This can be arranged through 
individual contracts with class members or, in the absence of such an arrangement, the court might 
order all class members to contribute to the litigation funding costs.32 Whether law firms should be 
able to conclude contingency fee arrangements is currently under debate following recommendations 
to do so by an Australian governmental working group.33  
3.2.2 In Europe 
As most collective redress mechanisms in European jurisdictions are still relatively new and, so far, 
have focused mainly on (semi-)public bodies to operate the devices, entrepreneurial mass litigation is 
in its infancy. Yet it is on the rise, and has developed along the following lines. 
 
                                                             
 
24 Standing Committee of Attorneys General, Litigation funding in Australia. Discussion Paper, May 2006, p. 5.  
25 Standing Committee of Attorneys General, Litigation funding in Australia. Discussion Paper, May 2006, available at 
<justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/litigationfundingdiscussionpapermay06.pdf>, p. 5.  
26 Legg 2008, p. 669, Morabito & Waye 2011, p. 331, Legg e.a. 2011, p. 628, Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 
96. 
27 Morabito & Waye 2011, p. 331; see also Australian Government Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrange-
ments. Inquiry Report No. 72, Volume 2, September 2014, available at <pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/access-jus-
tice/report>, p. 603-605. 
28 The High Court of Australia first allowed third-party funding in 2006 in Campbells Cash and Carry v. Fostiff (2006) 229 
CLR 386. 
29 Morabito 2017, p. 35. 
30 Morabito & Waye 2011, p. 329 ff, Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 97-98. 
31 Morabito & Waye 2011, p. 325, Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 96.  
32 Kalajdzic, Cashman & Longmoore 2013, p. 108, Waye & Morabito 2017, p. 167, 178, and Waye & Morabito 2018, 
referring to, inter alia, Pathway Investments v. National Australia Bank [2012] VSC 625, and Money Max v. QBE Insur-
ance Group [2016] FCAFC 148. 
33 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements. Inquiry Report No. 72, Volume 2, 
September 2014, p. 625-629. See also Waye & Morabito 2017, p. 165.  
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In the early days of European (injunctive) collective redress, governments would subsidize certain pri-
vate representative organizations, particularly in the area of consumer law, to – also – initiate collec-
tive redress. For instance, in the Netherlands, the consumer bodies Consumentenbond and Kon-
sumenten Kontakt could apply for government funding to initiate collective actions, as such actions 
would render governmental action superfluous.34 The European Commission also subsidized collective 
actions by consumer associations, for (cross-border) injunctions to eliminate unfair terms in several 
member states.35 National public bodies could pursue collective redress as well.36 However, over the 
years it seemed that public funding and (semi) public enforcement did not suffice. For instance, one 
of the main obstacles identified in the evaluation of the 2001 Injunctions Directive was the lack of 
resources by (semi-)public bodies in light of the financial risks of litigation.37 Moreover, despite the 
European Commission’s pleas to member states to increase their expenditure on legal aid, the public 
funding of legal aid started to decline in the mid-1990s, and austerity measures have been increasing 
ever since, not only with regard to subsidized legal aid but also court fees.38 Hence, the budgets of 
potential intermediaries such as consumer organizations were limited, and the risk of severe losses 
was high due to the loser pays rule which has been adopted in most EU member states.39 As a conse-
quence of the protective function of this rule – it aims to filter out frivolous claims – the cost risk of 
losing is duplicated: not only does the loser pay its own litigation costs, it is also ordered to pay (part 
of) those of its prevailing opponent. 
 
The enforcement gap might have other explanations as well. Private non-profit organizations have 
been faced with a decreasing number of members (and, thus, membership fees), and both private and 
public bodies have a range of tasks that extend (well) beyond litigating.40 As dispute resolution is not 
their core business, non-profit organizations might also lack expertise and display risk-averse behav-
iour towards litigating, given the required investment, uncertainty and cost risk.41 Moreover, they 
                                                             
 
34 Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 16983, 8, p. 22, Kamerstukken II 1984-85, 18600, 17, p. 8 and 20 ff., and Nota II Inv, PG, 
Inv. 3, 5, 6, p. 1772. See also Mölenberg 1995, p. 125-126, 131, 337. Other examples are the German Verbraucherschutz-
vereine, which is a private body but largely subsidised; see COM(2000) 248 final, p. 21, and Gousgounis 2009, p. 2: ‘State 
authorities make sure that the associations have the appropriate resources and quality services to play that role.’  
35 COM(2000) 248 final, p. 9. 
36 Such as the UK Office of Fair Trading; see for more examples the Commission’s Green Paper on Access of consumers 
to justice of 16 November 1993, COM(93) 576 final. 
37 EC Report on the application of the Injunctions Directive, COM(2008) 756 final, consideration 32. See also section 2.2. 
See also the EC White Paper on damages actions for breach of antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, p. 4. 
38 Green Paper on Access of consumers to justice of 16 November 1993, COM(93) 576 final, p. 86, Molenberg 1995, p. 
339, Hodges 2009a, p. 110, and Hodges 2013, p. 3. 
39 Civic Consulting & Oxford Economic, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress mechanisms 
in the European Union. Final Report, Berlin 2008, p. 70. See also the 2008 Report EC on the Injunctions Directive, con-
sideration 32, and sections 4.3, 5.3, and 6.3. 
40 See, for instance, the annual reports of the Dutch Consumentenbond or the investors’ organization VEB, available at 
<consumentenbond.nl/over-ons/wie-zijn-we/onze-organisatie/jaarverslag> and <veb.net/over-de-veb-
menu/jaarverslagen>. See also Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private actions in competition law: A con-
sultation on options for reform – government response, January 2013, p. 3 and Howells 2011 p. 67. 
41 EC Report on the application of the Injunctions Directive, COM(2008) 756 final, consideration 32. See also Cappelletti 
& Garth 1978, p. 43. 
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might be prone to capture or a loss of independence.42 They might pursue a political or ideological 
agenda which is not in line with the class members’ interests, and (therewith) encourage or discourage 
particular lawsuits. This is particularly problematic when a governmental body is the – alleged – wrong-
doer. 
 
Hence, potential intermediaries might be allowed to pursue mass claims, but will not always be able 
or willing to do so. Nonetheless, until recently, the tone of the debate on private enforcers did not 
really change. In 2010, the European Commissioners Reding, Almunia and Dalli stated that adequate 
financial means should be available to allow citizens and businesses to have access to justice in a mass 
claim situation, but that contingency fees for third-party investors or lawyers should be firmly opposed 
as being incompatible with the European legal tradition.43 The European Parliament subsequently 
stressed that a European framework on collective redress should not address contingency fees, as they 
are, by and large, unknown in Europe.44 However, the European Commission did not leave the topic 
fully to the member states’ own devices. In its 2013 Communication, it mentions that contingency fees 
and third-party funding could serve the objective of ensuring access to justice. As it might also inspire 
abusive behaviour, regulation should be carefully designed.45 This was laid down in the Commission’s 
Recommendation. Recommendation 30 states that member states should not permit contingency fees 
that risk creating an incentive to unnecessary litigation. However:  
 
‘Member States that exceptionally allow for contingency fees should provide for appropriate national 
regulation of those fees in collective redress cases, taking into account in particular the right to full 
compensation of the members of the claimant party.’46  
 
In addition, Recommendation 32 urges member states to: 
 
‘ensure, that, in addition to the general principles of funding, for cases of private third party funding 
of compensatory collective redress, it is prohibited to base remuneration given to or interest charged 
by the fund provider on the amount of the settlement reached or the compensation awarded unless 
that funding arrangement is regulated by a public authority to ensure the interests of the parties.’  
 
These principles are a compromise, following the diverging responses of member states to the 2011 
public consultation on collective redress. These responses varied from outright rejection at one end of 
the spectrum to reticent hesitance at the other end. The German, British and Dutch responses illus-
trate this divergence. The German government mostly disapproved. It expressed the view that in order 
to avoid abuse, no incentives should exist to profit from litigation, directly or indirectly, or to bring a 
                                                             
 
42 Cappelletti & Garth 1978, p. 37, Schaefer 2000, p. 198; Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 67-72; Issacharoff & 
Miller 2012, p. 58; Tzankova & Hensler 2013, p. 104, Faure & Visscher 2015, p. 83-84. 
43 Joint information note by Commissioners Reding, Almunia and Dalli, SEC(2010) 1192, p. 6. See, similarly, the rejection 
of contingency fees by the European Economic and Social Committee in its Opinion on defining the collective actions 
system and its role in the context of Community consumer law, 2004/C 162/01, 25.6.2008, consideration 1.6. 
44 European Parliament’s resolution of 2 February 2012, 2011/2089(INI), consideration 20.  
45 Communication of 11 June 2013, COM(2013) 401 final, p. 3, 8-9, and 15. 
46 Recommendation of 11 June 2013, 2013/396/EU. 
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claim without financial risk. Furthermore, litigation costs should never disproportionately reduce a 
damages award.47 The British government believed that entrepreneurial lawyering should be avoided, 
but stated that in the area of competition law it has ‘a more open mind on what might be the best 
solution’. It furthermore argued that litigation funding should be left to national regulation.48 The 
Dutch government is slightly indecisive. In 2011, it considered that a claim culture should be avoided, 
contingency fees limited and safeguards should include protecting the quality/governance of (com-
mercial) representative parties and their funders.49 In its response to the 2013 Recommendation, it 
inquired whether the EC has any indication that third-party funding has created problems so far, and 
it questioned whether regulatory action in this field is required at this point in time.50 
  
Regardless of the current legislative/regulatory position on contingency fees and third-party funding, 
in practice, entrepreneurial (mass) litigation has continued to evolve. Under the umbrella of promoting 
access to justice, various types of private parties have started to test the water. In some jurisdictions, 
the third-party funding of ‘regular’, two-party litigation is even reaching a point where it is considered 
‘mainstream’. Of all of the European jurisdictions, this type of litigation funding is the most well devel-
oped in the UK; Germany is catching up with the UK, and in the Netherlands it is just getting started.51 
It is plausible to assume that this type of litigation funding has sprung for similar reasons as those 
attributed to its rise in Australia: 1) considerably high litigation costs, 2) the limited availability of con-
tingency fee arrangements,52 3) the ‘loser pays’ costs shifting rule, and 4) decreasing legal aid fund-
ing.53 The extent to which these factors have indeed influenced the emergence of entrepreneurial 
mass litigation and the specific features thereof will be addressed in Chapters 4 to 6. I will first gener-
ally introduce the types of entrepreneurial parties involved in mass litigation, and discuss their poten-
tial benefits and drawbacks. 
                                                             
 
47 Deutscher Bundestag, Stellungnahme im Rahmen der Konsultation Kollektiver Rechtsschutz, Drucksache 17/5956, 
25.05.2011, p. 16. 
48 UK response to public consultation 2011, considerations 24 and 36. See also, similarly, Private Actions in Competition 
Law: A consultation on options for reform - Government response 2013, p. 33 and 34. 
49 Dutch response to public consultation 2011, p. 4.  
50 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 22112, 1663 (Dutch response to the Recommendation and Communication). 
51 See sections 4.4.3, 5.4.5, and 6.4.3. 
52 In fact, many litigation funders are former attorneys. 
53 See also Morpurgo 2014, p. 21.  
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3.3 The types of entrepreneurial parties and their funding techniques 
To help describe the different types of entrepreneurial parties that are currently operating on the mass 
litigation market, I have conducted an internet scan of the Volkswagen debacle.54 Tables II and III illus-
trate the variety by listing (some of the) entrepreneurial parties that – aim to – pursue, in Europe, the 
claims of two types of harmed parties: car owners and investors.55 
 
Entrepreneurial party and type of ac-
tion (so far) 
Type of – potentially – represented parties, funding and the third-parties 
involved 
VW Emissions Action (England) 
(application for) GLO 
British car owners. 30% contingency fee. The case is being brought by the 
law firms Harcus Sinclair (now removed) and Slater & Gordon (UK), funded 
by Therium Capital Management (US/UK)  
Your Lawyers / Car Emissions Lawyers 
(England) Competitor of previous 
party, objects against GLO application 
Vehicle owners, traders (and shareholders, see Table III). No win, no fee. 
Fee in case of success is not mentioned on the website. The vehicle is sup-
ported by the global law firm Hausfeld and Ferguson Litigation Funding. 
Leigh Day (application for) separate 
GLO (on a different legal ground) (and 
test case at Motor Ombudsman) 
Consumer vehicle buyers. The law firm Leigh Day acts under a conditional 
fee (no win, no fee), capped at no more than 30% of a class member’s ob-
tained compensation. Leigh Day has arranged ATE insurance.56 
MyRight.com (Germany) 
Test cases in Germany and Ireland (as-
signments) 
European car owners. 35% contingency fee. The German case is being 
brought by the global law firm Hausfeld and is backed by funding from Bur-
ford Capital (US/UK). 
WeClaim (France) 
A ‘class action’ has been announced, 
further information is not available on 
the website 
European car owners. Contingency fee in individual cases (25%). The organ-
ization states that it cooperates with third-party funders (undisclosed). If a 
‘class action’ is launched, and funding is acquired, individuals pay ‘a small 
percentage’. If third-party funding is not acquired, individuals have to pay 
to participate (amount undisclosed).  
                                                             
 
54 The following websites were consulted for the car owners’ claims (last checked in February 2018): <weclaim.com/ac-







4982816-0/>, <volkswagenaudiclaim.nl>, <stichtingvolkswagencarclaim.com>, <derclaim.nl>, <akd.nl/en/Pages/Sticht-
ing-Volkswagen-Car-Claim-announces-appointment-of-chairman-of-the-board-and-chairwoman-of-the-supervisory-
board.aspx>, <verbraucherrecht.at/cms/index.php?id=2419>, <cleanvw.org/>, <emission-compensations.eu>.  





pr.de/files/pi-vwshareclaim-20151209.pdf>, <volkswageninvestorsettlement.com/>, and <demi-
nor.com/drs/en/home> 
55 The overview is intended as an illustration and is possibly incomplete. Please note that only entrepreneurial parties 
are listed here. Some consumer associations are also pursuing claims on behalf of consumers or their members; see, 
for instance, <facua.org/es/noticia.php?Id=9193> (Spain).  
56 See section 5.4.3.1.  
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Stichting Volkswagenaudiclaim  
(the Netherlands) 
Preliminary witness hearing (denied) 
Dutch car owners.57 Contingency fee (25%). A foundation has been estab-
lished by Pieter Leijesen and Oscar van Oorschot, who have been involved 
in previous Dutch claim vehicles and collective actions.  
Stichting Volkswagen Car Claim / Der-
claim.nl (linked to Stichting 
Volkswagen Investors Claim, see Ta-
ble III) (the Netherlands) 
Seems to aim at a (WCAM) settlement 
European car owners. Website states that costs will be recovered by the 
foundation in the course of a settlement. In the event that such a costs 
agreement cannot be reached, the foundation will deduct 18% from the 
settlement amount. The foundation is linked to the Dutch law firm AKD, 
the Austrian law firm Breiteneder and the Austrian consumer association 
VKI. 
Clean Foundation (the Netherlands) 
Seems to aim at a (WCAM) settlement 
Non-US car owners. Website of partner Corpocon states that ‘costs are 
covered by the Foundation’, probably as part of a settlement agreement. 
In the case of litigation, a contingency fee is charged (15%). The founda-
tion has been set up by a network of international attorneys (Global Jus-
tice Network) and Corpocon B.V., which has been involved in previous 
Dutch claim vehicles and collective actions. 
Table II: Entrepreneurial mass litigation in Europe involving Volkswagen (car owners) 
 
                                                             
 
57 That is, the website and application form are available in Dutch only. 
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Entrepreneurial party and type of ac-
tion (so far) 
Type of – potentially – represented parties, funding and the third-parties 
involved 
Your Lawyers / Car Emissions Lawyers 
(England) GLO 
Shareholders (and vehicle owners and traders, see Table II). No win, no fee. 
Fee in case of success is not mentioned on the website. The vehicle is sup-
ported by the global law firm Hausfeld and Ferguson Litigation Funding. 
Various parties have joined the Kap-
MuG proceedings in Germany 
Approx. 170 claims have been filed so far, including two claims by 278 in-
stitutional investors worldwide. Various law firms are involved, e.g.:58 
- Tilp, which cooperates with a consortium of funders, including CFE 
(Ireland) and the US law firm Grant & Eisenhofer; 
- Rotter, which cooperates with the German litigation funder Ad-
voFin; 
- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, which cooperates with Ben-
tham Europe. 
VEB (the Netherlands) 
Has filed a representative action (col-
lectieve actie) 
Dutch and foreign investors (VEB members). VEB is an association for in-
vestors – mainly Dutch – and provides support (including collective redress) 
and information. It charges an annual membership fee, and regularly re-
ceives a remuneration as part of a settlement agreement.59 
Dieselclaim (the Netherlands) 
Is awaiting negotiations with VW, and 
has joined the KapMuG proceedings 
Dutch investors.60 Assignment and contingency fee (20%). Dieselclaim is 
part of Consumentenclaim, an association which has been involved in pre-
vious Dutch claim vehicles and collective actions. 
Stichting Volkswagen Investors Claim 
(see also Volkswagen Car Claim) (the 
Netherlands). Involved in US discov-
ery proceedings, awaiting negotia-
tions with VW, and may join the Kap-
MuG proceedings 
Non-US investors. Website states that costs will be recovered by the foun-
dation in the course of a settlement. In the event that such costs agreement 
cannot be reached, the foundation will deduct 18% from the settlement 
amount. The foundation is linked to the Dutch law firm AKD, the German 
law firm Baum Reiter, and the Austrian law firm Breiteneder, and is funded 
and advised by Labaton Sucharow, a US law firm. 
VWShareClaim (the Netherlands) 
The action undertaken so far is un-
clear 
German (?) investors.61 Participants pay a one-off contribution plus a con-
tingency fee (20-25%). The foundation has been set up by SMCO, which has 
been involved in previous Dutch claim vehicles and collective actions. 
Volkswagen Investor Settlement 
Foundation (the Netherlands) 
Seems to aim at a (WCAM) settlement 
Investors worldwide. No financial obligation, ‘reimbursement of Founda-
tion expenses and payment of legal fees for Foundation counsel will likely 
to be included as terms for payment out of any recovery in any Settlement’. 
The foundation is linked to the Dutch law firm Stibbe and the US law firm 
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann. 
Deminor Recovery Services (Belgium) 
Has filed two lawsuits in Germany, 
may join the KapMuG proceedings 
Investors worldwide. Funding model for this case is not mentioned on the 
website, but Deminor normally operates under a contingency fee arrange-
ment. 
Table III: Entrepreneurial mass litigation in Europe involving Volkswagen (investors) 
 
The financing of (all or part of) the costs in return for a share of the proceeds by a party that is other-
wise unconnected with the mass damage event takes various shapes. The following types of parties 
and funding techniques can be distinguished.  
 
                                                             
 
58 See the overview on <newsroom.legial.de/fileadmin/newsroom/RM_03_2016_Klageflut.pdf>.  
59 See sections 6.4.4.2 and 6.5.6.2. 
60 That is, the website and application form are available in Dutch only.  
61 That is, the webpage is available in German only.  
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First, entrepreneurial lawyers can be involved. Contingency fee arrangements are, by and large, pro-
hibited in the selected jurisdictions.62 However, attorneys/law firms can set up a claim vehicle or be 
involved therein (see also hereafter) and charge an hourly or conditional fee. The overview also shows 
that US law firms are active on the European mass litigation market. As will be further discussed in the 
national chapters, such law firms might negotiate their fee to be paid out of the action’s proceeds (a 
common fund-like technique). For this construction, the consent of individual class members is not 
necessarily required as the entrepreneurial party can enter into such an arrangement with the liable 
party as part of the settlement agreement. 
 
Second, an entrepreneurial party might set up an ad hoc special purpose vehicle (SPV). This SPV can 
act as a representative organization, such as the Volkswagen Investor Settlement Foundation. In this 
situation, individual class members normally conclude a participation agreement with the SPV, which 
includes a contingency fee.63 Alternatively, the SPV might enter into a settlement agreement that in-
cludes a common fund technique such as the one above. The SPV can also use the construction of 
(bundled) assignments to pursue the claims, as MyRight has done. In this situation, individual class 
members transfer their claim or right of action to the SPV, and this transfer includes a contingency 
(like) fee. The SPV then pursues the claim(s) in its own name.64 
 
Third, the ‘stranger’ can be a third-party litigation funder, such as AdvoFin or Bentham, that cooper-
ates with a law firm or SPV. Such funders can be subdivided into passive and active ones, although in 
practice the dividing line is not always easily drawn.65 A passive funder’s main role is to foot the bill. 
This construction does not necessarily include the individual class members; their contract can also be 
concluded with the law firm or SPV. The passive litigation funder is approached by the – potential – 
representative of the claimants, and if they decide to fund the action they are regularly informed but 
not actively involved in litigation strategies and decision-making. In essence, it is a financial services 
provider. Conversely, active funders are involved in litigation strategies and decision-making. Moreo-
ver, they might search for potential claims, screen cases, invest in developing the action on their own 
initiative, approach and inform potential claimants, and possibly initiate collective action themselves, 
through a SPV or in cooperation with a law firm. In that sense, they resemble the first and second type 
of entrepreneurial parties.  
 
Entrepreneurial mass litigation can thus involve multi-bilateral relationships, which may comprise i) 
class members and attorney, ii) class members, attorney and entrepreneurial party, or iii) class mem-
bers, attorney, entrepreneurial party and representative organization that cannot be identified with 
the entrepreneurial party. This structure obviously complicates litigation and the traditional roles that 
are assigned to parties in litigation. It is added to an already convoluted litigation mechanism, in which 
the (un)quantifiable and (un)identified class members are or are not a formal party to the procedure.66 
The extent to which the benefits and/or drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation indeed occur is 
                                                             
 
62 See also sections 4.4.2, 5.4.3, and 6.4.2. 
63 See the third example in section 1.1.1.  
64 See the first example in section 1.1.1. 
65 Veljanovski 2012, p. 408.  
66 Cf. Voet 2015, p. 225. 
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closely tied to this structure, the collective redress mechanism, and the relevant rules and features of 
the jurisdiction in which it operates. Nevertheless, all aforementioned routes have in common that 
the entrepreneurial party provides or endorses a platform to assemble class members and increase 
leverage to pursue collective redress, in order to, eventually, share in the proceeds of the action in 
case of success. In the following sections, I turn to the potential effects of such an entrepreneurial 
objective. Where necessary, it will be mentioned to which type of entrepreneurial party it specifically 
applies.  
3.4 The upside: potential benefits 
3.4.1 Access to justice 
As explained in Chapter 2, ineffective access to justice has been one of the main drivers of the emer-
gence of collective redress mechanisms. However, in turn, the operation of such mechanisms strongly 
depends on the activities of the authorized initiators. Given its scale and the number of parties that 
are potentially involved, mass litigation is expensive and risky. For this and other reasons, as discussed 
in section 3.2.2, potential collective actions might not (all) be undertaken by those traditionally au-
thorized to do so. In this way, its objectives are not (fully) achieved. Enter the entrepreneurial parties. 
Even if the individual claims of class members are negatively valued, mass damage events are likely to 
constitute a (high) positive-value claim. The prospect of a potentially sizeable return on investment 
serves as the entrepreneurial party’s incentive to undertake action. Class members (or their repre-
sentative) do not have to pre-finance litigation costs nor run the risk of having to pay (a part of) the 
adverse costs. By taking over the funding and the risks, entrepreneurial parties facilitate or improve 
access to justice and, consequentially, pursue the effectivity objectives of the collective redress mech-
anism (compensation and deterrence). 
 
Access to justice by way of entrepreneurial parties addresses both financial and psychological barriers 
to effectuate individual claims. The reduction of financial obstacles provides the lubricant for the ac-
tual operation of the collective redress mechanism. It solves class members’ (or their representative’s) 
rational apathy and risk aversion.67 This can serve various types of parties: the one that lacks sufficient 
financial resources to engage in litigation, as well as the one that is risk averse and/or does not want 
to see the litigation costs on the balance sheet. Moreover, it can serve those that fear retaliation or 
have hopes of engaging in future business with the alleged wrongdoer. Finally, depending on the con-
struction, the parties do not have to invest effort and time, or might appreciate more hands on deck.68  
 
There is some empirical evidence to underpin the intuition or theory that (various types of) private 
litigation funding increase access to justice in the sense of litigation volume, although it very much 
depends on aspects such as the type of case, claimant and fee. This will be discussed in section 3.5.1. 
 
                                                             
 
67 Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, Visscher & Schepens 2010, Cassone & Ramello 2012, Faure 2013. 
68 Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 12-19. 
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Collective redress mechanisms also aim to address information deficiencies that obstruct access to 
justice (a lack of information on and knowledge of – the infringement of – their rights).69 Active entre-
preneurial parties can facilitate this function, as they invest time and energy in searching for and as-
sessing potential infringements.70 If an action is initiated, they provide information about the wrongful 
behaviour and the available remedy (join their action) through various channels, and assemble and 
organize class members.71 
 
Entrepreneurial parties can also help to resolve the free-rider problem. This problem can negatively 
affect the operation of collective redress mechanisms.72 Free riders are passive class members that do 
not (financially) contribute to another person’s action yet do benefit from the result thereof. In the 
case of a successful action, the free rider might benefit from the (settlement) award. If the action is 
limited to active class members only, free riders might still benefit, particularly if the judgment is bind-
ing or has some effect of precedence. They might be able to use the evidence or information gathered 
in the proceedings at the expense of or due to the investment of others. They might also benefit from 
the result of an action if it applies to the general market, such as a forced price reduction.73 If the other 
person’s action is unsuccessful, the free rider will not have spent its own resources. The free-rider 
problem also impedes the functioning of collective redress by representative organizations. It makes 
it more difficult to distribute the costs among class members, which might even lead to an action not 
being initiated. The free-rider problem thus coincides with the funding and cost distribution of collec-
tive redress. Moreover, active claimants’ support might be necessary to provide documents/evidence 
to underpin the action, and they might monitor the representative’s actions – in particular repeat 
players such as institutional investors – and create its representativeness. 
 
Free-riding behaviour can be completely eliminated under a mandatory system, where no opt-out 
possibility is granted, and an opt-out mechanism is often considered to be the second best option to 
reduce free riders as, in light of rational apathy, few individuals will opt out.74 This can be illustrated 
with a quote from Calabresi: 
 
‘When the matter [mass damage event] was brought to my attention, with the right to opt out, I 
didn’t think for one moment of opting out and bringing my own suit, for the same reasons that I 
previously had no knowledge or interest in the wrong that had been done me.’ 75 
 
                                                             
 
69 See section 2.3. 
70 See also section 3.4.3. 
71 Bentham Europe 2014, p. 4. 
72 Olson 1965, Stigler 1974, Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 60, Tzankova 2011, Van den Bergh 2013, Visser & 
Faure 2015. 
73 Van den Bergh 2013, p. 25. 
74 Rosenberg 2002, Eisenberg & Miller 2004, Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 60-63, Issacharoff & Miller 2012, 
p. 64-65, Faure 2013, p. 49, Van den Bergh 2013, p. 21. 
75 Calabresi 2012, p. 10.  
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However, an opt-out mechanism is not always available or politically viable, and the aforementioned 
reasoning does not apply, or applies to a lesser extent, to positive-value claims.76 Furthermore, an opt-
out mechanism does not necessarily solve the funding/costs distribution problem. The cure that en-
trepreneurial parties can provide is twofold. First, they reduce the (financial) threshold for individuals 
to participate, and therewith incentivize them to do so rather than await the action of others. Second, 
even when the contingency fee provides an insufficient incentive to participate, the entrepreneurial 
party might create or engage in a remuneration construction that does not require a contractual rela-
tionship with class members, such as the common fund.77 In this way, they cure the free-rider problem, 
thereby restoring the functioning of the collective redress device and improving the objective of de-
terrence. 
3.4.2 Competition 
Incentives to bring claims and therewith gain a profit have created a ‘vibrant group litigation sector’ in 
the USA. A successful Australian third-party funder has encouraged newcomers to the market which, 
in turn, has changed the Australian class action landscape: in the period 2014-2017, other law firms 
were involved in 77% of all filed class actions.78  
 
If entrepreneurial parties are allowed to operate on the legal services market, it adds various other 
key players (third-party funders, attorneys, SPVs). Depending on the specific market they serve,79 en-
trepreneurial parties might compete not only with each other, but also with the traditional legal ser-
vices providers such as attorneys that operate on hourly fees and the (semi-)public/private organiza-
tions that are already allowed to initiate collective redress, and with funding techniques such as legal 
expenses insurance.80 In such a competitive market, aggrieved parties have more choice, might get a 
better deal, and market failures might be remedied. Such a market is welcomed by law and economics 
scholars. They consider a monopoly by (semi-)public/private organizations, assisted by attorneys that 
operate on an hourly tariff, to be problematic.81 Particularly, if it is questionable whether such bodies 
also pursue their own interest due to political motives or opportunistic reasons. The assumption that 
(semi-)public bodies are ‘special human beings entirely unmoved by individual utility’, is a peculiar and 
unproven hypothesis.82 In the words of Stürner:  
 
‘Even non-profit organizations live on earth and are not angels’.83  
 
                                                             
 
76 See, for instance, Coffee 2008, p. 416. 
77 See section 3.2.1.  
78 Marcus 2013, p. 163, Waye & Morabito 2017, p. 159, Morabito 2017, p. 35. See also section 3.2.1. 
79 See also section 3.5.3. 
80 Faure 2013, p. 50; and Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 67 ff. 
81 Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 71, Faure 2013, p. 47, 50, Marcus 2013, p. 159, 163, Van den Bergh 2013, p. 
26 ff. 
82 Cassone & Ramello 2012. See also section 3.2.2. 
83 Stürner 2012, p. 84. 
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Entrepreneurial parties diversify the supply of funding mechanisms that are available to class members 
and can provide a safeguard against (political) capture as it is driven by different forces.84 A competi-
tive market may enhance the objectives of compensation (a ‘better deal’ by way of price competition), 
deterrence (the better detection of infringements) and efficiency (‘better litigation’ by way of quality 
competition – see also sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). 
 
As entrepreneurial parties enhance the market for legal services, competition among them and with 
attorneys that operate on hourly fees will increase as well. If the market is well established and freely 
competitive, it should have a downward pressure on the fees and/or percentages charged.85 An illus-
trative example of such an effect is the abandonment of solicitors’ monopoly in specific legal services 
in the late 1980s in England and Wales, which made the prices thereof drop by 20 to 28%.86 Further 
measures to abolish the complete monopoly on legal representation by solicitors and barristers are 
also said to have encouraged competition within the legal services market, improved efficiency, and 
reduced prices and decreased costs of legal services.87 Opposing views to this effect of competition 
have been expressed as well. For instance, in 2003, Brickman argued that the contingency fee market 
in personal injury cases is not price competitive. He links this to, inter alia, the entry barriers and the 
prohibition of the claim transfer of personal injury claims.88 Furthermore, even with a variety of (en-
trepreneurial) parties that operate in the collective redress market, it has a high degree of specialisa-
tion and concentration of legal services. The elements to generate perfect competition and create 
competitive rates might not be present.89  
 
It should also be noted that it remains unclear to what extent class members can compare the return 
value (the quality of services) for advertised percentages. This depends on their capacity/capability 
and the search costs – see also hereafter on ‘exit strategy’.90 Whether price competition takes place 
also depends on the specific features of the collective redress mechanism. For instance, Hensler states 
that for securities class actions price competition has emerged from i) auctioning class actions to the 
highest bidder (the law firm with the lowest percentage) and ii) a provision in the 1995 Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), pursuant to which the choice of lead plaintiff is based on the amount 
in dispute, which has incentivized law firms to compete (concerning prices) for those with the largest 
stake in such actions: institutional investors.91 Furthermore, the presence of competing parties, in par-
ticular those that object to (the lead counsel’s fees in) class action settlements is relevant for the fees 
awarded in class actions. Eisenberg, Miller & Germano have found that: 
 
                                                             
 
84 Coffee 2015, p. 5-7, De Mot, Faure & Visscher 2017, p. 51. 
85 Schaefer 2000, p. 194, Silver 2002, p. 2089, Abrams & Chen 2013, p. 1079. 
86 Paterson e.a. 1988, p. 363, with further references. See also section 5.2.2. 
87 Department for Constitutional Affairs, The Future of Legal Services: Putting Consumers First, CM 6679, October 2005.  
88 Brickman 2003. 
89 Waye & Morabito 2017, p. 164, Hensler 2010, p. 152-153, Schaefer 2000, p. 194.  
90 On search costs, see also section 3.4.5. 
91 Hensler 2010, p. 161, referring to an American Bar Association report that states that price is a key factor for institu-
tional investors in the selection of law firm. See also Perino 2006.  
63 
 
‘(…) cases with no objectors obtained a statistically significantly higher fee percentage on average 
than cases with objectors (p < 0.01), but a lower average fee award.’92  
 
Another positive effect of a competitive market is that a class member with a strong claim should be 
readily able to find someone to facilitate the pursuit of the claim,93 and those that are not satisfied 
with the choices of one can turn to another. Therewith, class members have an ‘exit strategy’ and gain 
control, which diminishes principal-agent problems (a misalignment of the interests of the initiator of 
the action and class members).94 Proof thereof is provided by Coffee, who describes how the afore-
mentioned change in the PSLRA led to increasing exits (opt outs) of institutional investors, which stim-
ulated competition in the sense of quality improvement (or less charges) of the entrepreneurial law-
yers.95  
3.4.3 Quality of claims 
One of the main said risks of entrepreneurial parties is that they stimulate frivolous litigation. This 
might refer to a variety of questionable litigation, such as speculative, nuisance, or abusive suits. Op-
ponents claim, for instance, that ‘the occasional jackpot’ encourages entrepreneurial parties with a 
substantial case portfolio to enter into speculative litigation (cases with an expected outcome that is 
marginally less certain than that of other cases).96 Furthermore, claimants have unique information 
about the quality of their claim. This information asymmetry might lead to adverse selection: only 
claims with weak merits are selected to be transferred.97 It is questionable to what extent such critique 
is correct. Entrepreneurial parties might equally increase the quality of cases being litigated and there-
with benefit the objectives of compensation (fair compensation), deterrence (reducing frivolous claims 
and thereby overdeterrence) and efficiency (no excessive, frivolous litigation). The characteristic of 
improving the quality of claims will be discussed in this section. The risk of inciting frivolous litigation 
will be further discussed in section 3.5.4. 
 
The increase in quality essentially results from the assumption that entrepreneurial parties do not like 
to lose money and, thus, will screen a case thoroughly – for which they might have the necessary 
expertise (see section 3.4.4) – and will only bring those that have a relatively high chance of success. 
Such an intake and due diligence assessment – and the monitoring of the case during proceedings – 
improves the quality of claims that are (continued to be) pursued. There is some empirical evidence 
that these assumptions are tenable, although most studies have focused on regular litigation.98 How-
ever, since the costs and risks of mass litigation are significantly higher, it is plausible that this line of 
reasoning applies to entrepreneurial mass litigation as well. 
 
                                                             
 
92 Eisenberg, Miller & Germano 2017, p. 959-960.  
93 Friel, Barnes & Bird 2016, p. 25. 
94 Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, p. 71, Van den Bergh 2013, p. 30. On the theory, see sections 3.4.5 and 3.5.5. 
95 Coffee 2008. 
96 Helland & Tabarrok 2003, p. 518, referring to Bernstein 1996.  
97 Abramowicz 2005, p. 743, referring to Akerlof’s seminal paper (1970) on the market for lemons. 
98 See, for instance, the overview in Fenn & Rickman 2010, p. 142 ff.  
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In 2003, Helland and Taborrok conducted an empirical study on US attorneys’ remuneration in per-
sonal injury cases, comparing the impact of contingency fees and hourly fee arrangements, inter alia, 
on the quality of cases. They convincingly found that limits on contingency fees led to an increase in 
the drop rate, that is, that more claimants initiated proceedings but later on dropped their claim. This 
drop rate, according to Helland and Taborrok, signals insufficient case screening. They attribute the 
increase in the drop rate to the lack of incentive for an ‘hourly fee attorney’ to not bring a claim with 
a low chance of success. This indicates, they conclude, that limits on contingency fees reduce legal 
quality, or, conversely, that contingency fees increase legal quality.99 Furthermore, the screening of 
cases signals the quality of a claim to the potential claimant. If litigation funding is rejected due to a 
lack of merits, this claimant might drop the case.100 The causality between the drop rate and screening 
has been contested by Fenn and Rickman. They argue that greater drops could equally imply that at-
torneys take their monitoring role more seriously once the case is in motion and information is pro-
duced.101 Nevertheless, in their review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic (based 
on US and UK data), Fenn and Rickman also conclude that lawyers who bear some risk through con-
tingency fees are likely to act as gatekeepers and screen cases more carefully than those who do not.102 
 
Accurately assessing claim value (its chance of success) can be challenging, however. The case studies 
of Hensler et al. show that it is complex and in the eye of the beholder.103 The case studies involved 
ten different class action lawsuits and, inter alia, assessed the underlying claims and the presentation 
thereof by both parties. According to Hensler: 
 
To the RAND research team, it was unclear which, if any, of the ten class actions were non-meritori-
ous and which were worthy of litigation. In each lawsuit, viewed from one perspective, the claims 
appeared meritorious and the behavior of the defendant blameworthy; viewed from another per-
spective, the claims appeared trivial or even trumped up, and the defendant's behavior seemed 
proper. Moreover, we have found that different readers' assessments of the merits of the cases often 
are diametrically opposed.104 
 
The screening process might be (further) improved if a third-party litigation funder is involved. Litiga-
tion funders often previously worked as attorneys or they intensively cooperate with attorneys. They 
are said to be ‘good funders [as they] have the ability to assess the value of suits.’105 Similarly, in 2016, 
an international law firm noted that: 
 
‘the involvement of a funder adds an additional layer of diligence at an early stage of the process, 
leading to greater rigour in risk and cost-benefit assessments.’106 
 
                                                             
 
99 Helland & Tabarrok 2003. 
100 Helland & Tabarrok 2003, p. 519, with further references.  
101 Fenn & Rickman 2010, p. 143. 
102 Fenn & Rickman 2010, p. 143, with further references. See, similarly, Faure & Hartlief 2012, p. 160 ff.  
103 Hensler 2010, describing empirical studies concluded by her RAND colleagues and herself. 
104 Hensler 2001. The case studies are elaborately discussed in Hensler e.a. 2000. 
105 Issacharoff & Miller 2012, p. 55. 
106 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, as quoted by Friel & Barnes 2016, p. 5. 
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The study by Veljanovski addresses the third-party litigation funding of regular and mass litigation. 
Based on documentation provided by and interviews with third-party litigation funders, Veljanovski 
found that only a small percentage of cases are selected for funding and that there is a considerable 
process of filtering out unmeritorious claims: 
 
[t]he selection of cases involves considerable due diligence from the management team, their legal 
advisers, and, often, forensic accountants. Funders with a private equity background, e.g., Calunius 
Capital and Therium, used financial modelling to select cases. Others used risk assessments, while 
others implemented more informal methods. Most of this time and effort was upfront and relatively 
fixed, regardless of the size of the claim.107 
 
A final aspect is the entrepreneurial party’s investigation of the opponent’s financial means and/or 
insurance. Whether an award or settlement can be recovered in the case of success is an important 
criterion for funding or pursuing a claim.108 This aspect of entrepreneurial mass litigation is mainly a 
funder’s interest and is subject to the risk of imperfect information and an impossibility to predict the 
future (assets). However, it adds to the quality of a claim as it avoids ineffective litigation. On the other 
hand, this neglects certain objectives such as developing the law and providing restorative justice. 
Furthermore, the asset assessment might also lead to adverse selection. This risk will be discussed in 
section 3.5.3. 
3.4.4 (E)quality of arms 
As the stakes in mass litigation are high, allegedly liable parties might just take a deep breath, dip into 
their deep pockets, and engage in strategical conduct to subdue, intimidate or outspend claimants.109 
They might refrain from doing so when they are facing a financially sound and professionally equipped 
opponent, not someone that foregoes litigation due to financial or psychological restrictions. Not only 
does this increase the quality of litigation, but it also levels the playing field between both opponents, 
thereby creating equality of arms. The availability of funding furthermore adds muscle to the already 
countervailing power of a class that challenges a powerful defendant. This potential beneficial charac-
teristic of entrepreneurial mass litigation does not only apply to court litigation, but to settlement 
negotiations as well. Veljanovski notes that a defendant might be more willing to settle as it realizes 
that the claimants, backed by a litigation funder, can bear the financial risk of taking a case to court.110 
Hence, the professionalism of entrepreneurial parties might enhance the objective of efficiency in var-
ious ways. 
  
This benefit particularly concerns repeat players – as opposed to one-shotters, those that only occa-
sionally engage in litigation. The professionalism of repeat players in general was first recognized by 
Galanter in 1974, who summed up that:  
                                                             
 
107 Veljanovski 2012, p. 420, 439-441. See similarly, for instance, Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 108-111, 116-117, Bentham 
Europe 2014, p. 4, and sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.1. 
108 Veljanovski 2012, p. 420, Pirozzolo 2014, p. 164, Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 112. 
109 Yeazell 2004, p. 955. For consumers, various studies report their feeling of inferiority to businesses, which causes 
trust issues in legal proceedings; see Creutzfeldt 2013, p.235. 
110 Veljanovski 2012, p. 439. 
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1) repeat players’ litigation experience creates ‘advanced intelligence’ to structure their next 
transaction and build a record; 
2) repeat players have expertise, access to specialists and enjoy economies of scale; 
3) they have the opportunity to develop relationships with decision-makers such as courts; 
4) are incentivized to establish and maintain credibility and a ‘bargaining reputation’; 
5) are able to (adopt strategies to) spread litigation risks over more cases; 
6) utilize resources to influence rule-making (e.g. lobbying); 
7) have a long-term vision and therefore a concern for the rules that govern future cases of the 
same kind; ‘anything that will favourably influence the outcome of future cases is a worth-
while result’, which might lead them to, for instance, select those cases which are likely to 
produce favourable rules; 
8) or those cases that make a tangible difference; and  
9) invest the matching resources to secure such favourable outcomes.111 
 
Indeed, many entrepreneurial parties are repeat players and are said to have a team and network of 
experts to help build the case and pursue the claim. In case of cooperation with an attorney they are 
an extra key player that manages the litigation (budget), assists or instructs lawyers, and assists and 
informs claimants.112 Yeazell notes that entrepreneurial lawyering has developed the American plain-
tiff bar from one that would be ‘systematically outgunned’ by the defence bar, to an equally capitalized 
and skilled plaintiff bar.113 A similar development is observed in Australia. As mentioned in sections 
3.2.1 and 3.4.2, two law firms, often backed by litigation funders, have long been the main suppliers 
of class actions. This is gradually changing, however, as between 2014 to 2017, other law firms were 
involved in 77% of all filed class actions.114 Although Morabito found that 62% of all the law firms 
involved had no prior experience in dealing with such actions, some of them only act in class actions 
supported by litigation funders and Australia’s main litigation funder (IMF Bentham, active in class 
actions since 2001) remains the largest supporter of class actions (one out of every three funded class 
actions).115 
3.4.5 Alignment of interests 
An objection that is often raised against entrepreneurial parties is that they pursue their own interests 
rather than those of the class members. The principal-agent theory, which will be discussed in this 
section, argues that the problem of conflicting interests can be solved by way of a result-based remu-
neration as it aligns the interests of both parties. The potential insufficiency of this alignment will be 
discussed in section 3.5.5. 
 
                                                             
 
111 Galanter 1974, p. 98-103. 
112 Bentham Europe 2014 (on the Australian experiences), p. 4. 
113 Yeazell 2004, p. 955 and 958. 
114 Morabito 2017, p. 35. See also section 3.5.1. 
115 Morabito 2017, p. 33-36.  
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An agency relationship is one in which the principal benefits from the performance of a task by the 
agent in exchange for payment, such as an aggrieved individual that engages an attorney.116 The prin-
cipal-agent theory is based on the assumption that the principal and agent both pursue different in-
terests, and that the principal does not have the information to observe, assess and control the exper-
tise, efforts and goals of the agent (information asymmetry).117 If the interests of both are not aligned 
and the principal lacks certain information, the agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately, 
that is, in its own interest instead of that of the principal. The agency theory focuses on determining 
the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship.118 One of the options to reduce 
the costs that ensue from the information asymmetry (the costs of searching/assessing/controlling the 
agent) is to make the agent’s remuneration dependent on the output of its efforts, such as a contin-
gency fee arrangement.119 The agent shares in the profits that the principal wants to have maximized. 
When effort is unobservable, such an outcome-based contract is said to be the efficient approach to 
avoid a conflict of interests.120  
 
Mass litigation deviates from the classical principal-agent situation since it concerns various principals 
instead of one, whose preferences might be heterogeneous. When the interests of the aggrieved in-
dividuals are aligned, the theory applies one on one.121 Furthermore, according to Posner, even if the 
complications that arise from a heterogeneous group of principals are taken into account, the basic 
lessons of the agency theory still hold true.122  
 
Pursuing their claim against minimal costs is the main interest of class members. Generally, they are 
unable to directly observe and assess the representative’s level of effort, although it depends on the 
situation (see hereafter). Class members might lack both factual and legal knowledge: is the claim 
viable, is the legal assistance necessary, are there cheaper alternatives to pursue the claim, is the rep-
resentative a professional, what are the efforts it needs to undertake to pursue the claim, what are 
the costs thereof, and so on.123 Furthermore, if the action does not lead to (satisfactory) compensa-
tion, is this because the claim was unmeritorious or because the agent did not make enough of an 
effort? Is the amount of the received compensation equal to its actual worth minus the actual costs of 
pursuing it, or is the organization’s portion too large?  
                                                             
 
116 See, for instance, Rickman 1994, p. 35, and Posner 2000, p. 1. 
117 Posner 2000, p. 4, Kreps 1990 (Chapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives), and Mas-Colell & Whinston 1995, p. 
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If the agent is an attorney that is paid by the hour, he has two types of interest. The attorney’s main 
interest is to maximize his remuneration. According to the agency theory and due to the class mem-
bers’ lack of information, the attorney might perform his task against a minimum of effort. Hourly fees 
tend to induce shirking (the agent engages in little effort), billing too many hours, taking unnecessary 
actions in order to write bills or giving a biased assessment of the quality of the claim.124 Obviously, it 
is also the attorney’s job to protect the principals’ interests. In that protection, he is bound by ethical 
and professional codes, and is subject to general professional liability rules. However, merely losing a 
case does not constitute culpability. Hence, reputational risks and personal characteristics aside, the 
attorney does not bear the risk of an outcome that is unfortunate for class members.  
 
To solve this agency problem, the class members can invest in monitoring costs to observe the agent’s 
behaviour. The extent to which (perfect) monitoring can take place depends on the type of class mem-
ber, representative, case, and the design of the collective redress mechanism, such as additional mon-
itoring by the court. For instance, in the case of negative-value claims class members’ interest might 
be too low to warrant incurring monitoring costs, or they might be incentivized to freeride if it is diffi-
cult to spread the costs among the class members. Furthermore, even if monitoring is possible, how 
do the class members assess the accounts as stated by the attorney on the time and effort spent? If 
the principals cannot (fully) observe the agent’s conduct, another solution is to better align the inter-
ests by way of an outcome-based remuneration. This provides the agent with the incentive to obtain 
optimal compensation.125 Both the entrepreneurial party and class members now have the same in-
terest: as high proceeds (compensation or a percentage thereof) as possible, in a speedy, inexpensive 
and efficient way. If the entrepreneurial party is an additional party, such as a third-party funder, it 
can also monitor the attorney’s or representative’s actions.126  
3.5 The dark side of the coin: potential risks 
3.5.1 Claim culture 
In this first of five sections that discuss the potential risks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, I will dis-
cuss the risk of creating or sustaining a compensation culture, also known as litigation or claim cul-
ture.127 This risk can be considered the opposite side of the benefit that entrepreneurial parties facili-
tate access to justice and increase the quality of claims.128  
 
Urban legends regarding the McCoffee spill case and a microwaved poodle aside, it is cases such as 
the following that have incited opposition against (entrepreneurial) mass litigation: 
 
                                                             
 
124 Rickman 1994, Emons 2000, Visscher & Schepens 2010, Deffains & Langlais 2011; and Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 
2011, p. 65, all with further references. 
125 See the literature mentioned in the previous footnote. See also Ulen 2011, p. 194. 
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127 Some parts of this section are based on Tillema 2017. 
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‘Recently, Ferrero U.S.A. settled lawsuits brought by two moms who said they were deceived by 
health claims made on jars of the chocolate hazelnut spread Nutella. Yes, if you bought Nutella think-
ing it was spinach in a jar – actually even if you bought it because you find it delicious – you are a 
winner.’129 
 
European opponents label cases such as these as ‘American situations’; an ominous motto to oppose 
the introduction of certain American elements into European legal systems.130 One of the situations 
the expression refers to is the alleged American compensation culture, which is boosted by entrepre-
neurial parties. Not uncommonly, however, the opponents fail to underpin such statement or omit 
additional facts. Furthermore, such opposition renders the question of how to label, for instance, po-
litical or regulatory activities aimed at banning any reference to meat on the packaging of vegetarian 
meat replacements.131 European situations?  
 
Obviously, beneath the surface of empty rhetoric might lie serious issues. Compensation culture, how-
ever, is a rather ambiguous phenomenon.132 The relevance of the question of whether or not entre-
preneurial parties increase mass litigation is not always clear. Posing such a question suggests a vision 
on the desirable level of litigation: when is access to justice excessive? The main concern seems to be 
that entrepreneurial parties increase the number of claims and the amount of damages. The policy 
documents as described in Chapter 2 also focus on the concept of fairness, that is, litigation is excessive 
if the action is abusive or unethical, such as pursuing frivolous claims. These effects might increase 
courts’ workload (inefficiency), deteriorate a jurisdiction’s business climate, reduce trust in its judicial 
and legal system, and impose disproportionate costs on industry (overdeterrence and unfair compen-
sation): the fear of litigation might lead to defensive behaviour, high insurance costs, harm competitive 
behaviour and/or negatively impact innovation. Furthermore, the costs of litigation and/or compen-
sation might be redistributed.133 In the following sub-section, I will discuss the element of excessive 
access to justice. Potential abusive behaviour will be discussed as a separate risk, in section 3.5.4.  
 
In general, ‘[b]asic economics dictates that if the costs of litigation are reduced, there will be more of 
it.’134 Entrepreneurial parties do not necessarily reduce costs, but facilitate access to justice by taking 
over the pre-financing of costs and the cost risk.135 This reduces the threshold for a claimant to pursue 
his claim. This is why, generally, contingency fees are said to increase litigation.136 Logic dictates that 
                                                             
 
129 D. Segal, ‘A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits’, New York Times 6 May 2012, as quoted by Marcus 2013, p. 170.  
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the same applies to entrepreneurial parties in mass litigation, where the potential to increase the vol-
ume of litigation is amplified by the fact that entrepreneurial parties might actively search for claims, 
raise publicity, and approach class members.137 On the other hand, the boost in litigation might be 
mitigated by the fact that entrepreneurial parties will only take on quality claims,138 rather settle than 
litigate,139 and pursue only those claims of a particular type and value.140 Moreover, an increase in 
mass litigation might go hand in hand with a decrease in regular litigation.141 An increase in mass liti-
gation might furthermore be unrelated to the activity of entrepreneurs but caused by other factors, 
such as a financial scandal or crisis. 
 
In short, the extent to which entrepreneurial parties indeed increase (mass) litigation depends on sev-
eral variables and is difficult to (in)validate. According to law and economics scholars, the overall result 
cannot be predicted theoretically.142 Empirical evidence of the effect of entrepreneurial funding on 
litigation volume is scarce.143 Fenn & Rickman attribute this scarcity to the difficulty of gaining (access 
to) sufficiently detailed data and the lack of variation in funding methods in order to make a diligent 
comparison.144 For mass litigation, an additional reason is the lack of a sufficiently large number of 
cases.145 Even in the USA, real evidence on, inter alia, the volume of litigation is scarce,146 but some 
data is available. For instance, in 2004, Galanter showed the rise of class action filings as of the 1990s 
(particularly tort and securities class actions) as opposed to the ‘vanishing trial’: the decline in the rate 
and number of regular civil trials in the US.147 The study concerned cases in both state and federal 
courts. Galanter attributes the said increase to changing strategies by defendants that started using 
the class action as an instrument to manage the risk of multiple claims. Moreover, he connects the rise 
of class action filings to the decline in regular trials: 
 
‘when lawyers undertake to bundle claims in “high trial” areas like torts (…) into class actions, we 
might expect fewer trials. Conversely, the withering of civil rights class actions may be reflected in 
the great surge of filings and trials in individual civil rights cases.’148 
 
In his reflection on Galanter’s data, Burbank notes, however, that the inference is premature and 
should exclude, for instance, those class actions that would not have been litigated but for the class 
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action (e.g. negative-value claims) and those non-class action mass settlements that did not neces-
sarily lower the trial rate.149 Another empirical study that has provided data on the volume and growth 
of class actions is that by Pace et al. (2007) on insurance class actions.150 The study reaches a similar 
conclusion as Galanter’s, that there has been a steep increase in (this specific type of) class actions as 
of 1993. However, the researchers also identify a considerable drop in the increase as of 2002. In con-
trast, Willging and Lee – examining data on federal class actions in the period of 2001-2006 – have 
shown that (these types of) actions have continued to rise considerably.151  
  
Hence, general predictions and statements on litigation rates cannot easily be made. More im-
portantly, none of these studies specifically address the effect of attorney remuneration on litigation 
volume. As for regular litigation, Yeazell has linked this question to developments in (privatized) pre-
trial investigation and, to meet the high costs thereof, the restructuring of the legal profession. For 
instance, he describes how practice groups have emerged (lawyers practising in groups rather than 
alone), building portfolios and utilizing part of their income from a range of work to invest in larger, 
less predictable cases. In addition, an active and well-functioning referral market has emerged: 
  
‘with the less-well-capitalized practices getting referrals of cases too small for the big fish and the 
high-end practice getting referrals of large-value, large-investment cases from small practices.’152 
 
Over decades, such financing and strategy practices have developed the plaintiff bar from one that 
would be ‘systematically outgunned’ by the defence bar, to an equally capitalized and skilled plaintiff 
bar.153 The effect thereof, according to Yeazell, is that fewer cases go to trial and they are settled 
instead: 
 
‘In a world in which the plaintiffs lawyer had made virtually no investment in pretrial investigation or 
discovery (perhaps because he or she could not afford any), trial, if the lawyer could hang on that 
long, was a rational choice – there was a very small chance of winning, but there was little chance of 
winning without it. Further, there was little need for continuing investment and the continuing reeval-
uation that decision entails. In a world of significant pretrial investment – continuing investment 
made by both sides – settlement looks different.’154 
 
There is some Australian evidence available on the effects of third-party funding on the volume of class 
actions. Based on empirical research by Morabito on federal class actions in the period 1992-2009 and 
backed by other data, Waye and Morabito describe how the involvement of third-party litigation fund-
ing has increased significantly in the past decade. Nonetheless, the overall number of class actions has 
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only slightly increased.155 Waye and Morabito explain how, around 2007, the number of class actions 
had started to decline as they had become too expensive and risky for law firms – which are not al-
lowed to engage in contingency fees and have limited access to capital markets. Backed by litigation 
funders, however, their willingness to initiate and engage in class actions returned.156 Waye and Mo-
rabito’s conclusion is supported by another empirical study. In 2013, Abrams and Chen combined data 
from Australia’s largest litigation funder, IMF, with published case law. Although their methodology 
might require caution as to the results,157 they found no statistically significant effect of litigation fund-
ing on the volume of class actions.158 Finally, in 2017, Morabito provided some first evidence that re-
futed the prediction that the number of class actions would increase after introducing a common fund 
scheme in federal class actions.159 
 
Finally, as to the effect of attorneys’ fees on the amount of recoveries, the empirical studies of Eisen-
berg et al. are relevant. The researchers have conducted three empirical studies on attorneys’ fees in 
American class actions in federal and state courts. None of the studies found robust evidence that (the 
mean or median) recovery for plaintiffs has increased over time (1993-2013).160  
3.5.2 Inefficient competition  
As discussed in section 3.4.2, the potentially high return on investment in mass litigation might in-
crease competition between (entrepreneurial) parties. Such a surge might also produce the adverse 
effect of inefficient competition. Competing (entrepreneurial) parties will try to attract class members 
through various channels.161 This might result in confused individuals as to what party will better serve 
their interests, an information asymmetry that is detrimental to consumers in particular.162 Moreover, 
the potentially ensuing separate collective actions, whether simultaneously or sequentially filed, might 
fully or partially overlap if the initiators invoke different legal grounds, seek different types of relief, or 
represent a specific sub-class only.163 If their consent is not required, class members might be included 
in more than one action, or be ‘bombarded with notices from the multiple suits’.164 Such a multiplicity 
of proceedings obviously negatively affects the objective of efficiency as it leads to more cases, in-
creased costs for parties and society, possibly inconsistent adjudication and finality problems. This 
inefficiency problem of competing actions will be discussed in this section. Competing actions might 
also result in inefficient settlements (reverse auction, collusive settlements). The latter risk is related 
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to abusive behaviour that originates from a conflict of interests165 and does not necessarily affect the 
objective of efficiency, but rather that of (fair) compensation, and this will be discussed in section 
3.5.5.3. 
 
In the US, competing class actions are common. An estimated 20-50% of mass disputes result in com-
peting class actions.166 In Australia, competition is less common but not entirely absent. In 2012, Mo-
rabito conducted an empirical study on 45 Australian competing class actions with regard to 17 mass 
disputes.167 Although cautiously, given the lack of reliable data on the overall numbers, he estimates 
that 12.8% of all federal class actions are competing class actions. In 2016, he reported a slight increase 
to 15%.168 Australia’s class action is an opt-out device, but allows for closed class actions that only 
include those class members that have entered into a litigation funding arrangement.169 Morabito re-
futes the assertion that competing entrepreneurial parties that seek the most profitable form of liti-
gation are responsible for competing class actions, by observing that two of the 17 mass disputes in-
cited (nine) competing class actions by different law firms in which only non-monetary relief was 
sought.170 Furthermore, while endorsing closed class actions has increased the number of competing 
ones, 40% of those cases did not involve a third-party litigation funder. Moreover, the endorsement 
has reduced the number of overlapping class actions.171  
 
In his evaluation of the case law on competing class actions, Morabito concludes that the risk that class 
members are included in multiple actions filed by competing attorneys is mitigated not so much by 
way of judicial (pro)activity, but due to the competing lawyers’ prompt action and cooperative con-
duct. As a consequence: 
 
(…) Australian class members have not been the recipients of multiple opt out notices and/or settle-
ment notices from competing class actions and, as a result, have not been confronted with the chal-
lenging, if not daunting, task of understanding the practical ramifications of being bound at the same 
time by more than one class action filed by different lawyers with respect to the same dispute and 
then determining what steps to take, with respect to the proceedings in question, to advance their 
interests.172 
 
In both jurisdictions, several solutions have been implemented to deal with competing classes, such 
as consolidating proceedings and maintaining separate representation and funding, multidistrict liti-
gation statutes, or the appointment of a lead counsel.173 Hence, this risk is very much linked to the 
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design of the collective redress mechanism. An issue of competition that is related to opt-out mecha-
nisms is that those parties that lose the competition battle might incite class members to opt out and 
pursue their own action.174 Opting out is anything but abusive, but might cause inefficiency if it is fol-
lowed by a competing (class) action and hinders finality (a defendant’s incentive to settle), and might 
reduce the objectives of deterrence or compensation if it is not followed by another action or settle-
ment. In the USA, however, the frequency of objectors and opt-outs is low. Empirical research by Ei-
senberg, Miller & Germano shows that between 1993 and 2014, 0.115% of the class in the studied 
cases (n=286) filed any objection, and the opt-out rates averaged 0.544% of the class (n=244).175 
  
The effect of the introduction of a US-inspired common fund on the level of competing Australian class 
actions has been tested by Morabito in 2017. The (limited)176 data suggest that the court’s aim to 
reduce closed classes (and, therewith, competition) by allowing a common fund seems to work, as the 
number of open classes has risen.177 
3.5.3 Adverse selection (cherry picking) 
The other side of a thorough screening and selection process, as discussed in section 3.4.3, is that it 
might lead to an adverse selection problem: only particular cases are selected. Since entrepreneurial 
parties’ (main) goal is to maximise the return on investment, they are likely to select those with the 
largest expected return on investment and not – necessarily – meritorious claims that have the ‘most 
culpable defendant’ or that could benefit from funding in order to enable access to justice.178 Hence, 
the benefit of improving access to justice (and therewith the objectives of compensation, deterrence 
and efficiency) might be limited to certain types of cases.  
 
First of all, there is only a selection problem if the market is insufficiently competitive and/or alterna-
tive initiatives are unavailable, such as (semi-)public bodies that resolve those cases that are less at-
tractive for entrepreneurial parties. For instance, Coffee has observed that large law firms might pur-
sue the largest class actions, yet boutique firms or start-ups cover the small(er) ones.179 
 
An entrepreneurial party’s selection can include the type and risk/complexity (legal or factual ease) of 
the case, its amount in dispute (a high value will lead to a potentially spectacular return), its impact 
(high-profile cases are likely to acquire media coverage and might require less efforts to attract class 
members), and/or the opponent’s potential assets (a defendant with deep pockets to actually recover 
a settlement or an award in the case of success). Indeed, entrepreneurial lawyers are said to turn down 
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cases with a relatively low value.180 They might be risk-averse and ‘tend to drop low-stake, low-prob-
ability cases if the success fee does not justify the risk that they are ‘buying’’.181 Abrams & Chen have 
reported this effect for Australia; they show that litigation funders need a minimum amount in dis-
pute.182 A large portfolio might mitigate this risk, as the aim is then to maximize profit in the portfolio 
as a whole.  
 
If a collective redress mechanism is designed particularly to serve negative-value claims, they might 
not be the ones that benefit from the entrepreneur’s activities. However, the aggregation of a range 
of negative-value claims will often constitute a positive-value claim and possibly exceed a funder’s 
required minimum amount in dispute. Nevertheless, entrepreneurial parties might still focus on those 
cases with the largest potential value, as aggregate litigation is normally more complex, time-consum-
ing and costly.  
 
As to the types of cases, various American and Australian data show that securities class actions are 
the most popular type for funders. Commercial litigation is popular, too, as such claims are said to be 
well documented.183 Not surprisingly, given their business model, entrepreneurial parties are less likely 
to pursue claims where no monetary relief is sought. For instance, IMF Bentham states that it does not 
fund claims where the legal remedy sought is exclusively injunctive, declaratory or other non-mone-
tary relief.184  
3.5.4 Abusive behaviour  
The large profits that entrepreneurial parties can obtain in mass litigation might incentivize them to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour. This affects the objectives of (fair) compensation, deterrence 
(overdeterrence), and efficiency (excessive, frivolous litigation).185 Abusive behaviour can take various 
shapes. The most often expressed fear is that entrepreneurial parties will pursue unmeritorious claims 
with the intention of coercing the alleged wrongdoer into a settlement; this is also known as a black-
mail settlement and frivolous litigation. A blackmail settlement differs from the settlements that will 
be discussed in section 3.5.5, as a blackmail settlement does not necessarily stem from a conflict of 
interests between the entrepreneurial party and class members, but from a bad motive in general. 
Abusive conduct can, furthermore, be displayed by way of aggressive marketing/selling tactics; this is 
also known as ambulance chasing, and by putting forward an empty shell in order to escape a potential 
adverse costs award. These three topics (blackmail settlement, ambulance chasing and empty shells) 
will be discussed subsequently in this section.  
 
                                                             
 
180 Visscher & Schepens, referring to Kritzer 1997. 
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In 1971, Handler substantiated the blackmail settlement thesis.186 If it is cheaper to settle than to go 
to court, occur litigation costs and potentially suffer reputational and internal damage, theoretically, 
a rational defendant might enter into a settlement even though the underlying claim lacks merits. 
Obviously, such practices are deemed undesirable. If ‘defendants who maintain their innocence have 
no practical alternative but to settle, they have been de facto deprived of their constitutional right to 
a trial on the merits.’187 Any compensation that follows from such a settlement lacks legal justification. 
Furthermore, it is said to have a broader negative effect: 
 
[t]his will result not only in undesirable distribution effects but also in a loss of trust in the legal order 
leading to costly evasion reactions of the defendants and excessive production costs of goods thereby 
causing efficiency losses. It is thus questionable whether the broader social benefits of class action as 
a result of higher deterrence exceed the associated social losses which result from increased possibil-
ities of lawsuits with low success rates and large settlement options which are undesired from a legal 
policy perspective.188 
 
However, there are various issues that weaken the theoretical underpinning and/or mitigate the risk 
of blackmail settlements and frivolous litigation. They relate to the definition, source and proof 
thereof. 
 
The first issue is the lack of a clear definition of the concept of unmeritorious or frivolous litigation. 
When can a settlement be qualified as blackmail? Is a claim with a low success probability due to 
uncertainty concerning the (interpretation of) law actually abusive? And what is ‘low’ in this regard? 
Might a settlement in a small-claim class action that hardly benefits the claimants, but leads to exces-
sive fees for the entrepreneurial party, be considered ‘a reason for thinking that a defendant is right 
to settle, not for thinking that a defendant is coerced’?189 Silver explains how a blackmail settlement 
is a metaphorical rather than a legal concept, emphasizing that no theory has actually identified bad 
motives or how settlement demands relate to coercion.190  
 
Related to this aspect is the lack of clarity as to which (combination of) feature(s) create(s) the coercive 
power of a class action. Is it the mere fact that it is driven by an entrepreneurial party in search of a 
jackpot? Or is it – also – the large litigation costs of a class action, particularly in a jurisdiction such as 
the USA with a costly pre-trial discovery and information gathering phase? Is it – also – attributable to 
the American rule (parties bear their own litigation costs) which might incite claimants to bring claims 
with a low success probability, and/or punitive damages?191 Does it – also – follow from the uncer-
tainty on the (interpretation of) law?192 Is there a lack of (procedural) safeguards to prevent abuse? 
Can reputational damage and judicial certification (and the appellate review thereof) provide such 
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safeguards? For instance, Silver argues that even if Handler’s argument is true that abusive behaviour 
constitutes a due process violation, this argument is no longer persuasive as changes in the class ac-
tions regulation/management make ‘this form of blackmail exceedingly unlikely. Most trial judges ap-
ply the certification requirements scrupulously, and appellate judges eagerly correct their mistakes on 
interlocutory review.’193 
 
Finally, there is little evidence on the existence of blackmail settlements or engagement in frivolous 
litigation by entrepreneurial parties. Instead, unmeritorious claims might not pass the thorough 
screening by such parties, as discussed in section 3.4.3. Various scholars have stated and/or shown 
that neither economic models nor empirical evidence support the conventional wisdom that contin-
gency fee arrangements lead to an increase in frivolous litigation.194  
 
Nevertheless, various incidents can be and have been labelled as abusive. An illustrative example of a 
questionable motive to fund a case – although it does not concern a class action – is the case brought 
by Hulk Hogan against the tabloid publisher Gawker. Hulk Hogan was funded by a third party that held 
a grudge against Gawker. According to Gawker’s attorneys, this led to some questionable litigation 
strategies, such as selecting a legal ground that would prevent Gawker from using insurance pay outs, 
and turning down ‘several large settlement offers’. This was deemed peculiar as Hogan was allegedly 
experiencing financial problems; ‘taking a multi-million dollar settlement appears to make more sense 
in that situation than taking a case to court with no guarantee of a victory.’195 However, as Hogan’s 
claim was eventually successful, the claim obviously did not lack merits. The motive of this particular 
funder might have been different or more than a mere entrepreneurial one, but, here too, the norma-
tive problem is debatable. Is this particular motive to support an apparently meritorious claim undue 
or inefficient? How does this relate to litigation in which we have no idea or interest as to where the 
money to litigate comes from? Obviously, the perspective changes if the entrepreneurial motive leads 
to abusive behaviour such as bribing ‘in-house’ plaintiffs, objectors to a settlement approval, experts, 
witnesses, and so on. Such abusive behaviour is also related to the competition between entrepre-
neurial parties. An illustrative example is the Milberg, Weiss scandal, in which four attorneys of this 
law firm (specializing in securities class actions) were imprisoned for paying ‘kickback payments’ to 
their ‘in-house’ plaintiffs in order to incentivize them to act as lead plaintiff and in order to improve 
their chances of being selected as class counsel.196 
 
Another type of abusive behaviour is ambulance chasing and aggressive marketing techniques, 
whether or not amplified by the possibility to award or receive referral fees. Ambulance chasing is the 
negative side of an entrepreneurial party’s active search for (mass harm) claims. It refers to the situa-
tion in which competing parties try to find claims by all possible means through various (media) chan-
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nels. The term originates from personal injury lawyers that needed to operate on a high-volume ba-
sis,197 but the risk applies similarly to entrepreneurial repeat players in class actions. A modern-day 
example is solicitation by way of robocalling (automated telephone calls) that reduce entering into a 
class action to merely pushing a phone button. In the USA, there has even been a class action filed 
against robocallers that aimed to solicitate claimants for a class action.198 The risk of ambulance chas-
ing also relates to competition between entrepreneurial parties.199 
 
A final example of abusive behaviour concerns an intentional lack of financial means, in particular by 
supporting or putting forward an empty shell. This risk entails three aspects. First, from the defend-
ants’ perspective, there is the risk of not being able to recover an adverse costs order. A possible im-
munity of class members from such costs might leave a successful defendant in an unfavourable posi-
tion.200 Second, from the class members’ perspective, a settlement or award paid to the entrepreneur-
ial party or empty shell might evaporate in the case of insolvency or fraud. Third, also from the class 
members’ perspective, the entrepreneurial party might lack the financial means to fully pursue or sup-
port the action. Obviously, an entrepreneurial party’s lack of sufficient financial means is not neces-
sarily a result of its abusive behaviour. However, if litigation is deemed vexatious and the entrepre-
neurial party had substantial control over the litigation, various courts have held litigation funders to 
be liable for adverse costs even though they were not a formal party to the litigation.201 An illustrative 
example is the action against Walt Disney, where the third-party funder of a shell company’s claim was 
held liable for Walt Disney’s attorney fees. The court deemed the claim ‘implausible, at best’, the pur-
suit thereof ‘objectively unreasonable’, and the appeal legally and factually unreasonable. Further-
more, the funder had testified that it knew at the outset of litigation that the plaintiff had no assets, 
and that it had the ability to direct and control litigation. Hence, it was held liable for the adverse 
litigation costs. In order to assess the extent of its liability, the funder was ordered to disclose the 
funding agreement and to identify data on, inter alia, its investors.202 
3.5.5 Conflict of interests 
3.5.5.1 Two types of inadequate settlements 
In the previous section, I discussed abusive (blackmail) settlements, where a defendant settles in order 
to prevent a worse scenario, such as high litigation costs or reputational damage. There are two other 
types of settlements that are deemed undesirable: premature and collusive settlements. In both situ-
ations, the settlement amount is set too low, and therewith creates underdeterrence and unfair com-
pensation, while it benefits the entrepreneurial party. Both types of settlement result from a conflict 
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of interests between class members (principals) and their agent, the entrepreneurial party. As ex-
plained in section 3.4.5, an agency problem arises from an information asymmetry and the inability or 
incapacity of class members to observe, control and evaluate their agent’s behaviour. If they could do 
so, the agent might put in the desired effort and act in their interests. Another method to mitigate the 
agency problem is a result-based remuneration. However, the alignment of interests that such remu-
neration constitutes might not suffice. The size (the amount in dispute), complexity and costs of mass 
litigation might still incentivize the entrepreneurial party to act in his own interest: to ensure a – suf-
ficient – return on investment, possibly at the expense of class members’ interests by settling for too 
little.  
 
In the USA, most class actions are settled.203 In Australia, too, the involvement of third-party litigation 
funders has attributed to an increase in the percentage of settled class actions.204 If conflicting inter-
ests and the inability of class members (or other safeguards) to identify or repair the conflict render 
such settlements inadequate, this obstructs the objectives of (fair) compensation and/or deterrence 
(underdeterrence; such a settlement does not force the defendant to internalize all of the damage 
caused).205 
3.5.5.2 Premature settlement  
In theory, an entrepreneurial motive (result-based remuneration) creates an incentive to enter into a 
settlement as early as possible, as opposed to the situation in which an attorney operates under an 
hourly fee. By doing so, the entrepreneurial party receives its share of the proceeds, ensuring the cash 
inflow, and avoids further costs of negotiation or litigation.206 This incentive might be enhanced by the 
high amount in dispute in mass litigation; an early (low) settlement might still amount to a relatively 
large return on investment, which does not – necessarily – correspond with the efforts that were put 
into the case.207 
 
An early settlement is not necessarily inefficient or undesirable. On the contrary, under normal cir-
cumstances it is preferable over litigation as it limits litigation costs and efforts from the perspective 
of class members, defendants as well as the judiciary and society.208 Nevertheless, an early settlement 
is considered inadequate if claimants would have been better off going to trial given the expected 
value of the claim.209 Although this expected value might be difficult to estimate (see also section 3.4.3) 
‘one may be fairly confident that the extent of the compensation for the attorneys involved is hand-
some and that for the class members, less so.’210 
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The extent to which an entrepreneurial party indeed enters into an early settlement depends on vari-
ous factors, as identified in various theoretical and empirical studies.211 First, the risk of an inadequate 
settlement is enhanced if the entrepreneurial party controls the decision-making process and is insuf-
ficiently monitored. Although the actual level of control depends on the specific funding agreement 
and/or the design of the collective redress mechanism (opt-out or opt-in), the entrepreneurial party 
can be expected to exercise at least some influence on the decision-making process.212 As mentioned, 
monitoring the agent’s behaviour can prevent a conflict of interests. This can be done by class mem-
bers (in particular professional, well-informed ones), the attorney (if he is not affiliated with the en-
trepreneurial party), and by intervening courts (if the settlement requires approval and it is not moti-
vated by self-interest).213 Moreover, the type of entrepreneurial party is relevant. Rickman has ex-
plained how contingency fee attorneys that are confident and drive a hard bargain in the negotiation 
process will reject an early (too low) settlement proposal.214 Furthermore, an altruistic lawyer will be 
less inclined to put his own interest over that of a client.215 Anecdotal evidence is provided by Coffee 
in his description of the rise and fall of Milberg, Weiss (a US law firm specialized in securities class 
actions): 
 
‘The styles of Lerach and Weiss [managing partners of the California respectively New York branch 
of the law firm] were simply irreconcilable. Weiss was a “settler” who wanted to play within the rules 
of the game, while Lerach was an angry iconoclast who did not need to be accepted by the estab-
lished bar and preferred to pressure his adversary for a record settlement, rather than agree to an 
early one.’216 
3.5.5.3 Collusive settlement 
The second type of an inadequate settlement is a collusive settlement. For such a settlement, the 
following elements need to be present: competing actions and ‘unsavoury’ attorneys. If there are com-
peting class actions that represent the same class, an unsavoury lawyer on the claimants’ side might 
enter into an inadequate (too low) settlement with the defendant in return for a generous fee (a so-
called reverse auction).217 This also requires a defendant, or its attorney, that ‘exploits’ the claimant 
attorney’s interest, but such behaviour on the defendant’s side is not necessarily undue.218 
 
An example of an inadequate settlement driven by collusion is a so-called coupon settlement. Class 
members receive a discount on the defendant’s products – which are hardly used, or can be profitable 
for the defendant as well – and the entrepreneurial party receives a sizeable fee.219 Another type of 
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collusive settlement is the one in which the entrepreneurial party negotiates a disproportionate cut of 
the pie (a fixed remuneration or a result-based one), which reduces the class members’ (fair) compen-
sation. In both situations, defendants and entrepreneurial parties win and class members lose. 
 
Over the years, various methods have been implemented to address the risk of unfair coupon settle-
ments and/or disproportionate fees for attorneys. A solution to address coupon settlements is to link 
the attorney fees to the value of the claimed proceeds, that is, the redeemed coupons.220 Further-
more, judicial approval of the settlement, including of the attorney fees, is considered an important 
safeguard.221 American courts assess the attorney fee separately, even if parties have stated that the 
class members’ compensation and attorney fees have been negotiated separately, no objections 
against the settlement or fees were filed, and/or the fee is not calculated as a percentage of the pro-
ceeds.222 However, some have raised concerns as to whether the high expectation of such judicial 
scrutiny is fully justified.223 For instance, Helland and Klick found (empirically) that judges in class ac-
tions ‘more easily grant the attorney’s fee request in order to terminate cases rapidly, thus avoiding 
court congestion (which may damage their reputation)’.224 Furthermore, courts might not be fully 
equipped to assess the reasonableness of the fee (information asymmetry). Finally, class members (or 
an entrepreneurial party on their behalf) can file objections against the reasonableness of the settle-
ment. Here, too, the instrument might not fully suffice, as some so-called ‘professional objectors’ have 
been said to fall foul of adequate behaviour as well, as their main reason to object is to earn a fee for 
‘improving’ the settlement.225  
3.6 Benefits, drawbacks and the objectives of collective redress 
Now that the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation have been established, it is 
time for a summarizing overview of these effects in light of the objectives of collective redress mech-
anisms. How the potential effects affect the objectives of collective redress has been described in the 
previous separate sections. This is schematically depicted in Table IV. The potential effects are pre-
sented as more or less opposite sides of the coin, which can positively or negatively affect the objec-
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Potential benefits Affected 
objective(s) 
(+) 
Potential drawbacks Affected 
objective(s) 
(-) 
1. Facilitate access to justice a, b 6. Fuel a claim culture a, b, c 
2. Competition a, b, c 7. Inefficient competition c 
3. Increase the quality of claims a, b, c 8. Adverse selection / cherry picking a, b 
4. (E)quality of arms c 9. Abusive behaviour a, b, c 
5. Alignment of interests a, b, c 10. Conflict of interests a, b 
Table IV Effects that positively (+) or negatively (-) affect the objectives of collective redress mechanisms 
 
Whether and the extent to which these effects take place, also depend on the specific features of a 
national legal system.226 In the following part of this book (Chapters 4-6), I will turn to the three se-
lected jurisdictions, and investigate the legal rules and features that are closely connected with and 
shape the operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation (sub-question 3). Based on the potential effects, 
I have selected the following key issues of entrepreneurial mass litigation. After a brief introduction to 
some of the jurisdiction’s civil justice settings, each chapter will address the relevant national regula-
tion and case law on:  
 
- The legal services market in which entrepreneurial parties (might) operate – which types of 
legal representatives are active in the collective redress market, and how are the activities of 
these parties regulated and/or supervised? 
- The litigation funding regime – which types of (mass) litigation funding exist and how are the 
funding arrangements regulated and/or monitored? This part has focused particularly on rules 
on result-based remuneration and the alienability of legal claims; 
- The litigation costs and costs shifting – how are (mass) litigation costs calculated, controlled, 
and distributed between the parties involved? 
- The specificities of the collective redress mechanisms that affect the functioning of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation. In light of the potential risks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, this 
includes the safeguards against abusive behaviour that have been put in place to protect (ab-
sent) class members and/or defendants. 
 
As the selected jurisdictions’ experience, so far, with entrepreneurial mass litigation is relatively lim-
ited, the overviews offer a first inventory, to be placed within the context of the objectives of collective 
redress and the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation. The chapters do not aim to 
provide an exhaustive overview of the three legal systems and cultures on collective redress. Obvi-
ously, there are other relevant issues for obtaining collective redress, such as the burden and standard 
of proof, and the disclosure of documents. I have sought to describe those issues that are the most 
closely connected to – the operation of – entrepreneurial mass litigation. Addressing these key issues 
will provide an insight into the role and regulation of entrepreneurial parties and their funding ar-
rangements, how they (might) function within a specific jurisdiction’s legal architecture of mass litiga-
tion and its costs, and how class members and/or defendant(s) are protected. 
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From these country studies, I will distil the rules and features that potentially mediate the beneficial 
or disadvantageous operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per addressed key issue. In Chapter 
7, the rules and features of the three jurisdictions are assembled and analysed within the framework 














'Die Ansätze im deutschen Rechtssystem bleiben halbherzig, genährt von dem Miss-
trauen gegen heraufdräuende amerikanische Verhältnisse.‘1 
 
4.1 Setting the scene: some essential features of the civil justice landscape 
German civil law is internationally recognized as an authoritative and influential body of rules.2 In rank-
ings, Germany continues to feature among the countries with an efficient legal framework for settling 
disputes. For instance, in the Rule of Law Index 2016, Germany was placed second in the category of 
civil justice.3 According to some, complaints about litigation explosions or excessive litigation costs and 
delays are comparatively rare in Germany.4 This does not mean, however, that the German legislator 
is resting on its laurels. On the contrary, some have described it as ‘somewhat hyperactive’.5  
 
The German court system for private law matters is structured as follows. Non-specialized,6 general 
(ordentliche) civil litigation can take place at the local state courts (Amtsgerichte), the state district 
courts (Landgerichte), the state appellate courts (Oberlandesgerichte), and at the Federal Supreme 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof). Local state courts deal with cases with a dispute that does not exceed 
€ 5,000, or that concern family law, tenancy and certain (other) non-contentious matters.7 In other 
civil matters, the district court has jurisdiction as the court of first instance. A party that wishes to 
appeal needs permission to do so. Fundamental rights can affect private law through the federal con-
stitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). 
 
German civil litigation is built upon a number of guiding principles, some of which are embedded in 
the German Constitution.8 Access to justice (Verfahrensgrundrecht and Justizgewähranspruch) is not 
laid down in the German Constitution as such; however, it is widely accepted to follow from general 
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constitutional principles.9 A major reform of civil procedure took effect in 2001.10 The amendment of 
– in particular – the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) was intended to bring justice closer to the 
people and to enhance the efficiency and transparency of civil litigation.11 For instance, the reform 
placed a stronger emphasis on courts’ case management powers (Prozessleitung).12 It complements 
two main principles in civil litigation: party presentation (Verhandlungs- or Beibringungsgrundsatz) 
and party control of litigation (Dispositionsmaxime). Pursuant to these principles, parties are first and 
foremost responsible for the scope of litigation, submitting issues and evidence, and for the decision 
to commence or halt litigation.13 However, nowadays, dispute resolution is a joint responsibility of the 
parties and the court (Kooperationsmaxime). The court does not investigate the facts, but has to assist, 
exercise control, and take evidence where necessary. In this way, it has various discretionary powers 
to determine the course of a trial.14 It can ask questions and give instructions to litigants (Aufklärungs- 
und Hinweispflichten). Some scholars have discussed to what extent German civil trials are nowadays 
inquisitorial or adversarial; the legislator seems to have at least opened the door to a more investiga-
tory approach.15 The 2001 reform has furthermore facilitated consensual dispute resolution at the 
earliest occasion. In principle, courts are required to organize a conciliation hearing in all civil cases 
(Güteverhandlung). This hearing takes place before a judge with the aim of reaching a settlement prior 
to the oral hearing.16 According to Murray and Stürner, it is quite common for a judge to propose a 
particular settlement based on a preliminary review of the case.17 Dispute resolution at the earliest 
appropriate occasion is also stimulated by the rules on costs.18 
 
The joint responsibility of the parties and the courts may be the root cause for the said efficiency of 
the German civil justice system.19 However, this efficiency does not necessarily apply to large and more 
complex cases, in particular given the relative unavailability of efficient collective redress.20 As ob-
served in section 2.2.2, this is related to the dominant role of individual (procedural) rights in German 
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private law: ‘das Leitbild des liberalen Individualismus (…): jeder soll über seine Lebens- und Rechtsver-
hältnisse frei bestimmen können’.21 The focus on individual (procedural) rights has led to critical re-
sponses to (proposed and implemented) collective redress mechanisms. Illustrative is the following 
comment on the model case/group action KapMuG regulation.22 As to the tension between individual 
autonomy and regulatory objectives, Haar states:  
 
‘It stands to reason that one may question this practice of forcing an individual claimant into lawsuits. 
In fact, it reveals instances of the model case procedure where the law tries to take advantage of the 
individual claimants’ incentives and their money by using them and their lawsuits as a tool to enforce 
the regulatory goals of ad hoc disclosure.’23 
 
Generally, collective redress is regarded as an exception, not to be extended beyond its designated 
field of application.24 Against this backdrop and in light of the industry’s strong opposition to and its 
lobbying against collective redress, unsurprisingly, the German government has politely welcomed the 
European Recommendation on collective redress, but in the same breath it has emphasized member 
states’ autonomy to decide on available collective redress instruments.25  
4.2 The regulation and supervision of the legal services market 
The German legal services market is a strictly regulated one, in which attorneys (Rechtsanwälte and 
Fachanwälte)26 play a key role, both in and out of court. Attorney representation is required in all cases 
before the state district court and beyond (Anwaltszwang).27 A large number of litigants appoint an 
attorney to represent them before a local court as well.28 This might be linked to the relatively large 
percentage of German households that have taken out a (before-the-event) legal expenses insur-
ance.29 Predictably, comparative research shows that the number of attorneys per inhabitant is rela-
tively high in Germany.30 
 
The prevailing opinion has long been to maintain the attorneys’ monopoly on legal advice and enforce-
ment.31 In the last few decades, there has been some shift in the notion of attorneys forming an inde-
                                                             
 
21 Wendt 2011, at II.1. 
22 See section 4.5.4.  
23 Haar 2014, p. 102. 
24 Domej 2014, p. 287.  
25 Bundesrat, Beschluss des Bundesrates, Drucksache 513/13, 20.09.13, sub. 4. 
26 The latter is a specialized attorney; § 43c BRAO.  
27 § 78 ZPO. 
28 Murray & Stürner 2004, p. 161. See also the FRA report ‘Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and 
opportunities’, national report Germany, available at <fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1526-access-to-
justice-2011-country-DE.pdf>, p. 10.  
29 See section 4.4.1. 
30 Winter e.a. 2015, p. 57. Data from CEPEJ show that in 2014 Germany had 202 attorneys per 100,000 inhabitants (the 
Netherlands: 105, England and Wales: 315), see CEPEJ 2016, p. 160. 
31 Stadler 2017, p. 202. On extrajudicial legal services, see also hereafter.  
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pendent body for the administration of justice (unabhängiges Organ der Rechtspflege) towards a sit-
uation where the attorney is now seen as a profit-oriented services provider.32 For instance, attorneys 
are now allowed to provide extrajudicial services for a fee that deviates from the statutorily fixed one, 
albeit under specific circumstances.33 Generally, however, the idea remains that attorneys are the le-
gal services providers that are best equipped to protect society’s interests, in particular since they are 
guided by professional and ethical rules.34 Within the context of collective redress, Micklitz has argued 
that – regardless of its fee structure – the attorney-entrepreneur is an essential key player:  
 
‘It is his duty to keep the group action claimants together, to organise the process, to keep contact 
with the judge, to inform the press, in short, just like the judge must be a ‘managing judge’, the 
attorney must be a ‘managing attorney’. The prototype of a ‘managing attorney’ is far away from 
the professional that still seems to form the self-image of the attorney. In practice the attorney-en-
trepreneur has long been a reality. Mr. Tilp (Telekom representative) considered himself a business-
man; this produced under the attending attorneys, judges and academics not only consent at [a Ger-
man symposium in 2006].’35 
 
Obviously, the latter observation is time and context-dependent. For instance, a decade later, Half-
meier states that the Telekom case has accelerated the emergence of a sophisticated plaintiff bar in 
capital market cases.36 These developments will be further discussed in section 4.5. 
 
The main regulations that currently apply to the legal services market are the Legal Services Act 
(Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz, RDG), the Federal Attorney’s Act (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, 
BRAO),37 the Attorney’s Remuneration Act (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz, RVG), and the Attorneys’ 
Code of Conduct (Berufsordnung der Rechtsanwälte, BORA). Attorneys’ main professional duties are 
laid down in § 43a BRAO, the interpretation of which can be further complemented by the ethical rules 
(BORA). They include independence, confidentiality, objectivity, integrity and professionalism. The 
regulations furthermore address topics such as publicity and remuneration.38 As far as contingency fee 
arrangements are allowed, they are also subject to the legal rules that will be discussed in section 
4.4.2. As for publicity, German attorneys have been permitted to advertise their services since 1995, 
as long as it provides functional information on the form and nature thereof and is not aimed at solic-
iting for being retained for a specific case.39 An attorney is required to separate monies entrusted to 
                                                             
 
32 See § 1 and 2(2) BRAO and § 12 GG. See also Verkijk 2010, p. 55, p. 111 ff and p. 188 ff, with further references. 
33 § 4 RVG. See also sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4. 
34 Verkijk 2010, p. 190-191, with further references.  
35 Micklitz 2007, p. 25, referring to the Symposium ‘Collective Legal Enforcement – Chances and Risks’ (February 2006 
in Bamberg). 
36 Halfmeier 2016, p. 294 ff. 
37 Legal translation available at <brak.de/w/files/02_fuer_anwaelte/berufsrecht/brao_stand_1.6.2011_englisch.pdf>.  
38 § 43b and § 49b BRAO. 
39 § 43b BRAO. This provision follows from the constitutionally guaranteed occupational freedom (‘freie 
Berufsausübung’); § 12(1) GG. See, for instance, BGH 01.03.2001, I ZR 300/98, DStRE 2001, 1064; and BGH 15.03.2001, 
ZR 337/98, DStRE 2001, 1134.  
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his care.40 A professional indemnity insurance is compulsory.41 Attorneys are obliged to comprehen-
sively and impartially advise their clients.42 This includes informing clients about legal aid funding.43 
Some infer from this duty that attorneys are well advised to also discuss potential third-party litigation 
funding arrangements.44 Others even state that attorneys have a duty to do so, following the profes-
sional rules or their contractual duty to protect a client from foreseeable damage.45 Such a duty, how-
ever, requires a well-established market for litigation funding. In 2004, Jaskolla claimed that such a 
market is present in Germany, yet this is contested by others.46 Over a decade later, the presence of 
such a market remains questionable.47 Although a third-party litigation funder might pay the attor-
ney’s bills and triangulate the attorney-client relationship, the attorney’s responsibility remains to pro-
tect his client’s best interests.48  
 
Attorneys are members and fall under the supervision of the Federal Chamber of Attorneys (Bun-
desrechtsanwaltskammer, BRAK), which functions as the Federal Bar Association. As of 2014, the BRAK 
includes an ombudsman (Schlichtungsstelle) to deal with disputes between clients and attorneys. Pro-
fessional misconduct may be sanctioned by disciplinary measures under the BRAO and such miscon-
duct will be dealt with by the Disciplinary Courts (Anwaltsgericht and Bundesgerichtshof - Senat für 
Anwaltsachen), or give rise to civil liability towards the client. Some have reported that the BRAK’s 
supervision over the profession is relatively limited, and argue that private law norms and professional 
liability play a more important role.49 
  
German rules on providing out-of-court legal services are rather restrictive, although they have been 
extended since 2002 and 2008. In 2002, the Legal Counsel Act (Rechtsberatungsgesetz, RBerG) weak-
ened the attorney’s monopoly on legal services. Since then, consumer organizations that are sup-
ported by public funding can enforce consumer claims, as long as their action is deemed to be neces-
sary for consumer protection.50 These organizations are authorized to represent parties and are not 
necessarily represented by an attorney.51 The court may prohibit such an organization from continuing 
to represent consumers, if it is unable to appropriately present the circumstances and the facts.52 At 
first, the courts were reluctant to allow such organizations to have standing. This changed in 2006, 
when the German Supreme Court ruled that although a collective interest to protect consumers is 
                                                             
 
40 § 43a(5) BRAO. 
41 § 51 BRAO. 
42 § 43a BRAO.  
43 § 16(1) BORA. 
44 Eversberg 2016 (with Roland ProzessFinanz AG). 
45 Heussen & Hamm 2016, § 54, Rn. 229-234, respectively Jaskolla 2004, p. 154-157, referring to the case law on this 
contractual duty. 
46 See, differently, Coester & Nitzsche 2005, p. 84-85.  
47 See section 4.4.3. 
48 Heussen & Hamm 2016, § 54, Rn. 250-252.  
49 Verkijk 2010, p. 59-60, Winter e.a. 2015, p. 59. 
50 § 1(3)(8) RBerG (old), now § 79(2)(3) ZPO. See Micklitz 2007, p. 13-14 and Stadler 2010, p. 82. See also sections 4.5.2 
and 4.5.3. 
51 § 79(2) ZPO. 
52 § 79(2) ZPO. 
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required, this bar should not be set too high.53 The RBerG was abolished in 2007, and superseded by 
the Legal Services Act (RDG) in 2008, which further relaxed the rules regarding out-of-court legal ser-
vices. A legal service is now defined as any activity in a concrete ‘foreign’ claim (fremde Forderung) 
that requires a legal examination of the particular case.54 The professional debt collection of assigned 
claims is considered to be a legal service, and a party may only provide such a legal service within the 
limits of the Legal Services Act.55  
 
The German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 
BaFin) overlooks the financial services market. Some have argued that litigation funding contracts (any 
type of quota pars litis arrangement) are specific types of (consumer) credit contracts, despite their 
non-recourse structure (the ‘loan’ is not repayable if enforcement is unsuccessful).56 Therefore – if 
allowed at all – (the provider of) such contracts should adhere to financial services laws and regula-
tions. This, however, goes against the prevailing doctrine that the funder-claimant relationship quali-
fies as a contract sui generis or a contract of undisclosed partnership.57 So far, no measures have been 
implemented to regulate and supervise litigation funding, other than the fact that, as described above, 
they cannot provide legal services.58  
4.3 Litigation costs and costs shifting 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The litigation costs of German summary proceedings include court charges, witness and expert costs, 
and – if representation by an attorney is required – attorney fees. In addition, a party may have in-
curred pre-action costs before the claim was issued (extrajudicial costs). In the following, I will discuss 
the main elements of the German costs and costs shifting regime.59 
4.3.2 Litigation costs 
One of the key characteristics of German litigation costs is the high level of predictability due to the 
statutory fixation of court charges and attorney fees. This allows parties to precisely calculate the liti-
gation costs and the risk (the potential adverse costs award), usually as soon as the amount in dispute 
is identified.60 Court charges are regulated by the Court Charges Act (Gerichtskostengesetz, GKG), and 
attorney fees by the Attorney Remuneration Act (RVG). Court charges, initially, are only paid – in ad-
vance – by the initiator of the proceedings, thus, the claimant.61 A defendant only owes court charges 
                                                             
 
53 BGH 14.11.2006, XI ZR 294/05, BKR 2007, 79. 
54 § 2(1) RDG. 
55 Registered pursuant to § 10(1)(1) RDG. See also section 4.4.4 and 4.5.5. 
56 Bruns 2000, p. 240 ff, Bruns 2012, p. 542.  
57 Jaskolla 2004, p. 47-50, p. 145, Homberg 2006, p. 61 ff, Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 466, Langheid & 
Wandt 2016, § 1, Rn. 107-109, Heussen & Hamm 2016, § 54, Rn. 248, Van Boom 2017, p. 15, all with further references. 
See also section 4.4.3. 
58 Eversberg 2016, p. 29. 
59 See also Hess & Hübner 2010, Wagner 2010. 
60 See Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 364. 
61 § 22(1) GKG. 
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if he is ordered to pay such charges if he loses.62 The structure of court charges is said to generally 
cover most state expenses for the administration of justice by the civil courts.63 The inter partes attor-
ney fees are based on the RVG and ZPO (scales) and are recoverable pursuant to the costs shifting 
rules (which will be discussed in section 4.3.4). A party’s own attorney’s fees are based on the agree-
ment with the attorney in question, which is governed by the RVG but not necessarily by its scales – 
see hereafter. These fees become due at an early stage and are not affected by the number of state-
ments or other efforts throughout the proceedings.64  
 
Generally, both types of costs (Gebühren) are tied to categorized amounts in dispute (Streitwert and 
Gegenstandswert).65 The court has a discretionary power in determining the amount that is being dis-
puted, and does so at the onset of litigation, based on the statement of claim.66 The charges and fees 
are capped at the disputed amount of € 30 million, except for specific types of cases.67 For instance, 
for court charges in claims for injunctive relief, the court will exercise its discretion in determining the 
amount in dispute, which is capped at € 250,000; for declaratory relief, generally, the court applies a 
discount of 20%.68 Furthermore, there are some instances in which a court can adjust the disputed 
amount for the purpose of reducing the litigation costs and risk. In particular, in competition law cases 
the court can take into consideration the economic situation of the claimant, upon its request to tie 
the court charges and attorney fees to a reduced amount in dispute.69 This provision intends to stim-
ulate private enforcement. It only benefits claimants, a defendant cannot apply for such a reduction. 
The legislator compared the provision to a contingency fee: in case he loses, a claimant pays reduced 
court charges, his own attorney’s fees and adverse costs. A prevailing claimant’s attorney, however, 
can claim its fee based on the original amount in dispute. The German legislator did not fear abusive 
behaviour, since the application is subject to the court’s approval.70 
 
The attorney’s basic fee that is calculated upon the amount in dispute can subsequently be multiplied 
by two fee factors (a multiplier): one for (preparing) litigation (Verfahrensgebühr), such as written 
statements, and one in case a hearing has taken place (Terminsgebühr).71 Both multipliers range from 
                                                             
 
62 § 29(1) GKG. 
63 Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 361. 
64 Wagner 2010, p. 156.  
65 For court charges, see § 3 and 34 GKG and Appendix 1 (Kostenverzeichnis, KV) and 2 (Gebührentabelle). For attorney 
fees, see § 2 and 13 RVG and Appendix 1 (Vergütungsverzeichnis) and 2 (Gebührentabelle). Some exceptions apply for 
extrajudicial services and specific procedures; see hereafter and section 4.2. The scales were last amended in 2013; 
before then, they were amended in 2004 and 1994; see Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Kostenrechtsmodernisierungs-
gesetz, Drucksache 15/1971, 11.11.2003, and Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Zweites Kostenrechtsmodernisierungsge-
setz, Drucksache 17/11471, 14.11.2012. 
66 § 3 and 4(1) ZPO. See also Wagner 2010, p. 151-152.  
67 § 39(2) GKG and § 22(2) RVG. 
68 § 48(1) GKG. See also Wagner 2010, p. 151, with further references. Other exceptions within the context of collective 
redress will be addressed in section 4.5. 
69 § 89a of the Act against Restraints on Competition, GWB; § 12 of the Act against Unfair Competition, UWG.  
70 Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Siebten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Geset-
zes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Drucksache 15/3640, 12.08.2004, p. 18 and 69. 
71 Appendix 1, Part 3 to § 2(2) RVG (Vergütungsverzeichnis, VV) 
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0.3 to 3. Their weight depends on the type of case and its specific features. In standard litigation, the 
Verfahrensgebühr is 1.3 and the Terminsgebühr is 1.2.72 Thus, in such litigation the basic fee is multi-
plied by 2.5. If the proceedings end with an amicable settlement, an additional multiplier of 1.0-1.5 is 
awarded for the recoverable attorney fees (Einigungsgebühr).73 Moreover, in order to incentivize such 
a settlement, the court fee is reduced.74 
 
The aim of the German costs system is to promote both the predictability of costs and the pursuit of 
small claims by way of cross-subsidization.75 To illustrate this, Table V shows the cost risk in six cases 
before a court of first instance,76 with varying amounts in dispute, for proceedings in which a hearing 
took place (multiplier 2.5).77 
 
 € 3,000 € 30,000 € 300,000 € 3,000,000 € 30,000,000 € 300,000,000 
 
Court fee 324 1,218 7,386 37,608 329,208 329,208 
Own attor-
ney’s fee 
622 2,591 7,440 31,895 272,870 272,870 
Opponent’s 
attorney fee 
622 2,591 7,440 31,895 272,870 272,870 
Total 1,568 6,400 22,266 101,398 874,948 874,948 
Table V: A claimant’s cost risk in six categories of claim value 
As the table illustrates, court charges and attorney’s fees are relatively low for small claims. They are 
subsidized by high-value claims. However, the increase is regressive: as a percentage of the claim 
value, the costs increasingly diminish.  
 
As mentioned, the own attorney fees may deviate from the statutory fees. However, to protect the 
system of cross-subsidization and the attorneys’ task of promoting an independent administration of 
justice, an attorney is not allowed to agree to a lower fee than the statutory one for court proceed-
ings.78 A lower fee is allowed for extrajudicial activities.79 Attorneys and clients are allowed to negoti-
ate a higher fee, but such a fee is not necessarily recoverable in the case of success.80 Higher, hourly 
                                                             
 
72 Pursuant to nos. 3100 and 3104 VV. See also Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Kostenrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, 
Drucksache 15/1971, 11.11.2003, p. 144 and 147.  
73 Pursuant to nos. 1000-1004 VV. 
74 Pursuant to no. 1211 KV.  
75 Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 352-353. 
76 The fees for appellate proceedings are higher than for those before a court of first instance.  
77 Calculated with the online tool of the German Bar Association (DAV-Prozesskostenrechner), see <anwaltver-
ein.de/de/service/prozesskostenrechner>. Included are the court fees, the attorney fees, a fixed reimbursement of € 20 
for expenses (Auslagen) pursuant to nos. 7001 and 7002 VV, and 19% VAT.  
78 § 49b(1) BRAO.  
79 § 4(1) RVG; see section 4.2 and hereafter.  
80 See section 4.3.4.  
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fees are said to be common in complex litigation where the expertise of a specialized attorney is nec-
essary, such as competition law and commercial litigation.81 Wagner has attributed this empirical ob-
servation to the weak incentives for attorneys to work hard for a successful outcome, since they earn 
their fees at an early stage of the proceedings and the fees remain unaffected by further activities; 
‘sophisticated parties think that the incentives created by hourly payments are worth their price.’82  
  
For extrajudicial activities, the RVG scales might also not apply. Three types of such activities can be 
distinguished: basic legal advice, mediation and the enforcement of a claim. For basic legal advice or 
mediation, clients and attorneys are free to negotiate a reasonable consulting fee 
(Beratungsgebühr).83 For further extrajudicial (enforcement) activities, the statutorily fixed business 
fee (Geschäftsgebühr) applies, which can be based on the amount in dispute.84 A lower fee is allowed 
as well, as long as it bears a reasonable relation to the services provided.85 If basic legal advice is fol-
lowed by further consultation on the same issue, the consulting fee is deducted from the business 
fee.86 If enforcement activities result in court proceedings, 50-75% of the business fee is deducted 
from the court fees.87 This deduction only applies to a party’s own attorney’s fees; in the case of suc-
cess, the full statutory fee that is linked to the court proceedings can be recovered from the oppo-
nent.88  
4.3.3 Security for costs 
Civil procedure rules allow defendants to apply for the claimant to provide security for costs, that is, 
for a potential costs order (Prozesskostensicherheit). The situations under which a court will make such 
an order are limited. The main reason to do so is if the claimant is an inhabitant of a non-EU jurisdiction 
that is not a party to a treaty prohibiting the provision of security for costs.89 In effect, neither this 
provision nor the other exceptional situations in which such an order will be made90 are relevant within 
the scope of this research.  
 
Nevertheless, a particular entrepreneurial party that also litigates in Germany has recently started to 
provide security for costs to address a potential costs award in collective redress cases.91 This measure 
should be seen in light of earlier case law in which the special purpose vehicle’s business model was 
dismissed. This will be further discussed in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.5.2. 
                                                             
 
81 Wagner 2010, p. 168; Harte-Bavendam & Henning-Bodewig 2016, § 9, Rn. 124-125. 
82 Wagner 2010, p. 182. 
83 § 34 RVG. 
84 § 34 RVG and VV nos. 2300-2303. 
85 § 4(1) RVG.  
86 § 34(2) RVG.  
87 VV no. 3100, Vorbemerkung 3(4).  
88 § 15a(2) RVG. See also Wagner 2010, p. 155 and section 4.3.4. 
89 § 110(1) ZPO.  
90 See § 89(1), § 921(2) and § 936 ZPO.  
91 Stadler 2017, p. 208. See, similarly, section 6.3.3. 
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4.3.4 Costs shifting 
The German costs shifting rule (§ 91 ZPO) states that the losing party bears the opponent’s litigation 
costs, including the attorney’s statutory fees and expenses, insofar as the costs were necessary to 
enforce or defend a right. It is a full indemnity rule, that is, normally, all statutory costs are shifted.92 
If an attorney and client have agreed upon a higher fee than the statutory one or a contingency fee, 
generally the ‘supplement’ cannot be recovered from the opposing party in the case of success as part 
of the costs order.93 The rationale for the costs shifting rule is the ‘mere’ initiation of unsuccessful 
litigation (Veranlasserprinzip); the payment of adverse costs is not considered to be a punishment or 
damages.94 
 
There are a limited number of exceptions to the general costs shifting rule and judges have little room 
to deviate from this rule. The main exceptions are that no costs shifting applies in uncontested claims 
and in family law cases.95 Furthermore, if each party partly loses and wins, the costs are balanced out 
or shared proportionally.96 If the case is resolved by way of an amicable settlement, each party bears 
its own costs unless agreed otherwise.97 Furthermore, regardless of the outcome of litigation, the 
court can order any party to reimburse the opponent’s costs that have been incurred due to specific 
inefficient litigation conduct: failing to observe time limits or filing unsuccessful or unnecessary mo-
tions.98 The latter exceptions are of marginal importance in practice.99 
 
The court that has dealt with the case declares – ex officio – whether costs are to be shifted and, if so, 
which party bears the costs and, occasionally, for which proportion (Kostengrundentscheidung).100 Ex-
cept for court charges, the actual assessment of the necessary (notwendige) costs takes place in sep-
arate costs proceedings (Kostenfestsetzungsverfahren) before a court officer (Rechtspfleger) in the 
same court.101 These proceedings are intended for the (procedural) assessment of costs only. Substan-
tive claims, such as the invalidity of a power of attorney, need to be filed in separate proceedings, save 
uncontested claims or those of such simplicity that they can be addressed in the costs proceedings.102 
The criterion for assessing whether costs are necessary is whether a reasonable and efficient party 
(verständige und wirtschaftlich vernünftige Partei) would have incurred the costs – at that time – as 
                                                             
 
92 § 91 ZPO. See also section 4.3.2. 
93 See § 3a(1) RVG. See also hereafter, and sections 4.3.2, 4.3.5 and 4.4.2. 
94 Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 448, Pohlman 2014, p. 379-380.  
95 § 93 ZPO and § 132, 150 and 183 Familienverfahrensgesetz. 
96 § 92 ZPO. 
97 § 98 ZPO. See also § 91a ZPO.  
98 § 95 and § 96 ZPO.  
99 Wagner 2010, p. 166. 
100 § 308(2) ZPO. See also Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 450-451.  
101 § 19 GKG, § 103-104 ZPO and § 21(1) Rechtspflegergesetz, RPflG. See in more detail Wagner 2010, p. 166-167. 
102 See BGH 22.11.2006, IV ZB 18/06, NJW-RR 2007, 422 and Schneider & Thiel 2016, at ‘Materiell-rechtliche Einwände’. 
See also sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. 
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being relevant for resolving the case.103 This leaves some room for discretion, albeit to a limited ex-
tent.104  
 
A costs order should be seen as being independent from a potential claim for damages regarding liti-
gation costs. Such claims, which require separate proceedings to be instigated, are relatively rare.105 
Once a costs order has been made it generally replaces a substantive claim.106 Case-specific circum-
stances such as contractual obligations or tortious litigation conduct might dictate otherwise, but only 
if they have not yet been considered as part of the costs order:  
 
Zwar ist – wie in der Rechtsprechung des BGH anerkannt ist – eine prozessuale Kostenentscheidung 
nicht erschöpfend, sondern lässt grundsätzlich noch Raum für die Durchsetzung materiell-rechtlicher 
Ansprüche auf Kostenerstattung etwa aus Vertrag, wegen Verzugs oder aus unerlaubter Handlung. 
Dieser materiell-rechtliche Anspruch kann dabei je nach Sachlage neben die prozessuale Kostenrege-
lung treten und ihr sogar entgegengerichtet sein, sofern zusätzliche Umstände hinzukommen, die bei 
der prozessualen Kostenentscheidung nicht berücksichtigt werden konnten. Bleibt hingegen der 
Sachverhalt, der zu einer abschließenden prozessualen Kostenentscheidung geführt hat, unverän-
dert, geht es nicht an, nunmehr den gleichen Sachverhalt erneut zur Nachprüfung zu stellen und in 
seinen kostenrechtlichen Auswirkungen materiell-rechtlich entgegengesetzt zu beurteilen (…).’107 
 
Extrajudicial costs that have been incurred to obtain payment, such as debt collection costs, or to de-
termine damage or liability, such as an own expert report, are generally not shifted under the costs 
rules. They lack the necessary direct connection to the proceedings (unmittelbaren Prozessbezogen-
heit) and are considered to be a party’s own responsibility:  
 
‘Damit soll verhindert werden, dass eine Partei ihre allgemeinen Unkosten oder prozessfremde Kos-
ten auf den Gegner abzuwälzen versucht und so den Prozess verteuert. Jede Partei hat grundsätzlich 
ihre Einstandspflicht und ihre Ersatzberechtigung in eigener Verantwortung zu prüfen und den 
dadurch entstehenden Aufwand selbst zu tragen.’108 
 
Such costs, however, remain potentially recoverable as damages under substantive law.109 This also 
applies to attorney fees. As discussed in section 4.3.2, instead of the statutorily fixed fee, the attorney 
and client might negotiate a higher, hourly fee if the complexity of the case so requires and/or the 
client so desires. Costs incurred for litigation purposes that are claimed as damages need to be neces-
sary and appropriate (erforderlich und zweckmäßig).110 Literature and case law mention that this is the 
                                                             
 
103 See, for instance, BGH 1.2.2017, VII ZB 18/14, NJW 2017, 1397, para. 12. 
104 See also Hess & Hübner 2012, p. 153.  
105 Wagner 2010, p. 161 and 162. 
106 Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 441, 447, Pohlmann 2014, p. 379-380. 
107 BGH 16.02.2011, VIII ZR 80/10, NJW 2011, 2368, para. 10. 
108 Thomas & Putzo 2005, § 91, Rn. 8 and 47-52, Schneider & Thiel 2016, at ‘Inkassokosten’ and ‘Privatgutachten’. See, 
for instance, BGH 17.12.2002, VI ZB 56/02, NJW 2003, 1398 and BGH 18.11.2008, VI ZB 24/08, BeckRS 2008, 26028.  
109 § 249 ff. BGB and, for instance, § 823 BGB.  
110 See, for instance, BGH 8.11.1994, VI ZR 3/94, NJW 1995, 446; and BGH 10.01.2006, VI ZR 43/05, NJW 2006, 1065, at 
B, II, 1.  
98 
 
case if payment pursuant to the RVG scales is uncommon in a particular field of law and/or is unwar-
ranted due to the complexity of the case.111 It also includes an assessment of the reasonableness of 
the higher fee, which cannot be excessive (unangemessen hoch). If so, ‘unter Berücksichtigung aller 
Umstände’ the court can reduce it to the statutory fee.112 Such a court assessment can also take place 
concerning an allegedly unreasonable contingency fee.113 This brings me to the question of whether 
litigation funding costs are recoverable. 
4.3.5 Recovery of litigation funding costs 
Successful claimants are generally unable to recover litigation funding costs from their opponent(s) as 
part of the costs order.114 First of all given the statutory fixation of recoverable costs and fees, and the 
limited possibilities to deviate from the costs rules. Moreover, pursuant to the prevailing case law, the 
assessment of the necessity of such costs – such as interest payments on a loan – is too complex and 
thus not in accordance with the simplicity and practicability of costs proceedings.115 Such an assess-
ment would require, for instance, an assessment of the litigant’s income and financial means. Hence, 
litigation funding generally leaves the position of the opponent unaffected.116 However, such costs 
might be recoverable as damages. As mentioned, the costs that have been incurred for the purpose of 
litigation can be awarded as damages if they were necessary and appropriate; this criterion applies to 
litigation funding costs as well.117 Illustrative is a 2009 case before the district court of Aachen, where 
a claimant who had funded litigation by way of a litigation funder sought to recover as damages the 
contingency fee of over € 800,000. The district court dismissed the claim, since the claimant had not 
substantiated the necessity to enter into such an arrangement; that no alternatives were available 
such as personal funding, a loan or public legal aid.118 If not, the court ruled, the costs of the funding 
arrangement should still be compared to those of the hypothetical alternative, such as (missed) inter-
est and loan costs, and could not considerably exceed those costs:  
  
‘Ein Ersatz der Kosten des Prozessfinanzierers kommt nur dann in Betracht, wenn der Betrag der Er-
folgsbeteiligung der Höhe nach die Kreditkosten oder die entgangenen Anlagezinsen jedenfalls nicht 
wesentlich übersteigt.’119 
 
The district court recognized the advantages of a litigation funding agreement, but did not consider 
them to be sufficiently persuasive to alter its judgment on the recoverability of the costs thereof.120 
To award the costs of pre-financing proceedings, including a potential adverse costs risk, would go 
                                                             
 
111 Harte-Bavendam & Henning-Bodewig 2016, § 9, Rn. 124-125. See, for instance, OLG Koblenz 29.5.2008, 2 U 1620/06, 
NJW 2009, 1153, and OLG München 30.6.2010, Az. 7 U 1879/10. 
112 § 3a(2) RVG. 
113 See also section 4.4.2. 
114 On litigation funding see also section 4.4. 
115 See, for instance, OLG Koblenz, 4.1.2006, 14 W 810/05, NJW-RR 2006, 502.  
116 Wagner 2010, p. 173, Schneider & Thiel 2016, at ‘Prozessfinanzierungskosten’.  
117 LG Aachen 22.12.2009, 10 O 277/09, BeckRS 2010, 28938. 
118 See, similarly, Harte-Bavendam & Henning-Bodewig 2016, § 9, Rn. 127. 
119 LG Aachen 22.12.2009, 10 O 277/09, BeckRS 2010, 28938, at I, 1, sub a.  
120 LG Aachen 22.12.2009, 10 O 277/09, BeckRS 2010, 28938, at I, 1, sub b. 
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against the restorative objective of damages. Costs rules do not include a consideration of fault; even 
if a claimant is publicly funded this does not (fully) cover the adverse costs risk. Moreover, recovera-
bility would exceed the compensation of a pure economic loss, since it includes the funder’s potential 
economic gain. In short, the criteria for recoverability are not easily met when it comes to litigation 
funding costs.  
 
Searching for and arranging litigation funding might be costly. Normally, a third-party funder will re-
imburse the attorney for such additional costs, yet the claimant will probably be the one to eventually 
bear those costs.121 
4.3.6 Liability for adverse costs 
A costs order is made against a litigant. This is based upon the principle that the litigant has incited 
(unsuccessful) litigation (Veranlasserprinzip).122 Liability for adverse costs is generally not subject to 
other conditions, such as a claimant’s capacity to litigate.123 However, an attorney can be held liable 
for unnecessary litigation expenses if he is or should have been aware of the invalidity of his power of 
attorney to litigate (Prozessvollmacht).124 The aforementioned principle might lead to third-party lia-
bility for litigation costs, if the third party is the one that has actually incited the proceedings and the 
litigant is non-existent or invalidly represented.125 However, a costs order will not be made against a 
third party that has ‘merely’ agreed to pay the (adverse) litigation costs, as it is not party to the pro-
ceedings.126 Hence, such third-party liability for litigation costs would require a separate claim for dam-
ages.127 In some cases it could nevertheless be argued that a claim-scouting entrepreneurial party is 
the one who has incited litigation and thus is liable for the costs order as well.128 Insofar as I have been 
able to ascertain, no such case law exists.129 
 
If parties are joined and they are represented by the same legal representative, the court can either 
state the individual’s proportional liability in the costs order, or hold them jointly liable 
(Gesammtschuldner), regardless of their internal individual liability.130 For mass litigation cases, for 
instance KapMuG, divergent rules might apply. These will be further discussed in section 4.5. 
                                                             
 
121 Pursuant to VV no. 2300; see Heussen & Hamm 2016, § 54, Rn. 249. 
122 See also section 4.3.4. 
123 BGH 04.03.1993, V ZB 5/93, NJW 1993, 1865; see Thomas & Putzo 2005, § 91, Rn. 2. 
124 § 88 and 89 ZPO; see Thomas & Putzo 2005, § 89, Rn. 5; Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 441 and 446; and, 
for instance, BGH 26.11.1953, IV ZR 127/53, BeckRS 1953, 31373538 and BGH 18.11.1982, III ZR 113/79, NJW 1983, 
883.  
125 See, for instance, BGH 29.1.2001, II ZR 331/00, NJW 2001, 1056, at A, II, 4. 
126 Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 446, referring to old case law (1953).  
127 See, similarly, Schmidt 2001, p. 999-1000, on the liability of a partner (Gesellschafter) for a costs order against a 
partnership.  
128 See section 5.3.6.2. 
129 See section 4.4.3. 
130 § 100 ZPO. See also Haag & Geigel 2015, Kap. 41, Rn. 31-39. 
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4.4 Private litigation funding 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, litigants are themselves responsible for obtaining the necessary funds for litigation.131 
However, parties with limited financial means can request the court to assess their eligibility for legal 
aid (Prozesskostenhilfe).132 If a party’s personal and economic circumstances impede access to justice, 
and the court deems the claim to be reasonable and not frivolous, it will grant publicly funded legal 
aid. The fact that the court undertakes this assessment has sometimes led to abusive behaviour by 
parties trying to obtain information on the quality of their claim and the prospect of success.133 Public 
legal aid funding entails that the claimant is – temporarily or permanently – freed from paying court 
charges and attorney fees.134 Furthermore, the attorney’s fees are reduced, and initially the state is 
responsible for the payment thereof.135 The reduction of the attorney fees has disincentivised attor-
neys to accept such cases, although they are obliged to do so,136 and this is said to at least provide a 
strong incentive to look for alternative funding sources.137 As legal aid does not cover a potential costs 
order, a litigation risk remains. 
 
A party is not eligible for legal aid if it has taken out a legal expenses insurance.138 As mentioned, a 
large percentage of German households have taken out legal expenses insurance.139 Due to the pre-
dictability of the German cost and costs shifting system, insurers are capable of gauging their risks and 
they therefore offer coverage for legal expenses at reasonable rates.140 For this reason, in combination 
with a culture of risk-avoidance,141 before-the-event legal expenses insurance is a very popular instru-
ment to minimize the litigation cost risk. However, such insurance is not available for commercial liti-
gation,142 and in the aftermath of the Telekom case (a KapMuG proceedings) insurers have now also 
excluded investments or securities litigation.143 Complaints are said to have arisen from the judiciary, 
stating that the high level of insurance has led to a litigation explosion and frivolous claims, but the 
                                                             
 
131 Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 349. 
132 § 114-127a ZPO. 
133 FRA report ‘Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities’, national report Germany, 
available at <fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1526-access-to-justice-2011-country-DE.pdf>, p. 11. 
134 § 122(1) ZPO.  
135 § 122(1) ZPO and § 49 RVG. 
136 § 48(1) BRAO. 
137 Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 356. 
138 Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 468.  
139 Faure, Hartlief & Philipsen 2006, p. 55, Hess & Hübner 2012, p. 158, and Hodges, Peysner & Nurse 2012, p. 39, refer 
to data stemming from 2006, when more than 40% of German households had taken out a legal expenses insurance. 
Winter e.a. 2015, p. 57, refer to a publication from 2010 with a similar percentage. More recent information is unknown 
to the author. 
140 Murray & Stürner 2004, p. 11, Wagner 2010, p. 171-172 and 180. 
141 Winter e.a. 2015, p. 60, whose conclusion is based on interviews with key players in the legal services and insurance 
market.  
142 Stadler 2017, p. 201. See also BGH 21.5.2003, IV ZR 327/02, NJW 2003, 2384. 
143 Rotter 2011, p. 443, Halfmeier 2016, p. 295. See also section 4.5.4. 
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tenability of this statement has not been empirically tested.144 After-the-event insurance seems to be 
absent in the German insurance market.145 
 
In spite of the relatively large role of legal expenses insurance, other types of private litigation funding 
have emerged. Currently, the following arrangements are available, which will be discussed in the fol-
lowing sections: contingency fees, third-party litigation funding, and the assignment model. 
4.4.2 Attorney litigation funding  
Generally, German attorneys are not allowed to operate under a contingency fee arrangement, as it 
would generate perverse incentives, thereby conflicting with attorneys’ independence.146 However, 
from 2008, the ban has been lifted in strictly limited circumstances. The relaxation followed a 2006 
judgment by the Constitutional Court, ruling that the ban on contingency fees violated the constitu-
tional right to occupational freedom, in conjunction with the right to have access to justice as derived 
from the German Constitution.147 This ruling led to a legislative amendment, pursuant to which attor-
neys are now allowed to provide legal services under a result-based remuneration (Erfolgshonorar).148 
However, this is only allowed (‘nur für den Einzelfall und nur dann’) in the situation where a party’s 
financial situation is impaired in such way that, without this type of remuneration and under reasona-
ble consideration (‘bei verständiger Betrachtung’), he would be unable to pursue his claim.  
  
Contrary to third-party litigation funders (see section 4.4.3), the attorney cannot shoulder the full liti-
gation risk. The arrangement can only cover the attorney’s fees, not the court fees, the expert’s fees 
(‘Kosten anderer Beteiligter’) or other expenses.149 The attorney’s remuneration can deviate from the 
statutorily fixed minimum fee in various ways. For instance, in the case of success, the fee can consist 
of a percentage of the proceeds, but it can also be constructed as a success fee (‘no win, less fee’).150 
The court’s discretionary power to reduce an agreed fee if its amount is inappropriate (unangemessen 
hoch) also applies to the contingency fee.151 
 
The fear of ‘American situations’ is noticeable in the government’s solution.152 The legislator was ra-
ther reluctant to pass the amendment and the scope of the solution demonstrates this. In the words 
of Blattner, it is a ‘kleine Lösung’ for the constitutionally problematic ban on contingency fees.153 It is 
                                                             
 
144 Hess & Hübner 2012, p. 159. 
145 Jaskolla 2004, p. 156 and Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 359 
146 § 49b(2) BRAO, § 1 BRAO; Wagner 2010, p. 169. See also, for instance, BGH 23.4.2009, IX ZR 167/07, NJW 2009, 
3297. 
147 BVerG 12.12.2006, 1 BvR 2576/04, NJW 2007, 979. § 12 GG (occupational freedom) and § 2(1), 3(1) and 20(3) GG 
(from which the right to have access to justice is derived). 
148 § 4a(1) RVG. 
149 § 49b(2) BRAO and § 4a(3) RVG. See also Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Erfolgshonoraren, Drucksache 16/8384, 
05.03.2008, p. 9. 
150 Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf Erfolgshonoraren, Drucksache 16/8384, 05.03.2008, p. 10-11.  
151 § 3a(2) RVG. See section 4.3.2. 
152 Hess & Hübner 2010, p. 355. 
153 Blattner 2012, p. 571. 
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thus not surprising that, so far, not many parties have made use of this type of funding.154 The limited 
aim and scope of the rule and its circumspectly formulated conditions are open to interpretation, and 
the inherent insecurity and potential risk of nullification have not yet incentivized many to engage in 
this type of arrangement. 
4.4.3 Third-party litigation funding 
From the early 2000s onwards, third-party litigation funding has occupied a part of the German litiga-
tion funding market, evolving from or as a ‘natural extension’ to the legal expenses insurance mar-
ket.155 It is a fairly modest part, though; a 2007 study showed that between 0.2%-0.8% of litigation 
was funded by third-party litigation funders, as opposed to 35% by way of (before-the-event) legal 
expenses insurance.156 The annual statistical yearbook on attorneys addresses the main types of liti-
gation funding (self-funding, public legal aid and legal expenses insurance); data on third-party litiga-
tion funding are not collected given its modest market share.157 
 
Litigation funding is nevertheless recognized as a means to promote access to justice.158 The first liti-
gation funder, Foris AG, started in 1998 and has remained one of the market leaders.159 Currently, the 
other two key players are Legial AG and Roland Prozessfinanz. Together, the three of them are said to 
take up around 90% of the third-party litigation funding market.160 They usually operate in commercial 
litigation, with its high-value cases and the lack of competition from legal expenses insurance.161 Nev-
ertheless, some funders take up smaller claims as well, involving those claimants that are not eligible 
for legal aid or a contingency arrangement, have not taken out a legal expenses insurance, and/or 
want to avoid all cost risks, including a potential costs order. The most recent overview provided by 
the Anwaltsverein (September 2014) lists 17 litigation funders, some of which have a low minimum 
threshold as to the required amount in dispute (€ 150 to € 10,000).162 Such low amounts imply that 
these funders operate in the collective redress market. Some indeed do. For instance, one of the listed 
funders pools low-value consumer claims that consumers have transferred to the funder, and pursues 
the aggregated claims in its own name.163 In the case of success, the participating consumers recover 
67% of the individual proceeds. As this construction is based on an assignment to a special purpose 
vehicle for the purpose of obtaining collective redress, it differs from the ‘general’ third-party litigation 
                                                             
 
154 Blattner 2012, p. 562 and 571, Stadler 2017, p. 201. 
155 Hodges, Peysner & Nurse 2012, p. 39 and 40. On the early developments, see Fritzsche & Schmidt 1999 and Bruns 
2000.  
156 Hommerich & Kilian 2007.  
157 See Kilian & Dreske 2016, Chapter 7. 
158 And promoted as such, see, for instance, the German Bar Association DAV’s free publication on litigation funding, 
available at <www.anwaltverlag.de/prozessfinanzierung>. 
159 See <foris.de>. See also Homberg 2006, p. 39, Coester & Nitzsche 2005, p. 101, and De Morpurgo 2014, p. 27. 
160 Eversberg 2016, p. 31.  
161 Van Boom 2011, p. 34, Demougin & Maultzsch 2014, p. 527. 
162 The overview (September 2014) is available at <anwaltverein.de/files/anwaltverein.de/downloads/praxis/Vergue-
tungsrecht/Uebersicht%20Prozessfinanzierer-Stand%2029%2009%2014.pdf>; see, similar, the overview provided by 
Kallenbach 2010, p. 353.  
163 See metaclaims.de.  
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funding contract (Prozessfinanzierungsvertrag). I will further discuss this variation of entrepreneurial 
mass litigation in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.5.2. 
 
As for the percentages charged, there is little case law. According to Jaskolla, due to competition, the 
percentages of litigation funders mainly vary between 20 and 30%.164 In practice, according to Evers-
berg, a rule of thumb applies for funders that a percentage of 50% is safe, anything higher would prob-
ably go against public policy.165 Furthermore, all funders are said to provide for a veto right in respect 
of settlements, and share ‘the general conception of themselves as being more than just a cash pro-
vider and the preference for taking on an advisory role during the funding process.’166 
  
As mentioned in section 4.2, the contract between a commercial litigation funder and a claimant is 
generally qualified as a contract sui generis or as a contract of undisclosed partnership (Gesellschafts-
vertrag, the partnership is further qualified as Gelegenheitsgesellschaft and Innengesellschaft), de-
pending on the specific contract.167 In the latter situation, both the funder and the claimant contribute 
to the partnership: the claimant through his claim, and the funder with its wallet to pursue the said 
claim and cover a potential costs order. The claimant and funder remain the owners of their respective 
assets (claim and financial means); these are not transferred to the partnership.168 The partnership 
does not publicly act as such, this is undisclosed. Normally, parties will additionally stipulate a confi-
dentiality agreement to avoid disclosing the funder’s presence.169 The claimant pursues the claim in 
his own name, and the funder remains in the background. The claimant and the funder, however, have 
a joint aim and a matching interest: to enforce and capitalize – the potential value of – the claim.170 
This construction affords certain rights and imposes certain obligations on both parties.171 The claim-
ant is required to (allow his attorney to) provide the funder with information and to deliberate on 
litigation strategies and decisions (see hereafter). At the same time, the claimant secures the financial 
means to pursue the claim, and is covered against the risk of losing or an insolvent defendant (as to 
the litigation costs). However, these obligations for the funder apply only in the internal construct. 
Externally, only the claimant is liable, for instance, for adverse costs; not the funder, nor the partner-
ship. The insolvency of the funder thus mainly creates a risk for the claimant, less so for the defendant.  
                                                             
 
164 Jaskolla 2004, p. 77. 
165 Referring to the decision of the Munich Court of Appeal that a share of 50% was justified in a case where the funder 
had stepped in after the case at first instance had already been lost. 
166 Eversberg 2016, p. 29.  
167 Cf. § 705 ff. BGB. See Jaskolla 2004, p. 62 ff and 71, referring to, inter alia, a 1999 decision of – a predecessor of – 
the BaFin (p. 63), Homberg 2006, p. 110 ff and 120, Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 466, Langheid & Wandt 
2016, § 1, Rn. 109, Heussen & Hamm 2016, § 54, Rn. 248, Van Boom 2017, p. 15-16, all with further references. See, 
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168 Homberg 2006, p. 111-112. The claimant can assign the claim to the funder for security purposes, after which the 
funder authorizes the claimant to bring the claim in his own name on the funder’s behalf (Gewillkürte Prozessstand-
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170 See, differently, Bruns 2000, p. 238.  
171 See Jaskolla 2004, p. 68-74, Homberg 2006, p. 120 ff, Coester & Nitzsche 2005, p. 90-94, Rosenberg, Schwab & 




A third-party funder will only engage in a case after a thorough assessment of the chances of success 
and the credit-worthiness of the defendant.172 Much like insurers, third-party litigation funders are 
aided by the German costs (shifting) system, which enables them to accurately calculate the cost (risks) 
of litigation.173 However, although the case law on the topic is scarce, some complications might arise 
as to (the permissibility of) third-party litigation funding agreements. First, it might go against the pro-
hibition on contingency fees if an attorney is involved in such a contract.174 In 2012, the Munich Court 
of Appeal deemed the (indirect) involvement of an attorney in a litigation funding agreement to be 
invalid, as it had circumvented the contingency fee ban: 
 
Auch wenn Rechtsanwälte mehrheitlich an einer Gesellschaft beteiligt sind, die die Prozessführung 
ihrer eigenen Mandantschaft finanziert, besteht in gleicher Weise die Gefahr, dass die Rechtsverfol-
gung in einer mit der Stellung als Organ der Rechtspflege unvereinbaren Weise primär aus wirtschaft-
lichen Interessen betrieben wird.175  
 
Second, the strictly regulated legal services market as discussed in section 4.2 can put a spanner in the 
works, as the funder is not allowed to provide legal advice. This explains why third-party funders are 
not actively involved in litigation or do not interfere with the choice of lawyer.176 Another reason that 
they do not interfere with the choice of lawyer is that they depend on the lawyer’s referral of cases; 
replacing them with another lawyer would irreparably harm a funder’s business. Nevertheless, as men-
tioned, a contract between a funder and a claimant will most likely stipulate that the funder is allowed 
to deliberate on litigation strategies and decisions.177 In literature and case law this has been recog-
nized as an advantage, also for attorneys.178 A funder’s level of control might be most robust in the 
situation in which a claimant has assigned its claim to the funder which allows the latter to assert the 
claim(s) in its own name – as mentioned, such a construction will be discussed in sections 4.4.4 and 
4.5.5. A related issue that has not yet been dealt with in a court of law is the disclosure of a third-party 
funder’s presence. There is no legal obligation to do so and, as mentioned, the claimant and funder 
will not normally voluntarily disclose the latter’s involvement. This might be different if disclosure is 
advantageous, such as in settlement negotiations.179 Stadler has argued that for collective redress, in 
light of the European Commission’s Recommendation, an obligation to disclose a funder’s presence 
should be implemented.180 She deems disclosure to be necessary in order for courts to assess whether 
the funder has any (undue) influence over the claimant’s litigation decisions. Given the defendant’s 
                                                             
 
172 Homberg, p. 2, 19 ff.  
173 Wagner 2010, p. 173 and 180. 
174 See section 4.4.2. 
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potential abusive behaviour, however, she deems it to be reasonable that the details of the arrange-
ment should only be disclosed if necessary, and if so, to the court only. 
4.4.4 Special purpose vehicles: the assignment model 
As mentioned in the previous section, some parties fund litigation by way of having aggrieved parties’ 
claims assigned to them. Such a special purpose vehicle (Rechtsverfolgungsgesellschaft) then pursues 
similar, pooled claims in its own name, and in the case of success, the aggrieved parties are reimbursed 
with a percentage of the proceeds. Hence, such a construct resembles a contingency fee. In addition 
to consumer associations and a group of aggrieved parties, entrepreneurial third parties can establish 
such a vehicle. They have employed the assignment model in practice as a way to obtain collective 
redress, and as such the different types will be discussed in section 4.5.5. Here, I will discuss the con-
ditions under which a third party can enforce the claims of other persons. A special purpose vehicle 
might take the shape of different legal entities.181 However, regardless of its type, it is questionable 
whether it can pursue (bundled) assigned claims in its own name. This relates in particular to a party’s 
capacity to sue (who can bring other persons’ claims), and the restrictions on the alienability of a claim. 
In Germany, these rules reflect the strict regulation of the legal services market and the fundamental 
principle that civil justice should serve the protection of individual rights.182  
 
Normally, only a person whose individual rights are at stake has standing to bring the ensuing claim 
(Prozessführungsbefugnis). Only by way of regulated exceptions can a third party enforce such a right 
in its own name. First, a third party can enforce a claim in its own name on behalf of the owner of the 
actual claim. This needs to be based on specific legislation (gesetzliche Prozessstandschaft), or on an 
agreement between the third party and owner of the claim (gewillkürte Prozessstandschaft). An ex-
ample of the former is the administrator that litigates on behalf of a bankrupt party.183 An example of 
the latter is a debt collection mandate (Einziehungsermächtigung), with which the capacity to sue fol-
lows from the transfer of the right of action from the claim owner to a third party that has an own 
interest which is worthy of protection (schutzwürdiges Eigeninteresse).184 It is a – strictly regulated and 
rather complex – exception to the principle that a party should bring its claim pro se. In both cases, 
the third party litigates in its own name but has to make clear that it is not enforcing its own right.185  
 
An alternative route to pursue the claim of another person – which avoids the aforementioned proce-
dural requirements – is by way of assignment (Abtretung), which is possible under the German law of 
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182 As discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
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obligations.186 A third party may take the place of the original creditor by contract, and with the trans-
feral of the right steps into the shoes of the previous creditor as the new claim owner. It can then 
assert an own right on its own behalf, regardless of whether the assignment is full (Vollabtretung) or 
has been entered into for the purpose of commercial collection (Inkassozession), including by way of 
bringing the claim before the court. However, additional rules apply for the latter construction, the 
Inkassozession. The enforcement of a ‘foreign’ claim (fremde Forderung) for commercial purposes, 
where the original claim owner retains an economic interest in the claim, is restricted to those who 
have been authorized to provide legal services under the Legal Services Act (RDG).187 The transfer of a 
claim to an unauthorized party is considered void.188  
 
The conditions for a party’s capacity to sue are assessed in the admissibility phase of litigation. When 
a claim is brought before the court, it will first examine whether the procedural requirements to bring 
the claim are met. This examination of admissibility (Zulässigkeit der Klage) is conducted before and 
separated from the assessment of the merits of the case (Begründetheit der Klage).189 Matters of ad-
missibility are subdivided into various prerequisites for suing (Prozessvoraussetzungen), including par-
ties´ competence to litigate (Prozessführungsbefugnis). The court assesses these requirements ex of-
ficio, and if a party is not able to meet them, the claim will be dismissed on procedural grounds.190 A 
third party’s competence to litigate should be distinguished from any substantive restrictions to a 
claimant’s position, such as a non-existing right of the claim owner (Aktivlegitimation). Such substan-
tive matters are not assessed at the admissibility stage.191 In short, the recognition of standing is not 
necessarily equivalent to recognition of a right.192 
 
Within the context of this research, the relevant types of authorized persons to provide legal services 
under the Legal Services Act are the following. First, publicly funded consumer associations are allowed 
to provide legal services (Rechtsdienstleistungen), including debt collection services (Inkasso-
dienstleistungen), as long as this service is deemed necessary to protect consumers.193 This includes 
the enforcement of consumer claims for damages by way of assignment, either by bringing a test case 
(Musterverfahren) or by bundling the assigned claims for damages into one action (Sammelklage).194 
In addition, a registered third party can collect claims for commercial purposes.195 In order to be reg-
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istered, it needs to be adequate, trustworthy, competent/professional, and have professional indem-
nity insurance.196 Specific requirements can be attached to the registration, and the third party is re-
quired to transfer proceeds that are destined for the original claim owner as soon as possible, or to 
place them in a trust account.  
4.5 Relevant rules and features of the collective redress mechanisms 
4.5.1 Briefly brushing up 
In section 2.2.2, the German mechanisms of collective redress were introduced, save for the assign-
ment model that was introduced in the previous section and will be further discussed hereafter.  
As will be clear by now, the hesitance towards collective redress is rather strong in Germany. Never-
theless, there are a number of routes along which collective redress can be obtained. To reiterate, 
Germany does not (yet) have a general mechanism specifically designed to obtain collective redress. 
The statutory instruments are sectoral and are dispersed among various laws. With regard to con-
sumer and competition law, designated entities (such as Verbände) can provide for injunctive relief, 
recover ill-gotten gains, or pool assigned claims after an infringement of consumer law. With the Kap-
MuG, harmed investors can obtain compensatory collective redress in the area of securities law. Fur-
thermore, in practice, another – general – mechanism has been developed: the bundling of assigned 
claims and the pursuit thereof by a special purpose vehicle (Prozess- or Rechtsverfolgungsgesellschaft). 
 
In the following sections, I will further address these routes and their elements that affect the partici-
pation and contribution of entrepreneurial parties. I have categorized the routes as follows: 
i) traditional group action & a test case (section 4.5.2): joinder (Streitgenossenschaft), consoli-
dation (Verfahrensverbindung), and a test case (Musterklage); 
ii) representative action (section 4.5.3): action for injunction (Unterlassungsklage), and action 
for skimming-off illicit gains (Gewinnabschöpfungsklage); 
iii) specific group action/test case (section 4.5.4): model proceedings (KapMuG); 
iv) bundled assigned claims (section 4.5.5): Einziehungsklage and Rechtsverfolgungsgesellschaft.  
 
I will not further address the draft legislative proposal of July 2017 for a model proceedings (Muster-
feststellungsklage) for infringements of consumer law, as it is still a draft.197 Although the design is 
somewhat similar to that of the KapMuG, the likelihood of the involvement of entrepreneurial parties 
is uncertain, since only designated (non-entrepreneurial) entities have the right to bring such action. 
4.5.2 Joinder, consolidation and a test case 
As in most European jurisdictions, parties can jointly bring their individual, similar claims to court in 
one lawsuit (Streitgenossenschaft, § 59-60 ZPO), or the court may consolidate proceedings if various 
separate actions deal with the same legal and factual issues (Verfahrensverbindung, § 147 ZPO).198 The 
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two mechanisms have been found to be of little use for collective litigation purposes,199 let alone for 
entrepreneurial mass litigation. In both situations, the court still considers the bundled actions as in-
dividual cases, and thus treats them as such, both procedurally and substantively. Another obstacle 
for collective redress through these techniques is that the cases at hand need to be or have been 
brought before the same court. This is often impossible for practical and/or legal reasons. The larger 
the class, the more difficulties arise. Furthermore, it requires individual actions, which in the case of 
negative-value claims is unlikely due to rational apathy.  
 
Obviously, certain efficiency advantages can be achieved. For instance, evidence-taking can be com-
bined and costs can be shared. As to the amount in dispute and the related litigation costs (risk), the 
advantage of bundling depends on the number of claimants and the size of their claim. The charges 
and fees are calculated based on the combined amounts in dispute, which pro rata leads to lower 
individual costs.200 For individual cases, the amount in dispute remains capped at € 30 million. How-
ever, the combined amount in dispute is capped at € 100 million.201 The individual liability for adverse 
costs depends on the case and the underlying mutual agreement. If parties are joined and they are 
represented by the same legal representative, the court can either state the individual’s proportional 
liability in the costs order, or hold them jointly liable (Gesammtschuldner), regardless of their internal 
individual liability.202 Nevertheless, the efficiency objective of this procedural device is said to work 
only if the number of claims is relatively small. If not, ultimately, efficiency advantages in one area will 
be replaced by disadvantages elsewhere.203  
 
An equally unpractical or inefficient mechanism, for different reasons, is the test case (Musterklage).204 
In German civil procedure, KapMuG aside, there is no specific regulation (as yet) for such proceed-
ings.205 Nevertheless, in effect, a test case can provide for collective redress. This requires a consensual 
agreement between the claimants and the defendant(s) that is in conformity with regular contract 
law, i) ex ante, to litigate the test case and amicably resolve the other cases accordingly (Muster-
prozessvereinbarung), or ii) ex post, by way of a settlement after the test case has been decided upon. 
The former would have to include a suspension of the limitation period or a stay of proceedings for 
the other claims, and address the binding effect of the test case, as the judgment in such a case does 
not have this effect. An agreement ex post might not be feasible; for instance, due to the expiration 
of the limitation period for the other claims or the said lack of the binding effect of the test case. Both 
agreements obviously require the cooperation of the defendant(s), which might be problematic, and 
require an infrastructure or platform of sorts on the claimants’ side for purposes of organization, reg-
                                                             
 
& Höland 2010, p. 123, Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 238, 240-251, Stadler 2014b, and Halfmeier 2015, p. 
90. See also Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf KapMuG, Drucksache 15/5091, 14.03.2005, p. 13-15. 
199 See the references in the previous footnote. 
200 § 22(1) RVG (for attorney fees). See also Halfmeier 2015, p. 90, and section 4.3.2. 
201 § 22(2) RVG.  
202 § 100 ZPO. See also Haag & Geigel 2015, Kap. 41, Rn. 31-39. See also section 4.3.6. 
203 See the literature mentioned in footnote 192. 
204 On test cases by consumer organizations, see also section 4.5.5.1.  
205 On the draft legislative proposal for a Musterfeststellungsklage, see section 2.2.2. 
109 
 
istration, administration, information, et cetera. Given these impracticalities and obstacles, this instru-
ment has also been found to be of limited relevance for the pursuit of collective redress.206 The mildly 
more successful test case by way of an Einziehungsklage, brought by consumer associations, will be 
discussed in section 4.5.5.1. 
4.5.3 Representative actions 
4.5.3.1 Designated entities  
Under German law, in principle, a claimant has to base its action on (an alleged existence of) an own 
right, and, therefore, enforces a claim in its own name. By way of an exception, a designated entity 
can bring a representative action in the public interest and, in that sense, has its own right. This enti-
tlement needs to be based on specific legislation. The question of whether the entity has such a right 
and is thus entitled to bring the action is a matter of substantive law (Aktivlegitimation), not of proce-
dural requirements regarding admissibility and standing (Zulässigkeit and Prozessführungsbe-
fugnis/Prozessstandschaft).207 Consequentially, this question is dealt with according to party presen-
tation of evidence; the court does not have a duty to assess the admissibility/standing of the entity on 
its own initiative.  
 
The substantive laws that assign this authority are UWG and GWB for competition law, including the 
protection of consumer interests,208 and the UKlaG (previously, the AGBG) for consumer law.209 The 
remedies that the designated entities can pursue are injunctive relief (Unterlassungsklage) and the 
skimming-off illicit gains (Gewinnabschöpfungsklage).210 The designated private entities that can bring 
such an action are: business associations (Verbände zur Förderung gewerblicher Interessen), chambers 
of commerce and industry (Industrie- und Handelskammern or Handwerkskammern), and qualified 
organizations (Qualifizierte Einrichtungen).211 
 
Qualified organizations are those consumer associations (in the form of an incorporated association, 
eingetragener Verein) that, upon application, have been qualified by a public authority (Federal Office 
of Justice, Bundesamt für Justiz).212 In order to be qualified, they need to fulfil the criteria as laid down 
in § 4(2) UKlaG.213 In short, the criteria entail an assessment of the professionalism of the applicant, 
the number of members they represent, and the association’s financial means. The organization’s goal, 
as stated in its articles of association, needs to be the protection of general consumer interests by 
                                                             
 
206 Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 239, Stadler 2010, p. 82-83. See also Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf 
KapMuG, Drucksache 15/5091, 14.03.2005, p. 13-15.  
207 Micklitz & Stadler 2005, p. 20-21, Rosenberg, Schwab & Gottwald 2010, p. 236-238. 
208 § 8(3)(2-4) and 10(1) UWG, § 33(2) and 34a(1) GWB.  
209 § 3(1) UKlaG. 
210 See sections 4.5.3.2 and 4.5.3.3. 
211 See for an overview of all types of Verbände, Meller-Hannich & Höland 2010, p. 36 ff. See also Dürr-Auster 2017.  
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providing information and advice, not for profit, nor ad hoc.214 It needs to be made clear that the 
organization is not just acting as a debt collection agency.215 The association must have been estab-
lished for at least a year, and act in a professional manner, which is assessed on the basis of its previous 
activities. It needs to represent at least three active consumer associations or 75 individual members. 
Its financial means need to be sufficient to bear its own litigation costs and a possible costs award.216 
Publicly funded consumer associations are assumed to meet these requirements, such as the Federa-
tion of German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband) and the regional con-
sumer centres (Verbraucherzentralen), and thus need not apply.  
 
Being listed as a qualified organization does not automatically lead to the competence of the consumer 
association being accepted in a specific case, but nowadays the courts increasingly accept that such 
an organization is competent, in particular when competence is not in debate.217 In the case of a doubt 
as to whether a qualified organization still meets the requirements, such as sufficient financial means 
to bear a potential costs order, the court can refer the organization back to the Bundesamt für Justiz 
for a repeated assessment.218 Hence, this test does not take place within the court proceedings and is 
not public, thus not exposed to the defendant(s).  
4.5.3.2 Action for an injunction (Unterlassungsklage) 
The German action for injunctive relief has long been recognized as an effective instrument to provide 
collective redress after infringements of consumer and competition law:  
 
‘Die Rechtsdurchsetzung kollektiver Verbraucherinteressen ist in Deutschland mit dem Siegeszug der 
Unterlassungsklage verbunden. (…) [Sie gilt] als Exportschlager im Wettbewerb um das beste Recht-
schutzmodell in Europa, vielleicht darüber hinaus. (…) Die Unterlassungsklage ist nach wie vor das 
Zugpferd des Kollektiven Rechtsschutzes.‘219 
 
As discussed in sections 2.2.2 and 4.5.3.1, this representative action to cease and desist wrongful be-
haviour can be brought by various designated or qualified entities on behalf of those (competitors, 
consumers, the public) who are affected by infringements of, in particular but not limited to, consumer 
and competition law. These entities fulfil a public task if traditional instruments of control and law 
enforcement fail; they aim to restore the functioning of the market.220 Aggrieved parties can individu-
ally profit from the judgment’s reflex effect and precedent (Breitenwirkung).221 For UKlaG cases, the 
judgment has a binding effect against the same defendant(s) in similar claims.222 
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The evaluation by Meller-Hannich and Höland in 2010 confirmed the effectiveness of this instrument. 
A relatively large number of cases are being pursued, particularly with regard to unfair contract terms 
and unfair commercial practices.223 A properly functioning network exists to facilitate such redress. 
However, with regard to infringements of other (non-UWG) consumer law, undertaking such action is 
more problematic given the high cost risk and the lack of sufficient financial means by consumer asso-
ciations.224 The evaluation shows that courts seem to be increasingly inclined to, where possible, take 
into account the cost risk of consumer associations and their public task. Nevertheless, a number of 
cost risks remain.  
 
These obstacles signal the contribution that entrepreneurial parties could make. However, for them, 
the Unterlassungsklage is hardly interesting. First and foremost since, if possible at all, it is difficult to 
capitalize a judgment for injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is about putting a halt to behaviour and 
preventing future infringements. If not, fines (Bußgeld) can be collected, but it is unlikely that the gov-
ernment will allow a private party to collect them. Moreover, the injunctive action is not sufficiently 
interwoven with individual actions, as the former does not have binding effect on the latter.225 If this 
hurdle could somehow be overcome, the currently strictly regulated competence and standing of rep-
resentative organizations poses an equally important obstacle. An entrepreneurial party will not be 
able to qualify as an entity to bring such an action as it has a commercial interest. The only way an 
entrepreneurial party could pursue such an action would be to apply to be recognized as a qualified 
organization (Qualifizierte Einrichtung). This requires the organization to be non-profit, which an en-
trepreneurial organization obviously is not. Theoretically, it would be possible for an entrepreneurial 
party to back up or otherwise be involved in an action by a qualified non-profit organization.  
 
In practice, indeed, certain entrepreneurial parties seem to have found a way to engage in this type of 
collective redress. This is connected to the – extensive - Abmahnung practice. Before turning to judicial 
resolution, an association will almost always first send a formal warning, demanding that the wrongful 
behaviour must cease and be desisted from (Abmahnung). Such a demand will often include the re-
quest to declare such termination (Unterlassungserklärung), combined with a non-administrative fine 
(Vertragsstrafe), collectable if the activity is continued.226 The – alleged – wrongdoer owes such a fine 
to the acting association, as opposed to an administrative fine (Ordnungsgeld), which flows back into 
the public purse. If the wrongdoer does not enter into such an agreement, normally an Unterlassung-
sklage follows; if the agreement has been entered into, but not followed, a claim to collect the fine 
can follow (Zahlungsklage). This extrajudicial armament aims to – and indeed does – stimulate extra-
judicial resolution. However, it has given rise to abusive behaviour as well.227 Some associations have 
undertaken this practice with the only purpose of collecting the fines. Problematic is the fact that this 
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abuse is only detected when the case is later brought to court, which will not often be the case. In 
some cases, this has indeed occured, and the courts have declared the association’s behaviour to be 
abusive.228 For instance, if an association addresses specific businesses only, this is also considered 
abusive behaviour. The court then assumes that this is not in the protection of the general consumer 
interest, but for the association’s own gain. Making use of a litigation funder has also been found to 
be abusive, as it removes the cost and litigation risk for the claimant. 
Halfmeier argues, however, that the occurrence of these abusive practices should not be overesti-
mated. He lists the steps that such an association needs to take in order to make more than ‘ein karges 
Brot’.229 Basically, it needs to identify a possible infringement, an opponent that instead of object will 
rashly pay the fine, and then repeat this process, since the fines are generally of a modest amount 
(€ 200). 
4.5.3.3 Action for skimming-off illicit gains (Gewinn- and Vorteilabschöpfungsklage) 
Since 2004 (UWG) and 2005 (GWB), a designated entity – and sometimes the national cartel author-
ity – can bring a representative action to skim-off illegally obtained profits from businesses that have 
violated competition rules.230 The mechanism originated from a competition law enforcement deficit, 
in particular for negative-value claims (trivial and minor damage, Bagatell- und Streuschäden), and 
aims to deter companies from displaying wrongful behaviour and to ensure that unfair competition 
does not pay off.231 The action to skim off ill-gotten gains is intended as a last resort, if claims for 
individual damages or fines have not yet absorbed the illicit proceeds. It is considered to be an admin-
istrative sanction to be applied only in ‘hard-core’ cases of intentional infringements that concern a 
large number of persons.232 
 
In practice, however, the mechanism is said to lack effectiveness. The instrument has been described 
as a ‘nice colourful paper tiger’, ‘toter Buchstabe’, ‘ein stumpfes Schwert’, ‘durchweg dysfunctional’, 
and of practically almost no importance.233 First and foremost, because it is not often used. The des-
ignated bodies are said to lack incentives to initiate a claim, as the litigation risk is high and thus en-
dangers their budget, whereas they are not allowed to keep the proceeds in the case of a successful 
action in order to (re)fund their war chest.234 Instead, the proceeds flow back to the public (federal) 
purse. The litigation risk is high due to the complexity of this type of claim: proving the infringement, 
causality between the infringement and the profit obtained, and obtaining the necessary information 
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on the wrongdoer’s profits form high thresholds.235 For instance, requesting the disclosure of such 
information can be litigated up to the Supreme Court, before the substantive claim is even ad-
dressed.236 The wrongdoer might not even exist by that time, which adds to the claimant’s litigation 
risk.  
  
In 2010, Meller-Hannich & Höland reported that out of the 121 designated entities, four had experi-
ence with this action. In total, they had brought 17 actions.237 A well-known case is the misleading 
advertisement case of Lidl matrasses. After a successful Unterlassungsklage, the claimant (Ver-
braucherzentrale Bundesverband, Vzbz) brought a successful action to skim-off the illicit gains, with a 
disputed amount of € 25,000. Plausibly, this was not – even close to – the actual profit made, which 
the claimant had estimated at € 400,000. It had reduced the amount in dispute, however, in order to 
set the litigation costs at a lower rate.238 Nevertheless, its bold press release stated:  
 
‘Unternehmen müssen wissen, dass es teuer werden kann, sich unredlich zu verhalten.’239  
 
Similarly ‘successful’ was the ringtone case. Here, too, the action followed a successful Unterlassung-
sklage, and resulted in a settlement of € 18,500.240 Although claimants have been successful in some 
cases it is questionable, to say the least, whether the actions have indeed deterred potential wrong-
doers.241  
 
In addition to the problematic dual (private and punitive) nature of the remedy,242 the root cause of 
the aforementioned lacks of effectiveness are the high litigation costs and risk, and the claimants’ lack 
of a sufficient ‘war chest’. The litigation costs and risk are far larger in comparison to claims for injunc-
tive relief, in which the statutory charges and fees are relatively low.243 It could therefore be argued 
that entrepreneurial parties should be allowed to participate in such actions. This might seem too big 
a leap of faith, but there is one (unsuccessful) skimming-off claim that has been reported in which a 
third-party litigation funder was involved.244 Because the potential proceeds would flow into the public 
purse, the Bundesamt der Justiz had to approve the agreement between the funder and the consumer 
organization, as it included a percentage of the potential proceeds. The public authority did approve 
the agreement. As Halfmeier notes, it is striking that consumer organizations are not allowed to obtain 
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(a part of) the proceeds, but the state has allowed an entrepreneurial party to do so.245 To increase 
the consumer associations’ incentives to bring these cases, suggestions have been made to ‘privatize’ 
the remedy of disgorgement and to allow (a part of) the proceeds to go to the successful claimant, to 
a private fund that serves as a war chest, or to a designated fund that is funded by the public purse.246 
Such an incentive has yet to be implemented.247 Currently, the only specific costs rule that applies is 
that the designated entity can recover its administrative litigation costs (Aufwendungen) from the 
state (Bundesstelle) if it has been successful but unable to recover these costs from the defendant.248 
4.5.4 Specific group action/a test case: KapMuG 
In 2005, the Capital Investors’ Model Proceedings Act (KapitalanlegerMusterverfahrenGesetz) came 
into force to protect capital investors’ interests if various identical claims for damages originate from 
a mass damage event in the capital market.249 The duration of the KapMuG was originally limited to 
2012. In that year, the act was slightly amended and the duration date was prolonged to 2020. In 
essence, it applies to claims for damages originating from prospectus liability and liability for wrong or 
omitted ad hoc information on the securities market.250 
 
The proceedings consists of three parts. In the first phase, at least ten capital investors have to bring 
an individual claim to the competent court and individually apply for the adjudication of their case 
pursuant to the KapMuG. This minimum number of claims needs to have been asserted within six 
months after the court, upon the first application, has opened the register (Klageregister).251 The ap-
plications have to state that and how the answer to the central question(s) is of significance for the 
resolution of the other, similar cases.252 The court of first instance decides whether the claims are 
suitable to be resolved collectively through the model proceedings and, if so, what issues should be 
dealt with in the model proceedings.253 The court of first instance appoints the appellate court that 
will address the model case, and stays all other pending proceedings for the course of the model pro-
ceedings.254 With regard to this decision to stay, parties have the right – unless it is waived – to be 
heard.255 New cases join the model proceedings automatically – an individual opt-out is not possible 
at this stage. The second phase commences with the selection of a model case by the appellate court. 
It takes into account the claimant’s suitability to act as model claimant, any agreement between the 
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claimants and the model claimant, and the value of the claim.256 Generally, the claimant with the high-
est amount in dispute is selected, as assumedly he has the most interest in the outcome and thus 
provides the best guarantee for diligent procedural conduct.257 The other claimants become petition-
ers (Beigeladene), and have the right to perform procedural acts, as long as these are consistent with 
those of the model claimant.258 The appellate court will adjudicate the common legal and factual ques-
tion(s) of the model case as formulated by the court of first instance. The subsequent model case 
judgment (Musterentscheid) only addresses the model case, but binds all claimants.259 The court of 
appeal will then refer the model case back to the court(s) of first instance, which will assess the re-
maining cases accordingly in the third and last phase of the proceedings. Individual issues such as reli-
ance, causation and/or damages still need to be addressed.260 Alternatively, the 2012 amendment  
introduced the possibility for the model claimant and defendant to request the court of appeal to 
approve an opt-out settlement.261 The court of appeal assesses the settlement as to its reasonable-
ness.262 After the approval and notification thereof, parties can opt out within a period of a month.263 
The settlement is only valid if less than 30% of the registered claimants (not: class members) opt out.264  
 
Except for the situation in which a settlement is declared binding, the KapMuG is neither an opt-in nor 
an opt-out mechanism. Instead, it functions on the basis of a ‘no-option’ rule.265 A claimant either has 
to bring an individual action, and will then be included in the KapMuG proceedings, or decide to forego 
his claim. Unlike the Dutch WCAM, an individual does not have the right to bring a ‘separate’ individual 
action if KapMuG proceedings are deemed suitable.266 The logic behind this exclusivity was to avoid 
parallel proceedings. However, as a consequence, the KapMuG is filled with safeguards to adequately 
protect individual rights – which has led to a burden on the KapMuG proceedings ‘by many tedious 
petitions and requests’, avoiding which was precisely the objective of the KapMuG to begin with.267 
 
On two occasions, a government-commissioned evaluation of the KapMuG has taken place. The in-
strument was included in the aforementioned evaluation of German collective redress mechanisms by 
Meller-Hannich & Höland in 2010, and, in 2009, Halfmeier, Rott & Feess exclusively focused on the 
effectiveness of the KapMuG. The evaluations led to the prolongation of the act, and a revision in order 
to enhance its efficiency. In addition to the possibility to have a settlement declared binding, the revi-
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sions included the possibility for potential claimants to notify their claim in the register instead of ac-
tually having to file an action to participate in the proceedings.268 This registration does not replace 
the possible action and by registering, the issuer does not formally join the KapMuG, but it suspends 
the claim’s limitation period. In this way, potential claimants can await the outcome of the test case 
before deciding to file an action, and thus avoid the cost risk, which had proven to be a disincentive 
for individual claimants to bring an action in the KapMuG before 2012.269 
 
Before 2000, securities litigation was not common; according to Halfmeier, this was mainly caused by 
the high litigation costs and risk, and the prohibition of contingency fees.270 The level of litigation al-
tered after a reform of the substantive law on prospectus liability, and the introduction of the Kap-
MuG. Between 2005 and 2014, at least 300 model cases were brought before the Courts of Appeal.271 
In spite of the legislative amendments, the mechanism is still being criticised, in particular for the long 
duration of its proceedings. The notorious Telekom proceedings is a case in point, although it is im-
portant to note that this was the first KapMuG case and the 2012 amendment included improvements 
‘to speed up the proceedings’.272 The litigation is said to have been incited by the television appear-
ance of an attorney, Tilp, who nowadays is one of Germany’s most prominent ‘lead counsel’ (those 
that represent the model claimant) in KapMuG cases.273 It took many years from the filing of the first 
claim (in 2001, when the KapMuG had not yet been enacted) to the first oral KapMuG hearing (in 
2008). The first decision on liability was issued in 2012, upon which the Supreme Court’s judgment fol-
lowed in 2014, which reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, in favour of the claimants, which, in 
turn, was followed by two Court of Appeal decisions, one in favour of the claimants, for which an 
appeal at the Supreme Court is currently pending, and one in favour of the defendants, which was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 2017.274 Depending on the outcome of the currently pending appeal, 
the approximately 17,000 individual claims for damages might still need to be addressed by the court 
of first instance, unless a collective settlement follows. The American tandem proceedings of the Tel-
ekom case, a class action, was settled in 2005 (including a contingency fee for the plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
28% of the settlement fund).275 On the main defence attorney in the German case, however, Halfmeier 
states: 
 
‘His very strict strategy in the Telekom case – to deny any settlement and fight every single allegation 
by the plaintiffs – proved successful at least up until the model decision of 2012 that was in favour of 
Telekom. Now it might need to be revised after the pro-plaintiffs judgment by the Federal Court.’276 
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In addition to lengthy proceedings, another obstacle of the KapMuG was that the monetary incentives 
for attorneys to bring a model case were said to be low, whereas the workload is high.277 Lawyers’ 
‘economics’ remain challenging, as legal aid insurance is unavailable and contingency fee constructions 
are not allowed. Halfmeier notes that:  
 
‘most plaintiff lawyers resort to cooperation with third party litigation companies, or to other models 
that tend to circumvent the prohibition on contingency fees.’278 
 
Nevertheless, the Telekom case has accelerated the emergence of a sophisticated and competitive 
plaintiff bar in capital market cases, representing both private and institutional investors.279 For in-
stance, in the Telekom case, some 900 law firms are involved in representing the claimants, although 
Tilp & Rotter state that only a small number of those firms have made a noteworthy contribution.280 
Halfmeier, however, emphasizes the growing professionalism: 
 
‘While in the 1990s there may have been a certain asymmetry in German lawyers’ culture between 
more sophisticated (and well-paid) commercial lawyers and – allegedly – less competent and less 
successful lawyers on the plaintiff side, now this has changed to some extent as plaintiff law firms 
are also seen as competent and may even be regarded by some well-qualified law graduates as de-
sirable places to work.’ 
 
On the exact level of involvement of (other) entrepreneurial parties in KapMuG, there is not much 
information available. They are involved in high profile cases, such as the Volkswagen claim. As men-
tioned in section 3.3, some third-party litigation funders are backing the claims of three law firms that 
have filed claims on behalf of various (institutional) investors. Moreover, American law firms are in-
volved, which are likely to have an entrepreneurial stake in the litigation as well.281 
4.5.5 Assignment model 
4.5.5.1 By a consumer association (Musterklage and Sammelklage) 
As introduced in section 4.4.4, since 2002 consumer associations are allowed to enforce consumer 
claims for damages in their own name after infringements of consumer law. This right follows from 
the assignment by one or more consumers of their claim to the association (Einziehungsklage).282 The 
enforcement can be done by way of consolidating a number of claims (Sammelklage) or, as discussed 
in section 4.5.2, as a test case (Musterklage) that represents a number of similar cases with the same 
issues of law or fact. The mechanism has been allowed in particular for the pursuit of negative-value 
claims. The consumer association bears the costs (risk) and, therewith, aims to mitigate individuals’ 
rational apathy.  
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The Sammelklage has been used to obtain collective redress, mainly after a successful claim for injunc-
tive relief (Unterlassungsklage).283 However, the use of this instrument is limited.284 It is deemed inef-
fective in the situation where large groups of consumers have been harmed. In practice, the individu-
als’ rational apathy is not cured by this instrument, and the administrative costs for consumer organi-
zations are substantial, whereas they bear the litigation costs (risk). The claim(s) for damages is/are 
only manageable if the total number of aggrieved persons is not too high and they can be easily iden-
tified, as each claim needs to be assigned individually and assessed on its own merits.285 It also lacks 
effectiveness because it is an opt-in mechanism, and only those that assign their claims are compen-
sated in the case of success. Unsurprisingly, since the claims concern negative-value damage, the num-
bers of opt-ins in comparison to the number of class members are usually low.286 Furthermore, as the 
instrument is intended for scattered damage, courts have interpreted the consumer organization’s 
standing in a strict manner.287 Hence, in practice, the instrument is of little relevance to obtain collec-
tive redress.  
 
Due to the aforementioned obstacles, the assignment model is mostly employed as a test case to an-
swer a legal question that is relevant for numerous other consumers.288 The practical and legal prob-
lems with such a test case as a collective redress mechanism, as discussed in section 4.5.2, apply here 
as well: a test case judgment does not have a binding effect on other cases, and the ‘parked’ claims 
risk limitation problems.289 A test case can have an impact on the development of the law.290  
4.5.5.2 By a special purpose vehicle (Rechtsverfolgungsgesellschaft) 
A potentially suitable mechanism for entrepreneurial mass litigation is the entrepreneurial party’s es-
tablishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV, Rechtsverfolgungsgesellschaft) to which class members 
assign their claim. The economic risk of enforcing the claim partly remains with the original claim 
owner. Hence, the activity of an SPV is considered a debt collection service (Inkassodienstleistung).291 
As discussed in section 4.2, the professional debt collection of assigned claims is considered to be a 
legal service, and a party may only provide such a legal service within the limits of the Legal Services 
Act.292 Hence, the SPV needs to be registered in order to be able to enforce the claims.293 Furthermore, 
as the following case in point will show, entrepreneurial parties’ quest for acceptance of their for-
profit pursuit of collective redress has not been without costly legal hiccups.  
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119 
 
This particular type of entrepreneurial mass litigation was first tested in CDC’s cement cartel claims.294 
CDC is a Belgian-based company that purchases and bundles individual claims for damages that have 
arisen out of cartel infringements.295 After having done so, CDC pursues them in its own name. The 
contracts between CDC and individual class members stipulate that in the case of success, CDC will 
receive a percentage of the proceeds. CDC takes over the litigation risk and if the case is lost, it covers 
its own and the adverse litigation costs. In the cement cartel case the question arose whether CDC’s 
business model was consistent with German law. In 2009, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ 
judgments that CDC was entitled to bring the bundled claims it had purchased from a number of ce-
ment cartel victims, as claims of its own.296 At that point, the courts had not yet decided on the merits 
of the case, including the – contested – validity of the assignments.297 Whereas some academics were 
still somewhat hesitant as to whether the court would irrevocably ‘bless’ CDC’s business model,298 
others saw the judgment as a growing willingness to permit innovative forms of litigation funding.299 
However, after a referral back to the court of first instance, in 2013, the Düsseldorf District Court re-
jected CDC’s method of amalgamating cartel claims. The court’s main arguments can be summarised 
as follows.  
 
The assignments concluded before July 2008 fell within the reach of the Legal Counsel Act (applicable 
to legal advisors other than those admitted to the German bar).300 CDC was not authorized under this 
act to commercially collect ‘foreign’ claims. Therefore, these assignments were void. As to the assign-
ments that fell under the superseding – and less strict – Legal Services Act, CDC was registered accord-
ingly and was allowed to enforce ‘foreign’ claims. However, the district court found the assignments 
at hand to be contrary to public policy, as they infringed the – constitutional – principle of an even 
distribution of the cost risk. According to the court, ‘third’ parties need to have sufficient financial 
means to bear their own and potential adverse litigation costs up until the Supreme Court, without 
having to reduce the amount in dispute. In light of this principle, assignments should not be (ab)used 
in a manner that deprives a defendant from forfeiting a costs award; it should be avoided that a party 
without sufficient funds is pushed forward as a litigant. Although the court deemed CDC’s business 
model to offer considerable benefits for both CDC and the aggrieved parties, it neglected the principle 
of an even distribution of the procedural risk in an unacceptable manner. As CDC was not financially 
equipped to fully bear this litigation risk at the time of concluding the assignments, the defendants ran 
the risk of not being able to recover potential adverse costs. According to the court, this shifts the cost 
risk from CDC or the cement purchasers to the defendants, without justification.301 The court did not 
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consider the efficiency and costs advantages of bundling the claims (for both parties), such as the ad-
vantage of the regressive costs structure and a cap on the amount in dispute.302 
 
How did the court know about CDC’s financial status? This was shown by CDC’s own statement when 
it had commenced the action and requested to tie the court charges and attorney fees to a reduced 
amount in dispute.303 CDC had issued a declaration by its board that it would not be able to fully bear 
the litigation costs risk. In 2005, the district court nevertheless found CDC financially sound enough to 
do so, and rejected the request. Eight years later, the same court used the same declaration to under-
pin its argument that CDC, at the time of concluding the second cluster of assignments, did not have 
sufficient means to cover a costs award in the case of loss. CDC’s statements during litigation that, 
meanwhile, it had taken precautionary measures to cover a potential adverse costs award, was not 
enough: 
 
‘Abgesehen davon, dass sich fraglich erscheint, ob die Fähigkeit zur Erstattung der Kosten erster In-
stanz ausreicht, ist dieser Vortrag aber auch ersichtlich derart unbestimmt, dass er nicht zu berück-
sichtigen ist. Denn es bleibt unklar, worin die behauptete „hinreichende Sicherstellung“ besteht, ob 
sie bereits zum Abtretungszeitpunkt bestand oder ob ihr Eintritt damals zumindest sicher vorausseh-
bar war.’304  
 
The Higher Regional Court confirmed the judgment.305 In essence, that means that CDC’s request to 
reduce the amount in dispute had caused collateral damage with a huge impact: CDC’s claim vanished 
into thin air. Possibly not fully, though, as in 2015 CDC issued a second, related claim concerning a 
regional cement cartel. It provided security for costs of € 2.3 million.306 The district court rejected the 
claim as being time barred, but the appeal is currently pending.307 To conclude, an entrepreneurial 
party might be allowed to purchase, bundle and pursue the claims as its own, but when doing so, the 
SPV has to bolster its coffers (at the right time) in order to be able to bear a potential adverse costs 
award. In this respect, there is another relevant aspect of this case. The six defendants had issued 
third-party notices to other companies, which intervened, thereby increasing the adverse costs that 
CDC had to pay to a total of more than € 3.5 million.308  
 
The judgment did not refrain SPVs from entering and operating in the mass litigation market.309 An-
other cartel case, part of the Air Cargo claims that are pending before various European courts, was 
brought by an SPV that was established by one of the harmed parties. The case was settled in early 
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2018.310 SPVs are also involved in other types of damages claims. As mentioned in section 4.4.3, some 
SPVs bundle assigned (low-value) consumer claims, such as Metaclaims.311 In the case of success, the 
participating consumers recover 65-80% of the individual proceeds. Another example is MyRight.com, 
which states that it is pursuing the claims of about 35,000 Volkswagen car owners.312 In the case of 
success, the individuals will receive 65% of their individual proceeds, unless their legal aid insurer co-
vers the litigation costs. MyRight, in turn, is supported by a US law firm and backed by the litigation 
funder Burford.313 
4.6 Summary: rules and features that shape German entrepreneurial mass litigation 
In the following, I will summarize the main findings on the elements that affect the operation of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation in Germany.  
  
German civil justice is generally regarded as being influential and efficient. Dispute resolution is a joint 
responsibility of parties and the court, and various guiding principles aim to balance party autonomy 
with courts’ case management powers. Furthermore, various measures, such as costs incentives, aim 
to facilitate consensual dispute resolution at the earliest occasion. A quick scan also shows that the 
said efficiency is not so apparent when it comes to complex litigation. The legislator and the courts 
emphasize the protection of individual rights, also within the context of collective redress. Collective 
redress is regarded as a last resort. 
 
The legal services market is strictly regulated, both in and out of court. Attorneys have largely main-
tained their monopoly over providing legal advice and enforcement. As independent bodies of the 
administration of justice, guided by professional and ethical rules, they are seen as being best 
equipped to protect society’s interests. Inasmuch as other legal services providers are allowed to en-
gage in a ‘foreign’ claim, they need to be authorized as such by a public authority and act within the 
limits of the Legal Services Act. For instance, consumer organizations can enforce consumer claims 
under strict criteria on professionality and financial means. Entrepreneurial parties are active in the 
litigation market, in particular third-party litigation funders, but they cannot provide legal services un-
less registered as such. So far, no other measures have been implemented to regulate and supervise 
litigation funding.  
 
The German costs system aims to promote the predictability of costs by way of a statutory fixation of 
court charges and attorney fees, and the pursuit of small claims by way of cross-subsidization. Parties 
– as well as funders – can precisely calculate the litigation costs and risk (the potential adverse costs 
award). The charges and fees are based on the amount in dispute, which (for this purpose) is capped 
at € 30 million. Some exceptions apply for certain claims. For instance, in competition law cases, the 
court can reduce the amount in dispute if the claimant’s economic situation so demands. For court 
proceedings, attorneys and clients are allowed to negotiate a higher fee than the statutorily fixed one. 
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This is common in complex litigation, but such a fee is not necessarily recoverable in the case of suc-
cess. There are no relevant rules for providing security for costs, but there is an entrepreneurial party 
that has started doing so in light of critical case law on its business model. 
 
Costs (shifting) rules and proceedings are relatively simple and efficient. Normally, all (necessary) stat-
utory costs are shifted to the successful party. Courts do not have many discretionary powers as to 
costs shifting. The actual assessment takes place in separate costs proceedings before the same court. 
Due to the strictly regulated costs (shifting) rules, parties’ litigation conduct plays a limited role and 
does not create extensive litigation. Separate proceedings for additional claims for damages, such as 
extrajudicial or litigation funding costs, are rare. For such liability, the costs need to be necessarily and 
appropriately incurred and of a reasonable amount, criteria which are not easily met. A non-party to 
litigation can be held liable for adverse costs in limited circumstances only. Enabling litigation by 
‘merely’ providing funding is not sufficient to be held liable.  
 
Legal expenses insurance is the main source of alternative funding, but is not available for commercial 
or securities litigation. Contingency fees are not often entered into, since they are only allowed if the 
party’s financial situation is impaired in such way that pursuing a claim would otherwise be impossible. 
The main entrepreneurial parties in Germany are third-party litigation funders, having emerged from 
the blooming legal expenses market. However, they take up a minor part of the litigation funding mar-
ket. Between third-party funders, too, there is little competition. This type of funding is mainly used in 
commercial disputes; for other types of (small) claims the options are restricted, but are increasing. 
Although third-party funding remains precarious in light of various legal obstacles, it is recognized as 
a justified means to obtain access to justice. Their experience in assessing claim validity is considered 
an advantage as it supplements the attorneys’ expertise. Third-party funding contracts are often un-
disclosed, they ensure confidentiality, limit the funder’s external liability, and ensure a mutual delib-
eration on litigation strategy and decisions. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, a funder’s active involve-
ment in litigation is not permitted, unless it is authorised to provide legal advice. A third-party funding 
contract differs from funding provided by a special purpose vehicle, as the latter pursues (bundled) 
assigned claims in its own name. In order to be authorized, it needs to be adequate, trustworthy and 
professional, have a professional indemnity insurance and a trust account. Here, too, there are legal 
obstacles, and the inherent uncertainty has so far limited this type of litigation funding. 
 
For collective redress, Germany strongly focuses on semi-public bodies, such as consumer organiza-
tions. So far, the aforementioned entrepreneurial parties have not been much involved in mass litiga-
tion. The restrictions on the legal services market and hesitance or aversion towards collective redress 
have so far turned entrepreneurial mass litigation in Germany into a legal minefield and, consequen-
tially, there is not (yet) a well-developed market. Nevertheless, some (international) entrepreneurial 
activities in the collective redress market are emerging, in particular in KapMuG cases.  
 
As mentioned, the hesitance towards collective redress is rather strong in Germany. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of routes along which collective redress can be obtained, with varying effective-
ness. For practical and legal reasons, the ‘traditional’ routes of joinder and a test case have both been 
found to be of relatively little use for collective litigation purposes, let alone for entrepreneurial mass 
litigation. The same can be said for the action to skim-off illegally obtained profits. In particular, since 
the litigation risk is high, and designated entities lack incentives to bring such claims. In one case, the 
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state allowed an entrepreneurial party to cover the litigation risk, but otherwise they are not involved 
in this type of litigation. The long-standing action for injunctive relief is considered to be an important 
and effective instrument, although it cannot provide for compensatory relief. Such actions are brought 
by designated (non-entrepreneurial) parties. There have been some instances of entrepreneurial ac-
tivities, however, in collecting extrajudicial, non-administrative fines from businesses. If detected, 
courts have found such behaviour to be abusive. The courts assumed that in such situations, the ac-
tivities did not aim to protect general consumer interests. The actual occurrence of abusive practices, 
however, has been contested in the literature. 
 
So far, the KapMuG is the main instrument that can provide for compensatory collective redress. Ag-
grieved capital market investors can obtain compensation either by way of individual litigation that 
follows the model case judgment, or by way of a court-approved collective settlement. This settlement 
binds the parties to litigation (not: all class members), except for those that opt out. In order to avoid 
parallel proceedings, individuals cannot bring a separate individual action. Consequentially, the Kap-
MuG design includes many safeguards to adequately protect individual rights, which has led to lengthy 
litigation. Entrepreneurial lawyers, including American law firms, and funders are seen to be increas-
ingly cooperating, which has been said to have created a ‘plaintiff bar’ in these types of cases. In addi-
tion, the assignment model, where class members assign their claim to a third party, can provide for 
compensatory collective redress. The model can be employed by consumer organizations and entre-
preneurial special purpose vehicles. In the latter situation, however, the resistance towards collective 
redress and entrepreneurial parties being involved has created some legal uncertainties as to the ac-
ceptance thereof. Nevertheless, this type of entrepreneurial mass litigation is emerging in competition 
law and consumer law cases.  
 
To conclude, Table VI lists Germany’s rules and features that potentially mediate the beneficial or dis-
advantageous operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per addressed key issue. 
 
 
Key issue Distilled rule or feature 
Essentials of the civil justice 
landscape 
- Increasing focus on efficiency and the joint responsibility of parties and courts 
- Increasing case management by courts 
- Focus on the protection of individual rights 
The legal services market - Strictly regulated legal services market 
- Attorneys monopoly in litigation, seen as the main promotors of the independ-
ent administration of justice  
- Attorneys are guided by professional and ethical rules 
- Strict regulation and authorization of alternative legal services providers, in-
cluding criteria on professionality, financial means, professional indemnity in-
surance and trust account. 
- No additional regulation and supervision of third-party litigation funding 
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Litigation costs and cost-shift-
ing 
- Predictable litigation costs (own costs and inter partes costs) 
- Pursuit of small claims is stimulated by way of cross-subsidization 
- Regressive charges and fees structure 
- Court control over litigation costs (in determining the amount in dispute which 
decides the statutory fees and charges) 
- In general, full indemnification of the successful party’s litigation costs 
- Court can reduce an agreed fee if it is inappropriately excessive 
- Recovery of extrajudicial costs or litigation funding costs as damages only in 
limited circumstances 
- Few cost sanctions for abusive litigation, and liability for such damages is rarely 
invoked/awarded 
- Limited options to hold a non-party liable for adverse costs; requires separate 
proceedings 
- Security for costs not legally required but occasionally provided in practice 
Private litigation funding - Legal expenses insurance is the main source of alternative funding 
- Contingency fees allowed in limited circumstances only, and rarely entered into 
- Third-party funders act as a key player in addition to the attorney, and are ap-
preciated as such; limited involvement in litigation decisions due to the strict 
regulation on providing legal services 
- Third-party funders mainly operate in commercial disputes, but are testing the 
market in consumer law cases 
- No regulation on result-based remuneration percentages; guided by market 
and general civil law 
- Little competition between third-party litigation funders 
- Entrepreneurial special purpose vehicles, if authorized, can purchase (and bun-
dle) claims, but litigation remains a legal minefield 
- Strict rules on procedural requirements such as standing, in a phase separated 
from the assessment of a claim’s merits 
Specificities and safeguards of 
the collective redress mecha-
nisms 
- Strict judicial assessment of procedural rules such as standing 
- Strong focus on semi-public representative bodies; limited, yet growing, in-
volvement of third-party funders and special purpose vehicles 
- Strict case law on their financial means in relation to litigation costs risk 
- No regulation on the disclosure of the presence or identity of a third-party liti-
gation funder 
- Development of a ‘claimants’ bar in KapMuG cases, including American law 
firms 
- Competition in being appointed ‘lead counsel’ in KapMuG cases; competing 
cases restricted by law 









5 England and Wales 
 
‘There is no doubt that civil litigation, particularly in England and Wales, is expensive.’1 
 
‘The Government (…) clearly envisaged that many collective actions would be dependent on third party 
funding’.2 
 
5.1 Setting the scene: some essential features of the civil justice landscape 
As a common law jurisdiction, in which ‘a body of instincts and principles’ ‘is developed organically, 
building on what was there before’, England and Wales have an inherent flexibility and capacity to 
develop the law as applied by judges, independently of legislation.3 This flexibility is embedded in doc-
trines such as precedent.4 Nevertheless, various statutory instruments exist nowadays, also concern-
ing civil procedure – notably the 1998 CPR.5 
 
Contrary to continental jurisdictions, English law has a less strict division between private and public 
proceedings. Generally, civil law means ‘not criminal’.6 The court system for civil matters in England 
and Wales can be summarized as follows. The court of first instance is the Magistrates’ Court (family 
law), the County Court (cases under a certain amount in dispute and level of complexity), where the 
majority of civil cases are brought,7 or (otherwise) the High Court. The High Court is split into three 
divisions: the Queen’s Bench Division (e.g. contract and tort), the Chancery Division (e.g. corporate 
law, insolvency law, the law of inheritance and trusts), and the Family Division. As of July 2017, the 
specialist civil courts of the Commercial Court, the Technology and Construction Court (both sub-divi-
sions of the Queen’s Bench Division), and those of the Chancery Division have been renamed; they 
now fall under the umbrella of the newly introduced Business and Property Courts of England and 
Wales.8 It is possible to try a civil case by jury; however, this is exercised only in rare types of cases,9 
                                                             
 
1 Sime & French 2015, p. 87. 
2 Merricks v. Mastercard and Others [2017] CAT 16, para. 127. 
3 Patel v. Mirza [2016] 3 W.L.R. 399 (SC), p. 459-460. 
4 Stare decisis or the doctrine of binding precedent states that judgments of courts that are superior in hierarchy gen-
erally have binding force. Persuasive decisions are those of courts of the same level. See, for instance, Sime 2006, p. 24, 
and Slapper & Kelly 2015, section 4.2 and Chapter 6. 
5 SI 1998/3132. The CPR are rules of court that are made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. This is an advisory 
non-departmental public body set up under the Civil Procedure Act 1997. See also <gov.uk/government/organisa-
tions/civil-procedure-rules-committee>. The rules are submitted to the Lord Chancellor and – if allowed – are contained 
in a statutory instrument. 
6 Uff 2013, p. 196. See also Sime & French 2015, p. 60-69 and p. 217-223. 
7 See, for instance, Jackson 2009, p. 53.  
8 See Judiciary of England and Wales, The Business and Property Courts of England & Wales. An Explanatory Statement, 
May 2017, available at < judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/bpc-explanatory-statement-final-20170518-
v2.pdf>. Recently, Lord Justice Briggs has made recommendations for further decision-making on the future of the civil 
court divisions, for instance, abolishing the separate divisions; Briggs 2016, Chapter 8.  
9 Next to criminal cases at the Crown Court, it mainly concerned cases of libel and slander, see Hodges 2009a, p. 110. 
However, trial by jury in such cases was abolished in 2014. See Sime & French 2015, p. 1005. 
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and is irrelevant within the context of this book. At the appellate level, appeals on points of law and 
facts are adjudicated by the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal in London. Finally, the Supreme Court 
is the court of appeal for all UK civil cases on points of law.10 Permission to appeal is required, which 
can be obtained either from the Court of Appeal or from the Supreme Court. Certain cases are adjudi-
cated by Tribunals. Tribunals are specialised courts in certain areas of law, part of the independent 
judiciary, with panels of judges that include non-legal experts.11 For instance, the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT) was established in 2002 to hear and decide claims and applications under, inter alia, 
the Competition Act 1998.12 The civil courts’ structure was recently reviewed by Lord Justice Briggs, 
which has led to recommendations that also affect the costs of litigation; inter alia, the introduction 
of an online court and rebalancing London and regional civil justice.13 
 
Although civil procedure remains adversarial in the sense that parties control the issues in dispute and 
the gathering of evidence, the judiciary’s inquisitorial approach and active case management have 
significantly increased in the past couple of decades.14 The review of access to justice by Lord Woolf in 
1995 can be placed at the heart of this development, and its objectives were further advanced by Lord 
Justice Jackson’s review of civil litigation costs.15 The Woolf reports led to various recommendations 
to render civil procedure simpler, more efficient and less expensive, and to the introduction of the CPR 
in 1998.16 In conformity with Lord Woolf’s recommendation, case management was made a corner-
stone of the procedural reforms, also for multi-party actions.17 To meet the needs of the 21st century, 
the recommendations introduced a paradigm shift for civil justice, with court-controlled case manage-
ment complementing party autonomy and the traditional aim of securing substantive justice.18 First 
and foremost, this is expressed in the overriding objective that instructs courts to deal with cases justly 
and at proportionate cost, to which objective courts must give effect whenever they exercise any 
power or interpret any rule.19 General case management powers include identifying relevant issues 
and necessary evidence at an early stage of the proceedings, or requiring parties to do so, fixing time-
tables, and prompting parties to prepare litigation costs budgets and to submit them for approval at 
the start of the pre-trial process.20 Various sanctions, which need to ‘fit the crime’, can follow non-
                                                             
 
10 The Supreme Court was formerly known as the House of Lords. 
11 Uff 2013, p. 197. 
12 Enterprise Act 2002, section 12. See for a full overview of the types of proceedings before the Tribunal <catribu-
nal.org.uk/242/About-the-Tribunal.html>. 
13 See Briggs 2016. See also Ministry of Justice, Transforming our justice system: summary of reforms and consultation, 
September 2016, p. 8. 
14 See Andrews 2013, p. 334 ff, Sorabji 2015, p. 165 ff, Sime & French 2015, p. 695 ff. 
15 The Jackson reports will be discussed in section 5.3. 
16 SI 1998/3123. Ever since, the CPR have been amended on several occasions; see for an overview <jus-
tice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/stat_instr>. The CPR are accompanied by numerous Practice Directions (PDs).  
17 Lord Woolf 1995, p. 18, Lord Woolf 1996, p. 226. A clear example of case management techniques within the context 
of group litigation is the Buncefield case, as discussed by Tzankova 2014 and Creutzfeldt & Hodges 2016. See also sec-
tion 5.5. 
18 Sorabji 2014, § 1.4.1. 
19 CPR 1.1 and 1.2.  
20 CPR 1.4(2). See Sime & French 2015, p. 57-58 and 777 ff and Zuckerman 2013, p. 31 ff and p. 527 ff. CPR Part 3 
addresses the court’s case and costs management powers. See also section 5.4. 
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compliance; for instance, a cost sanction or striking out part of a statement. A court can also restrain 
disproportionate and unnecessary litigation, or even prevent a litigant from continuing or commencing 
a claim without the court’s permission.21 Parties’ responsibilities and the court’s supervision depend 
on the case track to which the court has allocated the claim: small claims track, fast track, or multi-
track.22 The trial phase in complex litigation is usually lengthy, it can take several months. For instance, 
the trial in the RBS litigation (GLO) was estimated to take 12 weeks.23  
 
Despite the efficiency reforms, litigation in England and Wales remains costly. This explains the rela-
tively low placement of the UK as compared to the Netherlands and Germany (ranking 1st and 2nd) in 
the category ‘civil justice’ in the Rule of Law Index 2016, where the UK occupies sixteenth place.24 The 
lower placement can be mainly attributed to the UK’s score on ‘Accessibility and Affordability’.25 Oth-
erwise, as to the efficiency of its legal framework for dispute resolution, the United Kingdom continues 
to feature in the top ten in the Global Competitiveness Index.26 
 
The civil justice reforms’ objectives and high litigation costs have also incited the support for ADR. ADR 
can include conciliation, and commercial contracts often encompass an obligation for parties to nego-
tiate prior to initiating proceedings.27 In 2004, the Court of Appeal stressed that:  
 
‘[a]ll members of the legal profession who conduct litigation should now routinely consider with their 
clients whether their disputes are suitable for ADR. But we reiterate that the court’s role is to encour-
age, not to compel. The form of encouragement may be robust.’28 
 
Consensual settlement at the earliest appropriate occasion is stimulated in pre-action protocols, and 
through pecuniary incentives and case management. For instance, cost consequences can follow an 
                                                             
 
21 Through general case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.1, or (for vexatious litigants) an order under the Senior 
Courts Act 1981, section 42, or a civil restraint order as defined in CPR 2.3(1); see Sime & French 2015, p. 275 ff.  
22 CPR 27-29.  
23 RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2017] EWHC 463 (Ch), para. 3. 
24 Separate numbers and figures for England and Wales are not reported. 
25 Provided by the World Justice Project. See <worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/media/wjp_rule_of_law_in-
dex_2016.pdf>, p. 40-41 (Factor 7: Civil Justice). The UK scores 0.56 on Accessibility and affordability (with an overall 
score on civil justice of .75), see p. 152, whereas the Netherlands scores .78 (with an overall score of .88) and Germany 
.73 (with an overall score of .86), see p. 117 respectively p. 86. 
26 The UK ranks 6th (out of 138 jurisdictions) on this indicator (no. 1.10) in the Global Competitiveness Index 2016-2017, 
as reported by the World Economic Forum; see <www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-
2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf>, p. 355. In comparison: the Netherlands 
ranks 12th and Germany 17th on this indicator, see p. 277 and p. 187. 
27 Sime & French 2015, p. 1262.  
28 Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3002 (CA), as cited by Sime & French 2015, p. 1257. See 
also PGF v. OMFS [2013] EWCA Civ 1288. 
129 
 
unreasonable refusal of a formal settlement offer, and courts can award additional damages if a judg-
ment is at least as advantageous for a claimant as its earlier offer to settle.29 Reportedly, settlement 
rates in England and Wales are high: at least 90% of civil disputes result in a negotiated settlement.30 
5.2 The regulation and supervision of the legal services market 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, English legal services providers operate in an open and competitive market. There is a vast 
variety of legal services providers. I will address the regulation and supervision of barristers and solic-
itors, Claims Management Companies and third-party litigation funders. Funding specificities and 
these parties’ operation in mass litigation will be further discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5.  
 
I distinguish third-party litigation funders from third parties that employ the assignment model: fund-
ing a case by having the original claim owner’s right of action transferred to itself and carrying out the 
litigation in its own name and for its own benefit, or by assignment of the potential proceeds of the 
action. I will refer to such parties as special purpose vehicles. As assignment and bundling of claims by 
special purpose vehicles is governed by private law and no specific regulatory requirements apply, I 
will discuss this topic separately (section 5.4.6). 
5.2.2 Solicitors and barristers 
In England and Wales, three general types of practising lawyers operate on the legal services market: 
barristers, solicitors and legal executives.31 A legal executive supports solicitors and barristers, and 
often carries out more routine legal work.32 Historically and generally, a solicitor was a general practi-
tioner that provided legal advice outside of the courts or appeared in the Magistrate’s or County 
Courts. Barristers, retained by a solicitor, had the right of audience to present a case in the higher 
courts.33 However, since the 1990 Courts and Legal Services Act, the 1999 Access to Justice Act, and 
the 2007 Legal Services Act (LSA 2007), which, inter alia, implemented the government’s policy to 
break down the historical monopolies of solicitors and barristers, the distinction between both legal 
professions is less clear.34 Nowadays, both barristers and solicitors tend to specialize in certain areas 
of the law and can acquire the right to litigate before any court, although the higher courts are still 
                                                             
 
29 CPR Part 36, LASPO, section 55, and the Offers to Settle in Civil Proceedings Order 2013. See, for instance, Sime & 
French 2015, p. 1096 ff. See also CPR 1.4(2)(e) and PD Pre-action Conduct and Protocols, paras 3(d), 8 and 9. Non-
compliance can be addressed with a cost sanction; see Sime & French 2015, p. 1268-1269. See also LASPO 2012, section 
11(5), which states that any criteria on the qualification for civil legal aid must reflect the principle that, in many dis-
putes, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution are more appropriate than legal proceedings. 
30 See Reimann 2012, p. 19, Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka 2010, p. 95, and Jackson 2009, Chapter 6. 
31 Other parties entitled to practise law include licenced conveyancers, patent and trade mark lawyers, costs lawyers 
and notaries. For an overview, see Boon 2014, Chapter 4, section IV.  
32 The difference between a legal executive and a paralegal is that the latter is not necessarily vocationally qualified as 
a lawyer. See <cilexcareers.org.uk/>. 
33 See for more details, for instance, Slapper & Kelly 2015, Chapter 16, and for a historical overview, Boon 2014, Chap-
ters 2 and 3.  
34 See Slapper & Kelly 2015, Chapter 16, and Boon 2014, Chapter 3, for an overview of the recommendations in the 
2004 Clementi Review of the regulation of the legal profession, and the implementation thereof in the LSA 2007. 
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very much the domain of barristers. Legal executives and other authorised persons can now also ob-
tain the right of audience in court and undertake other so-called ‘reserved legal activities’, as long as 
they have been authorised by an approved regulatory body.35 General legal advice is unreserved and, 
thus, can be provided by anyone; other than for the aforementioned authorised persons and Claims 
Management Companies (see hereafter section 5.2.3) it is not subject to specific regulation.36 
  
The LSA 2007 reduced solicitors’ and barristers’ regulatory autonomy by introducing the Legal Services 
Board: a regulator that oversees all lawyers and their ‘front line’ regulators.37 The latter regulator for 
solicitors is the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA),38 for barristers it is the Bar Standards Board (BSB).  
The LSA 2007 lists eight regulatory objectives and five professional principles.39 Authorised persons 
are required to, inter alia, protect and promote the public interest and those of consumers, support 
the rule of law, and adhere to professional principles such as independence and integrity.40 In addition, 
the SRA Handbook (which consists of the SRA Principles and the SRA Code of Conduct 2011), respec-
tively the BSB Handbook (which includes the BSB Code of Conduct) lay down professional and ethical 
rules and standards that solicitors and barristers must comply with.41 Both further address topics such 
as integrity, independence and publicity, as well as fee arrangements. The remuneration of solicitors 
will be discussed in sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.3. At this juncture, I will briefly address some related topics.  
 
As for publicity, since 1984, solicitors are allowed to advertise their services. At the time, legal adver-
tising was described as being ‘destined for relative obscurity’ as it was perceived to go against profes-
sional dignity.42 Increasingly, however, competition in the legal services market has made advertising 
commonplace.43 Publicity by solicitors and barristers needs to adhere to the general standard that it 
is not misleading and is sufficiently informative to ensure a client’s informed choice.44 An unsolicited 
direct approach to potential clients is not allowed. This is related to the former common law offence 
of barratry (the act of stirring up litigation, in particular by vexatiously soliciting potential clients; also 
                                                             
 
35 LSA 2007, sections 1(4), 12, 13(2) and 20, and the accompanying Schedules. The reserved activities are the exercise 
of a right of audience, conducting of litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities and 
the administration of oaths. See also footnote 24. 
36 Boon 2014, Chapter 4, section III under A. On this topic, see also the SRA’s response to the public consultation on the 
revision of the SRA Code of Conduct (p. 7 ff); see footnote 41. 
37 LSA 2007, Part 2. 
38 Formerly known as the Law Society Regulation Board. 
39 LSA 2007, Part 1.  
40 LSA 2007, section 1. 
41 Available at <sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page> and <barstandardsboard.org.uk/regulatory-re-
quirements/bsb-handbook/>. The SRA Code of Conduct is currently under revision. A new version is expected to be 
issued in 2017, including new Account Rules. The proposed changes do not seem to alter the principles discussed here. 
See the consultation documents at <sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/code-conduct-consultation.page#download>. 
42 See Harris 1985, p. 350. 
43 See, for instance, Lewis, Morris & Oliphant 2006, p. 172, Hodges 2009a, p. 110. 
44 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, Chapter 8 and BSB Code of Conduct, rC19 (see also gC57). 
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known as ambulance chasing),45 which was abolished in England and Wales in 1967.46 As of 2004, 
solicitors are allowed to pay referral fees to third parties such as claims management companies that 
have referred potential claims to them.47 The main aim thereof is to remedy the information asym-
metry between legal services providers and consumers on the quality of services. However, in practice, 
referrers predominantly referred cases to the highest bidder and the fees had an inflating effect on 
litigation costs, in particular in personal injury litigation. Moreover, referrers’ advertising practices 
fuelled the - perception of – a claim culture. Following Jackson’s recommendation, referral fees in 
personal injury cases are now once again prohibited since 2013.48 
 
Solicitors are obliged to inform clients in such way that they can make an informed decision, which 
includes providing information about the costs of the services to be provided.49 The SRA Code of Con-
duct indicates that this includes informing a client about its eligibility for public legal aid, or the possi-
bility for an insurance or third party, such as a trade union, to cover the costs.50 Most likely, the possi-
bility of third-party litigation funding falls within the scope of such information.51 As litigation funding 
is still a relatively new phenomenon, the lack of knowledge about such funding on the side of the 
solicitor might hamper this ‘indicated behaviour’. Litigation funding brokers have been keen to fill this 
knowledge gap.52  
Solicitors and barristers are required to separate money received, held or dealt with for clients or other 
persons.53 A professional indemnity insurance is compulsory.54 
 
The LSA 2007 also introduced the Office for Legal Complaints, which incorporates the Legal Ombuds-
man: an independent ombudsman that is authorized to deal with consumer complaints about author-
ised persons, including their bill – unless it concerns court proceedings, as only a court can assess such 
                                                             
 
45 For instance, in July 2017, a UK law firm suspended two of its employees for putting up posters offering legal support 
to victims of the Grenfell Tower fire; see <theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/07/law-firm-leigh-day-suspends-two-
staff-over-grenfell-tower-poster>.  
46 Together with maintenance and champerty, see section 5.4.2. 
47 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, Chapter 9. Barristers are not allowed to pay or receive referral fees, see BSB Code of 
Conduct, rC10. 
48 LASPO 2012, section 56. See Jackson 2010, Chapter 20. The ban also applies to regulated persons under the CILEx, 
see the Referral Fees (Regulators and Regulated Persons) Regulations 2014. The Lord Chancellor can make regulations 
to extend the ban to other types of claims and legal services. This power has not been used; see Ministry of Justice, 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Post-Legislative Memorandum, October 2017, p. 94. 
49 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, Chapter 1. See also section 5.3.2. 
50 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, IB(1.16). See also the predecessor of the code, the 2007 Code of Conduct, which encom-
passes a more explicit reference to this duty in Rule 2.03(d) and (g). 
51 See Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 196 and Friel, Barnes & Bird 2016, p. 25.  
52 Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 106 ff.  
53 SRA Account rules 2007, and BSB Code of Conduct rC73-75.  
54 SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules and BSB Code of Conduct rC76.  
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a bill.55 Professional misconduct by solicitors and barristers is dealt with by the Solicitors/Bar Discipli-
nary Tribunal.56 A notorious example of the SRA’s supervisory activities is its case against Leigh Day 
and three of its solicitors brought before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal for alleged professional 
misconduct, including entering into prohibited referral fee and fee-sharing arrangements with another 
solicitor/law firm and a referrer.57 Leigh Day specializes in public interest litigation, and the case at 
hand revolved around the alleged torture and murder of Iraqi civilians by the British army in 2004. 
Some of these claims were later found to be fictitious.58 All parties involved in the contested arrange-
ments had an interest in (a successful outcome of) the private law claims; Leigh Day due to the CFA 
with its clients,59 the other law firm and referrer due to their fee arrangements with Leigh Day, parts 
of which were only payable upon success. Ultimately, in its 213-page judgment, the tribunal cleared 
Leigh Day and its partners of all misconduct charges. The other solicitor, however, was found guilty of 
similar charges, which in addition to improper fee arrangements included unsolicited direct ap-
proaches to potential clients. He was struck off as a solicitor and the firm that he had founded was 
closed.60 The SRA has announced that it will appeal the tribunal’s decision against Leigh Day.61 
 
Solicitors and barristers can also be held liable for professional negligence.62 For instance, in 2016, the 
High Court held a law firm which had acted for claimants in a group action (GLO) negligent due to its 
failure to sufficiently secure the distribution of a (court-approved) settlement sum, as it had deposited 
the full sum into a bank account in the Ivory Coast. As a result of the negligence, part of the settlement 
award had been lost to fraud, and some 6,624 claimants failed to receive the compensation to which 
they were entitled.63 In the spin-off to another notorious case (Excalibur), a third-party funder held a 
large law firm professionally liable for overstating the claim’s prospect of success. The case was settled 
                                                             
 
55 LSA 2007, Part 6. See also Slapper & Kelly 2015, sections 16.3.3 and 16.6.7. On the assessment of litigation costs, see 
sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.4.  
56 Solicitors Act 1974, section 46. The Bar Disciplinary Tribunal is organized by the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Ser-
vices and governed by the Disciplinary Tribunal Regulations 2009, see <barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-pro-
fessional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/the-disciplinary-tribunal-process/>. See also Boon 2014, Chapter 
8, Part VI, under A-C.  
57 Therewith infringing the – then – applicable Code of Conduct 2007, rules 9.01(2), (4) and 9.02. On these aspects of 
the case, see Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 22 September 2017, Case No. 11502-2016 (SRA v. Day and others), p. 22-
25, and p. 128-181. 
58 This was the outcome of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, a public inquiry into the allegations of torture and murder by UK 
soldiers in Iraq. 
59 On CFAs, see also sections 5.3.5.2 and 5.4.3.1. 
60 Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 23 March 2017, Case No. 11510-2016 (SRA v. Shiner). 
61 See A. Rogers, ‘SRA will appeal decision to clear Leigh Day over Iraq war claims’, The Lawyer, 15 November 2017. 
62 In 2000, the House of Lords no longer upheld advocates’ immunity from such a suit. Barristers (or others with advo-
cacy rights) can also be held liable for negligence since then. See Hall and Co v. Simons and Other [2000] 3 W.L.R. 543 
(HL); see also Slapper & Kelly 2015, section 16.5.1.  
63 Agouman v. Leigh Day [2016] EWHC 1324 [2016] P.N.L.R. 32 (QB). Due to various uncertain circumstances, the court 
did not (yet) rule on the quantum of damages. On the Trafigura case, see also sections 1.1.1, 5.3.5.2 and 5.3.5.5.  
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out of court.64 In addition, the law firm is currently under the SRA’s scrutiny over the firm’s alleged 
conflict of interest due to one of its partners’ relationship with one of the litigation funders and the 
conditional fee agreement between the law firm and Excalibur.65  
 
Law firms increasingly cooperate with entrepreneurial parties, on a national and international basis, 
and not only in specific cases where a client acquires funding. For instance, in 2017, the UK’s leading 
litigation funder and a top 100 UK law firm entered into a portfolio litigation funding arrangement.66 
The regulation and supervision of litigation funders will be discussed hereafter,67 but insofar as law 
firms are involved the SRA and BSB supervise these practices as well.  
5.2.3 Claims Management Companies 
Within the context of this research, another relevant type of legal services provider is the Claims Man-
agement Company (CMC). Claims management services are defined as advice or other services in re-
lation to the making of a claim, which includes the provision of financial services or assistance, legal 
advice or representation, and referring claimants to others in exchange for a fee.68 CMCs thus offer a 
range of services, and do so mainly in the area of personal injuries and financial products and services, 
often by dealing with a large number of similar claims. Currently, 1,388 CMCs are authorised, of which 
approximately 50% operate in the financial claims sector.69 The number of authorised CMCs has been 
declining since 2011 when the CMR registered 3,213 authorised CMCs. CMCs cannot have a right of 
audience, but mainly act as intermediaries between litigants and lawyers.70 As to financial claims, 
CMCs mainly operate by addressing the client’s opponent directly or taking its complaint to the Finan-
cial Ombudsman.  
 
                                                             
 
64 See Bernal, N., ‘Clifford Chance braces itself for professional negligence claim from Excalibur funders’, The Lawyer 4 
December 2014, and Kinder, T. ‘Clifford Chance settles Excalibur professional negligence dispute’, The Lawyer 9 Decem-
ber 2015. See also Excalibur v. Texas Keystone and Others [2016] 1 W.L.R. 2221 (CA), in particular paras 9 and 30. The 
Excalibur case is discussed more elaborately in sections 5.3.4.3 and 5.3.6.2. 
65 Rogers, A., ‘CC hires Clydes as SRA launches probe into firm’s handling of Excalibur’, The Lawyer 6 July 2017.  
66 ‘Shepherd and Wedderburn secure ‘substantial eight figure’ Burford litigation finance deal’, 31 July 2017, Legal Busi-
ness Blog, <legalbusiness.co.uk/index.php/lb-blog-view/10556-shepherd-and-wedderburn-secure-substantial-eight-
figure-burford-litigation-finance-deal>. See also the deals between a UK funder and US law firm, <thelaw-
yer.com/woodsford-seals-litigation-funding-deal-us-boutique/?cmpid=dnews_3798632&adg=C2B2303D-EC46-4163-
B0F6-4C79D3A0DD57>, and a funder’s deal with a US/UK law firm that has opened a German office to fund German 
claims, <hausfeld.com/news/global/hausfeld-and-burford-capital-announce-30-million-german-venture>.  
67 See section 5.2.4 and section 5.4.4. 
68 Compensation Act 2006, section 4. See also the Compensation (Regulated Claims Management Services) Order 2006, 
section 4, the Compensation (Claims Management Services) Regulations 2006, and <gov.uk/govern-
ment/groups/claims-management-regulator>. 
69 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation Annual Report 16/17, p. 15, 19 and 21, and Ministry of Justice, 
Claims Management Regulation – Consultation. Cutting the costs for consumers – Financial Claims, 2016, p. 8. 
70 See Tzankova & Kortmann 2010, p. 118-119, and Peysner 2014, p. 71. For a detailed description of the activities of a 
large CMC, see Claims Direct Test Cases [2003] EWCA Civ 136. In essence, Claims Direct provided (bulk) claims handling 
services to personal injury victims, aided by its network of franchise claims managers, solicitors and medical experts. 
See also section 5.5.1 on the bank charges case.  
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CMCs started to flourish in the 1990s, in particular after conditional fee arrangements were made 
possible,71 and originate from so-called referral agencies that commercialised marketing and advertis-
ing to capture personal injury victims and then referred them to law firms. Initially, CMCs were wel-
comed as user-friendly competitors of solicitors,72 but at one point the tables turned. The acronym 
CMC became ‘synonymous with greed, fraud and dishonesty’ and ‘ambulance chaser’:  
 
‘The bad apples, it seemed were not just a few, but an orchard full of them, and this unleashed a 
wave of continuous bad publicity.’73  
 
After failed attempts to allow the market to regulate itself,74 the government created the Claims Man-
agement Regulator (CMR), which forms part of the Ministry of Justice.75 The CMR is responsible for 
licensing, regulating and supervising CMCs. The CMR has issued various regulations and guidance, cov-
ering, inter alia, advertising, advising and representing clients, client accounts, claims referral,76 and 
complaints handling.77 In its earlier years, the CMR was said to be ‘without teeth’ as it had little en-
forcement powers.78 This has improved as of 2014, when the Conduct of Authorised Persons Rules 
2014 (CAPR) entered into effect. The CMR’s Annual Report 2016/2017 reports ‘significant levels of 
frontline regulatory activity’, ‘more investigations into non-compliant CMCs than in any previous year’, 
and an increase in capacity ‘to identify, investigate and take enforcement action against unauthorised 
CMCs’.79 In the period reported on, 69 licences were cancelled, 196 warnings were issued, and a total 
of £ 1.1 million in financial penalties were imposed. Reports of and complaints about nuisance calls, a 
compliance priority, are said to have notably decreased.80 The CMR cooperates with, inter alia, the 
SRA to address solicitors that accept cases generated by CMCs.81 
The CAPR lay down ethical and professional minimum standards for CMCs. It encompasses the general 
principle for the business to conduct itself with honesty and integrity, and to act responsibly and with 
professional diligence, to investigate the merits of a potential claim and to refrain from making fraud-
ulent, false or misleading claims.82 CMCs that operate in the personal injury market are obliged to have 
                                                             
 
71 See section 5.4.2.1. 
72 Peysner 2014, p. 72. 
73 Wigmore 2013, p. 249-250. 
74 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation – Consultation. Cutting the costs for consumers – Financial Claims, 
2016, p. 8. See also Department for Constitutional Affairs, Tackling the “Compensation Culture”. Government response 
to the Better Regulation Task Force Report: ‘Better Routes to Redress’, 10 November 2004, response to Recommenda-
tion 1.  
75 It did so with the introduction of (Part 2 of) the Compensation Act 2006, which is accompanied by Regulations and 
Orders. See, for instance, Herbert 2006, p. 243 ff. 
76 Which is no longer allowed in personal injury claims; LASPO, section 56. See also sections 5.2.2 and 5.4.4. 
77 Available at <gov.uk/guidance/claims-management-company-regulations-guidance-and-legislation>. 
78 The Conduct Rules – and the accompanying detailed guidance note – are available at <gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/claims-management-regulation-conduct-of-authorised-person-rules-2014>. See also Isaacs & Alanizy 2015. 
79 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation Annual Report 16/17, p. 5, 13 and 16. 
80 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation Annual Report 16/17, p. 7, 13 and 27 ff.  
81 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation Annual Report 16/17, p. 14. 
82 CAPR, General Rules 1 and 2.  
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professional indemnity insurance.83 CMCs need competent staff,84 and are required to maintain sepa-
rate client accounts.85 Furthermore, the CMR has issued rather detailed guidance on marketing meth-
ods. Generally, any information provided to existing and prospective clients needs to be clear, trans-
parent, fair and not misleading.86 There is even advertising guidance on how (not) to advertise ‘no win, 
no fee’ claims.87 Complaints about CMCs can be made to the Legal Ombudsman; for the purpose of 
legal complaints, authorised CMCs are treated as authorised persons under the LSA 2007.88 Within 
that context, the aforementioned regulatory objectives also apply to CMCs.89 
 
In spite of the increasing regulatory oversight, problems with CMCs have yet to end. Various policy 
reforms have been announced. This will be further discussed in section 5.4.4. 
5.2.4 Third-party litigation funders 
The third market player that will be discussed, the third-party litigation funder, operates at the cross-
roads of legal and financial services. Although its history goes further back, the impetus for litigation 
funding in England and Wales was the introduction of CFAs in 1995. Further boosts came from the 
endorsement of the judiciary (notably the Arkin case in 2005), the CJC, and Sir Rupert Jackson.90  
 
Since 1999, the CLSA 1990 defines a Litigation Funding Agreement (LFA) as an agreement under which 
a funder agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services (by some-
one other than the funder) to a litigant, and under which the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder 
in specified circumstances.91 However, this statutory provision is not (yet) in force. The Association of 
Litigation Funders (ALF) Code of Conduct – see hereafter – defines a litigation funder as (the corporate 
subsidiary of) someone with immediate access to funds within its control, or someone who acts as the 
exclusive investment advisor to an associated entity or entities that have immediate access to funds 
within its or their control.92 Either way, it funds the resolution of disputes in England and Wales and 
can enable a party to a dispute to meet the costs of various types of dispute resolution procedures, 
including litigation. In return, the litigation funder or associated entity receives a share of the proceeds 
in the case of success, as defined in the LFA. 
 
                                                             
 
83 CAPR, General Rule 7. 
84 CAPR, General Rules 3 and 4. 
85 Pursuant to the Client Account Rules 2006, available at <gov.uk/government/publications/claims-management-com-
panies-rules-for-handling-client-accounts>. 
86 CAPR, Client Specific Rule 1(c). 
87 See <asa.org.uk/resource/no-win-no-fee-claims.html>. The guidance is issued by the Committees of Advertising Prac-
tice, which is part of the Advertising Standards Authority.  
88 LSA 2007, section 161 in conjunction with Part 6, and Schedule 19. See also section 5.2.2.  
89 LSA 2007, Part 1. 
90 See Arkin v. Borchard Lines [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055 (CA), the CJC Reports Improved Access to Justice – Funding Options 
& Proportionate Costs of August 2005 (Napier e.a. 2005) and June 2007 (Napier e.a. 2007), and Jackson 2009 and 2010 
(Chapters 15 respectively 11). See also Rowles-Davies 2014, Chapter 2, Pirozzolo 2014, p. 156-158, and section 5.4.5.  
91 CLSA 1990, section 58B, as inserted by the Access to Justice Act 1999, section 28. 
92 ALF, Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, January 2014, section 2. 
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According to the Court of Appeal, a commercial litigation funder can be distinguished from a so-called 
pure funder:  
 
‘(…) being those with no personal interest in the litigation, who do not stand to benefit from it, are 
not funding it as a matter of business, and in no way seek to control its course’93 
 
The difference between the two types is relevant for various costs rules, which will be discussed in 
section 5.3.  
 
Litigation funders mainly focus on commercial claims and corporate clients because, for one thing, 
funding consumers might lead to regulation by the regulator and the supervisor of the financial (ser-
vices) markets in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).94 In mass litigation, the use of litigation 
funding is not yet commonplace, but changes on the horizon are noticeable.95 In addition to the gen-
eral growth of the litigation funding market (see hereafter), this correlates with recent and potential 
future reforms of collective redress mechanisms. This will be further discussed in sections 5.4.5 and 
5.5. Currently, the FCA generally does not have authority over litigation funding,96 unless the litigation 
funder acts as an investment advisor.97 The CLSA 1990 specifies that additional regulation might re-
quire a litigation funder to be approved by a designated body, but such a regulation has not been 
drafted.98 Litigation funders often staff solicitors or other professionals that are regulated by their own 
professional bodies.99 Although there are similarities between LFAs and damages-based agreements 
(DBAs), and between litigation funding and claims management services, the DBA Regulations 2013 
are said not to apply to litigation funders.100  
 
In 2011, the ALF was established as a self-regulatory body, following the recommendations of a CJC 
Working Party.101 Membership is not compulsory.102 Currently, there are eight litigation funders listed 
                                                             
 
93 Hamilton v. Al Fayed (No. 2) [2002] EWCA Civ 665 (CA), p. 1194. 
94 Jackson 2010, p. 121. 
95 Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 142.  
96 Cf. Lord Jackson’s recommendation to only introduce statutory regulation by the FCA (then known as the FSA) if self-
regulation does not work. See Jackson 2010, p. 124. 
97 Mulheron 2014, referring to Bayens v. Kinross Gold Corporation [2013] ONSC 4974, consideration 4. See also Hodges, 
Peysner & Nurse 2012, p. 149.  
98 Mulheron 2014, p. 595. 
99 Friel, Barnes & Bird 2016, p. 26. On the regulation and supervision of solicitors and barristers, see section 5.2.2. 
100 As – convincingly – argued by Mulheron 2014, p. 592 ff. The CJC notes that it is foreseeable that in due course some 
funders might also offer claims management services, such as book-building of shareholders’ claims. To avoid satellite 
litigation on this point, the CJC has recommended to explicitly exclude third-party funders from the ambit of the DBA 
Regulations; see Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 33-35. The DBA Regulations will be further discussed in section 5.4.3.2. 
101 Which issued the CJC Report, Improved Access to Justice – Funding Options & Proportionate Costs, of June 2007 
(Napier e.a. 2007), its Consultation Paper, A Self Regulatory Code for Third Party Funding, of July 2010, and the 2011 
Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, revised in 2014. The ALF is governed by its Articles of Association and Rules of 
the Association, available at <judiciary.gov.uk/related-offices-and-bodies/advisory-bodies/cjc/third-party-funding/>. 
102 A compulsory system of self-regulation might be problematic in light of competition law, see Mulheron 2014, p. 579.  
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as member of the ALF.103 The August 2017 issue of Litigation Funding lists some 11 more funders. Most 
likely, this overview does not show all of the players;104 the market development is said to be at the 
early adopter stage and the market is likely to continue to grow.105 In addition, related activities are 
emerging, such as those of litigation funding brokers, who intermediate between funders and poten-
tial claimants, and legal pricing consultants.106 
 
ALF members are regulated by the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders as issued by the CJC in 2011, 
and they are supervised by the ALF.107 The Code of Conduct addresses the following key topics, which 
will be discussed hereafter: the capital adequacy of funders, control of litigation or settlement, and 
the termination of the LFA.108 As funders do not provide advice, they are not obliged to have profes-
sional indemnity insurance.109 Promotional literature must be clear and not misleading.110 
 
To make sure that a funder can meet its funding obligations towards its clients and – if so ordered111 
– successful defendants, the Code of Conduct requires that a third-party funder has sufficient financial 
resources. This entails that a funder should maintain access to adequate financial resources, at all 
times, to meet its obligations and those of its subsidiary or associated entity to fund all the disputes 
that they have agreed to fund.112 The code further specifies this requirement by, for instance, requiring 
a funder to have access to a minimum capital of £ 5 million.113 The funder has a continuous disclosure 
obligation in respect of its capital adequacy, and it is required to submit to annual auditing.114  
 
As for the controlling powers of a funder, the code of conduct stipulates that a funder cannot take 
steps that (might) cause the funded party’s solicitor or barrister to act in breach of their professional 
duties, nor seek to influence the solicitor or barrister to cede control or the conduct of the dispute to 
the funder.115 These rules relate to the – remainder of the – doctrines of maintenance and champerty. 
Nevertheless, a certain input by the funder is increasingly allowed. This will be further discussed in 
section 5.4.2 and 5.4.5. 
 
                                                             
 
103 Augusta Ventures, Burford Capital, Calunius Capital, Harbour Litigation Funding, Redress Solutions, Therium Capital 
Management, Vannin Capital, and Woodsford Litigation Funding. See <associationoflitigationfunders.com/>. 
104 Pirozzolo 2014, p. 160. See also, for instance, the Excalibur judgment, which addresses other funders; Excalibur v. 
Texas Keystone and Others [2016] EWCA Civ 1144. This judgment is discussed in section 5.4.5. 
105 Pirozzolo 2014, p. 156, Burford Annual Report 2016, p. 4-7. See also section 5.4.5. 
106 See the aforementioned Litigation Funding list.  
107 The Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders is available at <associationoflitigationfunders.com/documents/> (version 
November 2014, as amended in November 2016). 
108 See also section 5.4.5. 
109 Mulheron 2014, p. 574.  
110 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 6. 
111 See section 5.3.6. 
112 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 9.4. 
113 Or such other amount as stipulated by the ALF; Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 9.4.2. Between No-
vember 2014 and November 2016, this amount increased from £ 2 million to £ 5 million.  
114 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 9.4.3 and 9.4.4. 
115 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, sections 9.2 and 9.3. 
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Third, the code of conduct strictly and imperatively determines the grounds for terminating an LFA. 
Termination can only take place if the funder116 reasonably i) ceases to be satisfied about the merits 
of the dispute, ii) believes that the dispute is no longer commercially viable, or iii) believes that there 
has been a material breach of the LFA by the funded party.117 Examples of reasons to terminate an LFA 
are a significant escalation of litigation costs or a reduction of the likely recovery from what parties 
anticipated at the outset.118 The funder remains liable for all funding obligations up to the termination 
date, unless ground iii) applies.119  
 
Disputes between an ALF funder and a funded party about the settlement or termination of the LFA 
should be resolved by a Queen’s Counsel through binding opinion.120 As far as I have been able to 
ascertain, data on the use of such proceedings are not in the public domain. The code of conduct does 
not require litigation funders to disclose such information. In addition to the so-called QC clause (bind-
ing opinion), the ALF maintains a complaints procedure for conflicts between a funder and a litigant.121 
The complaints procedure thus has a broader scope than the QC clause, as the latter only covers a 
conflict between the funder and the funded party, and only about the settlement or termination of 
the LFA. Complaints are dealt with initially by the ALF’s General Counsel, and subsequently by the ALF’s 
board or independent legal counsel. Public information on complaints is unavailable, but the proce-
dure is said to have never been used thus far.122  
 
As mentioned, not all litigation funders are ALF members. Non-members are governed by ordinary 
civil law, in particular the – remainder of the – doctrines of maintenance and champerty, and by – ad 
hoc – judicial supervision. For instance, a funded party can bring a claim in contract to court. So far, 
the topic of contract termination by a third-party litigation funder has been addressed in the courts in 
only one case. The court apparently expected otherwise, judging by its reference to the case as ‘a new 
type of satellite litigation, of which (…) the courts appear likely to see much more’.123 In the case at 
hand, the funder had agreed to fund a particular case, but later changed its mind. The LFA stipulated 
that the funder could terminate the contract if in its reasonable opinion the prospects of success would 
not exceed 60%. A preliminary opinion had been written by the funded party’s solicitor, and had later 
been supplemented with its – brief – statement that the chances of success exceeded 75%. However, 
the funder deemed the solicitor’s opinion to be insufficient, and instructed an independent legal coun-
sel for advice. Ultimately, taking into account this counsel’s advice that the chance of success fell below 
60%, the funder terminated the ALF. The court ruled that the funder was allowed to withdraw from 
                                                             
 
116 Or the funder’s subsidiary or associated entity.  
117 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, sections 11.2 and 12. 
118 Pirozollo 2014, p. 162-163, Friel, Barnes & Bird 2016, p. 26.  
119 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 13.1. 
120 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 13.2. 
121 Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, section 15. The complaints procedure is available at <associationoflitiga-
tionfunders.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ALF-Complaints-Procedure-Final-PDF.pdf> 
122 Friel, Barnes & Bird 2016, p. 28. 
123 Harcus Sinclair v. Buttonwood Legal Capital and others [2013] EWHC 1193 (Ch), consideration 1. For a brief discussion 
of the case, see also Mulheron 2014, p. 589-590.  
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the contract. In forming its objective assessment, the funder was not required to invite the funded 
party to represent on the merits and/or to obtain a further opinion from its legal representative:  
 
‘The reasonableness of an estimate that the prospects do not exceed 60% is a purely substantive 
question, to be answered by an objective assessment of the available evidence against the back-
ground of the relevant legal rules and principles applicable to the claim. If the estimated figure is by 
that test within the ambit of reasonableness, it matters not by what route or process it was reached: 
the result is all.’124 
5.3 Litigation costs and costs shifting 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The English legal system is notorious for its complex cost system and high litigation costs. It is said to 
be one of the most expensive legal orders.125 Hence, litigation costs have been subject to various re-
forms in the past decades, aiming to reduce costs and improve access to justice. The reforms coincide 
with neoliberal and austerity measures that have also incited the development of alternative ways of 
litigation funding – which will be discussed in section 5.4. Alongside Lord Woolf’s review, the main 
underlying study is the review of civil litigation costs by Sir Rupert Jackson in 2009.126 As mentioned, 
the CPR’s overriding objective instructs parties and the court to keep litigation costs at a proportionate 
level. Similarly, the LSA 2007 has implemented the obligation for regulated persons such as solicitors 
and barristers to comply with its regulatory objective of improving access to justice, including conduct-
ing litigation at proportionate costs.127 Nevertheless, ten years after Lord Woolf’s recommendations, 
it appeared that this goal had yet to be met, as the costs of litigation continued to rise rather than 
decrease.128 Growing concerns about the effect of this rise and the so-called cost wars – litigation 
about cost issues, also known as satellite litigation – on access to justice (and London’s position in the 
global commercial litigation market)129 led to the appointment of Lord Justice Jackson to conduct a 
fundamental review of the costs of civil litigation.130 The review resulted in a broad range of recom-
mendations on civil costs and funding, which, ultimately, all aim at reducing the costs of civil litigation 
while safeguarding access to justice in England and Wales.  
 
It is difficult, if not practically impossible, to do justice to the English cost system in an overview. The 
following sections aim to set out its essentials, focusing on those that are relevant to (the development 
                                                             
 
124 Consideration 43.  
125 See Sime & French 2009, p. 78, and Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka 2010, in particular Case study 7, p. 57 ff. (dis-
cussed hereafter). See also the UK’s score in the Rule of Law Index 2016 in the category ‘civil justice’ on ‘Accessibility 
and Affordability’ as compared to the Netherlands and Germany, as discussed in section 5.1. 
126 The review resulted in a preliminary report (Jackson 2009) and a final report (Jackson 2010). For an overview of 
earlier reports on cost reforms, see Peysner 2010, p. 291.  
127 LSA 2007, sections 1 and 176. See Jackson 2009, p. 21. 
128 Jackson 2009, p. 1. 
129 Veljanovski 2012, p. 407. 
130 Jackson 2009, p. 2. 
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of) entrepreneurial mass litigation.131 Various reforms and developments that have ensued Lord Jus-
tice Jackson’s recommendations will be addressed: case and costs management, the Legal Aid, Sen-
tencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO; which entered into effect in April 2013 and, 
inter alia, abolished the recoverability of CFA success fees and ATE premiums, and permitted DBAs),132 
qualified one-way costs shifting in personal injury cases, legal aid cutbacks,133 and the growth of third-
party litigation funding.134 A recommendation that was not fully implemented, fixed recoverable costs, 
has been addressed by Jackson in his 2017 Supplementary Report. As it suggests introducing fixed 
recoverable fees in medium-complex cases up to £ 100,000 and, voluntarily, £ 250,000, this potential 
reform will be briefly discussed as well. 
5.3.2 Litigation costs 
5.3.2.1 Court charges and lawyers’ fees 
English court charges are based on the ‘pay as you go’ principle: court fees are charged from the party 
that undertakes a specific procedural action, such as requesting the court to issue a claim form (start 
proceedings) or to fix a trial date or period. For several separate actions, a fee is charged according to 
a statutory schedule.135 Notwithstanding the aforementioned reforms to reduce litigation costs, court 
fees have been increasing as of 2014.136 The government’s aim is to further reduce the taxpayer’s 
subsidy by rendering courts largely self-sustaining: 
 
‘In recent years, it has been the Government’s aim that the revenue from court fees should meet the 
costs of providing the civil courts system, (…) [T]he Government explores whether those who use the 
courts and who can afford to pay should make a greater contribution towards their cost, so that 
nearly all of the cost of the civil courts is met through fees.’137 
 
As the increases are said to impose an additional barrier to access to justice, they have been criti-
cised.138 Nevertheless, the government has adopted the view that most claimants will be able to afford 
the increased court fees and will not be deterred from bringing their case; at most they will more 
consciously consider whether to commence court proceedings.139  
                                                             
 
131 For detailed accounts of the English civil costs system see, for instance, Peysner 2009, Jackson 2009 and 2010, and 
Hurst 2013.  
132 A review of the implementation of LASPO is due to take place in early 2018; Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Post-Legislative Memorandum, October 2017, p. 96 and 97. 
133 Which were not part of Jackson’s recommendations, see Jackson 2010, p. 70.  
134 For a full overview of the measures that ensued from Jackson’s recommendations, see Jackson 2017, Chapter 2.  
135 Schedule 1 of the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008, SI 2008/1053 (L. 5).  
136 Schedule 1 has been amended on several occasions. The most recent one dates from December 2016, see the Civil 
Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2016, SI 2016/1191 (L. 19). For an overview of the developments, see Jackson 
2009, p. 63 ff and Sorabji 2015, p. 160 ff.  
137 Ministry of Justice, Court Fees: Proposals for reform. Part one consultation response: Cost Recovery (Cm 8845), April 
2014, p. 5. 
138 For an overview, see Sorabji 2015, p. 161, footnote 29. 
139 For a critical comment on the qualitative study – 18 telephone calls – that formed the basis for this conclusion, see 




Despite the upsurge in court fees, the largest portion of litigation costs consists of the lawyers’ fees.140 
Adversarial litigation provides a relatively large role for solicitors and barristers, particularly in the la-
bour-intensive evidence-gathering process, such as the disclosure of documents which, in turn, can 
create additional costs in the trial phase, such as witness and/or expert costs.141 Furthermore, lawyers’ 
fees are not regulated, that is, parties can freely negotiate a rate. Despite increasing competition on 
the legal services market, market forces have been said to insufficiently exert pressure on the rates.142 
The hourly fee remains a common type of remuneration, despite the opportunities for clients and their 
legal services provider to engage in alternative fee structures – which will be further discussed in sec-
tion 5.4. Solicitor fee rates are influenced by various factors such as the type of firm, its location (Lon-
don or elsewhere), and the lawyer’s expertise and experience.143 Peysner notes (in 2010) that a com-
mon fee in a complex commercial case is around £ 350, possibly increased by a conditional fee of up 
to a maximum of 100%, and that solicitors often charge in excess, anticipating a reduction after nego-
tiation or judicial cost assessment.144 All this renders the litigation costs (and risk) high and unpredict-
able.  
 
Various instruments have been implemented to reduce litigation expenses and the unpredictability 
thereof. As to the latter, one of the solicitors’ main obligations is to provide a client – at the outset as 
well as throughout proceedings – with the best possible information about the likely overall cost of 
the matter, including the risk of having to pay adverse costs.145 Similar rules apply to the other regu-
lated persons.146 As for curtailing litigation costs, as mentioned, the overriding objective is to instruct 
parties and the court to keep the costs at a proportionate level.147 In addition, the following measures 
have been introduced to reduce lawyers’ fees and to improve the predictability of litigation costs and 
risks: i) costs management and budgeting, ii) fixed recoverable costs, and iii) costs capping. All 
measures are applied at the outset or during litigation, and affect the costs order at the conclusion of 
litigation, which will be discussed in section 5.3.4. 
                                                             
 
140 The overview is limited to contentious costs (costs ‘in or for the purposes of proceedings’), which includes prepara-
tion costs such as taking instructions or obtaining evidence; see Solicitors Act 1974, section 87(1) and, for instance, 
Zuckerman 2013, p. 1315-1316. Furthermore, it particularly focuses on solicitor fees. The fees of experts, witnesses and 
counsel/barrister are referred to as disbursements. 
141 See Jackson 2009, Chapters 40 and 41, in particular p. 382 ff, Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka 2010, p. 93, and 
Reimann 2012, p. 54. See CPR 44.1(1)(iv) for all costs that can be subject to a costs order. 
142 See Jackson 2009, p. 72, and Zuckerman 2013, p. 1307-1309.  
143 Jackson 2009, p. 85. 
144 Peysner 2010a, p. 140-141. For various types of fee rates, see Jackson 2009, p. 85. See also hereafter on the Guideline 
Hourly Rates. 
145 SRA Code of Conduct, Chapter 1, O1.13. See also Sime & French 2015, p. 1087. On additional duties to inform if 
acting under a CFA, see section 5.4.2. 
146 See, for instance, BSB Code of Conduct rC22.1 (see also gC81). See also the guidelines for good costs service, issued 
by the Legal Ombudsman, and available at <legalombudsman.org.uk/downloads/documents/publications/Ombuds-
man-view-good-costs-service.pdf>. 
147 CPR 44.3(2). See also section 5.3.4. 
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5.3.2.2 Measure I: costs management and budgeting 
To further the overriding objective, in 2013, the courts’ case management toolbox was supplemented 
with active costs management powers.148 Courts should manage both the steps to be taken and the 
costs to be incurred by the parties to any proceedings. This is facilitated by the parties’ obligation to 
file a costs budget at the start of proceedings on claims below £ 10 million (multi-track cases), and the 
court’s power to make a costs management order, at any time, or hold a costs management confer-
ence. Costs budgeting is not mandatory in claims that exceed £ 10 million, but parties can still apply 
for the court to direct budgets and make a costs management order.149 The conference and/or order 
can address the revision and approval of the costs budgets, to the extent that the budgets have not 
been agreed between parties. In complex decisions, the court may consult a costs officer.150  
  
Generally, costs management/budgeting does not necessarily affect the actual costs between lawyer 
and client, as this would (according to Jackson, unacceptably) interfere with the freedom of contract. 
The restriction of recoverable costs, however, is said to incentivize lawyers – in a competitive market 
– to keep the actual costs down.151 Moreover, to a certain extent, the agreed litigation costs between 
a client and solicitor are subject to the court’s scrutiny. The Guideline Hourly Rates has been developed 
as a benchmark for reasonable hourly fees for solicitors and legal executives.152 The rates are based 
upon the location of fee-earners’ practice and their experience. For substantial and complex litigation, 
the circumstances of the case might justify a higher (recoverable) hourly rate.153 The aim of the guide-
line was to ‘reflect market rates for the level of work being undertaken’, intended for summary assess-
ment, but they are used in detailed assessment and costs management as well.154 Currently, however, 
the use of the guideline is controversial as it is outdated: it has not been revised since 2010.155 Never-
theless, costs budgeting and management are said to better control the costs from an early stage of 
                                                             
 
148 CPR, Part 3 II and III. 
149 CPR 3.15(2). See Jackson 2017, p. 134.  
150 See also section 5.3.4.1.  
151 Jackson 2017, p. 11.  
152 For barristers’ fees, a guideline has been provided by the Senior Courts Costs Office. The currently applicable 2010 
guideline is available at <gov.uk/guidance/solicitors-guideline-hourly-rates>. The guideline is set by the Courts and Tri-
bunals Judiciary, upon advice from the Civil Justice Council (Costs Committee). Before 2012, the guidelines were set by 
(the government’s) HM Courts and Tribunals Service. The Senior Courts Act 1981, section 51(1) gives courts the author-
ity to prescribe costs scales. The Solicitors Act 1974, section 66, states that the determination of the solicitor’s remu-
neration may depend on the skill, labour and responsibility involved in the business done by him. 
153 Sime & French, p. 1222 and (for counsel’s fees) p. 1223. 
154 See Jackson 2009 (Vol. 2), p. 542, Jackson 2010, Chapter 44, p. 450 ff, Jackson 2015, under 8.2, and Sime & French 
2015, p. 1218-1225. On the types of assessment, see section 5.3.4.3. 
155 Jackson 2009, p. 85. In 2014, the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (Master of the Rolls) rejected a proposal from the 
Costs Committee to revise the guideline (which would have resulted in a reduction of the current rates). The main 
reason for the rejection was the report’s insufficiently robust empirical underpinning. Evidence-gathering, apparently, 
had been difficult; for instance, defence law firms had failed to respond to the CJC’s survey. See CJC Costs Committee, 
Recommendations on Guideline Hourly Rates for 2014 (Report to the Master of the Rolls), May 2014, and Master of the 




litigation and to have increased the predictability of both the own client costs and inter partes recov-
erable costs.156 Generally, a costs order will follow the costs budget.157 This clarity and predictability 
explains why, inter alia, third-party litigation funders have welcomed costs management. So far, alt-
hough ‘some practitioners and judges regard the process as tiresome’ and costly, costs management 
has been evaluated as beneficial, particularly to clients.158  
 
One issue that remains problematic within this context is that costs budgets do not address the already 
incurred pre-issue costs, which can be substantial as well.159 For claimants, on average, they represent 
32% of the total budget figure.160 Jackson has endorsed suggestions to fix these costs in different cat-
egories of cases, but has recommended to withhold action in this area for now, since his recommen-
dations to implement an additional fixed recoverable fee regime (see hereafter) contains – yet another 
– significant reform.161  
 
Costs management and budgeting is used in mass litigation as well.162 For instance, in the Lloyds share-
holder litigation (GLO), the adverse costs risk was expected to exceed the cover of the claimants’ initial 
ATE insurance.163 Under a GLO, in the case of loss, the claimants are each severally liable for their 
portion of the costs.164 This risk is unattractive for defendants as they would have to collect costs from 
about 6,000 individuals, ranging from small to institutional investors. Upon the application for a costs 
management order (the claims exceed the £ 10 million limit), the court made a cost benefit analysis, 
weighing the costs of making a costs management order (estimated at approximately £ 225,000) 
against the benefit of certainty on the costs risk exposure. The court concluded that it would be just 
and in accordance with the overriding objective to require parties to spend money on costs manage-
ment in order to assess more accurately the level of the further ATE insurance cover or a substitute 
for this, such as security for costs by the litigation funder involved.165 
5.3.2.3 Measure II: fixed recoverable costs 
Controlling recoverable costs in advance can also take place through the fixed recoverable costs re-
gime.166 Like costs budgeting, this measure does not affect own fees between lawyer and client, yet 
aims to control litigation costs, create a predictable cost structure, and therewith promote access to 
justice.167 Currently, fixed recoverable fees apply to most claims in the fast track (low value claims, up 
                                                             
 
156 Jackson 2016a, p. 130-139. 
157 See section 5.3.4. 
158 Jackson 2016a, p. 131, 134 ff. See also Jackson 2015.  
159 See, for instance, Yeo v. Times Newspapers [2015] EWHC 209 (QB), para. 60-61.  
160 See, Jackson 2017, p. 93 ff.  
161 Jackson 2017, p. 97.  
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to £ 25,000) and the small claims track.168 In 2016, the government commissioned Jackson to consider 
extending the regime to more complex claims in the multi-track, building on the experience with fixed 
recoverable fees so far. In the ensuing 2017 supplementary review, Jackson has recommended fixed 
recoverable fees in all fast track claims, and to implement a new ‘intermediate track’ for claims of 
modest complexity up to £ 100,000, also with fixed recoverable fees, and a streamlined procedure to 
control the work to be done.169 Public consultation will now follow, but it is likely that the proposed 
reforms will be implemented, if only to make sure that the UK legal system ‘continues to lead the 
world’.170 Some have even distilled from recent case law that the courts are moving towards fixed 
recoverable costs ‘for everything’, including complex cases.171 However, the effect of the measure is 
said to be potentially mitigated through commercial contracts: 
 
‘Most banks and financial institutions already have contractual provisions in their contracts with cus-
tomers which allow the recovery of all costs on an indemnity basis to be added to the debt rather 
than sought through the court. As such they are less likely to be affected by the proposed changes. 
Such provisions negate the entire effect of fixed costs in those claims and may be rolled out more 
widely in commercial contracts.’172 
5.3.2.4 Measure III: costs capping and protective costs order 
A variation on the measures of costs management and fixed fees is costs capping, which has been 
employed in particular to control litigation costs in advance in multi-party litigation. The Woolf report 
had already encouraged courts to manage and control costs in multi-party litigation,173 and the ele-
ments that, nowadays, form the basis for costs capping have been developed in the case law.174 In AB 
v. Leeds Teaching Hospitals, in which a group litigation order (GLO) was issued, the court ruled that its 
general case management powers included the authority to cap costs in appropriate cases, ‘of which 
GLOs are prime examples’, ‘particularly where there is a risk that costs may become disproportionate 
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and excessive.’175 For fast track claims before the CAT, recoverable costs are mandatorily capped at a 
level to be determined by the Tribunal; however, this does not apply to collective proceedings.176 
 
As part of the aforementioned 2017 review, Jackson has recommended also introducing a voluntary 
capped costs pilot scheme in certain commercial cases up to £ 250,000.177 In order to control the work 
to be done within such a cap, the procedure is to be streamlined, for instance, by limiting the number 
of pages for statements and reports, narrowing disclosure and, where possible, limiting trial days. If 
successful, ‘the regime could be rolled out more widely for use in appropriate cases.’178 Jackson has 
taken the experiences of the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) as a source of inspiration. 
With its ‘highly streamlined procedure’ and capped recoverable costs regime, the IPEC has increased 
in popularity as a cost-effective and accessible venue, in particular for SMEs with limited financial re-
sources.  
 
Through a costs capping order, a court can limit the amount of future costs (solicitor costs and dis-
bursements such as counsel and expert fees) that are recoverable in the case of success. In other 
words, it places a maximum on the adverse costs risk; it does not necessarily affect the own litigation 
costs. Although costs capping can be a difficult, costly and time-consuming task and carries the risk of 
tactical behaviour by defendants (to frustrate the pursuit of a claim), it is said to be an effective meas-
ure to control costs in advance in certain complex cases.179 The difficulty of costs capping was ex-
pressed in Knight v. Beyond Properties.180 The court stated that costs capping involves a degree of 
speculation (just like ordering security for costs)181 and (unlike the latter) has the serious risk of getting 
it wrong, rendering costs irrecoverable. Any subsequent application to mitigate such a risk would add 
more litigation costs. Thus, costs capping is only applied in exceptional circumstances, if costs man-
agement or a detailed assessment182 are deemed insufficient; ‘the courts should not be troubled by 
satellite litigation’ on costs capping.183 In assessing the application, the court takes into account all the 
circumstances of the case, including whether there is a substantial imbalance between the parties’ 
financial position.184 For the assessment of such a position, the applicant has to provide the court with 
the full disclosure of its means, including capital assets.185 However, the ‘mere’ fact that the case will 
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not be further pursued in the absence of a costs capping order is insufficient; costs capping is not 
intended to remedy litigation funding problems.186 Although it can be applied for at any stage of the 
proceedings, it is risky to apply at a late stage.187 The cap should be proportionate to the amount at 
stake and the complexity of the issues. The costs are capped with a broad approach, and parties’ esti-
mates of the costs serve as a guideline.188 Parties can apply to vary the order in the event of unforeseen 
or exceptional additional costs, or for a reduction thereof. The order can also include a ‘contingency 
fund’, a percentage of the cap for unforeseen circumstances.189  
  
A species of costs capping is the protective costs order, which can be made in certain public interest 
litigation, so-called Aarhus Convention claims, on government accountability and environmental pro-
tection.190 These rules have been introduced to comply with the Aarhus Convention, which states that 
procedures referred to in the convention shall not be prohibitively expensive.191 Recently, Jackson has 
recommended to extend the Aarhus costs capping rules to all judicial review claims.192 The costs for 
claimants are currently capped at £ 5,000 for individuals who bring unsuccessful claims and at £ 10,000 
for companies that do so. For defendants, the costs are capped at £ 35,000. To protect the certainty 
of such costs capping and so as not to deter meritorious claims, the provision that courts can vary 
these amounts can only be made with good reason and at an appropriately early stage of the proceed-
ings.193 Allowing an order to vary the costs cap depends, inter alia, on the financial resources of the 
claimant. The disclosure of such confidential information should be held in private hearings.194  
5.3.3 Security for costs 
Generally, a claimant cannot be ordered to provide security for costs merely because he is poor, ‘it 
being deemed right and expedient that a court of justice should be open to every one.’195 Neverthe-
less, there are a number of situations in which a defendant can request the court to make an order for 
security for costs.196 The aim of such order is to protect the defendant against an impecunious or, in 
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the words of Andrews, a shifty litigant, and to prevent abusive litigation.197 The court needs to balance 
this interest of the defendant against the claimant’s interest of having access to justice.198 An order 
will be made, for instance, if the claimant is a company that has given the court reason to believe that 
it will be unable to pay a potential costs order, or if the claimant has taken steps in relation to his 
assets that would make it difficult to enforce an adverse costs order. The court has to assess whether, 
in light of all the circumstances, it is just to make an order for security for costs. This can include as-
sessing the merits of the case, but only if the case has a high degree of probability of success or failure 
– the assessment should not result in conducting a mini-trial.199 Another factor for the court to con-
sider is whether the claimant can obtain other potential sources of funding to cover the defendant’s 
costs, such as third-party litigation funding.200 An ATE policy is deemed adequate to provide security, 
if the cover is sufficient and the terms do not easily enable the insurer to avoid its liability.201  
 
The court can order a non-claimant, such as a litigation funder, to provide for security for costs.202 The 
court will do so if i) the third party is the original claim owner and has assigned its claim to the claimant 
in order to escape an adverse costs order, or ii) the third party has agreed to pay the claimant’s litiga-
tion costs in return for a share of the proceeds and is a person against whom a costs order may be 
made. Relevant factors for the decision whether to allow security for costs against a non-party are 
whether:203 
- it is motivated by its commercial interest in litigation (as opposed to a ‘pure funder’ with an 
altruistic motive);204 
- there is a real (not fanciful) risk of non-payment; 
- there is a sufficient link between the funding and the costs for which recovery is sought; 
- the non-party knows or should now of the risk of liability for costs. 
The key factor is whether the funder is potentially liable as a non-party for an adverse costs order. In 
entrepreneurial mass litigation, a costs order against a non-party is not uncommon.205  
 
Upon application, a court can order a claimant to disclose the identity and address of a litigation funder 
which would fall under this category.206 Such disclosure is not compulsory. The disclosure of assistance 
by a litigation funder does not – improperly – interfere with a claimant’s right to private life (art. 8 
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ECHR).207 The disclosure of (the terms of) the funding arrangement or ATE policy itself can be ordered 
if such disclosure would aid the case management or assess the funder’s level of control over the 
course of litigation, but will be rejected if its sole purpose is to enable a defendant in its consideration 
to apply for security for costs against the funders.208 This is because the third party is not – yet – party 
to the proceedings, and there is a potential risk of such information being misused by the defendants 
and/or the risk of inducing satellite litigation.  
 
The amount of security is as high as the court deems fit in light of the costs that the defendant is likely 
to incur, and should be neither illusory nor oppressive.209 Given the high litigation costs in England and 
Wales, the quantum of security can be substantial. In a shareholder case involving around 50,000 
shareholders, the court ordered a security for costs of £ 2.5 million.210 In the Excalibur case (not a mass 
litigation case), the claimant – or rather, his funders – had to provide security as high as £ 17.5 mil-
lion.211 In the RBS litigation (GLO), it was set at £ 7.5 million.212 Yet, such security might only be a 
fraction of the potential adverse costs risk: 
 
‘any amount now required to be secured is likely to be dwarfed by the amounts ultimately payable if 
the Defendants are awarded costs at trial, even if those costs are enormously discounted.’213 
 
Based on the experiences of Canada and Australia with security for costs in class actions, Mulheron 
has argued that its potential to hinder access to justice in mass litigation should not be underesti-
mated. She states that there is no empirical evidence that impecunious claimants have been put for-
ward in order to avoid an adverse costs order or security for costs.214 Nevertheless, following the CJC’s 
recommendations, the provisions on security for costs apply in multi-party litigation.215 A defendant 
in (collective) proceedings before the CAT can also seek security for costs; the rules are similar to the 
aforementioned rules.216  
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5.3.4 Costs shifting 
5.3.4.1 The loser pays rule 
In England and Wales, generally, the loser pays or the ‘costs follow the event’ rule applies.217 The un-
derlying principle is fairness or justice: an adverse costs order restores the prevailing party to its orig-
inal position. Moreover, the risk of an adverse costs order might avoid abusive litigation and encourage 
parties to settle.218 The order should not be considered as punishment for the losing party, nor a bonus 
to the prevailing one.219 This is also known as the indemnity principle: the losing party might be or-
dered to pay the prevailing party’s costs, but never more than the actual costs that the prevailing party 
owes to his solicitor.220  
  
The general approach towards the loser pays rule used to be that the prevailing party was fully indem-
nified. According to Lord Woolf, this approach has encouraged litigants to increase litigation costs:  
 
‘If you recover all your costs as long as you win, you are encouraged to leave no stone unturned in 
your effort to do so.’221 
 
Jackson has described the functioning of the loser pays rule in England and Wales as ‘a recipe for run-
away costs’ and uncertainty.222 Both the Woolf and Jackson reforms therefore aimed at encouraging 
reasonable litigation practice and costs. The main element that still shapes the effect of the rule is the 
court’s discretionary power as to whether costs are shifted from the prevailing to the losing party, and 
if so, which costs and what amount.223 Nowadays, this does not necessarily lead to full indemnification, 
but mostly results in partial indemnification.224 At a rough estimate, on a standard basis the prevailing 
party recovers about 75% of its lawyers’ fees.225 Since the Woolf reforms, courts can make separate 
orders regarding different issues, in order to incentivize parties to be more selective in their legal po-
sition.226 However, the rules’ complexity and courts’ discretionary powers have increased uncertainty 
and satellite litigation:  
 
‘Today the fear of costs is no longer confined to litigants of modest means. It affects even the rich 
and preoccupies even mighty Government departments. The complexity of the costs rules combines 
with the extensive court discretion whether to order a party to pay costs and how much to pay. The 
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exercise of this discretion has proved fertile ground for disputes, which could turn to be as extensive 
and costly as the resolution of the substantive action.’227 
 
As discussed in section 5.3.2, in past years, a number of Jackson’s recommendations have been imple-
mented to further control litigation costs at the outset or during litigation. The effect of costs manage-
ment or capping on the adverse costs order at the end of litigation will also be discussed hereafter. If 
parties have settled a case out of court and have agreed that one pays the other’s reasonable costs, 
yet cannot agree on the amount thereof, either one can apply for costs-only proceedings.228 The court 
will then assess the costs, generally through a detailed assessment,229 pursuant to the regular relevant 
rules. 
5.3.4.2 Does the loser indeed pay? 
Generally, as a first step in a costs order, the court will determine whether or not the prevailing party’s 
costs should be shifted. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the successful one’s costs. 
The court may make a different order, however.230 The order can be based on separate issues instead 
of the overall outcome of the case.231 In its determination, the court needs to consider all the circum-
stances.232 An important factor is the parties’ conduct. For instance, the court might address the ques-
tion of whether it was reasonable for a party to raise or pursue an issue.233 Zuckerman has argued that 
the motive for bringing the action can (and should) be addressed otherwise (e.g. striking out the claim), 
because as part of the costs order it gives rise to satellite litigation on questions of blame. Moreover, 
it changes the purpose of the ‘morally neutral’ loser pays rule to a blame-based principle through 
which unjustifiable loss is compensated and the litigant is compared to a tortfeasor.234 ‘There is plainly 
nothing unlawful, improper, or even undesirable in seeking court adjudication.’235 Either way, to de-
part from the loser pays rule requires substantial justification.236  
 
There are a number of statutory exceptions to the loser pays rule. For instance, costs shifting does not 
apply in family proceedings.237 Furthermore, since 2013, qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS) ap-
plies in personal injury claims for damages.238 In general, with QOCS, an adverse costs order against 
an unsuccessful claimant cannot be enforced without the permission of the court.239 The rule was 
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introduced as an alternative to ATE insurance and to mitigate the effect of abolishing the recoverability 
of the premium thereof.240 QOCS addresses the asymmetric relationship between the parties – the 
uninsured or otherwise poorly resourced claimant versus the defendant with deep pockets – and aims 
to provide costs protection for injured parties and therewith ensure access to justice.241 As the court 
takes into account a claimant’s litigation conduct, the rule is said not to affect the risk of frivolous 
litigation.242 The rule does not include a financial means test – thus, funded claimants also fall within 
the scope of QOCS.243 
In 2016, the CJC issued a report, upon Jackson’s recommendation to further consider which categories 
of litigants in other areas of civil litigation should benefit from QOCS.244 It argues that evidence on the 
possible effects of QOCS is limited and that, before moving forward, certain risks should be further 
examined. For instance, in claims arising from negligently-handled injury cases,245 there is a risk that 
solicitor premiums will increase and a secondary market for ‘claims farming’ develops.246 CJC has con-
cluded that it is a matter of policy to further extend QOCS. So far, the government does not seem 
eager to do so, as CFAs were less common in other areas of civil litigation and imposing QOCS ‘would 
distort the market by imposing substantial changes on all cases in a particular category of proceedings 
for a small number of claimants’.247 Jackson has recommended that if the scope of QOCS is to be ex-
panded, courts should be able to test claimants’ financial resources, in order to recognize the fact that 
an asymmetry between parties does not exist in all civil matters.248  
 
In multi-party proceedings, the loser pays rule applies as well.249 Its actual functioning depends on the 
type of mechanism, and will be discussed in sections 5.3.6 and 5.5. 
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5.3.4.3 How much does the loser pay? 
Once the court has decided that it is appropriate to shift costs, the question of which costs should be 
shifted and what amount will then arise. This requires a costs assessment, which can be undertaken 
by the court that has dealt with the particular case (summary assessment) or in separate proceedings 
before a costs officer at the Senior Courts Costs Office (detailed assessment).250 In complex litigation, 
such as multi-party litigation, detailed assessment is likely. The assessment of the receiving party’s 
statement of costs is at the court’s discretion, but is subject to various CPR provisions and common 
law principles.251 Thorough and strict costs assessment has become increasingly important. As the High 
Court noted in the RBS Litigation (GLO proceedings): 
 
‘litigants are free to pay for a Rolls-Royce service but not to charge it all to the other side.’252 
 
There are two routes along which the costs are assessed: the standard or indemnity basis.253 The in-
demnity basis is applied if, in any way, some of the party’s conduct is found to be abusive or unrea-
sonable; thus, in the determination of the amount, too, the parties’ conduct plays a role.254 The con-
duct will give rise to a claim for indemnity costs if it ‘takes the case out of the norm’; misconduct 
‘deserving of moral condemnation’ is not a requirement.255 Either way, the court will only award those 
costs that have been reasonably incurred and are deemed reasonable as to their amount. For instance, 
in the Corby litigation (GLO proceedings) the court ruled that the claimants had adopted a ‘scattergun 
approach’ to litigation and that some time had been wasted at trial. The claimants’ costs entitlement 
was therefore reduced by 10%.256 As mentioned in section 5.3.2.2, the Guideline Hourly Rates provide 
a benchmark for reasonable hourly fees for solicitors and legal executives, and are used by courts to 
assess the recoverability of the fees.257 The guidelines have been designed for summary assessment, 
but are also used for detailed assessment. Furthermore, if the standard cost route is followed, the 
court will determine whether the costs have been proportionately incurred and are proportionate in 
their amount. The principle of proportionality was introduced by Lord Woolf and, following Jackson’s 
recommendations, refined in 2013.258 Costs are proportionately incurred if they bear a reasonable 
relationship to the sum or value at issue, the complexity and conduct of litigation, and wider factors 
                                                             
 
Chapter 38). See also UK Government Response (Ministry of Justice), Improving Access to Justice through Collective 
Actions, July 2009, p. 15.  
250 CPR 44.6(1) and 44.1(1). 
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252 RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2017] EWHC 463 (Ch), para. 134. 
253 CPR 44.3 and 44.4. 
254 CPR 44.4(3)(a). 
255 Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings v. Salisbury Hamer Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879, Colour Quest 
and others v. Total Downstream and others [2009] EWHC 823 (Comm). 
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such as reputation or public importance.259 In its consideration of proportionality, the court can first 
compare the overall costs to the overall amount at issue, and spending more than 25% could ‘ring 
alarm bells’.260 Costs can be necessary and reasonable, but that does not render them proportionate. 
If the costs are disproportionate in their amount, they might be reduced or disallowed.261 In a complex 
case, the court should approach proportionality in the same way as in an individual claim.262  
 
A costs order on an indemnity basis usually leads to a greater costs award than one under the standard 
basis.263 Within the context of entrepreneurial litigation, the Excalibur case is an important example 
of a costs order under the indemnity basis.264 The court ordered that the nine funders involved had 
supported a hopeless case that was ‘essentially speculative and opportunistic’. The claimant, aided by 
its funders, had pursued ‘spurious claims’ ‘replete with defects, illogicalities and inherent improbabil-
ities’, ‘relentlessly to the bitter end’. Thus, the claimant was ordered to pay adverse costs, estimated 
at a minimum of £25 million.265 Such an order should not be considered as punishment for the unsuc-
cessful litigant: 
 
‘It is to afford the successful party a more generous criterion for assessing which of his actual costs 
should be paid by his opponent because of the way in which the latter, or those in his camp [such as 
litigation funders], have acted.’266 
 
The court will calculate costs on an issue by issue basis, but if such a calculation is too complex, the 
court can also award the prevailing party a percentage of the costs that it has incurred.267  
 
A costs budgeting or capping order usually avoids detailed costs assessment.268 A court will generally 
follow a previous costs budgeting or capping order.269 If the costs have been capped, the court will still 
assess the costs, and the order will address the costs actually incurred up to the limit of the cap.270 
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263 Jackson 2009, p. 26, with further references to case law.  
264 Excalibur v. Texas Keystone and Others [2013] EWHC 4278 (QB). 
265 The extent to which the nine funders were liable for these costs will be discussed in section 5.3.6. 
266 Excalibur v. Texas Keystone and Others [2014] EWHC 3436 (QB), consideration 60.  
267 Burchell v. Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358 (CA), para. 29 ff. See also Jackson 2009, p. 23-24 and Zuckerman 2013, p. 
1313, both with further references. 
268 Jackson 2017, p. 91.  
269 CPR 3.18. See also sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.4. 
270 Jackson 2017, p. 96.  
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5.3.5 Recovery of litigation funding costs 
5.3.5.1 Introduction 
The types of litigation funding that will be discussed in section 5.4 include conditional fee arrange-
ments (CFAs), which might entail a success fee, and damages-based agreements (DBAs) and litigation 
funding agreements (LFAs), which entail a contingency fee. Whether the costs of litigation funding, 
such as the success or contingency fee, can be obtained from a defendant in the case of success de-
pends on the type of litigation funding. 
5.3.5.2 CFA success fee 
As of 2000, defendants could be held liable for the CFA success fee of successful claimants. The oper-
ation of CFAs will be further discussed in section 5.4.3.1, but generally, a CFA success fee is a percent-
age increase of a solicitor’s or barrister’s base fee. This increase, the success fee, is only payable upon 
a successful outcome. The recoverability of a success fee – and that of an ATE insurance premium – 
was abolished in 2013.271 Hence, gradually, the complex assessment of recoverability and, thus, the 
reasonableness of success fees will fade into the ghost of the past. I will address the topic nevertheless, 
given the lessons learned on its impact on litigation costs and, thus, its relevance for entrepreneurial 
mass litigation. 
 
Courts could order a losing defendant to reimburse the claimant’s success fee as an ‘additional liabil-
ity’.272 The courts of first instance and appeal were supposed to act as watchdogs by assessing such 
liability as part of the (detailed or summary) costs assessment. This included the level of the success 
fee. In so doing, the court would consider the facts and circumstances as they reasonably appeared to 
the solicitor or counsel at the time when the funding arrangement was entered into, and at the time 
of any variation of the arrangement.273 Hindsight assessment was not allowed. Relevant factors for 
the reasonableness of the success fee included the availability of other funding methods, whether the 
success fee reflected the case’s prospect of success, and whether it was fixed or reviewable as the case 
(and the prospect of success) would progress.274 Despite the overriding objective, which includes that 
cases are dealt with in ways which are proportionate to the financial position of each party, a claim-
ant’s financial position was irrelevant; any person could conclude a CFA.275 As the defendant was po-
tentially liable for these additional costs, claimants were obliged to disclose information about the CFA 
and ATE, that is, whether such arrangements had been entered into. The amount of the additional 
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liability or method of calculation (such as the success fee percentage) did not have to be disclosed until 
costs assessment at the end of litigation.276 
 
The Lord Chancellor originally proposed a maximum success fee of 10 or 20%, but the uplift was later 
statutorily capped at 100% of the base costs.277 This maximum uplift was not meant to be the standard. 
As Chief Master Hurst reflected in 2003:  
 
‘[i]t is generally accepted that if the chances of success are no better than 50% the success fee should 
be 100%. The thinking behind this is that if a solicitor were to take two identical cases with a 50% 
chance of success in each it is likely that one would be lost and the other won. Accordingly the success 
fee (of 100%) in the winning case would enable the solicitor to bear the loss of running the other case 
and losing.’278 
 
In the early stages of CFAs, courts did not lay down hard and fast rules on what could be considered 
reasonable percentages. In personal injury claims resulting from traffic accidents, in 2001, the Court 
of Appeal ruled that in modest and straightforward claims, a maximum uplift of 20% could be consid-
ered reasonable, unless persuaded otherwise. It also ruled that the courts should continue to monitor 
success fees as the practice of CFAs (and ATE) was still developing.279 The Court of Appeal also drew 
attention to the (preferred) alternative structure of a two-step success fee. Hereby, the agreed uplift 
(with a maximum of 100%) would be reduced if the case was settled before a specific moment in the 
proceedings, for instance, to an uplift of 5%. According to the Court of Appeal, such a construction had 
the advantages that a refusal to settle would indicate a serious defence, the knowledge that the full 
uplift would be payable would encourage early settlement and a rigorous consideration of the merits, 
and the fee reflected the risk of the individual case, also the one that even a simple claim might be 
contested.280 This construction, with a maximum reduced uplift of 5%, was later deemed apt ‘to cater 
for the wholly unexpected risk lurking below the limpid waters of the simplest of claims’, that is, ‘ex-
tremely simple’ claims where ‘the prospects of success are virtually 100%’.281 
 
Within the context of entrepreneurial mass litigation, the Trafigura case is an illustrative example of 
the level of potential additional liability for defendants and the court’s assessment thereof.282 In 2009, 
this group action (GLO) for the personal injury of almost 30,000 claimants resulted in a settlement. 
The court approved the terms of the settlement agreement, which allowed for £ 30 million in damages 
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and for Trafigura to pay the claimants’ litigation costs. However, after the claimants’ law firm submit-
ted its bill of approximately £ 105 million, Trafigura decided to challenge those costs and bring the bill 
before a costs judge for detailed assessment. A substantial part of the bill was made up of the success 
fee of 100% under which the claimants’ solicitors and counsel had acted (combined with an ATE insur-
ance). Ultimately, on appeal, the court upheld the costs judge’s ruling to cut the success fee to 58%, 
which represents about a 62% chance of success.283 An important factor was the claim’s prospect of 
success. According to the Court of Appeal, a costs judge should rely upon the claimant’s initial assess-
ment thereof, but should be critical of the applied method and recognize that such assessment is ‘at 
least potentially self-serving’.284 Hence, where possible, a costs judge should also consider other evi-
dence, such as the assessment of the ATE insurer. Moreover, it should consider any change of circum-
stances – potentially altering the prospects of success – after the initial assessment. Ultimately, ac-
cording to the Court of Appeal, a costs judge’s assessment of an appropriate success fee involved ‘an 
overall assessment by weighing up various factors which were inherently difficult to quantify and on 
which reasonable people could differ (sometimes quite substantially)’.285  
 
The complexity and consequences of the courts’ task of assessing reasonableness was described by 
Lord Bingham: 
 
‘If they [the courts] were too restrictive in the level of success fees (…) which they allowed, lawyers 
and clients might be deterred from acting or proceeding on this basis and the objects of the new 
regime would be defeated. If they were too generous and too uncritical, excessive fees (…)  might be 
allowed and an unfair and disproportionate burden placed on defendants and their liability insurers, 
thereby undermining one of the key objects of the Civil Procedure Rules.’286 
 
The Trafigura case also shows the potential for extensive (satellite) litigation. This can be illustrated 
with the following paragraph from one of the three costs court judgments: 
 
‘The defendants, not surprisingly, have launched an extremely vigorous attack on both the generic 
and individual bills. I have been given electronic copies of the bills, which I am told run to some 55,000 
items, all of which are challenged (…) For the purpose of these key issues I was presented with in 
excess of 60 ring-binders of documents, and (…) the defendants' skeleton argument, including sup-
porting schedules, ran to over 1,000 pages, this being in addition to a witness statement (…) which, 
with exhibits, ran to over 3,000 pages. The claimants' skeleton runs to 73 pages, and their supporting 
witness statements, including exhibits, run to 923 pages.’287 
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The developing case law and the statutory fixation of success fees and the recovery thereof in specific 
type of cases created a colourful chaos. The market did not sufficiently develop reasonable fees. For 
instance, in 2005, the Court of Appeal found that the litigation risk in the case at hand justified a per-
centage of 15% rather than the 100% uplift the counsel and 70% uplift the solicitor had charged.288 
Furthermore, the establishment of a reasonable fee remained challenging for courts. Lord Hoffmann 
even stated that (costs) judges were not nor should be in the position to do so: 
 
‘What in fact determines the success fee solicitors charge is what costs judges have been willing to 
allow in more or less comparable cases, the fee being set at the level regarded as optimistic but 
hopefully not so optimistic as to provoke the liability insurers into contesting the amount. (…) So the 
next question is whether a decision of a costs judge, or the Court of Appeal on appeal from a costs 
judge, is the best way of compensating for the absence of price competition in the market. The tra-
ditional function of the costs judge, or taxing master, as he used to be called, was to decide what fees 
were reasonable by reference to his experience of the general level of fees being charged for compa-
rable work. But this approach only makes sense if the general level of fees is itself directly or indirectly 
determined by market forces. Otherwise the exercise becomes circular and costs judges will be de-
ciding what is reasonable according to general levels which costs judges themselves have deter-
mined. In such circumstances there is no restraint upon a ratchet effect whereby the highest success 
fees obtainable from a costs judge are relied upon in subsequent assessments. (…) I rather doubt 
whether difficulty is likely to be removed merely by the passage of time. All that costs judges will 
learn is what other costs judges are allowing. Solicitors will charge whatever is currently allowed and 
exert upward pressure to be able to charge more. But that will not tell anyone whether the fees paid 
to the solicitors represent reasonable value for money. (…) A legislative decision to fix costs at levels 
calculated to provide adequate access to justice in the most economical way seems to me a more 
rational approach than to leave the matter to individual costs judges. (…) Not only would this be more 
likely to keep the actual costs within reasonable levels but it would also greatly reduce the cost of 
disputes over costs. We were told that no less than 150,000 cases awaited the outcome of your Lord-
ships' decision in this case.’289 
 
Hence, the recoverability of success fees (and ATE premiums) had not only positively influenced access 
to justice, but also contributed to increasing litigation costs and helped incite the so-called costs war. 
The costs war covered various (technical) legal issues regarding CFAs, but in essence, the problem was 
made up of the following elements.290 Claimants had no incentive to negotiate the percentage of the 
success fee or the price of the ATE premium since they would not have to pay them. Lawyers had an 
incentive to negotiate a high percentage and to ‘cherry pick’, and therewith substantially enlarge their 
earnings. Thus, the market did not function. Defendants had all the incentives in the world to contest 
the percentage charged, in order to lower their liability, thereby creating extensive satellite litigation. 
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Furthermore, as a claimant’s reason to engage in a CFA could be a lack of resources and taking out an 
ATE insurance was not mandatory, successful defendants were exposed to the risk of not being able 
to recover an adverse costs order. Also, the claimants were not under a duty to disclose the percentage 
of the success fee in their costs estimate, so as not to reveal the funder/insurer’s prospect of the merits 
of the case. Thus, there was no signalling effect to the defendant as to the possible costs risk. This all 
rendered defendants’ position ‘wholly unenviable’.291 The costs war substantially increased lawyers’ 
and litigation costs, and where possible, costs were – indirectly – passed on to the wider public, for 
instance, by increasing insurance premiums. Courts complained about the level of satellite litigation 
and the lack of information and/or knowledge to adequately assess and control success fees. They 
furthermore found it difficult to retrospectively assess a percentage, with hindsight knowledge that 
could not be used. 
 
Meanwhile, in 2011, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the – impact of the – recovera-
bility of a success fee (95% uplift) in a media publication case (defamation) had violated the defend-
ant’s freedom of expression.292 In the case at hand, a newspaper had been ordered to pay damages 
(£ 3,500) and litigation costs (billed for a little over £ 1 million). CFAs and their recoverability had been 
long said to have a ‘chilling effect’ on journalism and to hold the risk of inciting defendants to pay 
(something) in order to avoid high litigation costs.293 Yet again, the costs and funding debate took place 
on fertile ground and exerted pressure on the government and the courts.  
 
The dilemma of continuing the recoverability of CFAs was sharply worded by Lord Jackson: 
 
‘It is, of course, congenial for claimant lawyers to see their clients provided with comprehensive fund-
ing and insulated from all risk of adverse costs. It is congenial for both claimant and defendant law-
yers to have a constant stream of work passing across their desks. Indeed, it is congenial for judges 
to know that the claimants who appear before them are not putting their personal assets at risk, 
whatever the outcome of the individual case. But these undoubted benefits have been achieved at 
massive cost, especially in cases which are fully contested. That cost is borne by taxpayers, council 
tax payers, insurance premium payers and by those defendants who have the misfortune to be nei-
ther insured nor a large and well-resourced organisation.’294 
 
Ultimately, in April 2013 and pursuant to Jackson’s recommendation, the LASPO abolished the recov-
erability of the CFA success fee and ATE premium.295 Claimants now pay the success fee, the base costs 
remain recoverable in case of success – as was the situation between 1995 and 2000. In this way, CFA 
                                                             
 
291 Cf. Turcu v. News Group Newspapers [2005] EWHC 799 (QB), para. 6.  
292 ECHR 18 January 2011, 39401/04 (MGN v. United Kingdom). In 2005, the House of Lords had ruled otherwise; see 
Campbell v. MGN [2005] UKHL 61. 
293 King v. Telegraph Group [2004] EWCA Civ 613, paras 37-41 and 99.  
294 Jackson 2010, p. 96. 




claimants have an incentive to control the costs incurred on their behalf.296 As a consequence, the 
discussion on a reasonable percentage will now, normally, take place outside of court. The government 
relies upon the market to set more reasonable fees and premiums. The types of cases for which fixed 
percentages had been statutorily set, now fall under the fixed recoverable costs regime.  
 
As the LASPO also included further legal aid cuts, it was feared that access to justice would take a huge 
blow. The government therefore took some additional measures. To meet the largest group of CFA 
users, personal injury victims, the government supported Jackson’s recommendation for courts to in-
crease non-pecuniary damages by 10%,297 it capped success fees at 25% of non-pecuniary damages 
(other than those for future care and loss), and introduced qualified one way costs shifting (QOCS), so 
that, generally, personal injury claimants would not need to take out ATE insurance.298 For mesotheli-
oma proceedings, success fees and ATE premiums remain recoverable until further notice.299 Further-
more, for all civil cases, the government has lifted the restrictions on damages-based agreements 
(DBAs), which will be discussed in section 5.4.3.2, and – briefly – hereafter.300 
5.3.5.3 DBA contingency fee 
As of 2013, legal representatives such as solicitors are allowed to enter into a damages-based agree-
ment (DBA) in civil litigation. Such agreement includes a fee that is contingent upon success and is 
determined as a percentage of the proceeds.301 A contingency fee thus differs from a conditional/suc-
cess fee, as it is based on the proceeds rather than the solicitor’s hourly fee. 
 
Generally, contingency fees pursuant to a DBA do not affect defendants’ liability for adverse costs, 
that is, not negatively. The assessment of recoverable costs (the lawyer’s hourly fee and disburse-
ments) takes place in the conventional way, as it would without a DBA.302 A DBA might, however, 
positively affect defendants. Pursuant to the indemnity principle, courts may not order the losing de-
fendant to pay a claimant any costs that exceed the latter’s actual legal liability to his solicitor for 
costs.303 In 2010, Jackson recommended abolishing the indemnity principle as it had been the root 
cause of extensive and expensive satellite litigation: 
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Given the ingenuity of lawyers, so long as the indemnity principle is there to tempt them, such uned-
ifying battles are likely to continue into the future.304 
 
Nevertheless, it continues to be in force. Hence, the defendant’s liability for adverse costs is capped 
at the percentage of the contingency fee.305 If the prevailing claimant’s solicitor has incurred more 
costs than the contingency fee represents, he will not be able to recover it, neither from the defendant 
nor from the claimant.306 For instance, if the agreed contingency fee is 25%, the awarded damages are 
£ 100,000 and the claimant’s solicitor fees are £ 30,000, the maximum recoverable costs are £ 25,000. 
In this case, the claimant receives the full damages award and the defendant pays the claimant’s so-
licitor a maximum of £ 25,000.  
5.3.5.4 LFA contingency fee 
Claimants can also enter into a litigation funding agreement (LFA) with a third-party litigation funder. 
Such an agreement can also include a fee that is contingent upon success and determined as a per-
centage of the proceeds.307 Generally, such contingency fee does not affect defendants’ liability for 
adverse costs as it is not recoverable as an additional liability.308 The assessment of recoverable ad-
verse costs takes place in the conventional way, as it would without an LFA. 
 
It has been argued that the DBA regime does not apply to third-party litigation funding.309 Hence, no 
statutory cap applies to LFA contingency fees that would potentially limit defendants’ liability. That 
does not mean that the defendant is necessarily liable for the (full) LFA contingency fee. On the con-
trary, absent statutory provision, a payment due to the litigation funder is not at all recoverable from 
a defendant.310 Generally, as a rule, the costs of funding litigation, such as interest paid on money 
borrowed to pay solicitors’ bills, are not recoverable.311 Thus, a successful claimant will be able to 
recover its ‘regular’ litigation costs from a defendant. It is a matter of contract or law (see hereafter) 
how the funder recovers his contingency fee, whether and to what extent the recovered costs are 
distributed between funder, solicitor and claimant(s), and the relation between the recoverable costs 
and the percentage of the proceeds.  
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In 2016, the High Court upheld an ICC arbitrator’s decision that litigation funding costs were subject 
to recovery as part of the costs of arbitration.312 The claimant owed the funder either 300% of the 
advanced funding amount or 35% of the proceeds – whichever was the higher amount – and success-
fully sought to recover these costs, almost £ 2 million, from the defendant. The total costs order was 
£ 4 million, based on the indemnity basis, as the defendant’s conduct had been financially ‘crippling’, 
driving the claimant to expensive litigation.313 According to the arbitrator, the defendant had left the 
claimant with no alternative than to turn to a litigation funder. This conduct led the arbitrator to con-
clude that it would be reasonable to include the costs of litigation funding in the costs order. The High 
Court confirmed the decision, since pursuant to the relevant rules an arbitrator has the discretion to 
determine the recoverable ‘legal and other costs’.314 According to the arbitrator, based on expert evi-
dence, the charged rate and terms were standard ones in the market. It has been argued that the 
decision might create an incentive for funded claimants to bring a claim before an arbitrator rather 
than a court.315 However, as the decision should be seen in light of the defendant’s bad litigation con-
duct and given the long history of English courts and tribunals in using cost sanctions, it has also been 
argued that under these circumstances, a court might very well follow a similar route in civil proceed-
ings.316 
 
In collective proceedings (not: collective settlement), a third-party litigation funder might be able to 
recover its fee from the unclaimed proceedings as part of ‘the costs or expenses incurred by the rep-
resentative in connection with the proceedings.’317 Hence, in a way, the fees are recovered from the 
defendant; not as part of the inter partes costs order, but as part of the awarded damages. This con-
struction will be further discussed in sections 5.5.6 and 5.5.7. 
5.3.5.5 Other costs of litigation funding 
Various costs can be incurred in connection with litigation funding. I will address vetting costs, made 
to evaluate the prospects of success, and the costs of negotiating and drafting the funding arrange-
ment.  
 
A reasonable conditional or contingency fee requires, inter alia, due diligence to evaluate the pro-
spects of success (vetting). Vetting is an important aspect of mass litigation, as a funder will want to 
make sure that the investment is solid. The reasonable and proportionate costs of collecting, assessing 
and managing claims might be recoverable.318  
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As mentioned in section 5.3.5.4., the costs of funding litigation such as the interest paid on money 
borrowed to pay solicitors bills, are generally not recoverable.319 In Motto v. Trafigura, however, the 
costs judge ruled (which was upheld on appeal) that the costs of drafting and preparing, explaining 
and advising on CFAs were recoverable, as they, distinguishable from interest, can be characterised as 
money payable to solicitors for work done for the ultimate benefit of the client. Moreover, such costs 
were deemed recoverable as ‘a matter of policy’, the Court of Appeal ruled.320 However, not all costs 
of establishing and setting up the CFA can be labelled as such. With regard to expenses for ‘getting 
business’, such as advertising or advising a potential claimant on the terms and effect of the CFA, ‘the 
solicitors are acting for themselves (…) [they] are negotiating with him as a prospective client, not for 
him as an actual client’. Thus, the costs concerned with identifying potential claimants, negotiating the 
terms on which they are to be engaged, or the costs of discussing the progress of litigation with ATE 
insurers are not recoverable; they fall under the solicitors’ general overheads or expenses. This all 
makes the precise dividing line between recoverability and irrecoverability ‘somewhat blurred and 
subjective’.321 
5.3.6 Liability for adverse costs 
5.3.6.1 Liability of class members 
In general, a losing party is liable for an adverse costs order. ATE insurance might cover this liability. In 
mass litigation, it depends on the chosen route whether class members are liable for (their share of) 
the costs. Determining liability for costs in the various types of mass litigation is a complex exercise.322 
 
In a representative action, the normal cost rules apply.323 In the case of loss, the costs order generally 
applies to the representative party, not the represented parties.324 However, the court can make a 
costs order against non-parties to contribute to the representative’s costs, also in advance.325 Zucker-
man argues that the lack of any reference to cost rules in CPR 19.6 should be construed in such way 
that, normally, such an order should not be made.326 Andrews suggests an equitable sharing of the 
costs burden of representative proceedings to remove the mechanism’s costs impediment. As to the 
liability for an adverse costs order, such costs sharing could depend on the type of represented parties. 
A spectrum of represented parties exists, from the ‘unaware’ represented party to the one who in 
everything but name is the true litigant and, thus, might be ordered to pay or share in the adverse 
                                                             
 
319 See Hunt v. Douglas [1987] WL492269. 
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324 See, for instance, Howells v. Dominion Insurance [2005] EWHC 552 (QB), para. 37 ff. See also Sime & French 2015, 
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Savings Association v. Taylor [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 484; and Re British Airways Pension Schemes [2000] Pens. L.R. 311 
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costs.327 In a recent case, the court granted permission to enforce the costs order – also – against the 
represented parties. It deemed the figures for the costs to be ‘eye-wateringly high’, and in light of the 
beneficial object of the representative action (avoid unnecessary joinder of parties and enable efficient 
litigation) it ruled that the costs order could also be enforced against the represented parties.328 
 
A different regime applies under the GLO.329 Within the context of the GLO, group members whose 
claim have been entered on the register are severally liable – unless the court orders otherwise – for 
an equal proportion of the common costs, and for the individual costs.330 Common costs are those that 
have been incurred in relation to the GLO issue(s), the individual costs have been incurred in relation 
to the test claim, and the lead legal representative’s costs have been incurred in administering the 
group litigation. Individual costs are those that have been incurred in relation to the individual claim 
entered on the group register. Once a GLO order has been made, the management court may give 
directions as to how the claimants on the group register will potentially bear or share the costs of 
resolving common issues or the costs of claims proceeding as test claims.331  
 
A combination of the above rules applies in collective proceedings (competition law).332 The (sub-)class 
representative is party to the proceedings, against whom a costs order can be awarded.333 In general, 
the other represented persons or class members cannot be held liable for adverse costs, unless indi-
vidual issues have been determined. In such a case, the associated costs can be awarded against the 
relevant individual person.334 
5.3.6.2 Liability of litigation funders 
A legal representative such as the solicitor can be held liable for adverse costs (wasted costs order), 
but in exceptional circumstances only; the hurdle is very high.335  
 
Courts also have a discretionary power to join non-parties in the costs order, such as a litigation funder 
or a solicitor that acts as such.336 A costs order against a non-party is exceptional, but not uncommon 
when an entrepreneurial party is involved. Whether a funder is held liable for the adverse costs first 
of all depends on the type of funding, that is, whether the funder is considered a ‘pure’ or ‘commercial’ 
funder. Normally, a pure funder will not be held liable for adverse costs, whereas a commercial funder 
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might be. A pure funder is one that funds out of affection, ‘whether described as charitable, philan-
thropic, altruistic or merely sympathetic’, rather than out of a personal, commercial interest.337 How-
ever, 
 
‘[w]here (…) the non-party not merely funds the proceedings but substantially also controls or at any 
rate is to benefit from them, justice will ordinarily require that, if the proceedings fail, he will pay the 
successful party's costs. The non-party in these cases is not so much facilitating access to justice by 
the party funded as himself gaining access to justice for his own purposes. He himself is "the real 
party" to the litigation, a concept repeatedly invoked throughout the jurisprudence’338 
 
Although a commercial funder might improve access to justice as a side effect, its mere objective is to 
make a profit from litigation.339 Or, as a judge in the Court of Appeal in Excalibur put it:  
 
‘I do not myself think that commercial funders are greatly motivated by the need to promote access 
to justice, and nor do I suggest that they should be.’340 
 
A commercial funder benefits from the proceedings and – to a certain extent – controls litigation. Thus, 
ordinarily, a court will make an order for costs against the (non-party) litigation funder if litigation is 
unsuccessful.  
 
The extent to which a funder can be held liable for adverse costs has been decided in the Arkin and 
Excalibur case. In Arkin, the Court of Appeal ruled that a litigation funder is liable for the adverse costs 
to the extent of its funding provided (the so-called Arkin cap).341 This is different, that is, funders will 
be fully liable if the funding agreement is deemed to be champertous (for instance, if the funders take 
complete control over the litigation) or if the funders behave dishonestly or improperly.342 The Arkin 
cap was the court’s solution to balance two competing public policies: the relevance of litigation fund-
ing to ensure access to justice versus the costs follow the event principle which entails that a funder 
that enables litigation should be liable for the costs that defendants incur.343  
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This so-called Arkin cap includes the funding provided to pay for security for costs, as was decided in 
Excalibur. Although it might have been an exceptional case, Excalibur v. Texas Keystone contains a 
landmark ruling for litigation funding in general, and on the liability of funders for adverse costs in 
particular.344 The case concerned the entitlement to proceeds of an oil field in Iraq. Excalibur was a so-
called brass plate company with no real existence or assets. Its claim was funded by seven commercial 
litigation funders and, in addition, Excalibur had entered into a conditional fee agreement with its 
solicitor. In 2013, the High Court dismissed Excalibur’s claim. In its costs judgment, the court did not 
hold back: Excalibur had put forward ‘a range of bad, artificial or misconceived claims which required 
a great deal of expense, labour and time to refute’, and the case was ‘essentially speculative and op-
portunistic’, ‘gargantuan in scope’ yet ‘based on no sound foundation in fact or law’.345 For instance, 
Excalibur was found to have grossly exaggerated the quantum of damages, undoubtedly hoping to 
drive the defendants to settle. The court therefore ordered the defendants’ costs to be assessed on 
the indemnity basis. Subsequently, the court had to decide whether the litigation funders could be 
held liable for the adverse costs on the indemnity basis, and whether the Arkin cap included funding 
through providing security for costs. The court first held that all funders had a commercial interest in 
the outcome of Excalibur’s litigation and, thus, could be held liable for the adverse costs as non-par-
ties.346 The court then ruled that the Arkin cap applied, that there was no champertous agreement nor 
that the funders themselves had behaved improperly or dishonestly. Then, the court discussed the 
question of whether the funders should contribute to the costs assessed on the indemnity scale. The 
court ruled that all funders were liable, jointly and severally, for indemnity costs:  
 
‘The pursuit of objectively hopeless claims which required much time, labour and expense to refute 
is itself a ground for indemnity costs both against the litigant and his funder. (…) In short, in a case 
of this kind justice requires that, when the case fails so comprehensively, not merely on the facts but 
because it was wholly bad in law, the funder should, subject to the Arkin cap, bear the costs ordered 
to be paid by the person whom or which he has unsuccessfully supported, assessed on the scale which 
the court thinks it just for that person to pay in the light of all the circumstances, including but not 
limited to that person's behaviour and that of those whom that person engaged. In short, he should, 
absent special circumstances, follow the fortunes of those from whom he himself hoped to derive a 
small fortune. To do otherwise would, in my judgment, be unfair to the Defendants and their person-
nel, who were on the receiving end of claims and actions of the character that I described in the costs 
judgment.’347 
 
A potential impact of such an outcome on the litigation funding industry did not impress the court 
much: 
 
‘I entertain some doubt that my decision will send an unacceptable chill through the litigation funding 
industry, whose aim is not to finance hopeless cases but those with strong merits. If it serves to cause 
funders and their advisors to take rigorous steps short of champerty, i.e. behaviour likely to interfere 
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with the due administration of justice, — particularly in the form of rigorous analysis of law, facts 
and witnesses, consideration of proportionality and review at appropriate intervals — to reduce the 
occurrence of the sort of circumstances that caused me to order indemnity costs in this case, that is 
an advantage and in the public interest.’348 
 
Finally, the court ruled that the Arkin cap was to be calculated by reference to the fees paid and the 
money provided for security for costs, as the latter was also to be considered a form of funding, an 
investment, and therefore to be included.349 
 
All this was upheld on appeal. According to the Court of Appeal, it was evident that the case was not 
one ‘of abstruse legal doctrine upon which two views might be possible’.350 The conduct of the claim-
ant that gives rise to the indemnity costs includes ‘those in his camp’, whether or not there was a 
direct contractual relationship. Even if the funders did ‘nothing discreditable in the sense of being 
morally reprehensible or even improper’, they may be ordered to pay costs on the indemnity basis:  
 
‘I can see no principled basis upon which the funder can dissociate himself from the conduct of those 
whom he has enabled to conduct the litigation and upon whom he relies to make a return on his 
investment.’351  
 
The Court of Appeal was unimpressed by the funders’ assessment of the merits of Excalibur’s claim (at 
certain points being ‘superficial, feeble and rush’); however, it refused an inquiry into the adequacy of 
the due diligence as part of the assessment of liability for indemnity costs, as it is ‘at best difficult and 
unsatisfactory and often impossible’ and would only give rise to undesirable satellite litigation and 
increasing costs.352  
  
Both courts criticised the role of the law firm as well. According to the Court of Appeal, the law firm 
also took part in the ‘egregious manner in which this litigation was pursue, including, it is surprising 
and depressing to have to report, aggressive and unacceptable correspondence from Clifford 
Chance’.353 The solicitors were not joined in the costs order, but the funders did bring a case to Allen 
& Overy to pay indemnity costs. Media reports suggest that the case has been settled, with Clifford 
Chance agreeing to pay the adverse costs.354  
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The Arkin and Excalibur cases concern individual litigation. As mentioned, costs orders against non-
parties are exceptional. However, mass litigation will most likely fall within this category: 
 
‘(…) in my view, a case with multiple claimants seeking to vindicate their rights under a GLO and who 
have been accorded by Court order the considerable benefit of several and not joint liability for costs 
will be likely to be considered 'exceptional'. In such a case, the defendant(s) will almost inevitably be 
put to exceptional difficulty in enforcing any costs order in their favour if they obtain one at the end 
of the day.’355  
 
Adverse costs can be substantial, in particular in complex litigation such as mass litigation. In the RBS 
litigation (GLO), after four years of litigation, the overall estimate of costs on the defendant’s side was 
approximately £ 129 million. This might be an unparalleled example and the costs might have been 
disproportionate and/or ‘seriously inflated’; however, such potential liability can create difficulties in 
obtaining (sufficient) ATE insurance coverage.356 In order to secure obtaining their potential adverse 
costs, defendants can also apply for security for costs to be ordered against the litigation funder.357 
5.4 Private litigation funding 
5.4.1 Introduction 
As part of the overall retreat from the welfare state and inherent spending cuts, public funding in 
England and Wales has increasingly reduced in the past few decades.358 By 1995, statutory limitations 
on financial eligibility and a strict merits assessment reduced the availability, and low pay rates and 
bureaucracy deterred attorneys from engaging in legal aid. Nowadays, legal aid remains available to 
those on a low (disposable) income, but for a limited type of civil legal services only.359 Conversely, in 
addition to an expanding market for legal expenses insurance (BTE),360 the number of available mech-
anisms for private litigation funding has increased. Currently, the following arrangements are availa-
ble, which will be discussed in the following sections: a conditional fee arrangement (CFA; possibly 
combined with an after-the-event insurance, ATE), a damages-based agreement (DBA), third-party lit-
igation funding, and the assignment model. Finally, the initiative to implement a contingency legal aid 
fund (CLAF) will be briefly discussed.  
 
Essential for the development of private litigation funding in England and Wales are the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty. Hence, these doctrines will be discussed first. It is important to note that 
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this solely concerns the English and Welsh context. For instance, in Ireland, the doctrine has developed 
in a different direction.361 
5.4.2 Maintenance and champerty 
The doctrines of maintenance and champerty are a specific feature of common law and are rather 
unknown to continental jurisdictions. Under the torts of maintenance and champerty, supporting or 
investing in another person’s dispute without just cause used to be prohibited.362 Maintenance is the 
‘intermeddling’ in the litigation of a third party with no other interest than its own: profiting from 
another man’s claim. Champerty is a species or, according to some, a ‘particularly obnoxious form’ of 
maintenance.363 It refers to the situation in which the third party helps pursue the litigant’s claim in 
exchange for sharing in the proceeds, by way of a ‘division of the spoils’.364 
 
As of the Middle Ages at least, maintenance and champerty were prohibited as a common law 
crime/statutory offence as well as a tort. Its existence was always based upon public policy, but differ-
ent accounts exist on the origin of the ban. Questionable parties would assign fraudulent claims to 
‘men of power’ like noblemen, with the idea that a judge would take such party more seriously and, 
consequently, the chances of success would increase, or rich landowners would speculate by encour-
aging actions with a low probability of success to be brought, thereby oppressing legitimate landown-
ers and hoping to share in the occasional successful recovery.365 Either way, obviously, at one point in 
time, such risks were relegated to the background, but the fear of abuse such as blackmail and frivo-
lous litigation remained, and so did the doctrines of maintenance and champerty. As a matter of justice 
and public interest, abusive litigation was to be prevented and, thus, a third party’s own interest in 
litigation was not allowed.  
 
In 1967, criminal and civil liability for maintenance and champerty was abolished. According to the 
advisory committee, the ‘ancient and unused misdemeanours and the ancient and virtually useless 
torts’ could be ‘consigned to the museum of legal history’.366 Nevertheless, section 14(2) of the Crim-
inal Law Act 1967 stated that the abolition would not affect cases in which a contract is regarded as 
being contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal. Whether a contract was deemed to be contrary to 
public policy depended on the third party’s motive. A genuine motive, a concern for the litigant’s right 
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or a genuine interest in the outcome, was allowed.367 The motive should not be improper, such as 
‘stirring up strife’ or ‘trafficking in litigation’.368 Courts would declare such contracts void or unenforce-
able. In essence, two factors underlie this public policy. First, the fear of incentivizing parties to practice 
unethically in order to secure success, such as inflaming damages or suppressing evidence.369 Second, 
the relationship of trust between a solicitor and his client was deemed of such importance that any 
invitation for the former to act in his own interest rather than that of his client had to be avoided.370 
 
After conditional fee agreements were statutorily permitted in 1995,371 the concept of maintenance 
and champerty with respect to public policy further developed, in particular in light of the need or 
desire to enable access to justice. Nowadays, the scope of the rule has progressively narrowed. The 
modern, flexible approach towards the ancient concepts is whether an agreement undermines ‘the 
purity of justice’, ‘corrupt public justice’ or ‘the integrity of the litigation process’, which is to be as-
sessed on a case by case basis.372 Public policy is said to have shifted in favour of, for instance, third-
party litigation funding, as shown by recent case law, the endorsement from, inter alia, CJC and Lord 
Jackson, and the establishment of a regulatory regime for such funding.373 Nevertheless, maintenance 
and champerty remain of concern to litigation funders.374 The remainder of the doctrines in specific 
funding situations will be further discussed in the following sections.  
5.4.3 Lawyers’ litigation funding 
5.4.3.1 Conditional fee arrangement and after-the-event insurance 
Based on the proposals by Lord Mackay, in 1995, the government decided to counterbalance the cut-
backs in legal aid by permitting litigation funding by lawyers through Conditional Fee Arrangements 
(CFAs).375 Before, the professional conduct rules of both solicitors and barristers did not allow pay-
ments related to a successful outcome.376 The possibility of concluding a CFA was first introduced in 
specific cases only, such as personal injury and insolvency cases. As of 2000, it was extended to almost 
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all civil litigation.377 Permitting CFAs had to be laid down in primary legislation, as otherwise the – 
remainder of – the doctrine of champerty and maintenance could render the arrangement unenforce-
able.378 The CLSA defines a CFA as a contract whereby parties agree that (part of) the fees and expenses 
of the person providing advocacy or litigation services379 are payable only in specified circumstances – 
usually, if the action is successful. If the CFA provides for a success fee, an uplift (the success fee) is 
charged in the case of success, expressed as a percentage of the normal, hourly fee (base costs).380 If 
the claimant’s case is lost, he either pays no fee (‘no win, no fee’), which is the most common ver-
sion,381 or a low fee (‘no win, low fee’). A CFA is not the same as ‘no cure, no pay’ or a contingency fee. 
The latter includes a percentage of the proceeds instead of the base costs. Furthermore, under the 
English rule, ‘no cure’ still means ‘pay’: the adverse costs. This is why, promptly after the introduction 
of CFAs, the after-the-event insurance (ATE) made its entry to supplement CFAs: to cover the claim-
ant’s risk of having to pay an adverse costs order.382  
  
Initially, neither the ATE premium nor the success fee were recoverable from the defendants. In the 
case of a claimant’s success, the defendant had to pay the base costs through the adverse costs order, 
and the claimant would have to pay the success fee and the ATE premium out of the damages awarded. 
In 2000, following further legal aid cutbacks, the recoverability of CFA success fees and ATE premiums 
on a successful outcome were introduced to bridge the (potential) gap in access to justice.383 The costs 
of CFA litigation were now placed on unsuccessful defendants. However, as discussed in section 
5.3.5.2, in 2000, the recoverability was abolished as its incentives drove up litigation costs and created 
extensive satellite litigation. Claimants now pay the success fee, the base costs remain recoverable in 
the case of success. In this way, CFA claimants have an incentive to control the costs incurred on their 
behalf.384 The government relies upon the market to set more reasonable success fees and premiums. 
Consequential to abolishing the recoverability of CFAs, the discussion on a reasonable percentage will 
now, normally, take place outside of court. The maximum percentage for a CFA remains 100% of the 
base costs.385 In personal injury claims, the largest category of damages cases in which CFAs are con-
cluded, the percentage is statutorily capped at 25% of the damages (non-pecuniary damages and past 
loss) for proceedings at first instance.386  
                                                             
 
377 Save for family law; CLSA 1990, section 58A(1)(b), as amended by the Access to Justice Act 1999, and proceedings 
under section 82 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990; see the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013, section 
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380 CLSA 1990, section 58(2). 
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CFAs can be and are being used in mass litigation as well. For instance, CFAs have been entered into 
in various GLOs, settlements that involved large numbers of aggrieved parties, and have been used to 
help fund the first collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.387 Around 2009, 
ATE was denoted as an emerging market, although not yet widely available and difficult to obtain in 
mass litigation.388 The August 2017 issue of Litigation Funding lists 27 ATE insurers for use with condi-
tional fees.389 However, ever since the recoverability of – usually substantial – ATE insurance premiums 
has been abolished,390 difficulties with obtaining ATE insurance have increased. It might be arranged 
through third-party litigation funders,391 but Burford has expressed its concerns on the lack of capacity 
in the ATE market to take on complex litigation.392 Funding methods and issues in mass litigation will 
be further discussed within the context of the specific mechanisms, in section 5.5.  
5.4.3.2 Damages-based agreements 
In 2012, LASPO lifted the ban on damages-based agreements (DBAs; also known as contingency fees) 
in civil matters.393 This, too, followed Sir Rupert Jackson’s recommendations. In his review, he pre-
sented various arguments in favour and against DBAs,394 but ultimately, recommended that they 
should be permitted, subject to safeguards. Jackson’s main considerations were that an additional 
means of litigation funding is in the interest of the public, that DBAs do not affect defendants’ liability 
for adverse costs, that it is illogical to ban DBAs as they might incentivize efficiency yet allow CFAs that 
might incentivize inefficiency, and, in the commercial context, freedom of contract.395 The government 
decided to adopt the recommendation. Not in order to fill an access to justice gap or to encourage 
litigation, but mainly to provide an alternative and useful form of private litigation funding.396 
 
                                                             
 
4-6. On the measures that were implemented alongside in order to balance the irrecoverability of the success fee and 
ATE premium for personal injury victims, see section 5.3.5.3. 
387 For examples, see respectively Motto and Others v. Trafigura & Trafigura Beheer [2011] EWCA Civ 1150 (CA), Young 
v. Brown and others [2007] EWCA Civ 43, and Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9. 
388 Sorabji, Napier & Musgrove 2008, p. 178, Mulheron 2009a, p. 195 and 226, Lee & Stech 2011, p. 141. See also RBS 
Rights Issue Litigation [2017] EWHC 1217 (Ch), para. 130. 
389 Litigation Funding, August 2017, issue 110.  
390 Section 5.3.5.2. 
391 See, for instance, Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, para. 140 ff.  
392 Burford Annual Report 2016, p. 21.  
393 LASPO, section 45, amending CLSA 1990, section 58AA. The Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 
2013/609) further regulates the use of DBAs. Before 2013, DBAs were only allowed in non-contentious matters, includ-
ing employment matters before tribunals. DBAs are not allowed in family proceedings, CLSA 1990, section 58AA(4)(aa), 
nor in opt-out collective proceedings, see hereafter.  
394 Jackson 2010, chapter 12.  
395 Jackson 2016a, p. 53-54.  
396 UK Government, Reforming Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales – Implementation of Lord Justice 
Jackson’s Recommendations: The Government Response, March 2011, p. 13. See also Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. vi. 
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A DBA is defined as an arrangement between a person providing advocacy, litigation or claims man-
agement services – not: litigation funding397 – and a client, whereby the representative’s fee is contin-
gent upon success and determined as a percentage of the financial benefit obtained by the client.398 
DBAs are statutorily capped at a maximum of 25% in personal injury cases (of non-pecuniary damages 
and past loss), 35% in employment cases, and 50% in any other case.399 This cap applies to proceedings 
at first instance, on appeal the parties are free to negotiate the percentage.400 The phrasing ‘financial 
benefit’ most likely refers to the money recovered by way of damages, not costs or expenses.401 An 
important element of the DBA regulation is that the contingency fee is calculated on the obtained 
damages and deducted from the costs award.402 In other words, recoverable costs fall within the DBA 
cap and the contingency fee is not charged on top of the recoverable costs. A successful claimant can 
recover the base costs (hourly fee and disbursements).403 This means that if client A and his solicitor 
have agreed upon a contingency fee of 25%, and A wins the case, is awarded £ 100,000 in damages 
and the recoverable costs are £ 20,000, his solicitor receives £ 25,000 (not £ 45,000, i.e. £ 25,000 con-
tingency fee + £ 20,000 recoverable costs).404 In addition to the DBA fee, a client must pay the expenses 
incurred by his representative, such as expert reports and court charges, which fall outside the DBA 
cap.405 The client is also liable for expenses incurred by himself, such as an ATE premium or litigation 
funding fee that might cover the adverse costs risk.406  
  
There are various elements of the DBA regulation that, so far, have withheld solicitors from engaging 
in such a construction. For instance, ‘obtained’ in the definition of a DBA means that the contingency 
fee is based on the amount actually recovered. The enforcement risk of a damages award thus rests 
on the solicitor.407 In addition, counsel’s fee needs to be paid out of the contingency cap as well, unless 
client and counsel enter into an additional DBA. The maximum of 25% then applies to the combined 
DBAs. CJC has therefore recommended that counsel’s fees should be kept outside the cap as expenses, 
since counsel and solicitor now ‘share a limited pot of money’, potentially causing a conflict of interests 
between counsel and solicitor.408 The solicitor, for instance, might be incentivized to settle before trial, 
as trial consumes a substantial part of the pot. Moreover, as the size of counsel’s fees are unpredicta-
ble in advance, a solicitor has an uncertainty problem when negotiating the contingency fee. Jackson 
made his recommendation in combination with recommending fixed costs, which would solve this 
problem. This recommendation, however, was not adopted by the government. Currently, counsel are 
                                                             
 
397 The DBA regime does not cover third-party funders’ Litigation Funding Agreements (LFAs). See Mulheron e.a. 2015, 
p. 33, referring to the drafted DBA Regulations 2015, section 1(2). See also Mulheron 2014, p. 592 ff.  
398 CLSA 1990, section 58AA(3)(a) and DBA Regulations 2013, Explanatory Memorandum, § 2.1.  
399 DBA Regulations 2013, sections 4(2)(b), 7 and 4(3).  
400 DBA Regulations 2013, section 4(4). 
401 See the draft DBA Regulations 2015, section 1(2), which has not yet been implemented and is discussed in Mulheron 
e.a. 2015, p. 13 ff. 
402 DBA Regulations 2013, section 4(1)(a). Explanatory Memorandum, § 7.10. Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 13 ff.  
403 See also section 5.3.5.3. 
404 This example is derived from Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. xi. 
405 DBA Regulations 2013, section 4(1)(b), and Explanatory Memorandum, § 7.13. 
406 Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 8.  
407 Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 16. 
408 Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 3.  
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unprepared to act on a DBA, which is a strong disincentive for solicitors to enter into one.409 Further-
more, the indemnity principle continues to be applicable.410 Therefore, the defendant does not have 
to pay more adverse costs than the claimant owes his solicitor; this entails that if the recoverable costs 
exceed the cap, the defendant does not have to pay the remainder. Here too, Jackson’s recommenda-
tion was set aside (to abolish the indemnity principle). The market has also developed a hybrid DBA, 
which entails a ‘no win, low fee’ agreement, whereby the solicitor charges a (significantly) lower fee 
in the case of loss.411 Such an agreement is said to be particularly suitable for commercial litigation.412 
It is questionable, however, whether this type of DBA is allowed.  
 
As a result of these and other more specific/technical elements of the DBA regulation, so far, DBAs 
have seldom been used as a source of litigation funding.413 In 2015, the CJC issued a report, listing and 
addressing 56 elements that hamper its usage. The government has yet to respond to the report.414  
 
Solicitors are not allowed to enter into a DBA arrangement in order to fund opt-out collective proceed-
ings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.415 This ban is aimed at avoiding a ‘litigation culture’ and 
speculative litigation, which would place ‘unjustified costs on defendant businesses’ and create ‘an 
incentive for lawyers to focus only on the largest cases’.416 In other types of mass litigation, DBAs are 
allowed.417 Mulheron has suggested to draft court rules to assess the reasonableness of the fees be-
fore any distribution of a damages award to the class can be made. Such an assessment should take 
into account the way the case was conducted, the size of the class, the degree of difficulty of the claim, 
the risk lawyers took on when agreeing the fee, and the work actually carried out.418 So far, usage of 
DBAs in mass litigation has not been observed. As mentioned, funding methods and issues in mass litiga-
tion will be further discussed within the context of the specific mechanisms, in section 5.5. 
                                                             
 
409 Mulheron e.a. 2015, p. 4.  
410 CPR 44.18, see also Mulheron 2013, p. 244.  
411 See also Rowles-Davies 2014, p. 75. 
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413 Jackson 2016a, p. 55. 
414 See Jackson 2016a, p. 55, and Litigation Funding, ‘On the circuit’, December 2016, issue 106, p. 8. 
415 CA 1998, section 47C(8) (inserted by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 8, section 6) and CLSA 1990, 58AA(11). 
See also section 5.5.6. 
416 BIS, Private actions in competition law: A consultation on options for reform – Government response, 2013, p. 27 ff 
and 41. See, critically, Mulheron 2014a, p. 118 ff.  
417 Other than for opt-out collective proceedings, no carve-outs of DBA availability have been specified in LASPO or the 
DBA Regulations 2013; see Mulheron 2014a, p. 118. 
418 Mulheron 2014a, p. 120-121, referring to the adverse experiences in Canada and Australia, and the thereupon based 
draft rule in CPR 19.42, which was drafted in anticipation of the Financial Services Bill, which, ultimately, did not become 
law; see section 2.2.3. 
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5.4.4 Claims Management Companies 
Currently, 1,388 CMCs are authorised, of which approximately 50% operate in the financial claims sec-
tor.419 CMCs cannot have a right of audience, but act as intermediaries between litigants and law-
yers.420 As to financial claims, CMCs mainly operate by addressing the client’s opponent directly or 
taking its complaint to the Financial Ombudsman. They do so in bulk, creating economies of scale 
through standardised processes. 
  
The DBA regime applies to CMCs as well.421 However, in spite of the increasing regulatory oversight as 
discussed in section 5.2.3, problems with CMCs have yet to end. Various policy reforms have been 
announced. In 2016, the Ministry of Justice issued a consultation paper, which states that the problems 
with CMCs in the financial claims sector are threefold: i) the charged fees are deemed to be too high 
(both the upfront payments and the percentages of the final compensation), ii) CMCs are said to pur-
sue a high level of speculative claims and nuisance calls are made to consumers, and iii) in specific 
(bulk) claims, they add little to nothing to the claims process.422 The problems arise in particular in 
cases concerning missold Payment Protection Insurance (PPI), for which online and free complaint 
forms are available and access to the Financial Ombudsman is free and said to be consumer-friendly.423 
The Ministry has proposed to cap the fees more rigidly than the regulatory regime for DBAs. For in-
stance, for bulk claims the cap is set at 15%424 of the net amount of the final compensation awarded 
if the total net value of all relevant claims equals £ 2,000 or less, and for claims with a larger total net 
value at £ 300. Under the DBA Regulations 2013, in financial claims, CMCs (or solicitors) can take up to 
50% of the damages.425 The Ministry has also proposed a ban on charges to a consumer that does not 
have a relationship or relevant policy with the lender, on referral fees,426 and – in general, for all types 
of financial claims – on any upfront fees being charged. The assumption is that lowering the potential 
earnings will have a positive effect on the marketing strategy of CMCs.427 Recently, the consultation 
was followed by the introduction of the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill.428 The bill aims to establish 
                                                             
 
419 Ministry of Justice, Claims Management Regulation Annual Report 16/17, p. 15, 19 and 21, and Ministry of Justice, 
Claims Management Regulation – Consultation. Cutting the costs for consumers – Financial Claims, 2016, p. 8. 
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Claims, 2016, p. 9 ff. See also, for instance, <fca.org.uk/consumers/payment-protection-insurance/claim-back-money-
sale-ppi>. 
424 Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013, section 4(3).  
425 Ibid., p. 5 and 25 ff.  
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a tougher regulatory framework for CMCs, ensuring consumer protection against malpractice and con-
tinuing access to high-quality claims management services.429 If enacted, claims management services 
will fall under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which will transfer responsibility for claims 
management regulation from the Ministry of Justice to the FCA. The proposal includes the FCA’s au-
thority (and, in relation to financial products and services, its obligation) to make rules to protect con-
sumers against excessive charges.430 The CMR is currently considering an interim regime on fee cap-
ping.431  
 
As to PPI claims, CMCs’ activities might increase in the short term, but will probably slowly decline, 
since the FCA has recently introduced a deadline for making new claims; the deadline is set at 29 Au-
gust 2019.432 However, CMCs continue to explore activities in new areas. For instance, since 2016, 
there has been an upsurge in claims in the so-called holiday sickness claims market. Unfortunately, 
this market has become a new ‘key priority area’ for CMR, as these claims are sometimes false and are 
mainly fuelled by some questionable activities by CMCs:  
 
‘Along with the increased activity has come information about misconduct, including reports of 
claims ‘touts’ operating at holiday resorts abroad approaching UK holidaymakers to encourage them 
to make a claim. (…) Allegations have been made that (…) call centre operatives are encouraging 
clients to say that they have become ill during their holiday due to food hygiene at their hotel in cases 
where this is not the truth.’433  
 
The scale of the problem and the negative consequences thereof for the UK’s travel industry and rep-
utation abroad have recently prompted British ministers to step in, announcing that they are going to 
tackle the ‘compensation culture which has penalised the honest majority for too long’.434 In addition 
to warning holidaymakers that they can face up to three years in prison if found guilty of making a 
fraudulent claim, and calling on the travel industry to come forward with further evidence, the minis-
ters have asked the Civil Procedure Rule Committee435 to urgently look at the rules governing the costs 
of holiday claims,436 and the Civil Justice Council (CJC)437 to look into low value personal injury claims 
in general and, more specifically, how to reduce the incentives to bring meritless claims. Meanwhile, 
the CMR continues to take action to tackle CMCs’ misconduct.438 
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In personal injury cases, future reforms are likely to change CMCs practices as well, in addition to the 
recent prohibition of referral fees in personal injury cases in 2013.439 In 2017, a consultation document 
was issued, suggesting to introduce fixed recoverable costs for clinical negligence claims up to 
£ 25,000, as currently for such claims, on average, recoverable legal costs are 220% of the awarded 
damages. Another disincentive for CMCs’ (or solicitors’) activities is the proposed reform of whiplash 
claims (road traffic accident-related soft-tissue claims), inter alia, the introduction of a tariff of fixed 
compensation for pain, suffering and loss of amenity for injuries with a duration of less than two years.  
5.4.5 Third-party litigation funding 
As discussed in section 5.2.4, third-party litigation funding (TPF) emerged after the authorisation of 
CFAs in 1995. It was statutorily addressed in 2000, but the specific provision has not (yet) become 
operative.440 The provision defines a Litigation Funding Agreement (LFA) as an agreement under which 
a funder agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services (by some-
one other than the funder) to a litigant, and under which the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder 
in specified circumstances. Thus, a funder enables a claimant to meet its costs of litigation. This can 
include the risk of having to pay the opponent’s costs. The funder, in turn, can cover such a risk through 
ATE insurance.441 In return for (pre)financing litigation, the funder receives a share of the proceeds in 
the case of success, as defined in the LFA. If the funder, claimant and its solicitor have also entered 
into a hybrid DBA construction, part of the proceeds will be split between funder and solicitor.442  
 
The relationship between funder and claimant is fully governed by contract, general civil law, and – if 
the funder is an ALF member – the ALF Code of Conduct.443 The DBA Regulation 2013 does not apply 
to litigation funders and thus does not cover LFAs. Additional regulation that requires a litigation fun-
der to be approved by a designated body has not been drafted.444  
 
In light of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty, third-party funding was initially approached 
with concern. Since the endorsement by the judiciary, notably the Arkin case in 2005, the CJC, and Sir 
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Rupert Jackson, TPF has become a recognised funding mechanism.445 In Factortame, the Court of Ap-
peal had already determined that only in abusive circumstances would a litigation funding agreement 
be held contrary to public policy, the remnant of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty: 
 
‘[w]here the law expressly restricts the circumstances in which agreements in support of litigation 
are lawful, this provides a powerful indication of the limits of public policy in analogous situations. 
Where this is not the case, then we believe one must today look at the facts of the particular case 
and consider whether those facts suggest that the agreement in question might tempt the allegedly 
champertous maintainer for his personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, to sub-
orn witnesses or otherwise to undermine the ends of justice.’ 446 
 
A particular point of debate concerns the level of control over the conduct of litigation that a funder 
might exert. The primarily interested person and, thus, the one in control is and should be the claim-
ant, the court clarified in Arkin v. Borchard: 
 
‘Our approach is designed to cater for the commercial funder who is financing part of the costs of the 
litigation in a manner which facilitates access to justice and which is not otherwise objectionable. 
Such funding will leave the claimant as the party primarily interested in the result of the litigation 
and the party in control of the conduct of the litigation.’447  
 
In 2012, Veljanovski reported that the predominant model of litigation funding in the UK is passive 
funding, correlating with the doctrines of champerty and maintenance that prevent funders from ac-
tively participating.448 A passive funder’s main role in litigation is to foot the bills, contrary to active 
funders, who organize the action, or participate therein, and thus play an active role in litigation and/or 
settlement negotiations.449 However, a shift towards more active participation by third-party litigation 
funders is noticeable. The ALF Code of Conduct prescribes that an LFA should state whether, and if so 
how, the funder (or its subsidiary or associated entity) may provide input to the funded party’s decision 
in relation to a settlement.450 Jackson deems such input to be reasonable and possibly advantageous: 
 
‘(…) the funder has a stake in the litigation. It is or should be entitled to be consulted. In addition 
funders build up substantial experience in the fields of litigation in which they operate. Therefore 
their views may on occasions be a positive asset for the client and its legal team.’451  
 
A funder cannot take steps that (might) cause the funded party’s solicitor or barrister to act in breach 
of their professional duties, nor seek to influence the solicitor or barrister to cede control or conduct 
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of the dispute to the funder.452 Threatening to terminate the contract might be considered a means of 
exercising undue control over the litigation and, thus, be held to be contrary to public policy as well.453 
Undue control of the litigation can also be making demands on the choice of counsel. Such choice can 
play a role, however, in the funder’s decision as to whether or not to fund the case.454 It is said to have 
become more and more common for litigation funders to attend hearings and settlement discussions, 
and to provide input on the settlement decision: 
 
‘It is standard for English litigation funding agreements to provide that third-party funders will be 
kept abreast of settlement discussions and offers, and some agreements will also provide that settle-
ment offers within a given range will be considered reasonable and should be accepted.’455  
 
Nowadays, a certain level of input has been completely accepted.456 This has been further fuelled by 
the Excalibur case, where litigation funders were held liable for the adverse costs order, even though 
they were not party to the proceedings and had not behaved wrongfully.457 The ALF, which was al-
lowed to intervene in the appeal, subsequently welcomed the judgment as it would wield the unpro-
fessional ad hoc funders from those who underwrite the association’s Code of Conduct.458 It welcomed 
the judgment as it endorsed litigation funding and, in addition, addressed funders’ concerns that if 
they exercise greater control over the litigation conduct, this will be characterised as champertous. On 
this topic, the Court of Appeal ruled:  
 
‘I understand why this concern is raised but I consider that it is unrealistic. As the judge pointed out, 
champerty involves behaviour likely to interfere with the due administration of justice. Litigation 
funding is an accepted and judicially sanctioned activity perceived to be in the public interest. What 
the judge characterised as “rigorous analysis of law, facts and witnesses, consideration of propor-
tionality and review at appropriate intervals” is what is to be expected of a responsible funder (…) 
and cannot of itself be champertous. I agree (…) that, rather than interfering with the due admin-
istration of justice, if anything such activities promote the due administration of justice. For the avoid-
ance of doubt I should mention that on-going review of the progress of litigation through the medium 
of lawyers independent of those conducting the litigation, a fortiori those conducting it on a condi-
tional fee agreement, seems to me not just prudent but often essential in order to reduce the risk of 
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orders for indemnity costs being made against the unsuccessful funded party. When conducted re-
sponsibly, as by the members of the ALF I am sure it would be, there is no danger of such review being 
characterised as champertous.’459 
 
In 2016, Jackson noted that the volume of third-party funding has hugely increased, due to the abol-
ished recoverability of CFA success fees and ATE premiums, the decreasing popularity of CFAs, the 
acceptance of third-party funding as a respectable alternative to fund litigation, its good return on 
investment, and costs management that has made it much easier to assess the risks and benefits of 
(funding) litigation, such as the adverse costs risk.460 Currently, eight litigation funders are listed as 
members of the Association of Litigation Funders (ALF), a self-regulatory body.461 Membership is not 
compulsory. The August 2017 issue of Litigation Funding lists some 11 other funders. Most likely, this 
overview does not show all of the players; the market development is said to be at the early adopter 
stage and the market is likely to continue to grow.462 In its Annual Report 2016, the litigation funding 
industry leader Burford reports the following on the growth of the litigation funding market: 
 
We have seen truly dramatic change in our industry in the last several years. In a surprisingly short 
period of time, client demand for financial solutions related to legal and regulatory risk has increased 
considerably and has prompted a consequent increase in the amount of capital available to clients 
(…) [W]e have no data to enable us to project what proportion of the total legal pie we and our 
competitors could occupy in the future (…). All we can tell you at this point in our evolution is that 
nothing we see in the market leads us to believe that our miniscule share of total global legal spend 
is not capable of ongoing expansion.’463 
 
The market is said to be increasingly competitive; a litigant with a ‘good case’ is said to be readily able 
to find litigation funding on attractive commercial terms.464 However, Burford states the following:  
 
‘There is (…) persistent interest from prospective entrants in the market, but many would-be entrants 
are unsuccessful in raising capital as investors tend to be sceptical of small teams of lawyers lacking 
track records in business or investment management. We are unable to ascertain accurately how 
much capital is available in the sector due to the secrecy of market participants (…). Nonetheless, we 
believe that there are some billions of dollars in litigation finance capital available globally.  
As a general matter, litigation finance investing tends to occur in pure play specialist firms (like Bur-
ford) that do not provide other kinds of corporate financing, which is a partial insulation to wide-
spread competition. Much as we view litigation dispassionately as a financial asset, there is nonethe-
less emotion associated with litigation, even at a corporate level, and businesses with activities in 
other parts of the financial services market generally find that the relationship downside of financing 
corporate litigation is harmful to their other lines of business. Moreover, this is not a business for 
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dabblers; entrants need significant teams of experienced and expensive people and need to be able 
to make a significant capital commitment to achieve the necessary portfolio diversification. Never-
theless, investors have a natural concern that competition could lead to price reduction and margin 
compression and ultimately to lower returns and deteriorating profitability. We believe that is not a 
near-term threat. (…)  
[N]ew entrants need to raise capital to compete. The providers of that capital can see Burford’s pub-
licly disclosed returns, and sensibly demand comparable returns from new entrants. Thus, discount-
ing to achieve volume will result in immediate underperformance by the new entrant, which will in 
turn lead to investor unhappiness and the refusal to advance incremental capital.465 
 
Third-party funders are particularly active in high value cases that provide a reasonable to good pro-
spect of a financial reward for the funder.466 Generally, they have set a minimum threshold as to the 
value of the claim; this varies between £ 1 million to £ 5 million, but in practice, this threshold may be 
left for sound cases with a prospect of quick recovery.467 Funders are not inclined to engage in actions 
for specific performance and injunctive relief, as there is no financial outcome in which to share.468 
The range and number of cases that are funded further depend on the funder and its selection criteria. 
Generally, the selection criteria are: the subject matter, the merits and value of the claim, the forum 
and the applicable law, and enforceability (obtaining the proceeds of litigation and a return on its in-
vestment).469 Moreover, the type of client is important. Since control over litigation remains in a claim-
ant’s hands, a funder will want to know how it will respond in certain situations and what its motivation 
is for bringing the claim.470 A 2014 survey showed that 65% of private practice lawyers said their clients 
use TPF because of limited resources, 19% because it helped their balance sheet, 14% because it al-
lowed them to more effectively manage resources, and 2% because it helped them retain a top quality 
lawyer instead of an average one.471 The selection of cases requires thorough due diligence and the 
search for (appropriate) litigation funding can be a complex and time-consuming process.472 
 
Third-party funders are increasingly active in mass litigation. For instance, in 2016, Burford reported: 
 
As an example of the rate of change in our business (…) only 12% of our new investment commitments 
in 2016 were in single litigation case matters. In 2009, that number was 100%. The remainder of our 
investment commitments are now in what we call either portfolio or complex matters.473  
 
Illustrative, too, is the fact that in the collective proceedings that have been brought before the Com-
petition Appeal Tribunal so far, a third-party litigation funder was involved.474 
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As discussed in section 5.3.5.4, a third-party funder’s fee (contingency fee) cannot be recovered 
from defendants as adverse costs in civil litigation. It depends on the construction of the funding 
arrangement and the mass litigation instrument whether and to what extent a represented class 
member pays the funder. The charged percentage depends on case-specific factors and competi-
tive limits.475 The level of the contingency fee is not generally subject to court approval. Any exces-
sive percentage could be considered contrary to public policy. According to Mulheron, accepted 
percentages vary between 8 and 55%.476 For instance, in the proposed collective proceedings re-
garding the truck manufacturers’ cartel, the intended claimant has secured funding from a third-
party litigation funder and the adverse costs risk is covered by ATE insurance.477 Represented par-
ties only pay in the case of success. As to the level thereof, the claimant’s website mentions the 
following:  
 
Based on conservative assumptions in relation to the level of damages per truck and the overall num-
ber of trucks that are in the RHA’s claim, the level of return to the funder will be at most 9% and may 
be as low as 5%. If the case settles early, these percentages will be reduced by a third, thereby re-
turning even more of the compensation to operators.478 
 
Information on assistance by a litigation funder and the general terms of funding is increasingly 
publicly disclosed, for instance on the – intended – claimant’s website. There is no general obliga-
tion, however, to disclose specific information on the funding arrangement.479 Litigation funding 
documents might entail confidential (company) information and/or give rise to strategic or abusive 
behaviour on the defendant’s side. For instance, an LFA will include terms on settlement negotia-
tions, claim valuation, terms and the amount of funding, definitions of success, provisions as to 
termination and the funder’s return on its investment.480 Some information might fall under the 
privilege of legal advice, such as references to the merits or litigation strategy, terms of the funding 
and the reasons/interpretation thereof. In its decision as to whether the disclosure of documents 
should be ordered, in relation to the privilege of legal advice, the court assesses whether specific 
information explicitly or implicitly reveals the content of legal advice or ‘betrays the trend of the 
advice’.481 
 
As mentioned, funding issues in mass litigation will be further discussed within the context of the 
specific mechanisms, in section 5.5.  
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5.4.6 Special purpose vehicles: the assignment model 
Entrepreneurial mass litigation can also take place by way of the so-called assignment model. This opt-
in mechanism has been created in practice. Under such a construction, a company (also known as a 
special purpose, claim or litigation vehicle) purchases (the cause of action of) claims of aggrieved par-
ties and by way of joinder enforces them in its own name and on its own account and risk. The business 
model has been employed in competition law cases in various European jurisdictions.  
 
Recognition of the assignment model depends in particular on the law on 1) claim transfer and sale/as-
signment, and 2) the standing of the litigation vehicle that joins the claims.  
 
As to the first element, nowadays, English law generally permits the purchase and transfer of the pro-
ceeds of an action (in which case the claim owner retains control over litigation), and sometimes that 
of a cause of action. If the latter assignment is effective, the assignee may bring a claim or continue 
litigation under its own name.482 Thus, the original claim owner normally loses control over litigation. 
Different variations of the rules apply, for instance between claims in tort and claims in contract, and 
whether they concern the right to litigate a purely personal claim, or whether the assignment is con-
tractually prohibited.483 Originally, a cause of action could not serve as a marketable commodity.484 
This has been attributed to the danger that the assignee ‘may buy up the claim at a small figure and 
use it to get a big profit for himself.’485 However, public policy has changed over time. In the landmark 
ruling in Trendtex Trading v. Credit Suisse, the House of Lords held that an assignment of a bare cause 
of action is valid ‘if the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in taking the assignment and in 
enforcing it for his own benefit’.486  
 
It remains questionable, however, whether the current notion of public policy allows, as such a genu-
ine interest, that of an entrepreneurial party that enables mass litigation – also – for its own benefit. 
Some have argued that a ‘genuine commercial interest’ in the enforcement of a claim can be inter-
preted liberally, others are more hesitant to arrive at such a conclusion.487 In light of the access to 
justice debate and the shift in favour of third-party litigation funding, it might very well be argued that 
(bundled) assignment does not undermine ‘the integrity of the litigation process.’488 Either way, the 
remainder of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty may have withheld litigation vehicles, so 
far, from filing claims under the assignment model. The method does not seem to have gained ground 
in England and Wales.489 In spite of the continuing relaxation of the doctrines of champerty and 
maintenance, it is questionable whether the model will do so in the future. This is related to the fact 
that the model has been used mainly in competition law cases, where the introduction of the collective 
proceedings instrument now provides an alternative mechanism to obtain collective redress, possibly 
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initiated or funded by an entrepreneurial party. In its response to the public consultation, CDC, a well-
known special purpose vehicle that operates under the assignment model, has urged the necessity of 
explicit recognition of the validity of the assignment model as an alternative to collective proceedings 
and clarification that it does not infringe public policy.490 As will be discussed in section 5.5.6, it seems 
that the government has reconsidered its initial position that special purpose vehicles should be ex-
cluded from bringing collective proceedings. From this policy decision, it might be inferred that the 
aforementioned liberal approach towards a ‘genuine commercial interest’ is tenable. This will be fur-
ther discussed in section 5.5.4, where recent case law is discussed that demonstrates a further shift of 
public policy towards accepting new forms of entrepreneurial mass litigation that enable access to 
justice, at least in low value claims which otherwise are not likely to be pursued.  
  
As for the second element, the standing of the litigation vehicle that joins the claims, English civil pro-
cedure does not have a general requirement to establish standing, it is a concept that is rarely referred 
to in civil proceedings.491 It is not a separate requirement in procedural rules, independent of the 
claimant's substantive right of action. A claimant needs to have a substantive right of action. ‘If he 
does, he has standing to sue, and if he does not, he cannot claim.’492 Nevertheless, specific rules on 
standing can be found in various places. For instance, pursuant to the Senior Courts Act 1981, an ap-
plicant for judicial review has to have a sufficient interest in the matter.493 A similar provision can be 
found in the Competition Act, it stipulates that the CAT rules may reject proceedings if the person 
bringing the claim does not have a sufficient interest in the decision.494 Four other examples are laid 
down in CPR Part 19II. For instance, CPR 19.9 stipulates that, if the court so permits, one or more 
members of a company (e.g. shareholders), body or trade union, can bring a derivative action on behalf 
of the company (instead of the company itself) if the company declines to pursue the claim itself.495 
For litigation vehicles, no specific regulatory provisions apply. Furthermore, as of 2013, the Directive 
on Antitrust Damage Actions confirms the standing of, inter alia, a person that has succeeded in the 
alleged injured party’s right, including the person that has acquired the claim.496  
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As to a potential adverse costs order, a problem that arises under this model is the asymmetric litiga-
tion cost risk. With competition law infringements, the number of cartel members might be large. 
Since they can be held jointly and severally liable for the damage caused, defendants in such litigation 
often instigate third-party proceedings or notices. Such actions substantially increase litigation costs, 
for which the claimant (the litigation vehicle) can be held liable in the case of loss by way of the adverse 
costs order. In order to balance the cost risk, to create a true level playing field, and to avoid any 
abusive use of such third-party proceedings or notices, CDC has suggested, inter alia, to limit a claim-
ant’s obligation for adverse costs to the amount it would be entitled to receive in case of success, 
and/or to limit the claimant’s obligation to provide security for adverse costs.497  
5.4.7 Contingency Legal Aid Fund 
As will be clear by now, the budget cuts, the financial crisis and reforms resulting from the Jackson 
review have incited the development of various private litigation funding arrangements. One is still 
under construction: the Contingency Legal Aid Fund (CLAF). Within the context of collective redress, 
around 2005, the CJC started to explore whether the implementation of a CLAF was viable.498 Basically, 
such a self-funding fund, administered by a private or public body, funds eligible claimants, and in the 
case of success receives a percentage from the proceeds. Therewith, future actions are funded. How-
ever, the CJC – and, subsequently, the government – concluded that such a scheme would only func-
tion properly (profitably) if competing funding arrangements were unavailable. As this was not the 
case, they deemed the implementation of such a fund unviable.  
 
Although Jackson seemed hesitant in his preliminary report, in his final report he suggested to under-
take financial modelling to further explore the viability of a CLAF.499 He reinvestigated the CLAF in 
2016, prompted by the fact that, in certain areas, legal aid is not available, CFAs are hardly used and 
there is a need for funding in these cases. Jackson considered that the time was ripe for reviving the 
idea, as the dust of the reforms that followed his recommendations in 2010 had settled and third-
party funding has proven to be successful. According to Jackson, in effect, a CLAF would operate as a 
third-party funder, the difference being that a CLAF does not have to put food on the table of share-
holders or other commercially interested parties. It would be a fully non-profit fund solely aimed at 
promoting access to justice, complementing both commercial and public funding structures. Eligible 
claimants could be those pursuing commercial or other claims, such as individuals or firms of modest 
means with a claim whose amount of dispute would probably result in – commercial – third-party 
funding being declined. Case and costs management techniques help the operation of a CLAF, as a cost 
risk is better assessable (see also hereafter on the increase of TPF, for which the same applies). The 
possible future fixed costs reforms in all civil cases up to a certain amount might also benefit the op-
eration of a CLAF, as it increases certainty as to the adverse costs risk, and furthermore avoids the 
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expense of costs management and assessment. Recently, Jackson has invited the Law Society, the Bar 
Council and CILEx to consider jointly setting up such a fund.500 
 
In 2010, Jackson also recommended to keep under review the viability of a Supplementary Legal Aid 
Scheme (SLAS). This is a self-funding legal fund, operated by a legal aid body, and serves as a form of 
civil litigation funding. Persons who do not have sufficient means to afford legal representation in their 
case can apply for such funding, and have to agree to pay a percentage of the recovered amounts back 
into the fund.501 A SLAS is similar to a CLAF, the difference being that, here, the claimant is a legal aid 
recipient and the fund is administered by the legal aid authority. Initially, the government did seem 
keen on implementing a SLAS:  
 
At a time when the public purse is constrained, the partially self-funding SLAS represents an im-
portant innovative measure to enable legal aid funding for civil cases.502 
 
After having publicly consulted the proposal, the government decided to implement a SLAS. The SLAS 
would recoup 25% of the proceeds of a successful claim of a publicly funded claimant, which would 
then be diverted to (supplement) the legal aid costs of other cases. The percentage was set at this 
level to express the government’s intent that, if possible, clients should enter into a CFA rather than 
apply for legal aid, and not to make the latter more attractive than entering into a CFA.503 Despite the 
government’s intention, a SLAS has yet to be implemented. According to Jackson, the idea has faded 
away.504  
5.5 Relevant rules and features of the collective redress mechanisms 
5.5.1 Joinder, consolidation, and a test case 
A court can consolidate separate actions into one proceedings or join any number of parties to a claim 
(consolidation and joinder of parties).505 The court can do so at the request of one of the parties or on 
its own motion if it deems joinder or consolidation convenient, for instance, if the claims concern com-
mon questions of law or fact.506 Claimants need to be represented by the same solicitor and counsel.507 
If claims are consolidated or parties joined, the common issues will be jointly addressed. Both tech-
niques do not create a formal group action, that is, the actions remain distinct and the joined parties 
are a full party to the proceedings. As of 2001, the GLO (which will be discussed in section 5.5.3) has 
streamlined the organizational and managerial issues that consolidation and joinder obviously require, 
particularly in the case of large numbers of (unknown) aggrieved parties. 
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English courts have a traditional preference for ‘completeness in adjudication’ and ‘disposing of as 
many controversies at the same time as is possible’.508 The main technique to do so is case manage-
ment, which might be considered an even more important instrument than a formal collective redress 
device. Indeed, the mechanisms of consolidation and joinder have been employed in mass harm situ-
ations, also after the GLO was introduced. Illustrative examples are the Cape asbestos group action, in 
which approximately 3,000 personal injury claims were consolidated, and the Railtrack litigation, in 
which almost 48,000 shareholders joined as parties in a claim for damages at the initiative of an action 
committee that was set up by a number of activist shareholders.509 Consolidation or joinder is deemed 
convenient when the different claims raise common issues of law or facts; the aim is to pool resources, 
create economies of scale, and avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and irreconcilable decisions.510 The 
instruments of joinder and consolidation can be employed to obtain collective redress if the individuals 
can be – easily – identified. Furthermore, a party needs to initiate, build, administer and coordinate 
the claims. If too many such parties are involved, a GLO might be preferable compared to a joinder. 
For instance, in the phone hacking litigation against News of the World, the High Court expressed its 
disbelief about the number of law firms that were taking on the individual claims and ‘threatened’ to 
make a GLO so as to appoint a lead solicitor, to better streamline the claims and to control costs.511 
Judges might also stretch their discretionary powers too far. In 2015, the Court of Appeal ruled that a 
court of first instance had extended its jurisdiction. It had listed a number of ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
cases in order to address common issues and therewith devise a standardised and streamlined process 
in anticipation of a large increase in the number of such cases. However, the common issues were later 
held to be ‘generic academic issues without any, or any proper, identification of the particular issues’. 
The Court of Appeal was also critical of the legal representatives, who should have ‘properly addressed 
their minds as to how to structure the proceedings’, such as bringing a representative action or making 
a GLO.512 
 
Despite its use in mass damage cases, the CJC concluded in 2008 that joinder and consolidation were 
inadequate means to effectively and efficiently obtain collective redress, as they become ‘unwieldy’ 
when large numbers of parties are involved.513 Another important obstacle that needs to be overcome 
is the funding of the proceedings and the distribution of costs between the claimants. This might re-
quire complex cost-sharing agreements between the claimants and, as mentioned, can create costs 
disputes.514 Since individual claimants remain full parties to the proceedings, individual claimants 
might be jointly liable for a potential adverse costs order. In the aforementioned Railtrack litigation, 
the claimants requested the court to order that individual claimants would be severally liable for a 
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proportion of the common costs.515 The defendants, however, argued that in effect such an order 
would make the recovery of adverse costs illusory, since the costs of individual recoveries would equal 
or exceed the cost to be recovered (about £ 40 per capita). The court was persuaded by this argument 
and denied the order, yet urging parties to devise a system under which provision would be made to 
meet potential adverse costs.516 All claimants had initially chipped in to cover the adverse costs risk, 
but the expected costs had exceeded the fund. Raising such (additional) funding among members is 
no picnic:  
 
The sum so far raised was raised, over two years ago, on the basis that it was a one-off call. If a letter 
went out now asking for more, say, for example £25 or £30, [the claimants’ counsel] says that some 
would pay, some would pay in full, some would perhaps not pay in full, some would debate in costly 
correspondence with the Committee or with the claimants' solicitors what was going on. Some would 
choose not to pay, some would simply not answer. A vicious circle would be created, as some chose 
not to contribute or failed to contribute, the burden on the remaining members would increase, which 
would of course increase the chance of them also deciding not to contribute.517 
 
This argument, however, also did not persuade the court to order a protective costs order: 
 
‘All I know about their means is that they [the shareholders] were, at some stage, able to buy shares 
(or possibly in a few cases inherit shares or otherwise come by them for nothing) and that they have 
since been able to contribute to [the committee] as requested £20 per head, and £10 per share rate-
able to shareholding. I cannot, without evidence, jump from that to a conclusion that they cannot 
raise £900,000 between them which, as I have mentioned, though it comes out at a modest £18.77 
each, even rounded up for administrative costs, it is not a large demand.’ 
 
Requiring individuals to issue proceedings and inherent funding and costs issues can thus form an ob-
stacle to pooling claim(ant)s. The minimal requirement is for someone to identify and coordinate the 
claim(ant)s. In order to make a proper return on the investment, entrepreneurial parties will only do 
so if the number of participating individuals and the claim value are sufficiently large. Individual par-
ticipation can be problematic – low – in opt-in actions, in particular in low value claims.518 The individ-
ual claimants in the cases discussed in this section were mainly represented on a conditional or con-
tingency basis by solicitors and CMCs.519 Moreover, in the phone hacking litigation, reportedly, a 
wealthy aggrieved party has offered to pay adverse costs whenever individual cases are unsuccess-
ful.520 
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Another way to pursue collective redress is by issuing a test case, or, if similar cases have already been 
filed, the court can order their stay and select one to be pursued as a test case. Here too, coordination 
is an essential requirement. An often cited example of ineffective mass dispute resolution through a 
test case concerns bank charges that consumers had to pay for overdrafts on their bank accounts.521 
The case against seven banks was brought by the OFT. It applied for a declaratory judgment that the 
charges infringed consumer regulation, aiming to provide the basis for settling the other claims.522 The 
action, however, was not undertaken until after a consumer awareness campaign by Which?, aggres-
sive advertising campaigns by claims management companies that charged relatively excessive condi-
tional and contingency fees, and thousands of small claims already having been issued before the 
county courts.523 A large portion of the individual proceedings (30%) were initially not stayed, until the 
Ministry of Justice issued a guidance document, urging county courts and claims management compa-
nies to withhold further action until the OFT test case has been settled.524 In 2009, the Supreme Court 
rejected the OFT’s claim. 
 
In 2008, the CJC deemed the bank charges dispute resolution strategy to be manifestly inefficient, as 
it had created large additional costs for litigants and the court system, and was potentially unfair:  
 
While many bank customers did receive payments because the banks took a commercial view to pay, 
bank customers, like others with individual claims in a class of claimants, were left to the dangers 
associated with numerous individual suits i.e., the risk of inconsistent judgments; disproportionate 
litigation delay; disproportionate and likely exorbitant cost to the litigants and the court system as a 
whole; and adverse publicity for the defendants over a long period of time.525  
 
More generally, just as with joinder and consolidation, a test case requires coordination, and raises 
additional issues of limitation, selection and commonality. In addition to the legal hurdles, there are 
practical obstacles. Here, too, creative costs arrangements might be necessary. For instance, in a 2015 
test case, the alleged wrongdoer agreed to pay the legal costs of the two opposing litigants. The case 
concerned residential mortgages and unsecured lending by a nationalised bank, and the result of the 
test case would ‘almost inevitably predicate the outcome’ for approximately 41,000 other parties.526 
Another issue that has emerged from the bank charges case was that few major law firms were willing 
or able to act for the consumers given the potential conflicts of interest with other clients.527  
 
                                                             
 
521 Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National and others [2009] 3 WLR 1215 (SC). See Mulheron 2008, p. 121 ff, Sorabji, 
Napier & Musgrove 2008, p. 83, Hodges 2008, p. 65 ff, Uff 2013, p. 199, and Andrews 2014a, p. 112.  
522 Such a ‘wider implications process’ can be brought if the legal issue is novel and with significant consequences; see 
also section 5.5.4. 
523 Mulheron 2008, p. 121 ff. 
524 Mulheron 2008, p. 124.  
525 Sorabji, Napier & Musgrove 2008, p. 82; see also p. 78, 84 and 151. 
526 NRAM v. McAdam and another [2015] EWCA Civ 751, para. 4.  
527 Sorabji, Napier & Musgrove 2008, p. 82.  
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Nevertheless, there are also praised examples of efficient and effective judicial case management 
without the use of any formal device. In the Buncefield explosion case, the court decided against or-
dering a GLO and the actions were never formally joined. Instead, several separate case management 
orders were made, such as referring the cases to one court and appointing a leading law firm.528 Parties 
were able to settle most of the approximately 3,300 cases within four years due to intensive judicial 
managerial control, gradually dealing with different legal questions, the involvement of highly experi-
enced judges and lawyers on both sides, and the defendant adopting a settlement rather than litiga-
tion approach.529 Most individual claimants were represented on a CFA basis.530 Tzankova has ob-
served only one drawback in this case: the lack of judicial oversight of the settlement.531 Creutzfeld 
and Hodges have also observed the lengthy discussions on costs between some of the claimants and 
the defendants, which took another couple of years and, eventually, were settled confidentially. They 
comment that these disputes could have been curtailed had the GLO route been adopted.532 
5.5.2 Representative action 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, a representative action can be brought under CPR 19.6, by one or more 
member(s) of the class that has or have the same interest as other persons. If the court allows the 
representative to act in this capacity, it will address the common issues at hand. The representative 
action is sometimes referred to as the English version of a class action, but – as will be discussed here-
after – the main distinction is that it is difficult or even impossible to claim damages on behalf of rep-
resented class members.  
 
The representative party needs to have a cause of action in its own right.533 A trade association or 
consumer organization will have difficulties in acting as a representative, but one or more of their 
members might be allowed to sue on behalf of the body.534 The court decides whether or not the 
representative can (continue to) act in such a capacity.535 According to the Lord Chancellor, it is unlikely 
that representatives will bring frivolous or vexatious claims; case management and the permission 
stage prevent this.536 The represented parties are not necessarily involved in the litigation and they 
are not required to opt in. The action can take place without the knowledge, participation or control 
of the class members – all litigation decisions are made by the representative claimant(s). The judg-
ment or order binds the class members. However, the judgment or order is only enforceable after the 
court’s approval on a case-by-case basis in which the individual circumstances will be assessed: 
 
                                                             
 
528 Colour Quest and others v. Total Downstream and others [2009] EWHC 540 and EWHC 823 (Comm). See Creutzfeldt 
& Hodges 2016, Tzankova 2014, and the 2012 BEUC study ‘Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings’, avail-
able at <beuc.eu/publications/2012-00227-01-e.pdf>.  
529 Creutzfeld & Hodges 2016, p. 328 ff.  
530 Creutzfeldt & Hodges 2016, p. 333.  
531 Tzankova 2014, p. 344-345. 
532 Creutzfeld & Hodges 2016, p. 333. 
533 CPR 19.6(1)(b).  
534 Howells 2008, p. 2, referring to Chocosuisse Union v. Cadbury [1999] ETMR 1020 (CA). 
535 CPR 19.6(2) and (3).  
536 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Representative Claims: Proposed New Procedures, February 2001, para. 40. 
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‘It is correct that a represented person may be able to avoid a judgment being enforced against him 
personally, by reason of special facts or matters which are particular to his case. Such facts would 
include, for example, facts relating to the person's membership of the class of persons represented; 
or (…) facts from which it can be shown that there was an element of fraud or collusion in the original 
action. There would therefore have to be some special reason why the judgment could not be en-
forced against a particular member of the class of persons represented.’537 
 
A key factor in the representative action is the identity of the interest, which is determined with a view 
to promoting the overriding objective and due process.538 As the represented persons are not required 
to consent to the action or to participate therein, ‘the same interest requirement is designed to ensure 
perfect overlap between the interests of the representative parties and those who they represent.’539 
Due to the courts’ narrow interpretation of this criterion, the scope of the representative action is 
limited.540 The narrow interpretation was underlined in Emerald Supplies v. British Airways, which re-
volved around two flower importers who, on their own behalf and that of all direct and indirect pur-
chasers, brought a claim for declaratory relief against British Airways (BA).541 The claimants sought a 
declaration that BA was liable for damage caused by the air freight charges price-fixing cartel in which 
it took part. The claim was dismissed because it did not meet the same interest requirement. According 
to the Court of Appeal: 
  
‘(…) the essential point is that the requirement of identity of interest of the members of the repre-
sented class for the proper constitution of the action means that it must be representative at every 
stage, not just at the end point of judgment. If represented persons are to be bound by a judgment 
that judgment must have been obtained in proceedings that were properly constituted as a repre-
sentative action before the judgment was obtained. In this case a judgment on liability has to be 
obtained before it is known whether the interests of the persons whom the claimants seek to repre-
sent are the same. It cannot be right in principle that the case on liability has to be tried and decided 
before it can be known who is bound by the judgment. Nor can it be right that, with Micawberish 
optimism, Emerald can embark on and continue proceedings in the hope that in due course it may 
turn out that its claims are representative of persons with the same interest.’542 
 
The Court of Appeal emphasized that class membership can fluctuate; that it does not have to remain 
constant and closed throughout. However, in this case, the problem was not the fluctuating member-
ship, but that a judgment on liability was required before being able to qualify any person as a class 
member. Furthermore, even if such qualification were possible, a defence might be available that 
                                                             
 
537 Howells v. Dominion Insurance Co [2005] E.W.H.C. 552 (QB), in which no such grounds were found to have been 
advanced. See also CPR 19.6(4). 
538 Emerald Supplies v. British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 (CA), para. 4, and Zuckerman 2013, p. 669-670. 
539 Zuckerman 2013, p. 669 and 671.  
540 For a critical analysis of the narrow interpretation, see Mulheron 2012, who refers to a case ‘pre-CPR’ with a similar 
setback for the flexibility of the representative action, Markt & Co v. Knight Steamship [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (CA). See also 
Howells 2008, p. 2-3. 
541 Emerald Supplies v. British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 (CA).  
542 Emerald Supplies v. British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284, para. 65. 
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would result in BA being held liable for the damages of some class members and not for those of others 
(e.g. those who had passed on the damage): 
 
‘If there is liability to some customers and not to others they have different interests, not the same 
interest, in the action.’543 
 
Thus, at the time of commencement, the group did not have the same interest as required by CPR 
19.6, and the action was declared ‘fatally flawed’. 
 
As a consequence of the narrow interpretation, it is difficult to initiate a representative action for 
claims for damages as, most likely, the interests of all individuals are not similar. According to some, 
this leaves the mechanism practically useless to obtain damages without having to bring a follow-on 
individual claim.544 Given the obstacles, apart from declaratory and injunctive relief, representative 
proceedings are relatively uncommon.545 According to Andrews, it has remained a ‘procedural back-
water rather than a flourishing style of multi-party litigation’, since the ‘arithmetic of individual loss 
must be totted and tabulated painfully and precisely.’546 The procedure is most commonly used where 
the claims arise out of one accident or tort or the breach of one contract,547 for instance, to clarify 
rights in relation to shares or property.548 As a representative party needs to have a cause of action in 
its own right and/or claims for damages are difficult, it is not likely that an entrepreneurial party will 
engage in such action. However, it is possible to settle the common issues through a representative 
action, and then to have the damages assessed in individual litigation.549 Also, in exceptional circum-
stances, liability and damages can be calculated in the first stage, or the damages can be awarded to 
the representative if the class members agree to this, for instance, for the compensation to be used 
for its war chest to fund a future action.550 In 2014, Andrews observed an increasingly flexible approach 
towards representative actions and claiming compensation if, at the time of the judgment, the court 
can determine i) the total amount of damages and ii) the value of individual claims for damages.551 A 
representative action might also serve to test whether a potential mass damage claim has a realistic 
prospect of success.552 
 
                                                             
 
543 Emerald Supplies v. British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1284, para. 64. 
544 See Andrews 2001, p. 253-255, who lists some exemptions from this two-stage approach. See also Howells 2008, p. 
27-30.  
545 Andrews 2014a, p. 113-115. 
546 Andrews 2001, p. 253.  
547 See Brown & Dodds-Smith 2012, under 1.1. 
548 Howells 2008, p. 2-3.  
549 Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries [1980] 2 WLR 339 (Ch).  
550 Andrews 2001, p. 254, with reference to Morrison Steamship v. Owners of Cargo SS Greystoke Castle [H.L. 1947] All 
E.R. 696 and EMI Records v. Riley [Ch. 1981] WLR 923. See also Howells 2008, p. 3. 
551 Andrews 2014a, p. 116, referring to Millharbour Management and others v. Weston Homes and another [2011] 
EWHC 661 (TCC). 
552 See, for instance, Fitzpatrick and another v. AIB Group [2015] WL 4635359 (HC), where the defendant successfully 
sought an application to strike out a claim or for a summary judgment. 
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If a case is settled after a representative action, normally the court does not monitor or approve the 
settlement. If a representative has settled a case under disadvantageous terms, represented parties 
might be able to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction.553 
 
Normally, the representative party is liable for adverse costs. However, the court might grant permis-
sion to enforce the costs order – also – against the represented parties, and also in light of the bene-
ficial object of the representative action: to avoid unnecessary joinder of parties and enable efficient 
litigation.554 In representative actions, too, defendants might have such a strong need for closure that 
they are willing to fund the action.555 
5.5.3 Group litigation order 
The practice of courts to group claims into one if they address common or related issues of fact or law 
provided the basis for the design of the GLO regulation. As a result of the Court of Appeal’s call for 
legislative action in Nash v. Eli Lilly,556 and Lord Woolf’s recommendations, a legislative structure based 
on this practice was implemented in 2000.557  
 
At the request of one of the parties or at a court’s own initiative, a group litigation order (GLO) enables 
courts to manage ‘a number of’ similar claims and by considering common issues collectively or in (a) 
test case(s).558 The procedure can be summarized as follows.559 After various preliminary steps, an 
application for a GLO can be made. If the required conditions are met and a court sets out to order a 
GLO, a senior judge at the court in question needs to approve the intended GLO. Pursuant to the su-
periority criterion, a court will not order a GLO if a representative action or joinder is more appropriate 
to resolve the mass dispute.560 Relevant in this respect is the fact that litigation under the GLO has to 
meet the overriding objective of CPR 1.1 (justly and at proportionate cost). In the GLO order, the court 
where the application was made specifies the issues that are subject to the GLO and the criteria for 
entry on the group register.561 The court also appoints a managing court, which is responsible for over-
all control over the case and hearing the generic GLO issues.562 Usually, this is the High Court in Lon-
don.563 This is said to have the advantage that GLO expertise remains with experienced judges.564 The 
managing court manages the claims on the group register, and other judges, for instance, a costs judge, 
                                                             
 
553 Andrews 2001, p. 252. On the court’s inherent jurisdiction in general, see Sime & French 2015, p. 42. See also An-
drews 2014a, p. 113-114. 
554 Chandra v. Mayor [2016] EWHC 2636 (Ch), para. 10. See CPR 19.6(4). See also section 5.3.6.1. 
555 Andrews 2014a, p. 114, referring to Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman [2000] 3 WLR 529.  
556 Nash v. Eli Lilly [1993] 1 W.L.R. 782 (CA). 
557 CPR 19 Part III (CPR 19.10 - 19.15) and PD 19B. 
558 CPR 19.10 and 19.11(1), PD 19B, paras 3.1 and 4. 
559 See, more detailed, Andrews 2001; Zuckerman 2013, p. 676 ff, Howells 2008, and Brown & Dodds-Smith 2012. 
560 Mulheron 2009, p. 15. See, for instance, Hobson & Others v. Ashton Morton Slack Solicitors & Others [2006] EWHC 
1134 (QB). 
561 CPR 19.11 (2). 
562 CPR 19.11 (2)(c) and PD 19B para. 8. 
563 Howells 2008, p. 3.  
564 Hodges 2009a, p. 112. 
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may be appointed as well.565 The managing court establishes a register where all claims that give rise 
to the issues under the GLO are registered. The claims that fall under the order, pending as well as 
new claims, are entered on the register – by the claimant itself or by the court – and transferred to the 
managing court.566 The order will also provide directions as to the publication of the order, usually in 
the form of an advertisement, so that future claimants are aware of the GLO.567 During litigation, there 
are periodic case management conferences, where the managing court may give directions, for in-
stance, which claim(s) will proceed as test or lead cases or the appointment of a lead solicitor. 568 At 
the trial stage, the court selects one or more lead cases which are typical for the group. The decision 
in these cases subsequently forms the basis for the settlement of the other disputes.569 It is possible 
to obtain damages through a GLO.  
 
The main difference with the representative action is that parties have to opt in after the managing 
court has set up a register.570 A party may also apply to be removed from the register.571 The court 
order is binding for the parties that are registered at the time of the decision, unless the court orders 
otherwise.572 Individuals can also opt out by applying to the court to be not bound by the decision.573 
 
Publicity by solicitors regarding potential group actions has to meet the standards of the Solicitors 
Code of Conduct 2011.574 A solicitor that represents a party that wishes to apply for a GLO needs to 
consult with the Law Society's Multi-Party Action Information Service as to whether other cases might 
give rise to such action. If there are more interested solicitors, the management court can appoint a 
lead solicitor to run both the application and the eventual case.575 Competition between solicitors 
might give rise to disputes over the selection and appointment.576 More than one lead solicitor might 
be appointed if the group is divided into cohorts. Their responsibilities might be both joint and several: 
 
‘[They are] jointly responsible for the management and co-ordination of the Claimants' actions. They 
shall have conduct of all investigations, applications and proceedings in respect of the common issues 
and preparation for and trial of any test cases relating to the common issues subsequently ordered 
by the court. [Name of one of the lead solicitors] shall be responsible for the group register.’577 
 
                                                             
 
565 PD 19B para. 8. 
566 CPR 19.11(2)(a), 19.11 (3)(a)(i and iii), (3)(b), 19.13(f). 
567 CPR 19.11(3)(c). See also Brown & Dodds-Smith 2012, p. 80. 
568 CPR 19.13. See also Hodges 2009a, p. 109. 
569 Brown & Dodds-Smith 2012, p. 79. 
570 Andrews 2001, p. 260.  
571 CPR 19.14. 
572 CPR 19.12(1). 
573 CPR 19.12(3). 
574 See section 5.2.2. 
575 CPR 19.13(c) and PD 19B paras 2.1 and 2.2. See also Andrews 2001, p. 258-259.  
576 See Hutson and others v. Tata Steel UK [2017] EWHC 2647. See also <litigationfutures.com/news/exclusive-law-
firms-face-off-high-court-lead-solicitor-role-vw-group-action> on the apparent battle between the law firms Harcus 
Sinclair and Your Lawyers, both aiming to be appointed as lead solicitor in the Volkswagen case. 
577 Hutson and others v. Tata Steel UK [2017] EWHC 2647, para. 6. 
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An application to add a lead solicitor is nevertheless approached cautiously: 
 
‘In addition to the potential for increased costs, the duplication of effort is also likely to increase the 
risk of delays, misunderstandings and disagreements relating to the management of the claims. 
Based on the history of [the applicant’s] involvement to date, I am satisfied that such risks are not 
merely theoretical.’578 
 
The number of claimants that are or might be eligible to join the group, as ‘scouted’ by the solicitor, 
might play a role in the selection, but not an essential one:  
 
‘[T]he selection of lead solicitors is not an exercise in proportional representation. Having a consider-
able number of individual eligible claimants may well give rise to an enhanced claim to the role of 
lead solicitor but it is a factor which falls far short of amounting to an entitlement. In this regard, 
each case must be judged on its own merits.’579  
 
Since its implementation, the GLO has been identified as the main mechanism to address mass damage 
claims.580 All current and settled GLO cases are listed.581 To date, 100 cases have been listed. This 
amounts to approximately 6 GLOs per year. The cases cover a wide variety of claims such as personal 
injury, product liability, holiday disasters, taxes, financial products or services, securities, and environ-
mental claims.582  
 
The mechanism has been criticised as well. Mulheron has observed that the GLO is just a ‘permissive 
joinder device’.583 In 2008, she identified relatively low opt-in rates and procedural problems, such as 
the need to identify claimants and costs, concluding that there is an unmet need for alternative col-
lective redress mechanisms. In a study on judicial case management, Tzankova quotes two English 
practitioners that have stated that ‘cases get really messed up as soon as judges start using the GLO.’ 
She infers from a BEUC study on the power of judges in collective redress that English courts often use 
case management techniques rather than make a group litigation order.584 Oddly enough, this obser-
vation goes against the original reason behind creating the GLO regulation, as a series of mass damage 
events in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to the conclusion that courts were not able to adequately deal 
with multiparty cases.585 This idiosyncrasy can probably be explained by the fact that, at that time, 
English case management techniques were not as developed and mainstream as they are nowadays. 
Unfortunately, the published case law in the Buncefield litigation, in which making a GLO was consid-
ered, does not mention the reason for rejecting the application and relying on ‘regular’ case manage-
ment techniques instead.586 Another, more specific, problem is observed by Higgins. He notes that 
                                                             
 
578 Hutson and others v. Tata Steel UK [2017] EWHC 2647, para. 12.  
579 Hutson and others v. Tata Steel UK [2017] EWHC 2647, para. 21.  
580 Andrews 2001, p 249, Andrews 2013, p. 620, and Andrews 2014a, p. 111. 
581 See <gov.uk/guidance/group-litigation-orders>. 
582 See Mulheron 20098, and Brown & Dodds-Smith 2012, p. 80.  
583 Mulheron 2004a and Mulheron 2008. 
584 Tzankova 2014, p. 346. 
585 See section 2.2.3. 
586 On the case, see also section 5.5.1. 
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GLO proceedings are not suitable for low value claims, due to its opt-in design. He states that the 
requirement of filing individual forms and having to pay court charges creates prohibitively high trans-
action costs.587 The lack of judicial overview on settlements after GLO proceedings has been detected 
as another important lacuna.588 Many cases are settled after the common issues have been addressed. 
An example is the Corby group litigation, which concerned the mothers of the claimants being exposed 
to toxic materials during their pregnancy, causing birth defects to 18 children. The claimants litigated 
upon a CFA basis, with a 100% mark-up success fee, and ATE insurance. In 2009, the local authority 
was held liable; causation and quantum would have to be established in individual proceedings. The 
claimants’ costs for the group litigation (£ 4 million) were subject to an interim costs judgment. As the 
costs, in particular the recovery of the CFA success fee and the ATE premium, would be subject to a 
detailed assessment before a costs judge, the court reduced the preliminary costs award. However, 
the cases were settled through mediation in April 2010.589 Details of the settlement were not dis-
closed, such as what proportion of the total payment (£ 14.6 million) related to costs. Obviously, this 
is the parties’ prerogative and since it is an opt-in settlement, risks might be mitigated and/or merely 
theoretical. However, given the court’s earlier critical observations on the claimants’ solicitor and ATE 
insurer, and its description of the financial situation of the claimants (‘of modest means’),590 some 
judicial overview on the reasonableness of the settlement and the agreed costs award might indeed 
have been desirable to rule out any potential conflict of interests between the claimants and their 
representatives and insurers.591 
  
Most of the discussed GLO cases have been litigated on the basis of CFAs and ATE insurances. They fall 
under the ‘old’ regime of the potential recoverability of the CFA success fee and ATE premium.592 It 
can only be predicted to what extent GLO proceedings are affected by the reversal of the recoverability 
of those ‘additional liabilities’ in 2013. On the situation by the end of the 1990s, when recoverability 
also did not exist, Lee & Stech state that without ATE insurance, the possibility of funding multi-party 
claims through CFA structures ‘was largely thought dead’, following the failed attempt to sue tobacco 
companies that almost bankrupted the leading solicitors.593 The rise of third-party litigation funding in 
the field of mass litigation might suggest that there is an increasing need for alternative types of liti-
gation funding. Indeed, in the Volkswagen case, a law firm that has applied for a GLO is operating on 
a damages-based agreement and has secured third-party litigation funding.594 A competing firm states 
                                                             
 
587 Higgins 2012, p. 282.  
588 2012 BEUC study ‘Powers of the judge in collective redress proceedings’, available at <beuc.eu/publications/2012-
00227-01-e.pdf>, p. 163 and 166.  
589 See, for instance, <publiclawtoday.co.uk/local-government/litigation/311-litigation-articles/2350-corby-toxic-con-
tamination-compensation-bill-set-at-p146m>. 
590 Corby Group Litigation v. Corby District Council [2009] EWHC 2109 (TCC), paras 26 ff, 35 and 44.  
591 See also section 5.5.7. 
592 See section 5.3.5.2. 
593 Lee & Stech 2011, p. 141.  
594 Harcus Sinclair; see <vwemissionsaction.com/news/press-release-harcus-sinclair-takes-the-legal-case-against-vw>. 
The GLO application has been adjourned until October 2017.  
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that it is operating under ‘no win, no fee’ agreements, but has not (yet) disclosed more specific infor-
mation.595  
 
An element of GLO litigation that might be attractive to entrepreneurial parties is costs capping, as it 
makes litigation costs (risks) more predictable. In group litigation, costs capping is ‘common or at least 
not uncommon’.596 
5.5.4 Assignment model 
As discussed in section 5.4.6, collective redress can also be obtained by way of the so-called assign-
ment model. This opt-in mechanism has been created in practice. A special purpose vehicle purchases 
the (cause of action of the) claims of aggrieved parties and by way of joinder enforces them in its own 
name and on its own account and risk.597 In some EU member states, this model has been used to 
bundle the claims from a multitude of SMEs. In practice, the following practical advantages have been 
mentioned: the victim takes the deliberate and verifiable decision to sell its claim, by selling their claim 
SMEs do not compromise their ongoing business relationship with the wrongdoers, the bundling cre-
ates synergies (economies of scale and a strengthened negotiation position on the victims’ side), the 
litigation vehicle is a specialised repeat player, it carefully selects, manages and assesses claims and 
only pursues meritorious claims, it centralizes the substantiation of claims and is able to quantify dam-
age on a market-wide basis, it provides access to justice for SMEs that might otherwise not pursue 
their claim given their lack of financial resources, it creates interesting incentives and opportunities 
for external third-party litigation funders or investors (an attractive expected return on the invest-
ment), and the allocation of proceeds is easy as the victims and their share in the damages are identi-
fiable.598 
 
This construction has been applied not only to fund a case, but also to bundle claims and bring them 
collectively. As mentioned, the method does not seem to have got off the ground in England and 
Wales.599 As far as I have been able to ascertain, to date, no such cases have been brought before the 
English courts in competition law cases. In spite of the continuing relaxation of the doctrines of cham-
perty and maintenance, it is questionable whether the model will gain ground in England and Wales, 
for the reasons discussed in section 5.4.6. 
 
However, the model was recently successfully tested in a consumer law mass damage case.600 The 
case revolved around Casehub, a company that aggregates small value consumer claims into a group 
action by way of claim purchase agreements through which the claim for recovery is assigned to 
Casehub.601 For Casehub to actually pursue the claims, the value of the aggregated claims needs to 
                                                             
 
595 Your Lawyers; see <yourlawyers.co.uk/> and <caremissionslawyers.co.uk/>. 
596 Multiple claimants v. Corby Borough Council [2008] EWHC 619 (TCC), para. 9. On costs capping, see also section 
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600 Casehub v. Wolf Cola [2017] EWHC 1169 (Ch). 
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reach a certain threshold. Pursuant to the agreements, Casehub has either i) paid consumers a fixed 
amount (£ 40), or ii) will pay 60% of the sum recovered from the defendant. The latter payment is thus 
contingent upon a successful outcome. The consumers’ claims concerned an alleged unlawful cancel-
lation fee for terminating a cloud storage subscription. The defendant argued, inter alia, that the as-
signments were void as they assign a bare cause of action and thus are champertous and the percent-
age taken from the proceeds is too high. The court held that the assignments were valid and did not 
infringe public policy. For one thing, the claimant had a legitimate and genuine interest and the cir-
cumstances under which the assignments had been made were reasonable. The integrity of the legal 
process was not impugned. Such integrity involves equality before the law as part of the overriding 
objective. According to the court, the claimant enabled efficient and effective access to justice, in par-
ticular given the small value of the claims, the lack of any alternative means for the consumers to 
pursue their claim, and the lack of evidence that the proceedings impose an unacceptable burden on 
the defendant. Furthermore, as the sums in dispute are quantified, there is no risk of damages being 
inflated or otherwise abusive behaviour that infringes the ‘purity of justice’.602 On the assignability, 
the court ruled that the consumers had fully assigned their claims and the claimant was ‘merely’ liable 
to pay back, in the case of success, 60% of the proceeds:  
 
‘[U]nder the claim purchase agreements the claimant acquired the right to the sum in question and 
the assignment of the right to bring a restitutionary claim to recover the sum is incidental and sub-
sidiary to that right properly and is not a bare cause of action. The fact that liability to repay the sum 
is disputed does not affect its assignability.’603 
 
The judgment clearly demonstrates a further shift of public policy towards accepting new forms of 
entrepreneurial mass litigation that enable access to justice, at least in low value claims which other-
wise are not likely to be pursued. Still, it depends a great deal on the particular circumstances of the 
case. If, for instance, the entrepreneurial party takes too large a percentage from the proceeds, the 
circumstances might not reasonably warrant the assignment.604 
5.5.5 Consumer law: an enforcement order and enhanced consumer measures 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, the Enterprise Act 2002 has currently given three types of public and 
private consumer law enforcers the authority to apply for an enforcement order in the interest of 
consumers if consumer law has been infringed.605 For many years, an enforcement order could only 
provide for injunctive relief. The procedure was not often used, for reasons of complexity, costs and 
the risks to enforcers as opposed to the limitation in what it could achieve (to ensure compliance).606 
As of the introduction of the CRA, public enforcers and the civil courts can attach Enhanced Consumer 
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ages, the circumstances may not be such as to warrant the assignment”. 
605 The Enterprise Act 2002 followed the UK Stop Now Orders Regulations 2001 that had implemented the Injunctions 
Directive 98/27/EC, and has been amended by the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) in 2015. 
606 See Cartwright 2016, p. 277-279, with further references.  
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Measures (ECMs) to the order, including compensation or similar redress.607 Such a measure is only 
attached where it is considered just and reasonable to do so,608 and normally only a public body can 
apply for it. However, private bodies can be given this authority if they meet certain criteria – see 
hereafter.609 
 
General, designated and community enforcers can make an application for an enforcement order un-
der the coordination of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, previously the Office of Fair 
Trading, OFT). Unless urgent action is required, the enforcer needs to consult with the business at 
hand, and with the CMA (if the CMA is not the enforcer) before making the application.610 There is a 
consultation period of 14 or 28 days before the action can be undertaken. As general enforcers, the 
CMA and local weights and measures authorities (public bodies) can make such an application.611 A 
community enforcer, which is a body enlisted pursuant to section 4.3 of the Injunctions Directive, can 
do so as well.612 A designated public or private enforcer can also do this, but first needs to be author-
ised as such by the Secretary of State.613 Currently, only Which? is a private designated enforcer.614 In 
addition, as of 2015, a private designated enforcer can obtain the status of being ‘specified’, so that it 
can seek an ECM (e.g. compensation). In order to achieve this status, the enforcer needs to meet cer-
tain conditions, such as that the measures cannot directly benefit the enforcer. The measures do so, 
for instance, if the enforcer requires a person to pay money, or if the measure gives the enforcer a 
commercial advantage over any of its competitors.615 The Secretary of State may set out such condi-
tions only if it will result in better redress for or information to consumers and more compliance by 
businesses.616 Furthermore, the Secretary of State can only specify the private enforcer if the latter 
follows certain principles on transparency, accountability, proportionality, consistency and targeting 
cases that need action.617 Finally, private enforcers must act consistently with advice or guidance given 
by a primary authority.618 
 
                                                             
 
607 Enterprise Act, section 215 and 219A(2)(a). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 addresses infringements of consumer 
law. For instance, it has revoked and replaced the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999, which had 
implemented the 1993 Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) in the UK. Other measures that 
can be attached to the order are terminating contracts and compliance and information measures.  
608 Enterprise Act, section 219B. 
609 Enterprise Act, section 219C. 
610 Enterprise Act, section 214. 
611 Enterprise Act, sections 213(1). See the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Competition) (Consequential, 
Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2014, SI 2014/892. 
612 Enterprise Act 213(5). 
613 Enterprise Act, section 213(4). 
614 See BIS, Consumer Rights Act. Explanatory Notes, p. 66, and BIS, Enhanced consumer measures. Guidance for enforc-
ers of consumer law, p. 9. 
615 Enterprise Act, section 219C(4) and (5). 
616 See Enterprise Act, section 219C(3) and (6). 
617 Enterprise Act, section 219C(7). The principles concern those of good regulation in the Regulators Code and section 
21 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. 
618 Enterprise Act, section 219C(9) and (10).  
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The measures in the redress category include offering compensation or other redress to consumers 
who have suffered a loss as a result of the conduct which gave rise to the enforcement order. Where 
such consumers cannot be identified or not without disproportionate cost, the measures must be in-
tended to be in the collective interests of consumers.619 An example of a measure in the collective 
interests of consumers is requiring the wrongdoer to pay the equivalent of the loss suffered to a con-
sumer charity.620 The amount of the loss suffered is irrelevant; the measure can concern both scat-
tered and substantial losses. However, the measure needs to be proportionate to the breach.621 For 
instance, in the case of scattered loss, it might be disproportionate to demand that the trader contacts 
all those who may have suffered a loss. Consumers have the right to refuse an offer of redress.622 Both 
the enforcer and the wrongdoer can come up with a creative but appropriate solution to the breach.623 
An ECM will only be attached if it is just, reasonable and proportionate.624 The legislation on ECMs 
does not contain many details. According to the government, this has been done in order to give com-
plete flexibility to courts, enforcers and wrongdoers to identify the most suitable measure(s).625 
 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, as yet, no civil court has attached an enhanced consumer meas-
ure to its order. 
5.5.6 Competition law: collective proceedings 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, with the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) a mix of instruments was in-
troduced to improve the private actions regime in competition law. The jurisdiction of the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) as a venue for competition actions was extended, as well as the remedy that 
can be sought. Individuals can now bring a claim for damages, any other claim for a sum of money, or 
seek injunctive relief if they have been harmed after a specified infringement of competition law.626 
Such individual action will probably concern a substantial loss, for which the parties harmed can obtain 
‘real redress’, possibly in a (more expeditious and less costly) fast-track procedure.627 The most con-
troversial innovation, however, has been the introduction of an opt-out collective action and an opt-
out collective settlement regulation (the latter will be discussed in section 5.5.7).628 Both mechanisms 
have been designed after the emergence of third-party litigation funding and address this type of en-
trepreneurial party, as well as entrepreneurial lawyers and special purpose vehicles. It is therefore of 
particular interest for entrepreneurial mass litigation. 
                                                             
 
619 Enterprise Act, section 219A(2)(a) and (c). 
620 BIS, Enhanced consumer measures. Guidance for enforcers of consumer law, May 2015, p. 19. 
621 BIS, Enhanced consumer measures. Guidance for enforcers of consumer law, May 2015, p. 14. 
622 BIS, Consumer Rights Act. Explanatory Notes, p. 68. 
623 Cartwright 2016, p. 282.  
624 Enterprise Act, section 219B(1) to (3).  
625 BIS, Consumer Rights Act. Explanatory Notes, p. 65.  
626 Competition Act 1998, section 47A, as implemented together with the Enterprise Act 2002 and amended by the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
627 See DTI, A World Class Competition Regime (White Paper), July 2001, Chapter 8, and Enterprise Act 2002, section 
15A, as implemented with the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
628 Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 81 and Schedule 8 amend sections 47A and 47B of the Competition Act 1998, as 
implemented with the Enterprise Act 2002, sections 18 and 19. See also UK Government Response to BIS Consultation 




Before 2015, a specified body could bring an opt-in action for damages before the CAT on behalf of at 
least two victims of anticompetitive behaviour.629 The specified body had to be approved by the Sec-
retary of State in accordance with published criteria.630 Which? was the only specified body.631 The 
action could only be brought with the consent of the individuals concerned, which was considered to 
be a major disadvantage.632 This might explain why between 2002 and 2015, the Consumers' Associa-
tion (Which?) only brought one case under CA 47B, which was not very successful. The notorious foot-
ball t-shirts case concerned replicas of football shirts, following a decision by the OFT that some sports-
wear retailers had entered into price-fixing agreements. The consumer body sought damages from the 
defendant on behalf of approximately 130 consumers, a 0.3% opt-in rate.633 This instrument’s lack of 
effectiveness was one of the reasons why, after a long debate, the Competition Act (CA) extended so 
as to include collective proceedings that – upon the CAT’s discretion – use either the opt-in or opt-out 
technique.634 The CAT’s choice of technique depends on the strength of the claims and the practica-
bility of bringing opt-in proceedings.635 The CAT has exclusive jurisdiction over these proceedings.  
 
Whereas the opt-in action requires the consent of class members, in the opt-out proceedings they are 
automatically included, unless they opt out according to the (case-by-case) instructions of the CAT.636 
The opt-out option only applies to UK-domiciled class members. Non-UK residents can opt in to the 
proceedings. Collective proceedings can be initiated by a private body with ‘a genuine interest’ in the 
case, on behalf of individuals and/or businesses. According to the government, organizations such as 
trade or consumer associations (rather than only Which?) or those who have themselves suffered loss 
can be considered to have such a genuine interest.637 Thus, contrary to the representative action pur-
suant to CPR 19.6, the collective proceedings do not necessarily require the representative to have an 
own interest. Contrary to the private enforcer that might be specified to bring an enforcement order 
with enhanced consumer measures, the representative in collective proceedings does not need to be 
designated in advance. Instead, the CAT assesses the representative’s suitability on an ad hoc basis at 
the certification stage.638  
 
The collective proceedings have to concern claims that raise the same, similar or related issues of fact 
or law.639 The claim can be for damages, a sum of money, or for injunctive relief. The action can either 
                                                             
 
629 See also Department of Trade and Industry, A World Class Competition Regime (White Paper), July 2001, considera-
tion 8.17 ff.  
630 CA 1998, section 47B(9) and (10) (old). 
631 See the Specified Body (Consumer Claims) Order 2005. 
632 CA 1998, section 47B(3) (old). See also Hodges 2009a, p. 108. 
633 See Consumers' Association v. JJB Sports Plc [2009] CAT 2. See Howells 2008, Hodges 2008, Hodges 2009a, p. 108, 
and Hodges 2009b, p. 49.  
634 CA 1998, section 47B(10) and (11). See also Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 79(3), and Gibson v. Pride 
Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, paras 123-124.  
635 Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, p. 76. 
636 CA 1998, section 47B(11)(a) and (14). 
637 BIS, Private Actions in Competition Law: A consultation on options for reform - Government response, 2013, p. 34. 
638 CA 1998, section 47B(5) and (8). See also the Enterprise Act, Explanatory Notes, note 67. 
639 CA 1998, section 47B(6). 
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follow a decision from the CMA or EC that competition law has been infringed (a follow-on action), or 
a stand-alone action.640 Any unclaimed damages must be paid to charity (the Access to Justice Foun-
dation), unless the CAT orders them to be paid to the representative instead in respect of (part of) the 
litigation costs or expenses in connection with the proceedings.641  
 
There are few limitations for entrepreneurial parties to be engaged in collective proceedings. Origi-
nally, the government stated that a ‘genuine interest’ should be interpreted in such a way that private 
parties such as legal firms, third-party funders, and special purpose vehicles are excluded from bringing 
collective proceedings. This was intended to prevent abusive litigation, conflicts of interest and creat-
ing or cultivating a compensation culture.642 However, this strict and explicit exclusion seems to have 
been abandoned at a later stage. The only legislative provision that refers to entrepreneurial parties 
is the one that bans lawyers from operating under a damages-based agreement in opt-out collective 
proceedings.643 This ban is aimed at avoiding a ‘litigation culture’ and speculative litigation, which 
would place ‘unjustified costs on defendant businesses’ and create ‘an incentive for lawyers to focus 
only on the largest cases’.644 Thus, special purpose vehicles and third-party funders are not excluded 
from being engaged in collective proceedings, as will be observed hereafter.  
 
Pursuant to the amended Enterprise Act, the CAT can issue additional rules.645 It has done so in the 
form of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015.646 These rules include additional rules on the 
authorisation of the class representative (rules 78 and 85), costs (rules 98 and 104), and funding ar-
rangements (rule 113). 
 
The additional certification requirements for being authorised as a class representative include its ‘fi-
nancial wherewithal’.647 The applicant is required to show that it will be able to pay the defendant’s 
recoverable costs if ordered to do so.648 Furthermore, upon a request by the CAT, it should give an 
estimate and details of the arrangements as to costs, fees or disbursements.649 This prevents abusive 
behaviour such as selecting ‘a person of straw’. According to Mulheron it might also diminish the need 
                                                             
 
640 The CMA or the European Commission must first have made a decision establishing that one of the relevant prohi-
bitions has been infringed, and any appeal from such decision has been finally determined.  
641 CA 1998, section 47C (5)-(7). See also BIS, Private actions in competition law – government response, p. 27 ff. 
642 BIS, Private actions in competition law: A consultation on options for reform – Government response, 2013, p. 30-34. 
See also UK Response (European Scrutiny Committee) to the EC Recommendation and Communication, 4 September 
2013, under 7.12 and 7.16. 
643 CA 1998, section 47C(8) and (9)(c) in conjunction with CLSA 1990, section 58AA(3). See also section 5.4.3.2. The 
restriction does not apply to opt-in proceedings. See also Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, p. 
82.  
644 BIS, Private actions in competition law: A consultation on options for reform – Government response, 2013, p. 27 ff 
and 41. See, critically, Mulheron 2014a, p. 118 ff.  
645 Enterprise Act 2002, Schedule 4, paras 15B(1) and 15C(1), as implemented with the CRA 2015, section 31.  
646 SI 2015/1648. 
647 Mulheron 2015, p. 315-316.  
648 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 78(2)(d). 
649 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 78(3)(c)(iii). 
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to provide security for costs.650 She also observes that although the EU Recommendation states that 
a claimant should declare to the court at the outset of the proceedings the origins of the funds that it 
is going to use, the collective proceedings regulation does not include a provision on the notification 
or disclosure of the litigation funding agreement or of assistance by a litigation funder.651 
 
If the class representative no longer satisfies the requirements to act as such, the CAT can order its 
removal or withdrawal. It can do so ex officio or upon an application by the class representative, a 
represented person or defendant.652 The CAT also has to assess the suitability of the proposed class 
representative’s lawyers, given the ‘inevitable complexity of collective proceedings’.653 Furthermore, 
it will be critical of any pre-existing body that seeks to carry out the role of a class representative, such 
as a consumers’ organisation, a trade association, a law firm, a third-party funder or a special purpose 
vehicle: 
 
‘While there is no blanket prohibition against certain types of organisation taking on the role of class 
representative, the Tribunal will closely consider the nature of that body, its motivations for being 
involved and, crucially, whether there is an actual or potential conflict between that body and the 
interests of the class members. The potential conflict between the interests of a law firm or third 
party funder and the interests of the class member may mean that such a body is unsuitable to act 
as a class representative. Where the proposed class representative is a SPV, the Tribunal will expect 
to be given details of the constitution and management of the SPV and the reason why it was estab-
lished. The Tribunal will consider each application in its individual circumstances and proposed class 
representatives should be prepared to explain why they are suitable to carry out that role. As in the 
case of class members seeking to act as the class representative, the Tribunal will also consider the 
body’s ability to manage the proceedings and instruct its lawyers.’654 
 
In proceedings before the CAT, costs ‘may be awarded’. The CAT has a discretionary power to do so at 
any stage of the proceedings, and the rules are similar to the relevant CPR provisions.655 An adverse 
costs order will normally be awarded to or against the (sub-)class representative.656 In general, the 
other represented persons or class members cannot be held liable for adverse costs, unless individual 
issues have been determined. In such a case, the associated costs can be awarded against the relevant 
individual person.657 The CAT can assess the costs, but in complex cases it might refer the case to the 
SCCO for detailed assessment.658  
 
                                                             
 
650 Mulheron 2015, p. 316-317. 
651 Recommendation 2013/396/EU, section 14. See also Mulheron 2015, p. 312. 
652 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rules 85(1)-(3) and 87. 
653 Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, p. 72. 
654 Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, p. 72-73. 
655 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 104. See also rules 48 and 49, on the costs consequences of (not) 
accepting an offer to settle (similar to a CPR Part 36 offer; see section 5.1) 
656 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 98. See also section 5.3.6.1. 
657 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 98(1)(b) in conjunction with rule 88(2)(c) (for represented persons), 
and rule 98(2) (for class members). 
658 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 104(5)(b).  
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So far, two applications for opt-out collective proceedings have been made. Both actions have failed. 
The first application was made in March 2016, on behalf of people who had allegedly paid too much 
for a mobility scooter due to competition law breaches. The follow-on action was brought by the Gen-
eral Secretary of the National Pensioners Convention, according to whom it is ‘pretty plain that unless 
we or some other organisations acts, Pride will provide [the customers, mainly ‘vulnerable’ elderly] 
with no redress.’659 The actual initiator, however, was Leigh Day, which operated on a CFA, backed by 
third-party litigation funding and ATE insurance.660 The amount in dispute was estimated at £ 7.7 mil-
lion and concerned approximately 34,000 customers. The case was withdrawn after the CAT had ad-
journed the application in order to amend the claim. In short, the claimant had not sufficiently ad-
dressed quantification and causation as she had approached the estimation of loss on the wrong basis. 
The CAT did approve of the class representative and her legal team. Relevant in this respect was the 
experience of the law firm, its satisfactory litigation plan, a detailed costs budget, that it had secured 
the services of a (US) company with extensive experience in class action administration and a neutral 
third party to – in the event of a successful outcome – assess and process claims and determine dis-
putes thereon.661 The CAT did not find it objectionable that the impetus for the action came from Leigh 
Day:  
 
‘This seems to us almost inevitable with collective proceedings in particular for consumers, most of 
whom would be unaware that it was practicable to bring proceedings of which the cost vastly exceeds 
the individual loss they suffered. The relevant question is whether the class representative is able to 
ensure that the proceedings are then conducted in the interests of the class and not of the lawyers.’662 
 
The fact that the ATE insurance would potentially not cover all of the adverse costs was also not 
deemed to be problematic, that is, at this stage of the proceedings. Relevant aspects were the state-
ment of the litigation funder that it would be able to increase the insurance indemnity and of Leigh 
Day that it would give priority to paying adverse costs over the recovery of its own.663  
 
The second claim was dismissed, and the application for permission to appeal against the decision was 
refused in September 2017.664 The application was refused in the certification stage as, in essence, it 
lacked i) a sufficiently sound method to calculate a sum which reflects an aggregate of individual claims 
for damages and ii) a reasonable and practicable means for estimating the individual loss which could 
be used as the basis for distribution. Moreover, even if an approximation of the individual loss could 
be made, the collective proceedings would not result in damages being paid to those claimants in 
accordance with the governing principle of compensatory damages. Accordingly, the claims were not 
                                                             
 
659 Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, para. 130. 
660 Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, paras 135 and 140. See also T. Kinder, ‘Here come the US-style class 
actions’, The Lawyer, 14 June 2016. 
661 Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, paras 133-135. 
662 Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, para. 138.  
663 Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products [2017] CAT 9, para. 140-145. 
664 Merricks v. Mastercard [2017] CAT 21. 
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suitable for collective proceedings.665 The fact that such a decision, in effect, would deprive the ag-
grieved consumers of compensation did not persuade the CAT to decide otherwise:  
 
‘[T]hat is effectively the position in most cases of widespread consumer loss resulting from competi-
tion law infringements. It does not mean that an application to bring collective proceedings in such 
a case must always be granted. Every case has to be considered on its own terms, having regard to 
the statutory requirements.’666 
 
Of particular interest for entrepreneurial mass litigation is that the CAT nevertheless addressed Mas-
tercard’s attack on the permissibility of the litigation funding agreement.667 The authorisation of the 
class representative did not concern the person as such, who in the words of the CAT was ‘eminently 
suited’ to act as a class representative. The defence focused on the terms of the LFA which Merricks 
had entered into with the third-party funder, as it i) limited the funded adverse costs (£ 10 million), 
which was deemed insufficient, and ii) the content of the LFA. This stipulated that the funder would 
receive a remuneration equal to the greater of i) £ 135 million or ii) 30% of the undistributed proceeds 
up to £ 1 billion, plus 20% of the undistributed proceeds in excess of £ 1 billion. According to Master-
card, the CA 1998 does not provide basis for such stipulation. Thus, the CAT would have to order 
against it, which would activate the funder’s right to terminate the agreement and leave the applicant 
without funds to further pursue the litigation. 
 
The relevant legal provisions, sections 47C CA(5) and (6), state that undistributed proceeds should be 
paid to charity, unless the CAT orders that the costs or the expenses incurred in connection with the 
proceedings be paid to the class representative. In Mastercard, the CAT first ruled that the payment 
to a litigation funder can be considered as such costs or expenses. If necessary, the CAT can order an 
expert opinion to address the question of whether the funder’s payment (percentage) is appropriate, 
referring to Essar v. Norscot (where the arbitrator ruled that a payment due to the litigation funder is 
recoverable as the costs of arbitration). Second, the CAT approved these costs as being incurred by 
the class representative. This does require the LFA to provide for an obligation for the class repre-
sentative to pay these costs or expenses from the unclaimed damages. This liability is conditional, 
however, as the CAT has to make an order to pay the class representative the equivalent amount under 
section 47C(6) CA. The defendant argued that the CAT does not have the power to make an order since 
no costs had been incurred, and the CA lacks wording such as CPR 44.1(3) to address the indemnity 
principle. The CAT dismissed this argument: 
 
‘[S]ect 47C(6) CA is not an inter partes costs rule and it is not dependent on a strict application of the 
indemnity principle as that applies to recovery of costs. As we have already observed, it is a specific 
rule designed for a new and discrete procedural regime. The question is whether the statutory refer-
ence to a cost or expense being “incurred” is broad enough to cover a conditional liability. In our 
judgment, it is. Given the purpose of the CRA and the new collective proceedings regime, that is the 
correct and appropriate construction. Indeed, we think it is similarly the basis on which this provision, 
in conjunction with rule 93(4), enables the recovery out of unclaimed damages of the success fee or 
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‘uplift’ element of legal costs “incurred” under a conditional fee agreement, which is not recoverable 
as costs in the High Court (and therefore does not fall within rule 104: see also rule 113). Put another 
way, if a funding agreement contained a clause stating: 
 
a) the class representative is obliged to pay the funder’s fee of £x; 
b) the obligation under sub-clause (a) is reduced to the extent that the amount which the Tribunal 
orders should be paid to the class representative in respect of his obligation falls below £x” 
 
then we consider the obligation to pay the funder’s fee of £x would be a cost “incurred” within the 
meaning of sect 47C(6) CA. And on that basis, we do not see that the different formulation used in 
the amendment here should produce a fundamentally different result: that would elevate form over 
substance.’668 
 
This judgment shows that although the costs of litigation funding (the payment or percentage to the 
funder) might not be recoverable as adverse costs by way of a costs award, they can be obtained 
through the awarded damages, that is, the part that ultimately remains unclaimed. This construction 
slightly resembles the LASPO change of 2013: the CFA success fee and ATE premium are no longer 
recoverable as part of the costs award, but in order to cover this ‘loss’ the awardable non-pecuniary 
damages can be increased by 10%. The funding construction also shows that a contingency fee is not 
the only route whereby a funder calculates the return on his investment. It might also be a fixed fee. 
In this way, a conflict of interests as to the content of the settlement might be avoided; for instance, 
if no pecuniary damages are awarded but a change of contract. Through the fixed fee arrangement, a 
funder still receives his payment.  
 
The court rejected the submission that the funding construction creates a potential incentive for the 
class representative to ‘ensure that there is a sufficient amount of unclaimed damages’, which would 
create a conflict with the interest of the class to maximize the amount of damages claimed and dis-
tributed to them. In particular in the situation of a potential settlement, where the defendant has an 
incentive to settle as, in that case, the undistributed damages could be reverted to the defendant. The 
CAT rejected this objection; as to the distribution of damages to the class members, it deemed to be 
sufficient that the LFA requires the class representative to act independently and have sole control of 
the litigation in the best interests of the class. If damages are awarded, all class members must be 
notified, as approved by the CAT:  
 
‘In deciding to whom the damages are paid [applicant or some other entity], the Tribunal will need 
to be satisfied that the recipient is able and willing to make all reasonable efforts to achieve the 
fullest distribution to members of the class, and may seek appropriate undertakings if necessary.’  
 
The defendant had also raised the concern that, given the scale and complexity of the proceedings, 
the funder’s liability to cover a potential adverse costs award of £ 10 million would not suffice to cover 
Mastercard’s costs, and the LFA did not have flexibility to increase this sum, referring to the applicant’s 
costs budget of £ 19.5 million. The CAT rejected this ground of objection. It ruled that as the applicant 
had started from scratch with these proceedings, and Mastercard had already done a substantial 
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amount of work in comparable proceedings, it was not necessary that Mastercard’s litigation costs 
would be equivalent to those of the applicant. As Mastercard had not submitted an estimate of its 
own costs, which would be a first step in the challenge at hand, the CAT ‘has no basis at this stage to 
find that £ 10 million is likely to be inadequate for Mastercard’s potential recoverable costs, which (on 
the standard basis) would have to be proportionate and reasonable.’ This also in light of the fact that 
Mastercard, at any later stage, could file to vary or revoke a collective proceedings order or stay the 
collective proceedings.  
 
It has been announced that a third case wil be brought by the trade body Road Haulage Association 
against the trucks cartel, on behalf of any business that has suffered loss. The follow-on opt-out col-
lective proceedings will be brought against various truck manufacturers for participating in a price-
fixing cartel that was fined by the European Commission in 2016 (€ 3.4 billion).669 The claim is being 
funded by Therium Capital, and underwritten by ATE insurance: 
 
To ensure that as many affected hauliers are able to join the claim, we have secured funding from 
Therium Capital Management Limited and the largest tranche of After The Event insurance that’s 
ever been underwritten so there’s no cost to joining the claim, or any other risks if the claim is unsuc-
cessful.670 
 
The brochure issued by the RHA furthermore mentions with regard to the funding:  
 
Based on conservative assumptions in relation to the level of damages per truck and the overall num-
ber of trucks that are in the RHA’s claim, the level of return to the funder will be at most 9% and may 
be as low as 5%. If the case settles early, these percentages will be reduced by a third, thereby re-
turning even more of the compensation to operators.671 
 
To conclude, both actions show a potential for entrepreneurial parties to engage in collective proceed-
ings. Both actions failed on substantive aspects, that is, on (the method and means of determining) 
causation and quantum. 
5.5.7 Competition law: collective settlement 
To encourage parties to settle their dispute, the CAT can approve a collective settlement upon the 
application of the representative claimant and wrongdoer(s). With regard to the representative body, 
the collective settlement regime operates on the same premises as the above collective proceedings 
regulation. An application for approval can be made whether or not a collective proceedings order has 
been made.672 The CAT has to assess whether it deems the terms of the collective settlement to be 
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just and reasonable.673 If the CAT has not yet made a collective proceedings order, and the parties 
apply for the approval of the collective settlement, it has to make a collective settlement order; this 
order is not required if a collective proceedings order has previously been made.674 In the former sit-
uation, the CAT also needs to approve the adequacy of the representative and whether the claims that 
underlie the settlement would have been suitable for collective proceedings.675 Class members are 
bound by the collective settlement (order) unless they opt out.676  
 
As to costs and fees, the application must set out the terms of the settlement, including the pay-
ment of costs, fees and disbursements.677 They are considered part of the overall settlement terms, 
and thus subject to the CAT’s assessment of the reasonableness thereof. The application should also 
detail what happens to any undistributed settlement funds. A provision that any unclaimed balance 
of the settlement amount reverts to the defendants shall not of itself be considered unreasonable.678 
 
The approach towards ‘pre-existing bodies’ (which include entrepreneurial parties) is similar to the 
one in collective proceedings.679 The representative needs to be suitable. It needs to act both fairly 
and adequately in the interests of the class members.680 With the approval of the CAT, class members 
may participate in the approval process.681 If the settlement follows a collective proceedings, and class 
members have not opted out, they can still do so after the collective settlement has been approved.682  
 
To date, no application has been made to approve a collective settlement under the new regime.  
5.6 Summary: rules and features that shape English entrepreneurial mass litigation 
In the following, I will summarize the main findings on the elements that affect the operation of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation in England and Wales.  
 
For a continental lawyer, the English civil justice landscape comes across as a rather complex one, with 
its abundance of different types of courts, a less strict division between private and public proceedings, 
and flexibility in developing the law. It also shows a strong focus on efficiency, within the context of 
collective redress as well. Judges’ toolboxes have been seriously replenished with various case man-
agement tools. They are no longer mere umpires, and party autonomy is on an equal footing with the 
overriding objective, pursuant to which courts deal with cases efficiently (timely and cost-effectively) 
yet justly. The tools include various sanctions to address non-compliance with court orders. Moreover, 
                                                             
 
673 CA 1998, sections 49A(5) and 49B(8). 
674 CA 1998, section 49B(4). 
675 CA 1998, section 49B(5).  
676 CA 1998, section 49A(6) to (10) respectively section 49B(9) and (10). 
677 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 94(4)(b) and (9)(a). See also Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to 
Proceedings 2015, p. 86, and Mulheron 2015, p. 11. 
678 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 94(9)(g). 
679 Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, p. 89. See section 5.5.6. 
680 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rules 96(10) and (11). 
681 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rules 94(7) and 97(5). See also Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Pro-
ceedings 2015, p. 90-91. 
682 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, rule 94(10) and 97(8).  
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consensual settlement is stimulated at the earliest appropriate occasion and incentivised and facili-
tated by various legal instruments. England & Wales have a traditionally strong international position 
in commercial litigation and seem keen to maintain it. Within the context of mass litigation, law firms 
and litigation funders increasingly cooperate, also at an international level. The main aspect of English 
civil litigation that has shaped its functioning are the high litigation costs (risk). 
 
Nowadays, the English legal services market can be qualified as a fairly open one. The historical mo-
nopoly of solicitors and barristers has been broken down. Within the context of mass litigation three 
additional types of (entrepreneurial) parties have been identified that are active on the claimants’ side: 
claims management companies, third-party litigation funders and – tentatively – special purpose ve-
hicles. They both complement and compete with solicitors’ provision of legal services. The level of the 
regulation and supervision of the providers varies. In addition to being subject to professional (liability) 
rules, lawyers are bound by ethical rules and standards on, inter alia, their remuneration and business 
model. Supervisory scrutiny is increasingly vigorous. Claims Management Companies mainly operate 
within the context of personal injuries and financial products and services. Due to a surge in abusive 
behaviour such as unsolicited direct approaches and charging excessive fees, regulatory oversight is 
increasing. Third-party litigation funders might be governed by the Association of Litigation Funders 
and its self-regulatory Code of Conduct. Compliance, however, is optional since membership is not 
compulsory. Third-party litigation funders and special purpose vehicles are (also) subject to general 
civil law. Within that context, the ancient doctrines of maintenance and champerty give colour to the 
current concept of public policy. In essence, these common law doctrines relate to entrepreneurial 
engagement in civil litigation, which has been condemned for centuries due to risks of aggravating 
claim amounts, tampering with evidence, blackmail or collusive settlements, and otherwise undue lit-
igation conduct. However, the scope of the doctrines has progressively narrowed in the past decades 
and both courts and the legislator are increasingly liberal towards entrepreneurial parties as enablers 
of access to justice. Yet, courts’ scrutiny remains thorough, focused on the ‘integrity of civil litigation’. 
This is also observable in their application of the admissibility rules in mass litigation. If entrepreneurial 
parties are allowed to engage in such proceedings, courts are strongly focused on preventing abusive 
behaviour in order to protect the interests of class members and defendants, and the objective of 
efficient litigation. 
 
Litigation costs form an important, if not essential aspect of civil litigation. The English costs regime 
has rendered (own and inter partes) litigation costs complex, unpredictable and high, without parallel. 
The main contributing elements are the freely negotiable lawyers’ fees and market failure to exert 
pressure on the rates, relatively full indemnity in costs shifting, including – until 2013 – the recovera-
bility of CFA success fees and ATE insurance premiums, the large number of costs rules and the discre-
tionary power of courts as to whether and to which extent costs are shifted. Measures to reduce costs 
and create efficiency and predictability have been implemented as of the early 2000s. Increasingly, 
costs are considered at the outset and throughout litigation, as opposed to ‘merely’ upon the conclu-
sion of litigation. This is facilitated by principles such as the overriding objective and proportionality, 
and techniques such as costs management conferences and orders, and fixed recoverable fees. The 
effects thereof vary, but a slow change towards more predictability and proportionality in the costs 
landscape is observable. In light of the high costs risk, unsurprisingly, security for costs is an important 
aspect of (mass) litigation. Such an order can be awarded against claimants and, under certain circum-
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stances, against non-parties such as entrepreneurial ones. Litigation conduct is an important and com-
monly invoked or addressed aspect of costs shifting; undue behaviour is regularly addressed with costs 
sanctions. Costs aspects of an out-of-court settlement can be assessed with regard to their reasona-
bleness by way of costs-only proceedings. Furthermore, the costs and fees that are part of a settlement 
agreement are subject to judicial scrutiny in collective settlement proceedings (competition law).  
 
Successful initiators of collective redress that are party to proceedings can recover their litigation costs 
from the defendant. Between 2000 and 2013, this included the costs of CFA litigation (the success fee). 
This created a serious market failure. Claimants, in effect, bore no financial risk and their lawyers were 
incentivized to raise their success fee to the maximum. Defendants contested costs and the recovera-
bility thereof whenever possible. Courts were not sufficiently able or experienced to mitigate the influx 
of fees and satellite litigation. Eventually, the legislator revoked the recoverability of CFA success fees 
and ATE insurance premiums. Claimants are now encouraged to take responsibility for litigation costs 
by having to pay the success fee and ATE premium out of the proceeds of litigation. Courts now ‘only’ 
assess base costs, which excludes the (reasonableness of the) success fee. Some additional measures 
have been implemented to soften the blow for claimants, such as a 10% increase in damages for pain, 
suffering and loss of amenity and qualified one-way costs shifting in personal injury cases. Few routes 
remain for claimants or entrepreneurial parties to recover a conditional or contingency fee from de-
fendants. For instance, under certain circumstances, the costs of funding collective proceedings (com-
petition law cases) can take place by recovering the fee out of the unclaimed (undistributed) damages. 
In such cases, if necessary, courts can invoke the opinion of market experts to assess the reasonable-
ness of the charged rates and terms. 
  
Costs rules enable a prevailing defendant to widen the scope of liability for adverse costs to a non-
party such as an individual class member or entrepreneurial party. For instance, the Arkin and Excali-
bur cases have demonstrated that entrepreneurial non-parties can also be subjected to liability for 
adverse costs and/or costs sanctions, even if their own behaviour was immaculate. Allegedly, this po-
tential liability has incited third-party litigation funders to screen cases even more rigorously and to 
intensify their control over litigation, as far as this is allowed under the doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty.  
 
The high and unpredictable litigation costs, the budget cuts in legal aid, and their effect on access to 
justice have fuelled the growth of private litigation funding schemes. In addition to the already existing 
conditional fee arrangements (which are linked to the lawyer’s hourly fee), lawyers are now allowed 
to operate under damages-based agreements (linked to the awarded or recovered damages). ATE in-
surance can still cover the risk of having to pay an adverse costs order. However, it is a niche market 
with limited capacity, in particular for large and complex claims. Third-party funders increasingly par-
ticipate in mass litigation. The disclosure of (the terms of) the funding arrangement or ATE policy can 
be ordered if such disclosure aids case management or helps in assessing the level of control over the 
course of litigation. Of relevance for a court in the assessment of such an application is the potential 
risk of such information being misused by the defendants, and/or the risk of inducing satellite litiga-
tion, and – within the context of third-party litigation funding – that the funder is not a party to the 
proceedings. Under the old regime of the recoverability of CFA success fees, the amount of the poten-
tial additional liability or method of calculation (such as the percentage) did not have to be disclosed 
until the costs assessment at the end of litigation. As to the percentage of success or contingency fees, 
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in commercial litigation the freedom of contract applies, but within the boundaries of public policy 
(which an excessive percentage can infringe). In consumer law, as to claims management companies, 
the government has increasingly regulated their practices, including a current proposal to cap their 
fees. 
 
English law’s longstanding preference for ‘completeness in adjudication’ and the implementation of 
the overriding objective has various initiatives to settle mass damage. Nowadays, various routes exist 
to obtain collective redress. The following horizontal instruments – which apply to all types of civil 
cases – exist: consolidation of claims, joinder of parties, test cases, representative action, group litiga-
tion and the assignment model. In addition, in consumer law a court can attach enhanced consumer 
measures to an enforcement order brought by a public or private body, and in competition law, a class 
representative can bring collective (settlement) proceedings. The number of routes and their varying 
rules leave the collective redress landscape relatively cluttered. The routes are of varying efficiency 
and effectiveness – whether or not they allow the initiator(s) to claim for damages. Furthermore, the 
principle of individual and full compensation remains at the forefront, also when it comes to collective 
redress. In combination with the complexity of mass litigation and its high costs (risk), this all means 
that the mechanisms are risky routes to take. Case law shows that parties are sometimes reluctant to 
undertake action after mass damage events. Nevertheless, a ‘claimants’ bar’ is gradually growing, with 
different and creative types of costs and litigation funding arrangements while displaying mildly com-
petitive behaviour. Case law furthermore shows an acceptance of entrepreneurial parties and, thus, a 
potential to further engage in mass litigation, for instance in collective proceedings in competition law.  
 
To conclude, Table VII lists the rules and features that potentially mediate the beneficial or disadvan-
tageous operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per addressed key issue. 
 
 
Key issue Distilled rule or feature 
Essentials of the civil justice 
landscape 
- Flexibility of the common law system 
- Strong focus on (cost) efficiency through active case management  
- Increasing focus on a negotiated settlement and ADR 
- Focus on jurisdictional competition and international commercial litigation  
The legal services market - Open and competitive legal services market 
- Development of a ‘claimants bar’ in mass litigation, mildly competitive 
- Clear and strict regulation and supervision of lawyers 
- Ban on referral fees to a third party in personal injury cases  
- Increasing regulation and supervision of claims management companies, e.g. 
marketing, claims referral, complaint handling, client account and charged fees 
- Self-regulation of third-party litigation funders. Code of Conduct includes rules 
on capital adequacy, control of the dispute, and the termination of the LFA. 
Supervision by ALF 
- The Code of Conduct does not require litigation funders to publicise infor-
mation on disputes between funders and funded parties 
- Professional liability rules 
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Litigation costs and costs 
shifting 
- Complex and unpredictable costs system, in particular due to freely negotiable 
lawyers’ fees, judicial discretion, and a large number of costs rules  
- Specialized costs court 
- High litigation costs, related to lawyer-driven and labour-intensive proceedings 
and relatively full indemnity in costs shifting 
- Security for costs can be (and often is) ordered in mass litigation 
- Security for costs can be ordered against a non-claimant, such as an entrepre-
neurial party 
- Loser pays rule: potentially full indemnification of prevailing party’s litigation 
costs 
- Level of indemnification is subject to judicial discretion as to which costs are 
shifted and what amount 
- Various (often applied) cost sanctions for undue litigation conduct 
- Qualified one-way costs shifting in personal injury cases 
- Costs capping and protective costs order 
- Non-recoverability of CFAs, DBAs and ATE premiums 
- Possibility to hold a non-party liable for adverse costs order 
- Extensive litigation over costs (cost wars / satellite litigation)  
- Costs-only proceedings 
Private litigation funding - Various types of litigation funding, despite restrictions due to the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty 
- Developed market for litigation funding 
- Thorough due diligence assessment 
- Judicial assessment of (the reasonableness of) litigation funding arrangements 
- Third-party litigation funders act as additional key player to the representative 
organization and its lawyers 
- Fee caps for claims management companies  
Specificities and safeguards of 
the collective redress mecha-
nisms 
- Statutory criteria for and judicial assessment of class representative 
- Collective settlement: judicial assessment of the settlement, including of costs 
and fees 
- Provide information on financial means 
- Increasingly liberal approach towards entrepreneurial parties 









6 The Netherlands 
 
‘What is interesting is how many entities from outside the Netherlands – particu-
larly from the United States – have hopped on board this case [the Petrobras col-
lective action]. U.S. law firms and funding organisations bring with them the tac-
tics, culture and expectations of the United States civil litigation system – a system 
that many in Europe have decried as rife with baggage that does not belong in 
European courts.’1 
 
6.1 Setting the scene: some essential features of the civil justice landscape 
The Dutch civil justice system seems to function rather adequately. Worldwide, the Netherlands con-
tinues to feature among the countries with an efficient legal framework for settling disputes.2 In the 
Rule of Law Index 2016, provided by the World Justice Project, the Netherlands was in first place in 
the category of ‘civil justice’.3 Nevertheless, in the past few decades, the Dutch civil litigation landscape 
has been anything but stationary. In 2002, the rules of civil procedure were fundamentally reformed, 
and the process of reorganization and re-examination has continued. I will highlight some salient de-
velopments. 
 
Since the restructuring of the judicial map in 2013, the Netherlands is now divided into 11 districts, 
each with a court of first instance (rechtbank). Each district court has several sectors, including a civil 
sector and a sub-district sector (kanton), which deals with civil cases with a disputed value that does 
not exceed € 25,000 and cases on tenancy, labour or consumer law. For civil law, there are four Courts 
of Appeal (Gerechtshof) and the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). Civil cases with a disputed value that 
exceeds € 1,750 can be subject to an appeal. Parties do not need permission to appeal and – within 
limits – can amend their claim or introduce new facts. A party may lodge an appeal in cassation at the 
Supreme Court if there has been a violation of the law or a breach of procedure. 
 
As in other European jurisdictions, there has been a growing focus in the Netherlands on the quality 
of litigation, the responsibility of the parties involved, the simplification of the civil procedure, and its 
                                                             
 
1 Terzino, M.H., ‘Collective actions in the Netherlands: transnational trouble?’, 1 March 2017 at <justice-
notprofit.co.uk>. 
2 Ranking 12th (out of 138 jurisdictions) on this indicator in the Global Competitiveness Index 2016-2017, as reported 
by the World Economic Forum; see <www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-
2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf>, p. 277. In comparison: the UK ranks 6th 
and Germany 17th on this indicator, see p. 355 and p. 187. 
3 See <worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/media/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2016.pdf>, p. 40-41 (Factor 7). The 
Netherlands scores .78 on Accessibility and affordability (with an overall score of .88), see p. 117, whereas the UK scores 
0.56 (with an overall score on civil justice of .75), and Germany .73 (with an overall score of .86), see p. 152 respectively 
p. 86.  
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speed and costs.4 Next to the aforementioned reform of civil procedure in 2002, two notable examples 
are the increase in the small claims limit for civil commercial cases that fall under the jurisdiction of 
the sub-district court (where representation by an attorney is not required, see section 6.2) from 
€ 5,000 to € 25,000 in 2011,5 and the simplification and digitalisation of civil procedure that has been 
set in motion with the governmental programme ‘Quality and Innovation’ (KEI) as launched in 2012.6 
At the same time, austerity measures have affected the civil justice system as well; publicly funded 
legal aid has decreased, court charges for claims over € 25,000 have increased – although a legislative 
proposal to introduce cost-effective court charges was withdrawn – and, as mentioned, the judicial 
organization has been restructured.7 Some fear that the successful reforms will be endangered by new 
austerity measures,8 others see it as a boost for further innovation, also outside the judicial arena.9 A 
case in point is the surge in privatization to diminish the pressure on the judicial system. Various initi-
atives are directed towards reducing court-based and formal dispute resolution, focusing on reconcil-
iation and the underlying interests of parties. The Netherlands has a strong and well-developed tradi-
tion of extrajudicial dispute resolution,10 and the judiciary continues to develop working methods that 
better align with parties’ needs and stimulate parties to settle instead of litigating.11 One of the main 
principles of Dutch civil procedure is party autonomy. This is placed, however, within a framework of 
judicial case management; with regard to the course of litigation, the traditional concept of judicial 
passiveness is on the wane. An influential report by Asser/Groen/Vranken on the fundamentals of civil 
litigation has emphasized that since the 2002 reforms, litigation is a shared responsibility between 
courts and litigants,12 and some have argued that the laissez faire attitude in civil litigation has been 
abandoned, albeit implicitly.13 Generally, litigants control the scope of litigation, the presentation of 
                                                             
 
4 Two notable studies are Asser e.a. 2006 and De Bock 2015. For quantitative reports on dispute resolution see, notably, 
the multi-annual reports Dispute resolution delta (Geschilbeslechtingsdelta) of 2003, 2008 and 2014, which are based 
on the UK Paths to Justice Studies, and the reports Rechtspleging Civiel en Bestuur, all available at www.wodc.nl. 
5 For an evaluation of this measure, see Eshuis & Geurts 2016.  
6 See, for instance, Asser e.a. 2015. 
7 See, for instance, Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 31753, 64 (legal aid), Kamerstukken II 2008/2009, 31758, 3 (court charges), 
and Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32891, 3 (reorganization of the judiciary). See also Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33071, 11 
(withdrawal of the legislative proposal on cost-effective court charges).  
8 Van Rhee 2014, p. 77. 
9 Brenninkmeijer e.a. 2015. 
10 See, for instance, the draft legislative proposal on the stimulation of mediation, available at internetconsul-
tatie.nl/wetmediation, Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33611, 3 and Meijer & Snijders 2015 on the modernisation of the 
arbitration regulation, and Knigge & Verhage 2016 and Weber & Hodges 2012 on the successful Dutch Consumer Com-
plaints Boards (Geschillencommissies) such as the KiFiD for financial services complaints. 
11 Such as the project eKantonrechter (online dispute resolution, see <rechtspraak.nl/Naar-de-rechter/Kantonrech-
ter/eKantonrechter/Pages/default.aspx>), and the pilot programmes ‘Gericht op Oplossing’ (short track, mediation-like 
litigation, see <rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Rechtbanken/Rechtbank-Amsterdam/Regels-en-
procedures/Paginas/Procedure-Gericht-Op-Oplossing.aspx>) and mediation in bankruptcy cases (see <baliebulletin-
middennederland.nl/rechtbank-midden-nederland-start-pilot-mediation-in-faillissementen/>). On more judicial inno-
vations, initiatives and case management see, for instance, Steenberghe 2009, Dozy & Valk 2010, Dozy 2012, Smilde & 
Van Leuven 2013, and Dijkstra 2014.  
12 Asser e.a. 2006. 
13 Verkerk 2011, p. 30. 
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facts and the commencement and conclusion of a case, but courts’ discretionary powers to interfere 
and manage the course of litigation have gained importance and usage since 2002.14 
 
The focus on negotiations, settlement and case management is also noticeable in the design of the 
collective redress mechanisms. As mentioned in section 2.2.4, both the collective action and the 
WCAM regulation, as well as the proposed reform of collective action, stimulate or even revolve 
around negotiations and consensual dispute resolution. Furthermore, an important role is allocated 
to private representative organisations.15 
 
The Dutch government and the judiciary also focus on the international position of Dutch civil justice, 
and foreign law firms might be increasingly inclined to set up shop in the Netherlands or cooperate 
with Dutch law firms.16 For instance, as of 2016, parties can opt to litigate in English before the mari-
time chamber of the Rotterdam District Court in cases concerning maritime and transport law and the 
international sale of goods,17 while for international commercial cases, a pending legislative proposal 
aims to introduce the Dutch Commercial Court and Court of Appeal.18 Within the context of collective 
redress, the government continues to put the spotlight on the WCAM regulation and its (inter)national 
success.19 In response to concerns that were raised against the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s liberal 
reasoning on its international jurisdiction in the Converium case, the Minister of Security and Justice 
stated that he would look closely at the developments to see whether they require a further regulation 
of the WCAM, but that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s judgment shows that the WCAM also pro-
vides foreign companies with an effective method to end a large-scale international dispute. The min-
ister furthermore noted that the international jurisdiction was not contested by any of the interested 
parties.20  
6.2 The regulation and supervision of the legal services market 
The Dutch market for legal services can be qualified as a relatively open one. Attorneys (advocaten), 
bailiffs and notaries are regulated by law and are also self-regulated. In general, others are free to 
provide legal services, and for activities such as debt collection they are not required to obtain a licence 
or authorization. Consequentially, various types of other providers operate in the legal services 
market, such as in-house lawyers, legal advice or debt collection agents, mediators, and, in particular, 
                                                             
 
14 See, for instance, Van Schaick 2016, no. 8 and De Groot 2012.  
15 See section 6.4.4.2.  
16 See, for instance, ‘Nederland wordt straks paradijs voor massaclaims; Rijk gaat wetgeving verbeteren’, Financieele 
Dagblad 29 december 2011 and Kaal & Painter 2012. See also section 6.5.6.2. 
17 See <rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Procedure-Rules-for-proceedings-in-English.pdf>. The chamber also 
offers English summaries of port-related civil court rulings, see <rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisa-
tie/Rechtbanken/Rechtbank-Rotterdam/Over-de-rechtbank/Organisatie/Paginas/English-summaries-of-civil-court-
cases.aspx>. 
18 Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34761, 3. 
19 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31762, 1, p. 8.  
20 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33126, 7, p. 7. 
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legal expenses insurers.21 The number of households with such insurance has increased from 24% in 
2004 to 42% in 2013.22 As of 2011, the growth of the bar has slightly declined,23 and in the period 2012-
2017, a legal services provider for (seven) legal expenses insurers was the fastest growing provider as 
to the number of attorneys employed.24 It is likely that these developments are – also – related to the 
aforementioned increase in the small claims limit from € 5,000 to € 25,000 in 2011. 
  
Either way, attorneys have retained their monopoly on legal representation in civil cases that do not 
fall under the jurisdiction of the sub-district court or (for defendants) that of the preliminary relief 
judge who deals with summary proceedings and temporary provisions.25 Consequentially, civil profes-
sional liability rules aside,26 Dutch attorneys are bound by professional and disciplinary rules and reg-
ulation.27 In 2014, the Attorneys Act was revised after a long and fierce debate, particularly on the – 
ultimately largely in vain – attempt by the Minister of Security and Justice to strengthen the supervi-
sion of attorneys.28 Attorneys are supervised by the local and national (dean of the) Bar Association 
(Orde van Advocaten, a public law body).29 The local bar associations are overseen by the Supervisory 
Council (College van Toezicht).30 Client-attorney disputes on, inter alia, the quality of representation 
or the fees charged can be resolved before the district court or, if agreed upon, before the Disputes 
Committee for the Legal Profession (Geschillencommissie Advocatuur).31 Attorneys’ behaviour that 
– allegedly – has infringed disciplinary rules is dealt with by the dean of the local bar association and, 
                                                             
 
21 See Van Velthoven & Klein Haarhuis 2010, p. 120, Holthinrichs 2013, p. 97, Ter Voert & Klein Haarhuis 2016, p. 116-
117 and Eshuis & Geurts 2016, p. 97 ff. 
22 Ter Voert & Klein Haarhuis 2016, p. 34-35. Eshuis & Geurts have shown through peer ratings and party evaluations 
of the quality of representation, that legal expenses insurers score the highest – better than, for instance, independent 
attorneys; see Eshuis & Geurts 2016, p. 97 ff. A game changer for the popularity of legal expenses insurance might have 
been the ECJ’s decision in the Sneller v. DAS case that stated that, generally, a legal expenses insurance policy holder is 
free to choose his/her attorney, including in proceedings before the sub-district court. See Case-442/12, Sneller v. DAS 
Nederlandse Rechtsbijstand Verzekeringsmaatschappij, and on its consequences for the Dutch legal services market 
see, for instance, Holthinrichs 2013. 
23 Verkijk 2014; see also the 2016 annual report of the Bar Association, available at <advocatenorde.nl/nieuws/nova-
publiceert-jaarverslag-2016>, p. 16. 
24 SRK Rechtsbijstand; see the annual report ‘State of the Bar’, available at <advocatiemagazine.sdu.nl/maart-
2017#!/de-stand-advocatuur-en-notariaat>. 
25 Sections 79, 255 and 353 Rv. 
26 For which liability insurance is mandatory, pursuant to section 6.24 Regulations for attorneys (Verordening op de 
advocatuur).  
27 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32382, 7, p. 2. The Attorneys Act (Advocatenwet) is the main source. In addition, the Reg-
ulations for attorneys, the Code of Conduct (Gedragsregels 1992) and the Code of Conduct for for Lawyers in the Euro-
pean Union provide the (self-)regulatory framework that attorneys have to comply with. The disciplinary board and the 
court of appeal (see hereafter) can use the rules in the non-binding Code of conduct as a guideline to interpret the open 
norms of the Attorneys Act (in particular, section 46) and the Regulations for attorneys; see, for instance, De Groot-van 
Leeuwen 2016, p. 529-530, with further references. On the reciprocity between civil professional liability and discipli-
nary measures see, for instance, Van Dam-Lely 2016. 
28 On the legislative proposal (32382) and the new Attorneys Act see, for instance, Bannier 2011, Verkijk 2014 and 
Hesemans 2015. 
29 Sections 26 and 45a Attorneys Act. 
30 Section 45i Attorneys Act. 
31 Section 28 Attorneys Act in conjunction with section 6.29 Regulations for attorneys. 
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if the complaint remains unresolved or if the dean deems it to be necessary, before the Disciplinary 
Board (Raad van Discipline) and the Disciplinary Court of Appeal (Hof van Discipline).32 
 
As of 2014, the Attorneys Act lists the five core principles that provide the legal framework for as-
sessing an attorney’s professional behaviour: independence, partiality, professionalism, integrity and 
confidentiality.33 The Code of conduct (Gedragsregels) also reflects these principles. The focus on a 
negotiated settlement, as discussed in the previous section, is also ingrained in the code; section 3 
stipulates that such a settlement is often preferable to a litigated outcome. The Code of conduct also 
stipulates that an attorney is required to examine whether the client is eligible for public legal aid, that 
its remuneration should be reasonable, that contingency fees are generally not allowed, and that an 
attorney is required to inform a client of the financial consequences of pursuing its claim.34 Attorneys 
who hold client funds are required to set up a trust account (derdengeldenrekening).35 Attorneys are 
not allowed to grant or receive remuneration or a fee for securing an engagement referral fee (pro-
visieverbod), although this prohibition is criticised.36 Until 1989, they were also not allowed to market 
and advertise their services.37 Currently, social media activities are increasing and the growing compe-
tition between the various legal services providers has boosted marketing strategies; however, it is 
still not common for attorneys to advertise their services other than in legal and professional jour-
nals.38 
 
Within the context of collective redress, various special purpose vehicles – such as representative or-
ganizations that aim to protect the interests of aggrieved parties – complement or compete with at-
torneys’ legal services.39 In court, they need to be represented by an attorney, unless the amount in 
dispute does not exceed € 25,000 (which is less likely to occur within the context of mass litigation). 
General civil law requirements aside, including corporate law and admissibility rules in collective re-
dress regulation, such organizations are not specifically regulated by law.40 As opposed to attorneys, 
they are, for instance, not bound by restrictions on contingency fees and are not required to set up a 
trust account. Anyone can establish a special purpose vehicle. In some mass harm events, legal ex-
penses insurers have done so as well, in order to protect the interests of insured class members.41  
 
A claim vehicle that acts as a representative organization in a collective action or WCAM settlement 
can be either a foundation (stichting) or an association (vereniging) with full legal capacity. According 
                                                             
 
32 Section 46c and 46d Attorneys Act. 
33 Section 10a Attorneys Act.  
34 Sections 24-26 Code of conduct and section 7.7(1) Regulations for attorneys. See further section 6.3.2. 
35 Section 6.18 ff Regulations for attorneys. 
36 Section 2(2) Code of conduct. See, for instance, Gloudemans-Voogd 2016, p. 28-29. 
37 Pursuant to sections 7-9 of the predecessor to the Code of conduct (Ereregelen 1968) and sections 37-38 of the Code 
of conduct 1980 (Gedragsregels 1980). See Wladimiroff 1993.  
38 See <legalcoffee.nl/2015/08/advocaten-zijn-slecht-in-marketing-zo-moet-het-wel/>. 
39 See Cornegoor 2009, Lemstra 2009 and Van Boom 2010, p. 167-177. On the two types of special purpose vehicles 
that can be distinguished, representative organizations and vehicles that bundle assigned claims or mandates, see sec-
tion 6.4.4. 
40 See also section 6.4.4 ff. 
41 For instance, in the DSB case that, ultimately, resulted in a WCAM settlement; see section 6.5.4.2. 
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to Dutch law, foundations and associations are legal entities established for a particular goal. Although 
both entities are allowed to be driven by profits, profits cannot be paid out to the founders or (board) 
members. Any profits made must be distributed in line with the goal of the foundation or association.42 
Those governing the foundations and associations are eligible to obtain a salary. In contrast to foun-
dations, which are governed by a board of directors, associations consist of members with legal obli-
gations and rights, such as voting rights during the annual general meeting. Because of the less dem-
ocratic organizational structure, which seems to be more practical for their purpose, representative 
organizations are mostly established as foundations.43  
 
At one point, the diversity of representative organizations was said to confuse consumers as to which 
one to trust and participate in, and the – allegedly – liable parties saw themselves confronted with 
various opponents that all stated to protect the interests of the class members.44 This, and media crit-
icism about the performance of certain (board members of) representative organizations, incited a 
group of practitioners with a proven track record to establish the Claimcode, a self-regulatory initia-
tive. The Claimcode went into effect in July 2011 and lays down general provisions on the good gov-
ernance of representative organizations, aiming to give consumers more clarity and guarantees on the 
organizations that act on their behalf and to end their proliferation.45 It is based on the principle of 
‘comply or explain’ and consists of six principles and some explanatory comments on, among other 
things, the composition, task and remuneration of the organizations’ (supervisory) board. Neither the 
representative organization nor its (in)direct stakeholders should pursue profit and the board should 
be independent and avoid conflicts of interest; it should not, for instance, conclude a contract with an 
entity in which a (supervisory) board member has a stake.46 The operation of Dutch representative 
organizations and the effectiveness of the Claimcode will be further discussed in section 6.4.4.2 ff. At 
this place it is relevant to note that additionally, in 2016, a bill was introduced to improve the corporate 
governance of, inter alia, associations and foundations.47 The proposal includes i) clarification of the 
responsibilities and duties of (supervisory) boards (in short, to act in the interest of the company and 
its affiliated enterprise), ii) their position in a case of a conflict of interests (in short, to refrain from 
participating in the debate or decision-making on matters that involve those interests), iii) the possi-
bility to hold board members personally liable in the case of the company’s bankruptcy, and iv) clari-
fication of the rules on their discharge, for instance, if they neglect their duties. As to the liability of 
board members, under current law, they can already be held personally liable for damages, both jointly 
and severably; and both internally (towards the company) and externally (towards third parties).48 
However, this requires ‘serious blame’ (ernstig verwijt) to be attached to the person(s) held liable, 
which is generally considered to be a high threshold. There is no such case law within the context of 
                                                             
 
42 Section 2:285(3) BW (foundation) and section 2:26(3) BW (association). 
43 Huls & Van Doorn 2007, p. 54; Lemstra 2009, p. 40. See also section 6.5.4.2. 
44 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33126, 3, p. 4-5 and 12. 
45 Lemstra & Okhuijsen 2010, p. 160 and 162. The Claimcode is available at <stichtingservice.nl/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/07/claimcode-voor-claimstichtingen.pdf>. 
46 Principles 2, 4 and 5 of the Claimcode. 
47 Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 34491, 3. See, for instance, Blanco Fernández e.a. 2016 and Bartman e.a. 2016.  
48 Sections 2:9 BW (internal liability) and 6:162 BW (external liability).  
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collective redress. In section 6.5.4.2, I will return to the discharge of board members when discussing 
a recent example thereof within the context of collective redress. 
  
The (supervision of) Dutch financial markets is governed by the Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het 
financieel toezicht, Wft). The financial markets authority AFM is responsible for authorizing financial 
enterprises and supervising compliance with, inter alia, the Wft. A legal services provider might be 
qualified as a financial enterprise and be required to operate under a licence if the nature of its advice 
and/or intermediary services gives rise to such authorization.49 For instance, in 2009, the AFM stated 
that some representative organizations that were active in the DSB case might be regarded as provid-
ers that required a licence.50  
 
Third-party litigation funding is still in its infancy in the Netherlands. Currently, there are three active 
funders: Liesker Legal (as of 2011), Redbreast (as of 2015) and Capaz (as of 2016).51 So far, litigation 
funding has remained unregulated and unsupervised. General civil law applies to the funding arrange-
ment, which will be discussed hereafter in section 6.4.3. 
6.3 Litigation costs and costs shifting 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Two key factors of civil litigation are its costs and the way they are shifted between parties at the end 
of litigation. These factors are part of the litigation risk and are thereby highly relevant, possibly even 
crucial for the decision to pursue a claim in court or dealing with the dispute otherwise.52 In the fol-
lowing, I will discuss the main principles regarding these two factors, and some related topics.53 
6.3.2 Litigation costs 
In the Netherlands, both claimant(s) and defendant(s) pay court charges, save in cases before the sub-
district court, where only claimants pay court charges.54 The charges are statutorily fixed and are linked 
to categorized amounts in dispute.55 Thus, they are predictable in advance. They have to be paid in 
advance; a case will not be considered otherwise.56 The charges are capped; for 2017, at € 3,894 for 
claims larger than € 100,000.57 In 2011, a proposal for cost-based court fees (‘the polluter pays’) met 
with such fierce criticism that it was withdrawn in 2013.58 Within the context of collective redress, it is 
                                                             
 
49 Pursuant to section 1:1 in conjunction with sections 2:75-2:85 Financial Supervision Act.  
50 See Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2009/10, 1243, p. 2641-2642 and, for instance, <volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2680/Econo-
mie/article/detail/362397/2009/11/23/AFM-DSB-clubs-opereren-buiten-de-wet.dhtml>. 
51 In the past, some similar parties were active; see Kortmann 2009, p. 790, Tuil 2010, p. 408, Van Almelo 2012, p. 29-
31.  
52 See, for instance, Velthoven & Klein Haarhuis 2010, p. 202. 
53 See, more elaborately, De Jonge-Wiemans 2007, Tuil 2010 and Croes & Van Os 2012. 
54 Sections 3(1) and 4(1)(b) Wgbz. 
55 See Table VIII in section 6.3.4. For 2017, see Stcrt. 2016, 67519. 
56 Sections 127a and 282a Rv and section 3(3) Wgbz. 
57 These are the district court charges; for appellate cases, the cap is set at € 5,200, and for an appeal in cassation at 
€ 6,504. For the sub-district court, the cap is set at € 939 for cases with a value over € 12,500.  
58 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33071, 11. 
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relevant to note that when numerous individual claims are bundled into one action, each claim will 
still be individually examined and the court might deal with the claims differently as the law and facts 
indicate.59 Normally, if the claimants are represented by the same attorney and issue an identical 
statement, the amalgamated amounts in dispute dictate the amount of the court charges.60 However, 
if the individual claims result in different defence strategies, the court might split the action into sep-
arate ones and require each claimant to pay those court charges based on its individual amount in 
dispute.61 
 
Attorney fees form the largest portion of civil litigation costs. Although it is difficult to generalize, they 
approximately make up 70 to 90% of the overall litigation costs.62 There are several types of attorney 
remuneration. For a long time the most common one has been the hourly rate.63 Such a fee is freely 
negotiable, as long as the charged fee is ‘reasonable in light of the circumstances’.64 In practice, the 
rates vary significantly, depending on the experience and specialization of the attorney and/or the 
nature or complexity of the case. Estimates on fee rates have been made, but the outcomes vary con-
siderably.65 In 2012, Croes and Van Os reported that the average hourly rate was € 173 for a starting 
attorney and € 471 for a partner in a law firm. They noted, however, that more specific information 
on the fees actually charged was unavailable.66 Nowadays, Dutch attorneys are increasingly experi-
menting with alternative types of remuneration, such as fixed fees for a particular case, project or 
period.67 Attorneys enter into such a fee arrangement with repeat players such as banks and legal 
expenses insurers; empirical research shows that they are less inclined to do so with consumers and 
SMEs.68 In civil cases, standard activities aside, attorneys find it difficult to accurately predict the time 
investment, and some state that fixed fees demotivate such clients to accurately and orderly provide 
the documents that are necessary to pursue the claim. The study also shows that price and quality 
competition between Dutch attorneys is low, and that they have a competition advantage over other 
legal services providers as consumers are not always aware whether legal representation is indeed 
required.69 Some respondents note that attorneys are generally conservative and innovative business 
                                                             
 
59 On this method to obtain collective redress, joinder or consolidation, see section 6.5.1. 
60 Sections 3(1) and 15(1) Wgbz. 
61 See Rb. Utrecht 17 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BG7280 (Beursklacht/Defam), consideration 4.9.2. 
62 De Jonge-Wiemans 2007, p. 14. 
63 See Tuil 2010, p. 413.  
64 Pursuant to section 25(1) Code of conduct. 
65 See for an overview Croes & Van Os 2012, p. 18. 
66 Croes & Van Os 2012, p. 19-20.  
67 See Winter e.a. 2015, p. 31 ff. See also the data provided by the Rabobank, available at <rabobankcijfersen-
trends.nl/index.cfm?action=branche&branche=Advocatenkantoren>. 
68 Winter e.a. 2015, p. 31, 34 and 36. 
69 Winter e.a. 2015, p. 37-38 and 90. 
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models are still lacking.70 Third and finally, an attorney fee might be a result-based one, in the form of 
a conditional or contingency fee. These types of remuneration will be addressed in section 6.4.2. 
 
In addition to court charges and attorney fees, litigation costs in summons proceedings can include 
bailiff fees and witness and/or expert costs, which are all statutorily limited.71 With regard to witness 
and expert costs, in practice, parties often negotiate a higher rate.72  
6.3.3 Security for costs 
In a case of doubt concerning a claimant’s solvency and its potential (in)capacity to pay a costs order, 
there are two provisions in Dutch law that permit a court to order the claimant to provide security for 
the potential costs order (proceskostenzekerheid), should the opposing party so request. One applies 
to claimants without a domicile or permanent residence in the Netherlands, the other to consumer 
organizations that bring a 6:240 BW collective action (the assessment of general conditions).73 Both 
options are strictly regulated, and the courts allow them only exceptionally. Many treaties exclude the 
possibility to obtain such security from a foreigner, which renders the rule somewhat feeble. As to the 
6:240 BW collective action, this action is only sporadically lodged, and published case law shows no 
usage of the security for costs rule. 
 
Some have suggested enlarging the scope of this rule, that is, to require any claimant to deposit a 
security for costs, as – allegedly – a costs award is often irrecoverable.74 In light of section 6 ECHR, such 
a general rule might be difficult to implement or enforce.  
 
In spite of the inapplicability of the aforementioned rules, one entrepreneurial party has provided 
security for costs in two collective redress cases, in order to address a potential costs award.75 This 
may have been incited by the fact that the defendants had contested the vehicle’s business model. In 
the recently proposed collective action for damages, a security for costs rule is not included – which 
might be related to the generally relatively low costs order in the Netherlands.76 This brings me to the 
costs shifting system. 
6.3.4 Costs shifting 
In the Netherlands, too, at the end of litigation the losing party has to reimburse the winning party’s 
litigation costs.77 The rule was implemented to guarantee access to justice while preventing abusive 
                                                             
 
70 Winter e.a. 2015, p. 37. 
71 On bailiff expenses, see Stb. 2001, 325 (Besluit tarieven ambtshandelingen gerechtsdeurwaarders), and for witnesses 
and experts, see Stb. 2010, 727 (Besluit griffierecht burgerlijke zaken), section 2, which refers to Stb. 2003, 330 (Besluit 
tarieven in strafzaken 2003).  
72 Tuil 2010, p. 413. 
73 Sections 224 Rv respectively 1006 Rv. On the latter, see Kamerstukken II 1981, 16983, 1-3, p. 71. 
74 See Harreman & Tuil 2003, p. 57, Heemskerk 2004, p. 207-208, and Van Schaick 2016, no. 203. 
75 See Rb. Den Haag 17 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:15722 (CDC/Shell e.a.) and Rb. Amsterdam 10 May 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3166 (CDC/Kemira). See also section 6.5.3. 
76 See Tillema 2014, p. 338. 
77 Section 237 Rv.  
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litigation; costs would have to be distributed between parties in a manner in which ‘procedural risk 
and policy are taken into consideration’: 
 
‘over partijen te verdelen op een wijze waarbij aan overwegingen van procesrisico en procesbeleid 
mede betekenis wordt toegekend, onder meer om te voorkomen dat de voormelde vrijheid door de 
vrees voor een veroordeling tot omvangrijke proceskosten in gevaar zou worden gebracht.’78  
 
As litigation cannot be considered a tort, a costs award is neither damages nor a fine, but rather a 
principle of ‘fairness’.79  
 
In addition to the costs order, a court can award the prevailing party its extrajudicial costs (buiten-
gerechtelijke kosten) as patrimonial damage (vermogensschade). These costs are those incurred in the 
pre-trial phase, and include costs that result from determining damage and – tortious or contractual – 
liability, and costs from obtaining extrajudicial payment.80 This indemnification aims to put the ag-
grieved party in the hypothetical position he would have been in had the injurious event not oc-
curred,81 and can concern attorney fees, expert costs and debt collection costs.82 Extrajudicial costs 
are awarded if i) the defendant can be held liable for these costs,83 ii) the court deems both the amount 
of the costs and the fact that they have been incurred to be reasonable (dubbele redelijkheidstoets),84 
and iii) the costs do not fall under the scope of the costs order – see hereafter.85 If awarded, the rea-
sonably incurred costs that result from determining damage and liability are fully shifted to the liable 
party. Debt collection costs are generally reimbursed in accordance with statutorily fixed rates.86  
 
In spite of the loser pays rule, the Dutch costs shifting system cannot be considered to be a full English 
rule, since the losing party is not required to reimburse all of the prevailing party’s actual litigation 
costs – exceptions aside, see hereafter and the full indemnity costs shifting rule in intellectual property 
cases.87 Normally, bailiff, witness and court-appointed expert costs as well as court charges will be 
fully covered – unless parties have negotiated a higher rate than the statutorily fixed one.88 Attorney 
fees, however, are generally not fully shifted and, consequently, the costs award does not – necessarily 
                                                             
 
78 See Kamerstukken II 1980-81, 16593, 3, p. 8.  
79 See Haardt 1945, p. 14, Cleveringa 1972, p. 367 ff, Wesseling-van Gent, Minkjan & Holzhauer 1993, Sluijter 2011, p. 
45 ff, and Numann 2013. See also HR 27 June 1997, NJ 1997, 651 and HR 18 February 2005, NJ 2005, 216. 
80 Section 6:96(2)(b) and (c) BW, which has codified HR 3 April 1987, NJ 1988, 275, m.nt. C.J.H. Brunner (London/Drenth). 
See, for instance, Lindenbergh 2016.  
81 HR 26 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2797 (De Jonge/Scheper Ziekenhuis). 
82 Kamerstukken II 1975-76, 7729, 6-7, p. 90. 
83 Section 6:95 BW. Causation between the injurious event and these costs is required, actually incurred loss resulting 
from the injurious event is not necessary; see HR 11 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7423 and HR 13 March 2015, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:586. 
84 The court can moderate the costs; see sections 6:101 and 6:109 BW and section 242 Rv.  
85 Sections 6:96(3)BW and 241 Rv. See, for instance, De Bock 2015a and Lindenbergh 2016. 
86 Stb. 2012, 141 (Besluit vergoeding voor buitengerechtelijke incassokosten), see section 2(1) and (2). 
87 Section 1019h Rv, which has implemented the IP Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EG, section 14. See, for instance, 
Vrendenbarg 2017. 
88 See section 6.3.2. 
222 
 
– reflect the prevailing party’s actual litigation costs. The extent to which the fees are shifted depends 
on how the costs are qualified. The extrajudicial costs that fall under the scope of the costs order 
include the attorney fees that relate to case instruction (such as the gathering of facts and evidence, 
and legal analysis) and preparation (such as ordering and selecting documents and drawing up a sum-
mons).89 These costs ‘change colour’ as soon as litigation is commenced; they are no longer considered 
to be extrajudicial costs, but costs for the recoverability of which the costs order rules apply.90 The 
distinction is relevant, because the reimbursable attorney fees under a costs order are calculated on 
a flat-rate basis. The rates (Liquidatietarief) are linked to categorized amounts in dispute, and the re-
imbursable fee furthermore depends on the number of procedural actions taken.91 Just as court 
charges, the rates are capped; since 2004, the maximum rate is € 3,211 per procedural action (see 
Table VIII hereafter). Although attorney fee rates vary, as a result of this system it is unlikely that the 
attorney fees are fully shifted. The recoverable amount has been said to vary between 25 to 90 per 
cent.92  
 
The Liquidatietarief is a non-binding guideline for courts, established by the judiciary and the Bar As-
sociation. In practice, normally the guideline is followed.93 Judges can deviate from it, but a deviation 
in the sense of full costs shifting requires thorough reasoning and circumstances that justify such de-
viation.94 Full costs shifting can take place through a substantive claim for damages based on an abuse 
of (procedural) law or tort.95 For instance, if the claim should not have been brought, given its clear 
lack of merits.96 Full(er) costs shifting can also occur after undue litigation conduct by the losing party. 
The court will assess whether the costs were reasonably incurred and the culpability of the litigants’ 
behaviour, such as delaying the proceedings,97 or infringing the obligation to (truth)fully state all facts 
that are relevant to the judgment.98  
 
There are three exceptions to the regular costs shifting rule. The court normally does not shift costs in 
family law cases, if both parties are partly successful, or if the court deems that the costs have been 
                                                             
 
89 Section 241 Rv; see also HR 14 January 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:AR2760. 
90 See critically, for instance, Van Dijk 2006. 
91 See <rechtspraak.nl/Voor-advocaten-en-juristen/Reglementen-procedures-en-formulieren/Civiel/Paginas/Liquida-
tietarief.aspx>. 
92 Tuil 2010, p. 415. 
93 See <rechtspraak.nl/Voor-advocaten-en-juristen/Reglementen-procedures-en-formulieren/Civiel/Paginas/Liquida-
tietarief.aspx>. See also Huydecoper 2007. 
94 See Kamerstukken II 1980-81, 16593, 3, p. 8 and Sluijter 2011. See also, for instance, HR 3 April 1998, NJ 1998, 571 
(Lindeboom/Beusmans) and HR 20 March 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG7995. 
95 Section 3:13 BW respectively section 6:162 BW. See, for instance, Hof Leeuwarden 3 August 2010, 
ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2010:BN3290, HR 6 April 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BV7828. 
96 HR 29 June 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA3516. 
97 HR 20 March 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG7995. See also De Bock 2015a.  




unreasonably incurred (nodeloos veroorzaakt).99 The court that has dealt with the case will make the 
costs award; there are no specialized costs judges or officers. 
  
Table VIII provides some examples of a Dutch claimant’s litigation risk as in the adverse costs order, 
which is added to the claimant’s own litigation costs. For instance, if the amount in dispute is € 30,000, 
and the defendant has undertaken four procedural actions (3,5 points according to the Liquidatie-
tarief),100 the court will order a costs award of € 3,951 in favour of the defendant. The defendant will 
have to bear any remaining costs that he has incurred.  
 



























Total 1,344 3,951 10,894 15,133 15,133 15,133 2,200 
Table VIII: The claimant’s cost risk (adverse costs order) in the Netherlands102 
The recent legislative proposal for a collective action for damages includes a one-way, full indemnity 
costs shifting rule in favour of the representative organization(s). This rule, as well as the cost rule for 
a WCAM settlement, will be discussed in section 6.5. Currently, the regular cost rules apply in collective 
actions. In that respect, it is important to reiterate that it is not yet possible to claim for damages in 
such an action and that most claims are aimed at obtaining a declaratory judgment.103 This renders 
the amount in dispute indefinite, and consequentially, one of the lowest rates in the Liquidatietarief 
applies (see Table VIII, final column). However, as mentioned, a court can award damages or deviate 
                                                             
 
99 See, for instance, HR 23 March 1979, NJ 1980, 125, HR 23 January 1987, NJ 1987, 962, HR 5 June 1987, NJ 1988, 41, 
and HR 5 October 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:ZC3694. See also Wesseling-van Gent, Minkjan & Holzhauer 1993, p. 3-4, Van 
der Aa & Sluijter 2009, p. 2480-81, Tuil 2010, p. 416, and Sluijter 2014, p. 48-49. 
100 A statement of defence, a motion, an appearance before the court, and a last written statement. 
101 Defendants do not pay court charges at the sub-district court; section 4(1)(b) Wgbz.  
102 The calculations are based on the court charges and Liquidatietarief in 2017, for civil cases at the (sub) district court 
(for appellate courts, the court charges deviate – i.e. they are larger), and a legal entity as a defendant (for natural 
persons, the court charges are lower). See <rechtspraak.nl/Uw-Situatie/Onderwerpen/Kosten-rechtszaak/Griffier-
echt/Paginas/Griffierecht-kanton.aspx>, <rechtspraak.nl/Uw-Situatie/Onderwerpen/Kosten-rechtszaak/Griffier-
echt/Paginas/Griffierecht-civiel.aspx> and <rechtspraak.nl/Voor-advocaten-en-juristen/Reglementen-procedures-en-
formulieren/Civiel/paginas/liquidatietarief.aspx>. It is important to note that the table demonstrates the claimant’s 
cost risk, not its actual litigation costs, and that it does not include other costs such as expert costs. The calculation is 
based on a complex case, with 3,5 ‘litigation points’ on the costs order scale (statement of defence, a motion, appear-
ance before the court and a last written statement).  
103 See section 2.2.4 and, hereafter, section 6.5.3. 
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from the Liquitatietarief. Occasionally, courts have found a reason to do so in the complexity and in-
herent costs of the specific collective action. In one, the costs award (as to the attorney fees) for the 
prevailing representative organization was uplifted by way of awarding the Liquidatietarief’s maximum 
instead of minimum rate.104 This resulted in reimbursable attorney fees of € 12.840 instead of € 1.808. 
In another collective action, the court – creatively – qualified part of the representative organization’s 
attorney fees as (reasonably incurred) extra-judicial costs that did not fall under the scope of the costs 
order.105 This resulted in an ‘additional’ award for attorney fees of € 31.833,28. 
 
A recent case law study has shown that full indemnification of the defendant due to the representative 
organization’s undue litigation conduct or abuse of procedural right (see before) rarely occurs in col-
lective actions:106 
 
‘I found 10 unique cases in which one of these grounds was invoked by the defendant (n=400). In only 
one of these cases did the court indeed find an infringement. That case involved an entrepreneurial 
representative organization that had filed a claim that was the same as a claim that had been previ-
ously filed (and dismissed, due to a technicality). Given the close affinity between both claimants (the 
‘new’ organization had changed its name slightly) and the fact that no new points of law were raised, 
the court of appeal found that the ‘new’ organization had abused its procedural right to litigate, and 
ordered it to pay the defendant’s actual litigation costs of both instances for the ‘second’ claim 
(€25,853).’  
6.3.5 Recovery of litigation funding costs 
The pursuit of collective redress can be a costly endeavour, particularly as to the attorney fees and, if 
incurred, expert costs. The funding routes will be discussed in section 6.4. Here, I will discuss whether 
claimants can recover litigation (funding) costs from their opponent(s) in the case of success. 
 
First, any representative organization might be able to recover its (reasonably incurred) extrajudicial 
costs that result from determining damage and liability. The costs that are recovered through the ad-
verse costs order already fall to the representative organization as the (prevailing) claimant. In addi-
tion, it may have incurred extrajudicial costs not covered by the costs order. A claim for such costs, 
however, falls to the individual claim owner.107 Consequentially, the liable party cannot be held liable 
for this damage towards the claimant in a collective action, the representative organization. Never-
theless, in 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that a prevailing representative organization can claim as 
damages its extrajudicial costs that result from determining damage and liability, even though the 
wrongdoer is not liable for these costs towards the representative organization.108 According to the 
Supreme Court, the representative organization can effectively settle mass damage in the aggrieved 
                                                             
 
104 Rb. Den Haag 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145 (Urgenda), consideration 4.110. See also Tillema 2016. 
105 Rb. Noord-Nederland 2 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:4185 (WAG/NAM), considerations 4.5.4-4.5.7. See 
also Tillema 2016. 
106 Tillema 2017, p. 235 ff. 
107 Such a claim does not fall under the excluded claim for damages under section 3:305a(3) BW, see Frenk 1994, p. 163 
ff. 
108 HR 13 October 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2077, AW2080 and AW2081. 
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parties’ interest by way of a collective action, and the individual aggrieved parties would be able to 
claim such damages in individual litigation. Thus, a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of section 6:96(2)(b) 
BW in conjunction with section 3:305a BW should result in the indemnification of the representative 
organization. Some have argued that this line of reasoning can also be applied to recover extrajudicial 
costs that have been incurred in the build-up to a WCAM settlement.109 To compensate costs for de-
termining liability might appear odd when combined with a ‘without prejudice’ clause that is often 
included in such a settlement, but this has not prevented parties from doing so in practice.110 
 
Second, under certain circumstances, individual claimants might be able to recover a contingency fee 
(the percentage of the proceeds) that is due to the entrepreneurial party. It is plausible that this fee 
not only compensates the entrepreneurial party for (pre-financing) its litigation costs, but equally co-
vers its risk of not being remunerated at all. What the fee specifically covers might not be explicitly 
arranged.111 Thus, in the past, some argued that courts will probably not allow a prevailing claimant 
to recover from the opponent this percentage instead of the concrete extrajudicial costs based on 
hourly billing.112 However, in 2014, the Supreme Court opened the way for qualifying the percentage 
as reasonably incurred extrajudicial costs under section 6:96(2)(b) and/or (c) BW.113 In the case at 
hand, a personal injury case, the opponent initially had denied liability, the aggrieved party was not 
capable of bearing the hourly attorney fees, and furthermore had argued that the specific percentage 
(15%) was common practice. The Supreme Court ruled that in light of the rationale of the provision (to 
place the aggrieved party in the position he would have been in had the injurious event not occurred) 
it might be justified to recover the contingency fee, and that courts need to consider all of the circum-
stances when assessing the reasonableness of (such) extrajudicial costs. Van Boom has argued that 
this judgment gives the Dutch courts – a marginal yet desirable – leeway to assess the reasonableness 
of the contingency fee arrangement.114 Such court control, however, might also render this reasona-
bleness unpredictable, thereby inciting entrepreneurial parties to place the risk of judicial interference 
on the aggrieved party.115 Lindenbergh therefore advocates practical guidelines along the lines of 
those for the experiment with attorney contingency fees (discussed hereafter in section 6.4.2). Such 
(self-)regulation has not yet been implemented. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned case concerned a personal injury claim and that 
the parties had settled rather than litigated. This is relevant as, generally, the extrajudicial costs (as to 
the attorney fees) would be covered by the adverse costs order (Liquidatietarief).116 Moreover, for 
                                                             
 
109 See Frenk 2007, under 1.4, Schonewille 2007, Tillema 2016a, p. 98 ff, and Tillema 2017, p. 240. 
110 See also section 6.5.6.2.  
111 See, for instance, Rb. Overijssel 1 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2016:4203.  
112 See also Bauw e.a. 1999, p. 29. 
113 HR 26 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2797 (De Jonge/Scheper Ziekenhuis). See, for instance, Hebly 2014, Eng-
berts 2015, Van Boom 2015, and Lindenbergh 2015.  
114 Van Boom 2015, p. 18.  
115 Lindenbergh 2015, under 6. 
116 As mentioned, this differs in intellectual property cases; there, a full costs shifting rule applies. In one such case (no 
mass damage event), the Supreme Court recently deemed acceptable the recovery of a – modest – success fee (an 
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collective redress, case law on the matter has yet to take shape. Since 2014, some district courts have 
ruled on a contingency fee in individual cases that followed a mass damage event (the Dexia affair).117 
The outcomes vary. In some cases, a district court has allowed the recovery of extrajudicial costs that 
were incurred to obtain extrajudicial payment (summons, settlement negotiations, issuing the opt-out 
statement, et cetera), even though most of these activities may have followed a repeated pattern as 
the lawyer represented numerous other aggrieved parties with similar claims. However, as the contin-
gency fee arrangement did not specify which costs it concerned, the recovery thereof was rejected 
and the costs were awarded in accordance with the statutorily fixed tariff.118 In other cases, the extra-
judicial costs (contingency fees) were rejected based on the legal grounds of the claim: as opposed to 
tortious or contractual liability, undue payment following the nullification of a contract cannot lead to 
awarding those extrajudicial costs that relate to determining liability and damage.119 In one case, the 
(same) district court ordered the claimant to demonstrate the reasonableness of the agreed percent-
age (30%), also in light of the fact that its lawyer represented numerous other aggrieved parties with 
similar claims. The court ruled that it would be unreasonable to hold the opponent liable for a contin-
gency fee that substantially exceeds the amount of hours spent, even though it might be difficult to 
specify the costs of all individual clients. In these circumstances, a comparison between a contingency 
fee outcome and the hours spent was deemed reasonable.120 
6.3.6 Liability for adverse costs 
The losing party is liable for the adverse costs order. In the exceptional circumstance that this party is 
non-existent or has not had the authority to instruct the attorney to litigate, the attorney can be held 
liable for the costs order.121 A collective action pursuant to 3:305a BW only binds the representative 
organization (and the defendant); an adverse costs order thus does not affect the class members – 
unless the organization and class members have contractually arranged otherwise. 
 
For collective redress through bundled claims, it depends on the construction of aggregation. Under 
Dutch law, the person entitled to bring a claim is not necessarily the original creditor of the obligation. 
A distinction can be made between the party whose rights or obligations are in dispute (materiële 
procespartij) and the litigant responsible for the procedural actions and decisions (formele procespar-
tij).122 This distinction is not a mere academic obscurity, because two different parties can each fulfil 
one of the roles. Depending on the underlying arrangement, the entrepreneurial party might bind class 
                                                             
 
uplift to the normal tariff in the case of success in an appeal in cassation) as part of the costs order; see HR 13 November 
2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3304. 
117 More specifically, the cases concern those individuals that opted out of the WCAM settlement. On this case, see also 
section 6.5.6.2.  
118 Rb. Overijssel 1 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2016:4203. 
119 Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 24 August 2016, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2016:6242; Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 31 August 2016, 
ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2016:5388, Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 7 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2016:5983, and Rb. Zeeland-
West-Brabant 3 May 2017, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2017:2516. 
120 Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant 10 August 2016, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2016:5217. 
121 Section 245 Rv. See also Sluijter 2011, p. 57.  
122 See, for instance, the opinion of the Advocate General of the Supreme Court of 15 December 2006 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2006:AZ1496, consideration 2.5 ff, with further references.  
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members concerning the adverse costs award, even though the latter were not (formal) parties to the 
proceedings. Three types of legal construction can be distinguished.123 In the case of bundled assign-
ments (cessie pursuant to section 3:83 BW in conjunction with section 3:94 BW), the entrepreneurial 
party has become the claim owner and acts as a litigant, and is thus liable for the adverse costs order. 
In the case of bundled mandates (lastgeving pursuant to section 7:414 BW), the entrepreneurial party 
is contractually bound to collect the debt and, if necessary, to pursue the claim in court. The arrange-
ment can include an agreement that, although the rights of the claim owner are in dispute, the entre-
preneurial party acts in its own name and on its own account. The entrepreneurial party is then liable 
for the costs order as a formal and substantive party.124 If the entrepreneurial party acts in the name 
of the class members based on powers of attorney (volmacht pursuant to section 3:60 BW), the attor-
ney is not considered to be litigant; its actions are attributed to the class members.125 They remain 
‘substantive party’ to the proceedings and, thus, are liable for the adverse costs order. In all three 
situations, the contractual arrangement between the entrepreneurial party and individual class mem-
bers might stipulate who, in the end, bears which costs in the relation between the entrepreneurial 
party and the class member. For entrepreneurial parties that operate under a contingency fee arrange-
ment, this will most likely be the entrepreneurial party. However, if the entrepreneurial party is not 
the claimant, such as a third-party litigation funder, it is not likely that the defendant can hold this 
party liable for the adverse costs order, that is, the cost rules do not enable the defendant to widen 
the scope of liability.  
6.4 Private litigation funding 
6.4.1 Introduction 
As in many other jurisdictions, the availability of public legal aid funding in the Netherlands remains 
under pressure. Parties with limited financial means can apply for the funding of (a share of the) legal 
expenses.126 The number of legal aid subsidies (toevoegingen) was annually increasing between 2000 
and 2014; however, as of then, the number has been declining,127 and public legal aid continues to be 
subject to cutbacks.128 Consequently, the topic of private litigation funding has gained in importance. 
In the following, I will discuss the legal basics of private litigation funding by attorneys, third-party 
litigation funders and special purpose vehicles – the operation of these entrepreneurial parties within 
the context of collective redress will be further discussed in section 6.5. As mentioned, legal expenses 
insurers have taken up a significant part of the Dutch legal services market. As these insurances are 
mainly relevant within the context of ‘regular’ dispute resolution, they will not be discussed in detail; 
however, they will be addressed in section 6.5.6.2 within the context of a WCAM settlement.  
                                                             
 
123 See also sections 6.4.4.1 and 6.5.3. 
124 Hof Den Haag 18 April 2006, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2006:AZ3212.  
125 See Biemans 2011, p. 118, with further references. 
126 Section 18(2) Dutch Constitution (Grondwet) in connection with sections 12 and 34 Legal Aid Act (Wet op de rechts-
bijstand). 
127 Peters, Van Gammeren-Zoeteweij & Combrink-Kuiters 2016, p. 69. 
128 Such as an increase in the individual’s own contribution, raising the threshold for claim controversy or the type of 
case applicable for funding, and adjustments in the reimbursability of attorney fees. See, for instance, Kamerstukken II 
2013/14, 31753, 64 and, for a brief history on subsidized legal aid in the Netherlands, Wolfsen 2015, p. 40 ff. 
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6.4.2 Attorney litigation funding 
Dutch attorneys are allowed to operate under a conditional fee, that is, to charge a fixed fee or an 
hourly, basic (cost-effective) fee and increase it with a ‘bonus’ fee or a percentage of the proceeds in 
the case of success.129 As mentioned, attorneys are restricted from offering litigation funding by way 
of a contingency fee arrangement, that is, a ‘no cure, no pay’ arrangement combined with a percent-
age of the proceeds (quota pars litis).130 The government does not allow such a construction in cases 
other than mere debt collection, fearing that this might endanger the attorney’s independence and 
integrity.131 However, since 2014, a 5-year pilot scheme has been in operation that, under strict cir-
cumstances, allows a ‘no win, no fee’ arrangement in personal injury cases: the attorney receives an 
‘upgraded’ hourly fee in the case of success (success fee), and nothing if the case is unsuccessful.132 
The underlying idea is to improve access to justice for personal injury victims who are not eligible for 
subsidized legal aid.133 One of the key elements of the experiment is that the arrangement is only 
allowed if the opponent has not recognized liability and/or causality between liability and (the extent 
of) the damage is unclear. Furthermore, the percentage of the success fee is maximized at 100% of the 
regular hourly fee, with a cap of 25% of the proceeds (variant A), or the percentage of the success fee 
is maximized at 150% and the cap is set at 35% of the proceeds (variant B).134 Depending on the variant, 
the client bears the litigation costs other than the attorney fees (variant A), or the attorney bears these 
costs, but only in the case of loss (variant B). After five years, the government will decide whether or 
not to enact the provisional regulation into legislation. Attorneys that take part in the pilot scheme 
need to register at the local Bar Association and provide data for the evaluation. Recently, it was re-
ported that due to the large financial risks few attorneys have made use of this possibility (64 arrange-
ments were reported).135 In the recent legislative proposal for a collective action for damages, the 
minister reaffirmed his intention not to further allow contingency fees for attorneys, as they poten-
tially affect attorneys’ independence.136 
 
Some attorneys have been accused of circumventing the ban on contingency fees. For instance, in 
2010, the Disciplinary Court of Appeal had to rule in a case in which a personal injury victim had as-
signed her claim for damages to a third-party as she could no longer afford to pay her attorney. The 
contract entailed that the funder would receive 40% of the proceeds in the case of success. Further-
more, the claim would be reassigned if the client turned down a settlement offer, with the obligation 
to repay the funder’s costs so far incurred plus the proceeds that the funder would have obtained had 
the case been settled. The client’s attorney had recommended this funder, with whom he had close 
                                                             
 
129 See Hof van Discipline 10 November 1997, no. 2589, Advocatenblad 30 April 1999, p. 514, and Hof van Discipline 9 
February 1998, no. 2474, Advocatenblad 19 March 1999, p. 346 – see also hereafter.  
130 Section 7.7(1) Regulations for attorneys and section 25(2) and (3) Code of conduct; in line with section 3.3 of the 
Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Union. 
131 See Stb. 2005, 123, p. 6. See also Faure, Hartlief & Philipsen 2006, p. 26 ff. 
132 Directive of the Dutch Bar Association (Verordening to wijziging van de Verordening op de praktijkuitoefening (on-
derdeel Resultaatgerelateerde beloning)), Stcrt. 25 juli 2013, no. 20779. See, for instance, Van Boom & De Jong 2014. 
133 See the Explanatory memorandum to the directive, page 4. 
134 Sections 1, 3 and 4 of the Directive. 
135 Knoop, B., ‘No cure, no pay slaat niet aan bij letselschadeadvocaat’, FD 27 March 2017. 
136 Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34608, 3, p. 12. 
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family ties, as it later transpired. The client then approached the disciplinary court and tried to nullify 
the assignment before the Amsterdam District Court.137 The Disciplinary Court of Appeal deemed the 
attorney’s behaviour reprehensible. The construction itself did not infringe the ban on contingency 
fees, as it was not established that the attorney would receive a part of the percentage (he had in-
voiced his hourly fees). However, according to the disciplinary court, the attorney had failed to give 
sufficient and proper advice on obtaining public legal aid and on the consequences of the funding 
contract. Furthermore, he had advised the funder on the chances of success and a suitable funding 
construction and had thus jeopardized his independence. The attorney was disbarred for a month. 
Nevertheless, in the civil case, the funding construction was upheld. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
ruled that since the ban on contingency fees did not apply to the funder, the assignment was not 
contrary to public policy pursuant to section 3:40 BW, nor otherwise void. Although an excessive per-
centage could be considered to be contrary to public policy under certain circumstances, the claimant 
had not sufficiently argued as such.138  
 
If a contingency fee arrangement is found to be contrary to public policy, under certain circumstances 
the arrangement can be converted into a valid one, such as an hourly or conditional fee arrange-
ment.139  
 
Within the context of collective redress, little case law has been published on the remuneration of 
attorneys. I will highlight two notable cases; one recent, one less so. First, in 1997, the Disciplinary 
Court of Appeal had to rule on the remuneration of an attorney who represented the aggrieved parties 
of a pyramid scheme.140 At one point, the number of aggrieved parties that applied for the services of 
the attorney in question had started to increase (around 700 persons). Hence, he had established an 
association, of which his clients had to become members and to which they had to pay a fee of 
Dfl. 250,141 which was intended to fund two test cases. The attorney would bill the association 85% of 
his regular fee and would receive 15% of the proceeds in the case of success. At the time of the appeal, 
the construction had yielded the law firm approximately Dfl. 500,000. The court of appeal deemed the 
construction to be effective and in light of the circumstances (the sudden adhesion of clients) a rea-
sonable route to serve the interests of ‘an unusually large number’ of aggrieved parties (at the time of 
the disciplinary hearing, it had grown to approximately 2,700 clients/members). The court did not con-
sider the construction to be mandatory, as the aggrieved parties were free to participate or not. Fur-
thermore, the construction had attracted a large number of aggrieved parties but none had raised 
objections against the arrangement. The total earnings of the law firm were deemed substantial but 
not (yet) excessive, as the amount in dispute in the individual claims (around Dfl. 5,000) was found to 
be in balance with the individual payment and the law firm had taken on a considerable workload in a 
                                                             
 
137 See Hof van Discipline 11 January 2010, LJN YA0254, L&S 2010/14, and Hof Amsterdam 13 December 2011, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2011:BU8763. See also Van Boom 2012. 
138 See, for instance, Rb. Arnhem 5 April 2006, ECLI:RBARN:2006:AW7225 (on a loan with an excessive interest rate, 
1,000%, which was found to be contrary to public policy).  
139 See Rb. Den Haag 16 February 2007, ECLI:RBSGR:2007:AZ8717.  
140 Hof van Discipline 10 November 1997, no. 2589, Advocatenblad 30 April 1999, p. 514.  
141 At the current exchange rate, approximately € 113.  
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short period of time. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the law firm would have to consult the associ-
ation on a reasonable distribution of the proceeds, should the percentage of 15% result in even more 
substantial earnings.  
 
A more recent case in point is the collective action that concerns the gas drilling in Groningen, which 
caused minor earthquakes resulting in damage to homeowners. A foundation has taken it upon itself 
to hold those involved in the drilling liable for damages.142 It only represents those homeowners that 
have entered or will enter into a participation agreement with the foundation and agree to be repre-
sented by a specific law firm. Part of the participation agreement is the payment – to the law firm – of 
a fixed fee (€ 100) and, in the case of success, 5 to 10 % of the proceeds.143 The percentage is labelled 
a ‘success fee’, and the construction seems to have the characteristics of the aforementioned – per-
mitted – conditional fee arrangement, as it can be argued that the aggregation of € 100 per class mem-
ber (in 2015, some 900 members had registered) is likely to approximate the – required – basic (cost-
effective) fee for the law firm. Nevertheless, the law firm is currently under scrutiny due to an alleged 
infringement of the ban on contingency fees. The case is currently pending before the Disciplinary 
Board, and has once more stirred up the debate on whether or not attorneys should be allowed to 
agree on contingency fees.144 
 
Under certain circumstances, a claim can be assigned to an attorney. Section 3:43 BW states that, 
among other legal professionals, attorneys cannot acquire property (such as a claim) that is subject to 
proceedings before a court in the jurisdiction where they exercise their profession.145 The provision 
aims to serve the public interest by guaranteeing the legal profession’s integrity; (any appearance of) 
attorneys’ own interest in the outcome of litigation should be shunned.146 It is not fully clear whether 
this provision should be interpreted restrictively or extensively. First, the validity of the assignment 
depends on the moment of assignment. Pursuant to (the scarce) published case law, the phrasing 
‘subject to proceedings before a court’ requires that the case is actually pending before a court; the 
provision does not apply to claims that have been assigned previous to the action being lodged, even 
if preparatory activities signal such an intention.147 Furthermore, the phrasing ‘where they exercise 
                                                             
 
142 See Rb. Noord-Nederland 2 September 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:4185. 
143 The percentage depends on the date of registering with the foundation. In this way, ‘early birds’ are rewarded for 
contributing to financially enabling the action. On such a ‘reward’, see also section 6.5.6.2. 





145 Property (goederen) under section 3:1 BW and acquire (verkrijgen) under section 3:80 BW, which includes the as-
signment of a claim (cessie van een vorderingsrecht/vordering op naam) under section 3:94 BW. On assignment of 
claims, see also section 6.4.4. 
146 Kamerstukken II 1984/85, 17496, 10, p. 21. 
147 See Hof Arnhem 22 March 2011, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2011:BQ0938, Hof Den Bosch 15 September 2015, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2015:3593, and Hof Amsterdam 15 November 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:4639 (setting aside the – 
unpublished – judgment of the Amsterdam District Court of 5 August 2015, which had ruled that the assignment was 
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their profession’ can – for attorneys – refer to all Dutch courts, or be restricted to the district in which 
the attorney has registered his practice.148 The wording of the provision suggests the latter. In light of 
the provision’s rationale and the aforementioned rules on, for instance, professional independence 
and integrity, it can equally well be argued that it refers to all Dutch courts.149 However, if argued in 
this way, it is questionable why the provision does not just state that assignment to an attorney is 
forbidden, quod non. In this context, two provisions of the Code of conduct for attorneys are relevant 
as well. First, attorneys are not allowed to accept security other than a cash payment as a retainer for 
the payment of their bills, save in exceptional circumstances and only after consultation with the local 
dean.150 Second, an attorney should avoid any misunderstanding about the capacity in which he 
acts.151 Thus, there might be a duty to reveal his capacity as a claim owner if a client has assigned its 
claim to him in combination with a power of attorney to litigate on behalf of the attorney.152 It is 
important to emphasize, however, that an infringement of these professional rules does not constitute 
that the assignment is invalid.153 
6.4.3 Third-party litigation funding  
Third-party litigation funding is developing, but is still in its infancy in the Netherlands.154 As mentioned 
in section 6.2, third-party funding has remained unregulated and unsupervised; as it is not yet a wide-
spread phenomenon, the legislator’s policy has been a laissez faire one. Van Boom and Luiten have 
discussed various qualifications of the contract that underlies third-party funding, such as one of sales, 
partnership or credit. They conclude that, in all likelihood but depending on the specific stipulations, 
the contract will be qualified as a contract sui generis.155 Consequentially, no specific regulation ap-
plies, other than regular civil law.  
 
So far, the activity of third-party funders in collective redress has been limited. Nevertheless, the leg-
islator’s approach slightly differs within this context, as it expects that collective redress is the area in 
                                                             
 
invalid since the preparatory activities showed a clear intent to bring the claim; see also Hof Den Bosch 19 January 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2016:128). See also Kamphuisen 1960, p. 47.  
148 Pursuant to section 12 Attorneys Act. 
149 See Van Mierlo 2016, aant. 9.2, who argues in favour of the ‘local’ interpretation; similarly, Rb. Amsterdam 14 Jan-
uary 1993, KG 1993, 74 and Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 25 June 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:4438. Asser/Kamphuisen 
1960, p. 47 applies the broader interpretation; Van Boom & Luiten 2015, p. 189, seem to argue in line with this inter-
pretation as well. 
150 Section 28 Code of Conduct. 
151 Section 29 Code of Conduct.  
152 Normally, this duty only exists if the defence statements give rise to such exposure. See also section 6.5.2. 
153 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 25 June 2013, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2013:4438. 
154 See Van Boom & Luiten 2015, Philips 2016 and Luiten 2016.  
155 Van Boom & Luiten 2015, p. 190 ff. See also Luiten 2016, p. 21 ff.  
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which third-party funding will further develop.156 In 2013, the Minister of Security and Justice dis-
cussed potential regulatory routes, but stated that the developments will first be observed.157 Re-
cently, third-party funding has been discussed in the legislative proposal for a collective action for 
damages. The proposal includes a provision that a representative organization is required to have suf-
ficient financial means to litigate.158 This also affects third-party funders, in particular in combination 
with the already existing provision that a representative organization needs to adequately protect the 
interests of the aggrieved party.159 According to the minister, these provisions give the court the op-
portunity to gain an insight into the financial means of the organization, including a funding construc-
tion with a third-party funder. A court can, for instance, find the representative organization inadmis-
sible if it has concluded a funding construction that negatively affects the interests of the aggrieved 
parties; for instance, if the funder has full control over the decision to accept a settlement. The de-
fendant(s) can be excluded from gaining an insight into such information.160 The assessment is said to 
be marginal, however. It suffices that the organization can state and, if deemed necessary, show that 
at the time of the assessment it has sufficient financial means to execute the litigation. 
6.4.4 Special purpose vehicles 
6.4.4.1 Bundled assignments or mandates 
Individual legal claims for damages may represent a (substantial) financial value and, therefore, its 
alienability is an important legal instrument – also – for collective redress.  
 
In the Netherlands, the transfer of a claim is considered to be a transfer of property and not, as in most 
other European jurisdictions, a transfer of the claim owner governed by the law of obligations.161 A 
claim is transferred through assignment (cessie).162 The third party acquires the right of action because 
the right it serves to protect has been transferred; it is not possible to merely transfer a right of ac-
tion.163 The assignment requires a deed intended for that purpose, and a notice thereof by the assignor 
or assignee to the debtor(s). Claims are transferable, unless excluded by law, the nature of the right, 
or the contractual arrangement between creditor and debtor.164 Furthermore, a (title for) the transfer 
                                                             
 
156 Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34608, 3, p. 11. 
157 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33126, 6 (letter of the Minister of Security and Justice on third-party funding) and Ka-
merstukken II 2013/14, 31753, 65 (letter of the State Secretary of Security and Justice on contingency fees and third-
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164 Section 3:83 BW.  
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of property is void if it is intended for purposes of security (fiducia cum creditore) or does not intend 
to bring the property into the patrimony of the acquirer (fiducia cum amico).165 A fiduciary transfer for 
purposes of asset-backed financing is allowed as long as it is not merely intended to provide the ac-
quirer with a strong right to have recourse (such as a right of pledge or mortgage).166 The question of 
whether parties indeed intended to bring the claim into the third party’s patrimony is a matter of 
construction. Alternatively, the arrangement can be qualified as a – contractual – mandate (lastgeving 
pursuant to section 7:414 BW). In that case, a third party (for instance, a special purpose vehicle) is 
authorized to collect the claim owner’s debt, whether or not in its own name and on its own account. 
On numerous occasions, the Dutch Supreme Court has qualified a so-called ‘assignment for the pur-
pose of debt collection’ (cessie ter incasso) as a mandate.167 A special purpose vehicle will probably 
prefer an assignment over a mandate, as an assignment gives it full control over the claim. An assign-
ment can be combined with a mandate that obliges the entrepreneurial party to transfer the awarded 
damages to the account of the original creditor subject to the deduction of costs and/or the agreed 
upon percentage for the entrepreneurial party.168  
  
Special purpose vehicles can bundle assignments as an instrument to obtain collective redress, and 
have done so in various pending competition law cases. So far, this practice has not met with any 
resistance from the courts, even though defendants have challenged the vehicles’ business model 
and/or the validity of the assignments. These cases will be further discussed in section 6.5.3. 
6.4.4.2 Representative organizations 
Important within the context of Dutch collective redress are private representative organizations that 
aim to protect the interests of aggrieved parties. As introduced in section 6.2, these organizations 
(foundations or associations) can initiate and act as a claimant in a collective action or WCAM settle-
ment. In the past decade, they have increasingly done so on an entrepreneurial basis. In the following, 
I will sketch the development of these types of special purpose vehicle and introduce their mechanisms 
to fund collective redress.169 In recent years, some entrepreneurial representative organizations have 
been accused of undue behaviour, more specifically of looking after their own interests rather than 
those of the aggrieved parties. As these incidents take place and shape within the context of (the legal 
framework of) collective actions and/or WCAM, they will be discussed in section 6.5. 
 
Originally, representative organizations were ideological and/or non-profit organizations. Annual 
membership fees and donations were their main source of income. Additionally, in the 1980s and 
1990s, certain consumer organizations could apply for government subsidies to enable their activities, 
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167 See, for instance, HR 21 October 1983, NJ 1984, 254 (Zomerdijk/Goudsbloem) and HR 26 November 2004, 
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as these were in the public interest.170 Over the years, however, the subsidies evaporated and the 
number of memberships slowly declined. At the same time, the Dutch legislative framework for col-
lective redress seemed to open a gateway to entrepreneurial representative organizations. As of the 
2000s, they have been increasingly active in the Dutch collective redress landscape. When statements 
such as ‘the proliferation of claim foundations, compensation culture and entrepreneurial lawyering’ 
are used, they usually refer to these more or less ad hoc organizations with an entrepreneurial interest 
that are established after a particular mass damage event to assemble a ‘voice’, increase leverage, and 
obtain some form of compensation for the represented individuals.171  
 
Four types of representative organizations can be distinguished, based on the type of interest they 
aim to protect. The first type is the representative organizations that pursue a public interest, such as 
the enforcement of environmental law, human rights or social security; for instance, Stichting Pro-
efprocessenfonds Clara Wichmann (human rights, in particular women’s rights) and Milieudefensie 
(environmental protection). The second group comprises representative organizations that represent 
a private interest, such as consumers, retail investors, personal injury victims, tenants and employees. 
The claim will most likely have a pecuniary component and is often based on law that protects ‘weaker’ 
groups. Well-known Dutch examples are Consumentenbond (a consumers’ organization) and FNV (an 
employees’ organization). The third category contains representative organizations that represent 
commercial or business interests, such as entrepreneurs’ organizations (for instance, MKB), institu-
tional investors, or lessors (for example, Fair Huur). Some organizations might fall into the second 
and/or third category, depending on their specific action; a notable example is the VEB (a sharehold-
ers’ organization that represents both retail and institutional investors). These three types of organi-
zations are often relatively large and independent organizations that have established a track record 
of representing certain interests.172 They mainly operate by charging membership fees, contributions 
and/or receiving donations. They may also have built up a war chest over the years in order to fund 
(future) collective redress cases.173  
 
The fourth and final category might cover all of the mentioned types of interests. In addition, regard-
less of the type of class members or the law that they protect, these organizations have an entrepre-
neurial interest: they gain a stake in the outcome of the action by concluding contingency fee arrange-
ments. Their members agree to pay a percentage of the awarded compensation if the organization’s 
action is successful (sometimes in addition to a fixed membership fee). Such success can be achieved 
through an extrajudicial collective settlement, whether or not preceded by an individual action (a test 
                                                             
 
170 See Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 16983, 5, p. 30, Kamerstukken II 1983/84, 16983, 7, p. 19 and Kamerstukken II 
1984/85, 18600 XIII, 17, p. 8. At least two consumer organizations were active and received such a subsidy: Consumen-
tenbond and Konsumenten Kontakt Stisam; see Molenberg 1995, p. 339 (footnote 622).  
171 See, for instance, Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3, 5, Lemstra 2012, ‘Opkomst claimcultuur in Nederland dreigt’ 
(9 December 2011) FD; ‘Nieuwe wet tegen malafide claimclubs’ (8 December 2012) Trouw; ‘Waarom wij de Ameri-
kaanse claimcultuur moeten importeren’ (10 June 2014) De Correspondent; ‘Valt hier nog wat te claimen?’ (10 October 
2015) NRC.nl; ‘Wildgroei aan claimstichtingen’ (20 October 2015) De Financiële Telegraaf; jba.nl/nl/160/een-jaar-na-
mh17-amerikaanse-toestanden-in-nederland. 
172 Cornegoor 2009, p. 26 ff. 
173 See also section 6.5.5. 
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case) or collective action, and/or followed by a WCAM procedure to have the settlement declared 
binding for all class members. These organizations are mostly established for a particular mass damage 
event, although some have evolved into a more permanent player with branches that concern differ-
ent types of mass damage events.174 At times, they cooperate with or are established by a law firm, a 
third-party funder, or another representative organization.175 As discussed, attorneys are generally 
not allowed to engage in contingency fee arrangements, but this restriction does not apply to repre-
sentative organizations. As mentioned in section 6.2, foundations and associations are allowed to be 
driven by profit as long as it is not paid out to the founders or (board) members. Otherwise, they are 
free to choose their business model and funding arrangement; they are not bound by professional 
rules and rules of conduct. 
6.5 Relevant rules and features of the collective redress mechanisms 
6.5.1 Briefly brushing up 
As discussed in section 2.2.4, two legal proceedings have been specifically designed for collective re-
dress: the collective action and WCAM.176 In addition to the current collective action, in 2016, a legis-
lative proposal was submitted to introduce a collective action for damages. In sections 6.5.4 to 6.5.6, 
I will discuss the particulars of these instruments. First, I will discuss a number of alternative roads that 
can result in collective redress: joinder, consolidation and a test case (section 6.5.2) and bundled as-
signments or mandates (section 6.5.3). Due to their limited relevance for entrepreneurial mass litiga-
tion, I will only briefly introduce joinder, consolidation and a test case. In section 2.2.4, I also intro-
duced the collective action for the assessment of general conditions. This instrument will not be fur-
ther discussed as it is seldom used and is not of interest to entrepreneurial parties. 
6.5.2 Joinder, consolidation and a test case 
First, parties may jointly bring their individual, similar claims in one lawsuit (joinder, subjectieve cumu-
latie). The court can also consolidate proceedings (voeging), at its own initiative or at a party’s re-
quest.177 The claims remain individual ones and the court might deal with them differently as the law 
and facts indicate. If efficient adjudication is not served with a joinder or consolidation, for instance, if 
the individual claims result in different defence strategies, the court might split the action into sepa-
rate ones, or decide not to consolidate the cases.178 
 
Collective redress can also follow a test case, in which a claim similar to many others is brought by one 
of the aggrieved parties. The test case judgment can set a precedent and might lead the way for others 
to reach a settlement with the liable party or to bring their own claim. For instance, in three test cases 
                                                             
 
174 See, for instance, Consumentenclaim (<consumentenclaim.nl>) and SMCO (<collectiefonrecht.nl>).  
175 For instance, Stichting WAG (<stwag.gr>) was established by a law firm (De Haan Advocaten), and Stichting Woeker-
rente (<woekerrente.nl>) is supported by two more traditional representative organizations (Consumentenbond and 
Vereniging Eigen Huis) and backed by a litigation funder (Claims Funding International). 
176 Section 3:305a BW and, for the WCAM, section 7:907-910 BW and 1013-1018 Rv. Parts of sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.6 
are taken from Tillema 2017 (section 2). 
177 Section 222 Rv. For a more elaborate discussion on these routes, see Frenk 2003, p. 1418-1423. 
178 See Rb. Utrecht 17 December 2008, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2008:BG7280 (Beursklacht/Defam). 
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concerning the misselling of share leasing contracts, the Supreme Court provided general guidance on 
how to adjudicate similar cases.179 Relevant in this respect are the statutory provisions that entered 
into force in July 2012, under which a district or appellate court – on its own initiative or at the request 
of one of the parties – may refer a preliminary question to the Dutch Supreme Court should its answer 
be necessary to come to a decision, and is of direct importance to either a mass damage claim or to 
the resolution of ‘numerous’ other, ‘factually similar’ civil disputes.180 This answer can then contribute 
to negotiating a consensual settlement. 
6.5.3 Assignment (or mandate) model 
A different type of joinder (objectieve cumulatie) is created if, as introduced in sections 6.3.6 and 
6.4.4.1, a multiplicity of aggrieved individuals assign their claim to an entrepreneurial party or give it a 
mandate to collect their debts, including the authority to bring an action. The assignee or agent then 
enforces the aggregated claims in its own name and on its own account. In the case of bundled man-
dates, the agent might also act in the name of the claim owners.181 The bundling of these claims does 
not necessarily constitute a collective redress mechanism. Each claim still needs an examination of the 
individual circumstances regarding, for instance, the (amount of) damages. If the special purpose ve-
hicle does not sufficiently underpin all independent claims, it risks all of the bundled claims being dis-
missed.182 
 
The question of whether the construction should be qualified as bundled assignments or mandates 
can give rise to debate and, as mentioned in section 6.4.4.1, is a matter of construction. The qualifica-
tion, however, may be irrelevant for the vehicle’s standing; a court that finds the assignments invalid 
might anticipate a valid assignment when the intended assignee has already commenced with pursu-
ing the claim, and in the meantime it will assume that a mandate has been concluded.183 This is risky, 
though, and the courts may not be as willing in collective redress cases. In 2009, the Supreme Court 
found assignments by approximately 10,000 aggrieved parties to be invalid, because the notice of the 
claim transfer to the debtor did not state the names of the original creditors. Therefore, the claims 
could not be individualized – rendering them untenable.184 The special purpose vehicle had based its 
standing on mandates as well. In the case of a mandate, generally, the name of the creditor does not 
have to be mentioned in the writ. However, since the defendant had contested the claimant’s capacity 
to litigate, the court ruled that the vehicle should have proven its capacity to act in its own name. Since 
it had not done so, the claimant was found to be inadmissible. In spite of this decision, some argue 
that if a third party can prove standing without revealing the identity of the creditors, it should not 
                                                             
 
179 HR 5 juni 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2811 (Levob/X), ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815 (X/Dexia), and 
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2822 (GeSp/Aegon). 
180 Section 392-394 Rv. See, notably, Giesen e.a. 2016. The provision does not apply to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
when dealing with a WCAM application; see, critically, Schonewille 2009, p. 79-80. 
181 Section 7:414 BW.  
182 Hof Amsterdam 16 september 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BF0810 (Spirit/Aegon). 
183 See Asser/Bartels & Van Mierlo 2013, no. 359, Asser/Tjong Tjin Tai 2018, no. 280, and Biemans 2011, p. 37. See also 
HR 2 december 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1562, NJ 1996, 246, m.nt. D.W.F. Verkade (ABN Amro/Coopag Finance) and 
HR 20 september 1991, ECLI:NL:HR:1991:ZC0338, NJ 1992, 552, m.nt. J.B.M. Vranken (Tripels/Mason). 
184 Hoge Raad 27 november 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2162 (VEB/WOL). 
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have to reveal their names.185 While this might be correct in theory, it does not sound very viable in 
practice.  
 
According to Lemstra and Tzankova, a special purpose vehicle will prefer collective action over bun-
dling claims.186 The latter construction creates complex (administrative) logistics – with all the costs 
involved – and may give rise to an elaborate defence, possibly in three instances.187 However, if the 
number of aggrieved parties is limited, it may be an attractive route to claim damages collectively, 
particularly since it is not yet possible to claim damages in a collective action. Indeed, special purpose 
vehicles have done so in various pending competition law cases.188 So far, this practice has not met 
with resistance from the courts, even though defendants have challenged the vehicles’ business model 
and/or the validity of the assignments.189 In 2014, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal – in a request to 
stay the proceedings – ruled that the mere fact that the litigation vehicle has an entrepreneurial mo-
tive did not constitute an abuse of a (procedural) right (section 3:13 BW), nor any other unduly or 
inadmissible act or behaviour.190 In two separate cartel cases brought before the Amsterdam District 
Court, the court ruled that – although German law was applicable – the assignments were not void 
due to an infringement of public policy (section 3:40 BW).191 It might have been relevant here that the 
special purpose vehicle had provided security for litigation costs to address a potential costs award, 
and that the cost risk (the potential costs order) is much lower in the Netherlands than it is in Ger-
many.192 Finally, in 2013, following the defendant’s motion for the disclosure of documents (exhibitie), 
the District Court of The Hague ruled that the defendant had a sufficient interest in the disclosure of 
the assignments in order to assess its validity and the applicable law, but not to receive the full docu-
ments in order to assess (and potentially contest) the purchase price of the claims.193  
                                                             
 
185 Biemans 2011, p. 132. 
186 Tzankova & Van Doorn 2009, p. 106; Lemstra 2009, p. 51.  
187 See, for instance, Rb. Noord-Nederland 23 December 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2015:5982, Hof Amsterdam 30 June 
2015, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:2700, Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 29 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:9921 and Hof 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden 29 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:9922. 
188 See, for instance, Hof Amsterdam 24 September 2013, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:3013 and Rb. Amsterdam 25 March 
2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:1778 (Equilib/KLM e.a.), Hof Amsterdam 7 January 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:27 (East 
West Debt/KLM e.a.), Rb. Amsterdam 25 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:1780 (Stichting Cartel Compensation/KLM 
e.a.), Rb. Den Haag 1 May 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA1870 (CDC/Shell), Rb. Rotterdam 17 July 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:5504 (Stichting Elevator Cartel Claim/Kone e.a.), Rb. Amsterdam 4 June 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3190 (CDC/Akzo Nobel e.a.), Rb. Midden-Nederland 27 November 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:5978 (East West Debt/UTC e.a.), and Rb. Amsterdam 10 May 2017, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3166 
(CDC/Kemira) 
189 See Rb. Amsterdam 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BV8444 and Hof Amsterdam 24 September 2013, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:3013 (Equilib/KLM e.a.), Rb. Den Haag 1 May 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA1870 (CDC/Shell), Rb. 
Den Haag 17 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:15722 (CDC/Shell e.a.), and Rb. Amsterdam 10 May 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3166 (CDC/Kemira).  
190 Hof Amsterdam 7 January 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:27 (East West Debt/KLM e.a.). 
191 Rb. Den Haag 17 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:15722 (CDC/Shell e.a.), and Rb. Amsterdam 10 May 2017, 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:3166 (CDC/Kemira). See also the German cement cartel case, discussed in section 4.5.5.4.  
192 See sections 6.3.4 and 4.3.4. 
193 Rb. Den Haag 1 May 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA1870 (CDC/Shell). 
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6.5.4 Collective action 
6.5.4.1 The legal framework 
A precondition to litigate in a civil case is a party’s capacity to sue. Section 3:296 BW lays down the 
foundation for a party to bring a claim to court: the person to whom a debtor owes performance has 
a right of action vis-à-vis the debtor. Nevertheless, as seen in the previous section, the person entitled 
to bring a claim is not necessarily the (original) creditor. Another addition to the general rule is the 
collective action under section 3:305a BW: a foundation or association that meets particular criteria is 
allowed to bring such action against the alleged debtor(s). The representative organization does so in 
its own name and on its own account, but for the benefit or protection of the similar interests of other 
persons, diffuse public interests or those of specifically identified class members. Whether the inter-
ests are similar depends on the particular circumstances of the case, but the Dutch Supreme Court 
approaches this issue in a rather generous manner.194 The collective action should, however, be sub-
sidiary to individual litigation. If it does not offer an advantage over individual litigation, the latter 
should be followed; according to the legislator, in principle the opposing party has the right to be held 
accountable by the actual aggrieved party.195 Moreover, the collective action does not deprive the 
aggrieved parties of their individual right to litigate.196 The collective action judgment has limited bind-
ing effect (res judicata): it only binds the representative organization and defendant. Nevertheless, a 
court takes a collective action judgment as its point of departure.197 It then depends on the individual 
circumstances to what extent the judgment can be challenged.198 The judgment can also provide a 
basis for settlement negotiations – possibly followed by a WCAM settlement – or for individual pro-
ceedings to seek compensation.199 
 
The foundation or association that brings the collective action needs to have full legal capacity and its 
articles of association should state which interests it aims to protect. The aim should be demonstrated 
in practice as well (the organization’s activities must show that ‘the flag covers the cargo’).200 Before 
bringing a claim, the organization must have made sufficient attempts to reach a settlement through 
consultation with the party held liable.201 If it has not done so, in general, the organization will be 
found inadmissible. This consultation requirement does not constitute a very high threshold to obtain 
standing: a two-week period after the defendant has received a request for such consultations is suf-
ficient. 
 
                                                             
 
194 See, for instance, HR 23 December 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AU3713 (Safe Haven); HR 5 June 2009, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2811 (Levob/Bolle), ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815 (De Treek/Dexia) and ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2822 
(Stichting Gedupeerden Spaarconstructie/Aegon); HR 27 November 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2162 (VEB/WOL); and HR 
26 February 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK5756 (Plazacasa). 
195 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22486, 3, p. 7, 22-23 and 28; and Kamerstukken I 1993/94, 22486, 103b, p. 3. 
196 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22486, 3, p. 26-27. 
197 HR 27 November 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2162 (VEB/WOL), consideration 4.8.2.  
198 See Kamerstukken II, 1991/92, 22486, 3, p. 26. 
199 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29414, 7, p. 6 and 9; Kamerstukken I 2004/05, 29414, C, p. 2-3. 
200 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22486, 3, p. 20. 
201 Section 3:305a(2) BW. 
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An increase in the establishment of (ad hoc) representative organizations after mass damage events, 
combined with media criticism about the performance of certain organizations, led a group of practi-
tioners to establish the Claimcode, a self-regulatory initiative on the corporate governance of repre-
sentative organizations, which entered into effect in July 2011.202 Moreover, in 2013, an addition was 
made to the admissibility test of section 3:305a(2) BW. This addition specifies that a representative 
organization will also be found inadmissible if its claim does not sufficiently guarantee the interests of 
the class members.203 The aim of the provision is not to discourage representative organizations from 
entering the market in general, because they play a valuable role in the settlement of mass damage 
cases, but to discourage organizations that have a solely entrepreneurial objective.204 This is related 
to the legislator’s concern that such organizations may be driven first and foremost by their own in-
terests instead of those of the aggrieved parties. Furthermore – much like the Claimcode – the amend-
ment aims to improve the transparency and accountability of representative organizations. The 
amendment focuses on three perspectives: that of the aggrieved parties, defendants, and the judici-
ary. First, aggrieved parties most likely lack the necessary knowledge to assess the motives and exper-
tise of representative organizations. The provision should create more insight into this. Second, the 
alleged liable party might have difficulty in judging what organization is sufficiently professional to 
negotiate with in order to reach a just solution. Third, the advantage of the efficient administration of 
justice partly perishes if multiple organizations bring collective actions for the same collective dispute. 
This phenomenon is cost-ineffective, needlessly strains the courts, and can lead to conflicting out-
comes.205 
 
The stricter rule stipulates that a representative organization is inadmissible if its claim does not suffi-
ciently protect the interests of the aggrieved parties. This can only really be assessed in a specific case, 
but according to the minister this should entail a twofold test: first, to what extent the represented 
persons will benefit from the collective action if the claim is upheld and, second, to what extent can 
the representative association be trusted to have adequate knowledge and skills to litigate.206 A num-
ber of factors are mentioned that could play a role in this test: the (successfulness of the) activities 
undertaken by the organization for the aggrieved parties in the mass damage event at hand or a pre-
vious one; the number of aggrieved parties participating in the organization and the extent to which 
they support the collective action; the extent to which the organization meets the principles laid down 
in the Claimcode; whether the organization has acted as an interlocutor with, for instance, the gov-
ernment; and its media exposure. As for the remuneration structure of representative organizations, 
however, the minister has explicitly stated that the court’s assessment of a representative organiza-
tion should not involve a test on the organization’s business model, such as what contingency fee 
percentage is reasonable.207 The legislative proposal to allow representative organizations to claim for 
damages might (re)boost this debate, also in light of the European Commission’s Recommendation 32, 
                                                             
 
202 The Claimcode is available at <stichtingservice.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/claimcode-voor-claimsticht-
ingen.pdf>. See also the Explanatory Document by Lemstra & Okhuijsen 2010.  
203 See Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3, 4-5, and Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 126, 7, 10 ff.  
204 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33126, 3, p. 4-5.  
205 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3, p. 13. 
206 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3, p. 12 ff, and Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 126, 7, p. 10 ff. 
207 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3 and 6, and Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 126, 7, 10 ff. and 19 ff. 
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which states that for cases of private third-party funding of compensatory collective redress, it is pro-
hibited to base remuneration on the amount of the settlement reached or the compensation awarded 
unless that funding arrangement is regulated by a public authority. 
 
So far, representative organizations have relatively easily obtained standing before the courts.208 The 
court’s willingness might be connected with an important limitation to the collective action regulation: 
the procedure does not – yet – allow the representative organization to claim for damages (no com-
pensatory collective action). Currently, collective actions are primarily brought to obtain a declaratory 
judgment that states the legal relationship between the parties,209 such as the establishment that the 
defendant has committed a tort against the aggrieved persons. If the interests are suitable for bundling 
to provide efficient and effective legal protection, the common points of law will be judged separately 
from the particular individual circumstances that may or may not actually lead to compensation, such 
as causation or contributory negligence. 
6.5.4.2 The practical operation 
Since the introduction of section 3:305a BW in 1994, representative organizations frequently bring 
collective actions.210 To illustrate this, I have conducted a case law study on collective actions from 
1999 to 2015.211 One of the main findings was the upward trend of collective actions that have been 
dealt with by the Dutch courts and that the initiators responsible for bringing most cases are those 
that represent the interests of ‘weaker’ parties, such as consumers and employees, and cases in which 
commercial interests were dealt with, such as those of branch organizations. The number of cases 
brought by entrepreneurial representative organizations starts to gradually climb from 2008 onwards, 
but remains (well) under the level of the number of cases brought by the other representative organ-
izations. However, the relative size of cases of entrepreneurial organizations has grown. These findings 
did not necessarily support the claim that the development of entrepreneurial organizations arose 
from a decrease in (the financial means of) representative organizations such as the Consumenten-
bond. The findings did support the claim that there is an increased detection of mass wrongdoings,212 
although the number of collective actions appears to have remained modest: in the period 2007-2015, 
there were 20-26 published judgments per annum. Nevertheless, the increase is not necessarily or 
merely instigated by entrepreneurial organizations.  
 
                                                             
 
208 Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer 2009, p. 153, Van der Heijden 2010, and Tillema 2017.  
209 Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer 2009, p. 153. 
210 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 126, 3, p. 4. 
211 See Tillema 2017. I conducted searches in the court database (rechtspraak.nl), which is in operation since 1999, using 
the following keywords: ‘3:305a’, ‘305a’, and ‘collectieve actie’. The database was last consulted on 19 January 2016. It 
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212 Tzankova 2012, p. 559. 
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To further illustrate the practical operations of entrepreneurial parties, in the following, I outline the 
DSB case.213 In April 2009, the Dutch privately owned DSB Bank was discredited after being accused of 
misselling financial products and of breaching its duties of care, which eventually led to the bank’s 
insolvency in October 2009. In the intervening months, a number of representative organizations had 
emerged, and continued to do so after the insolvency. All of these organizations stated that they aimed 
to protect the interests of the aggrieved parties, but the manner in which they carried out this practice 
varied. In the following, I present this variety through subsequently describing the structure, target 
group, and activities the organizations carried out, and the cooperation and competition between the 
organizations. 
 
First, some organizations aimed to protect the interests of a general group, in other words, the ag-
grieved parties of DSB. Others represented certain aggrieved parties, such as the subordinated deposit 
holders or the mortgage holders. Some organizations emerged within an existing organization that 
had already acted in other financial products cases, and through that had gained experience. Others 
were established for this particular event – some by the aggrieved parties themselves, and some in 
cooperation with (renowned) individual attorneys or law firms. A common denominator for most or-
ganizations was to inform (former) clients about the developments regarding the insolvency of DSB. 
They provided a forum, organized information meetings and Q&A through websites or email, and pub-
lished newsletters, among other related activities. With that, some organizations primarily rendered 
a support group for aggrieved parties, giving them a way to ventilate their grievances and to give or 
obtain advice, such as on suitable attorneys. For other organizations, providing information was only 
one of the many services they provided. Some gave legal advice, such as on how to submit a claim to 
DSB administrators. Some offered to deliberate with politicians or to negotiate with the administrators 
of DSB. Some offered to draft individual damage reports and/or to focus their activities on individual 
or collective litigation. Some primarily stated that they would litigate.214 Some organizations based the 
                                                             
 
213 The websites of the following organizations were visited: Stichting Hypotheekleed (DSB-Leed), Stichting Steunfonds 
Probleemhypotheken, Stichting Platform Aandelen Lease, Vereniging DSBdepositos, Stichting Centralebankclaim, Stich-
ting SOBI, DSB-Klantenleed, DSB Ramp, Vereniging Cliënten Financiële Instellingen, Stichting consumentenclaim, Ver-
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ting Belangen Gedupeerde Spaarders. Furthermore, the public insolvency reports by the administrators of the DSB Bank 
were consulted, available – in English – at http://www.dsbbank.nl/crediteuren/en/public-reports/dsb-bank-%28public-






214 For instance, an association reported through various media that it would bring 50 test cases against the (adminis-
trators of) DSB. The association sent emails to thousands of the bank’s clients, advising them to stop paying their mort-
gage interest in the meantime. In 2010, they also filed a request to discharge the administrators of the DSB. This request 
was denied, primarily because the association ceased to exist before the action was brought (Rb. Amsterdam 3 Decem-
ber 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:BO6143). To my knowledge, apart from this request, no other cases were brought to 
court, possibly indicating that the test cases were never actually brought. 
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decision to litigate on the number of aggrieved parties participating in their organization; they needed 
a critical mass to fund the action(s).  
 
The activities of the representative organizations were usually accompanied by appearances in various 
media, such as the broadcasts of popular consumer programmes. Some of the ad hoc organizations 
used powerful language to push their services, such as ‘You complain, we’ll file a complaint!’ and ‘In-
dependent & neutral; the only independent website for DSB customers’. They all wanted to be con-
sidered the tortfeasor’s most important negotiation partner; hence, the amount of aggrieved parties 
signing up was important.215 In the competition for aggrieved parties’ attention, fierce debate took 
place among the organizations. On the other hand, some organizations successfully joined forces. In 
September 2011, the administrators of DSB, two representative organizations, and five legal expenses 
insurance companies reached a settlement to compensate former and current customers in cases that 
concerned insurance policies, securities-backed lending products, and compensation for excessive 
lending. Furthermore, a foundation that protected the interests of subordinated deposit holders 
reached a settlement with the administrators after filing a test case that was successful at the court of 
first instance. 
 
Despite these settlements, competition between the various organizations did not end. For instance, 
one organization set out to help individuals obtain more advantageous individual results by rejecting 
and challenging the 2011 settlement. This ‘after the settlement’ competition was already identified in 
the Dexia case on the misselling of share leasing products, when the success of two representative 
organizations in the realization of the Dexia settlement gave rise to the establishment of other organ-
izations.216 The latter organizations successfully persuaded a large group of aggrieved parties to refuse 
to consent to the Dexia settlement that was declared binding through a WCAM procedure (thus, to 
opt out), claiming that they could receive better compensation through individual litigation than 
through the settlement. Despite the legislator’s and the defendant’s intentions to avoid further litiga-
tion, other organizations’ activities prevented (full) finality. 
 
It was the DSB case in particular that incited the legislative amendment to require a representative 
organization to sufficiently guarantee the interests of the class members.217 Furthermore, on various 
occasions, the minister has attributed an important role to the aforementioned Claimcode. However, 
the truth is that the code does not have a statutory basis and lacks an official status for enforcement 
purposes. In spite of a Monitoring Committee that was established to ensure correct compliance with 
the Claimcode, research has shown that the Claimcode has not led to a desirable level of representa-
tion; for instance, few claim vehicles have established a supervisory board or are subject to account-
ants’ audits.218 A notorious illustration is provided by the Stichting Loterijverlies case. In 2008, this 
foundation initiated a collective action on behalf of aggrieved lottery ticket holders against the Dutch 
State Lottery (Staatsloterij). At the time of the final judgment (see hereafter) the foundation had about 
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22,000 members. Each had paid a registration fee of approximately € 40 and had concluded a contin-
gency fee agreement to pay, in the case of success, 15% of damages obtained to the limited company 
that was linked to the foundation. The Court of Appeal of The Hague accepted this construction by 
ruling that there was no abuse of the right to bring a collective action if the commercial interests of 
the companies behind the foundation (or its founder) played a role in the action.219 After years of 
litigation, in 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the Dutch State Lottery, for years, had misled con-
sumers as to the chances of success and the number and amount of prices that could be won through 
the lottery.220 The judgment, as it was a collective action, did not address the damage suffered, but 
various authors have emphasized the complexity of establishing causation and damages in this case.221 
Nevertheless, according to the spokesman of the foundation, the compensation could run up to € 13 
million. Predictably, the negotiations between the foundation and the State Lottery failed to progress 
smoothly. At the same time, various media started to raise concerns about the financial activities of 
the founder and sole board member of the foundation. Eventually, in 2016, a number of members of 
the foundation successfully filed a request to replace the foundation’s board, a judgment which was 
upheld on appeal.222 According to the board member under scrutiny, this case was initiated and 
funded by a competing litigation funder with ties to the now appointed interim board member.223 
Meanwhile, another representative organization was established. In 2017, this organization entered 
into an amicable settlement with the State Lottery. The settlement granted all aggrieved parties two 
to four lottery tickets in an extraordinary, one-off draw. Apart from waiving the right to further pursue 
damages, class members are free to participate. Moreover, those that have participated in Stichting 
Loterijverlies will be reimbursed their registration fee of € 40. Reportedly, 2.5 million individuals par-
ticipated in the settlement/draw.224  
 
Two other recent cases show the increasing scrutiny of the courts as to the entrepreneurial motives 
of the representative action.225 In both cases, the court ruled that the organization in question did not 
sufficiently represent the interests of the aggrieved parties. Furthermore, a currently pending legisla-
tive proposal aims to improve the corporate governance of, inter alia, foundations and associations in 
general.226 Combined with potentially stricter rules for representative organizations, as suggested in 
the legislative proposal for collective actions for damages (see hereafter), this might increase the qual-
ity and governance of representative organizations and reduce the risks as described above.  
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6.5.5 Collective action for damages 
Both the need for and negative consequences of a collective action for damages have been debated 
for years. Although questioned by some, others deemed that such action is necessary for the situation 
in which an alleged liable party is not willing to negotiate after a successful collective action for declar-
atory relief. The proponents deemed that introducing a collective action for damages is preferable to 
expecting class members to bring individual actions. In November 2011, a parliamentary motion to 
draft such legislation was adopted.227 In 2014, a draft bill was published. It contained a complex five-
step procedure, and drew sharp criticism for various reasons.228 After a significant revision of the draft, 
the minister submitted the legislative proposal for a collective action for damages in November 
2016.229 As mentioned in section 2.2.4, one of its main features is to stimulate collective settlements 
by improving both the quality of representative parties, the coordination of collective actions, and the 
finality of a settlement agreement or judgment. Just as the current collective action does, the pro-
posed action for damages applies to all types of civil claims, to avoid undesirable discussions on the 
applicable legal framework. Consensual settlement remains the preferred route to obtain collective 
redress.230  
 
Collective actions for damages can be brought before the district court that has jurisdiction. Under the 
original proposal, the Amsterdam District Court had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with any collective 
actions, including those for injunctive or declaratory relief. After various objections, this exclusivity 
was abolished.231  
 
The proceedings consist of three phases, which can be summarized as follows. If a collective action is 
brought, the representative organization will have to publish this in a public register. Subsequently, 
for a period of three months, other representatives are allowed to file their own claim concerning the 
same event, and to register it.232  
 
After the registration phase has ended, the second phase starts, in which the court will assess a) the 
commonality of the claims, and b) the admissibility of the representative organization(s).233 The pro-
posal includes judicial powers to further scrutinize the adequacy of representative parties by, once 
more, raising the threshold for obtaining standing. The new admissibility requirements concern the 
organization’s governance, funding, and representativeness. The court has the authority to assess the 
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organization of its (supervisory) board, its financial means, experience and expertise, its measures to 
enable class members to monitor or control its decisions, and to request the disclosure of its annual 
account and report. These requirements can be disregarded if they are deemed to be disproportion-
ate, for instance, for representative organizations with a public interest motive. If more than one rep-
resentative organization has filed a claim, the court will at this phase also appoint the most suitable 
one as the exclusive representative (exclusieve belangenbehartiger). As to suitability, the court should 
take into consideration – in addition to the admissibility criteria – the size of the represented class and 
the amount in dispute, as well as the other and previous activities that the candidate has undertaken 
for the represented type of class members or collective redress in general.234 If the nature of the 
claims, representatives or claimants so dictates, the court can appoint more than one exclusive repre-
sentative.235 The decision on the appointment of an exclusive representative is not subject to ap-
peal.236 
  
The exclusive representative becomes the main litigant with a coordinating role and, in principle, is 
the one that conducts the litigation. The non-exclusive representative organization(s) remain(s) as the 
claimant(s). The court can allow them to give instructions or to be heard. They can also monitor the 
exclusive representative. The relevance of the other organizations in monitoring the exclusive repre-
sentative relates to another important element of the proceedings: there is only one opt-out moment 
for class members, unless the proceedings result in a court-approved collective settlement, in which 
case a second opt-out moment will follow.237 The first (and possibly, only) moment to opt out is within 
a court-ordered period after the second phase ends with the judgment that describes the claim, class 
and, possibly, the appointment of the exclusive representative.238 At that time, non-Dutch class mem-
bers can opt in to the proceedings.239  
 
In the third and last phase, the claim is assessed on its merits. This does not necessarily include an 
assessment of individual damages by the court. As in the WCAM, the bill allows for settling damage by 
means of damage scheduling, either as part of a judgment or a collective settlement. Hence, individual 
matters such as quantum, contributory negligence and causation might be taken into account to a 
certain extent only.240 Where possible, the court should stimulate parties to come to an amicable set-
tlement. To enable such a settlement, the court can refer a preliminary question to the Supreme 
Court.241 The criteria for the approval of a collective settlement are the same as those under the 
WCAM.242 If the action nevertheless results in a judgment, it will have binding effect on all class mem-
bers who have not opted out after the second phase. Such a judgment can include a one-way, full 
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indemnity costs shifting rule in favour of the exclusive representative organization, in order to meet 
its financial burden of a successful action. Hence, only the defendant can be ordered to pay the full 
adverse costs; for a potential costs order in its favour, the regular cost rules apply.243  
 
The appointment of an exclusive representative in combination with the early opt-out moment has 
raised some concerns, also because the decision is not subject to appeal.244 Class members may not 
yet have had the opportunity to fully ‘assess’ the representative’s actions on its merits. If during the 
proceedings, they become uncomfortable with their representative, they can no longer opt out (unless 
the action results in a settlement). Some fear that the risk of undue behaviour is not sufficiently miti-
gated by the proposed admissibility and suitability requirements. For instance, the suitability require-
ments might lead to the appointment of a mediagenic representative that might not necessarily be 
the best choice.245 Furthermore, the proposal remains unclear on the extent of the interference by 
other representatives and the court’s role in this regard.246 A recommendation to allow some type of 
interlocutory assessment of the exclusive representative has not been followed up.247 We will have to 
wait and see how this will all develop in practice, that is, if the legislative proposal becomes law. 
6.5.6 WCAM 
6.5.6.1 The legal framework 
In addition to the collective action regulation, in 2005, the WCAM regulation entered into effect. The 
enactment was fuelled by the DES case, in which thousands of persons were harmed because their 
mothers had used DES (diethylstilbestrol) during their pregnancy. Inspired by the US damages class 
action, the act opts for a collective settlement as the route for resolving a mass damage dispute. The 
2008 evaluation of the WCAM led to the conclusion that it provides for an efficient and effective 
method to settle mass claims.248  
 
In short, the procedure provides for one or more representative organizations, on the one hand, and 
the alleged liable party, on the other, to submit a joint application to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
requesting it to declare legally binding a consensual settlement that contains rights to compensation 
for the class members.249 The settlement may have followed a previous test case or collective action, 
or may have completely arisen out of court. As part of the WCAM proceedings, the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeal assesses whether the interests of the class members are sufficiently guaranteed. The main 
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questions it addresses is whether the representative organization(s) is (are) sufficiently representative 
and the amount of compensation is reasonable in light of the extent of the damage, the ease and 
speed with which class members can obtain compensation and the possible causes of their damage.250 
The settlement can minimize the number of relevant individual circumstances by way of damage 
scheduling. The agreement should list the factors that the aggrieved party has to meet, how this per-
son will be classified into a particular category and how to obtain the corresponding damages.251 Dur-
ing the proceedings, individuals and other representative organizations have the right to raise objec-
tions against the settlement.252 If the court declares the settlement to be binding, all individuals af-
fected by the mass damage event are bound by the settlement, unless they opt out within a certain 
period (of at least three months) following the announcement of the order.253 
  
In 2013, the possibility was introduced to hold a pre-trial hearing (preprocessuele comparitie) in order 
to increase parties’ willingness to negotiate or discuss the further course of action. A party is now able 
to request the assistance of a judge at an early stage of the negotiations or if the other party refuses 
to enter into negotiations.254 During the hearing, the court has a facilitative and guiding role. It may 
assist parties in formulating the most important matters in dispute, discuss further case management, 
such as the desirability of bringing collective action, and/or stimulate parties to enter into a settle-
ment, for instance with the aid of a mediator.255 A hearing can be requested a) by a representative 
organization that protects the interests of aggrieved parties, and that pursuant to section 7:907 (1 and 
3, f) BW would be entitled to submit an application to have a WCAM settlement declared legally bind-
ing; b) by the alleged liable party or parties; or c) by a joint application. The applicant and the sum-
moned parties are obliged to attend the hearing. The judge can order an absent party to pay wasted 
costs. The district courts have jurisdiction over applications for a pre-trial hearing (parties are there-
fore required to be represented by an attorney). In response to a question by a Member of Parliament, 
the minister stated that these cases are not allocated to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on purpose: 
a court under whose guidance a collective settlement is concluded should not also be the one to de-
termine whether the settlement is reasonable.256 
6.5.6.2 The practical operation 
Since 2005, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has declared eight collective settlements to be binding in 
seven cases: DES, Dexia, Vie d’Or, Shell, Vedior, Converium, and DSB.257 Table IX presents an outline 
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of the cases and settlements.258 An eighth case is currently pending, the Fortis settlement. A request 
to have the settlement declared binding has been filed in May 2016, and an interlocutory decision was 
issued in June 2017.259 
 
As the ‘Type of case’ table row shows, the WCAM instrument mainly deals with financial products and 
securities cases. After the first WCAM settlement, in the DES case, no other settlement of personal 
injury claims followed, even though the WCAM was designed with this type of mass damage cases in 
mind.260 The organizations that were involved in the settlements can be qualified as those represent-
ing either private or commercial interests. In addition, in both the Shell and Converium settlements, 
US principal counsel was involved. Based on the manner in which these attorneys or law firms were 
remunerated (through contingency fee arrangements), they can be qualified as entrepreneurial par-
ties. 
 
                                                             
 




260 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 414, 3, 2. See also Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer 2009. 
249 
 
  DES Dexia Vie d’Or Shell Vedior Converium DSB 
Year of WCAM deci-
sion 
2006 and 2014 2007 2009 2009 2009 2012 2014 




Securities Securities Securities Financial products 
and services 















Size of the class (ap-
proximately) 
Not quite clear. 
17,000 persons reg-
istered in 2005 
300,000, of whom 
25,000 persons 
(8.3%) opted out 
11,000 500,000 2000 12,000 345,000, of whom 








lease, VEB, and Con-
sumentenbond 
Stichting Vie d’ Or  Shell Reserves Com-
pensation Founda-
tion, VEB, and two 
pension funds 






Foundation and VEB 
Stichting SSP, Stich-
ting PAL, and Stich-
ting SBRd (LEI) 
(Alleged) liable 




Dexia (and Aegon) Supervisor, state, 
auditors and actuary 




DSB’s trustees plus 
insurers 
Funding of ROs ac-




Participants of ROs 
(or their LEI) paid a 
contribution of €45. 
Supervisor estab-





Members of VEB pay 
annual membership 
fee plus war chest of 
VEB 
US attorneys and 
(alleged) liable par-
ties established & 
funded Foundation 




Settlement amount €38 million €1 billion  €45 million $448 million €4 million $58 million (incl. 
compensation ROs) 
max €500 million  
RO compensated in 
settlement 
Unknown Dexia bears litiga-
tion and administra-
tion costs of ROs 
Supervisor bears 
RO’s costs (‘volun-
tarily’) to a maxi-
mum of €8.5 million 
Shell bears costs of 
Foundation ($6 m), 
VEB ($6.2 m + attor-




costs of Stichting to 
a maximum of 
€212,000, plus the 
settlement costs  
Converium bears 
costs of Dutch litiga-
tion and administra-
tion (€1.6 million) 
plus US principal 
counsel fee (20% of 
settlement) 
DSB bears the RO’s 
costs, including an-





No No No Limited Limited Yes No 
Table IX Overview of the WCAM cases (2005-2017)
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With seven WCAM settlements concluded in over a decade, it is difficult to continue to insist that the 
instrument has given rise to an increase in litigation,1 let alone an increase instigated by entrepreneur-
ial organizations. Instead, it probably has the opposite effect, as it might – as intended – lead to a 
decline in ‘regular’ civil litigation. This assumes a certain interchangeability: that in each WCAM case, 
there would have been an outpouring of individual claims before the Dutch courts had the WCAM not 
existed. This cannot be easily tested, at least not with the study at hand. However, there is one case 
that hovered around both before and after the introduction of the WCAM, and although this is only 
one example, it does provide some evidence that the assumption is tenable. In the Dexia case (on the 
misselling of share leasing products), hundreds of individual cases flooded the courts of first instance, 
long before the WCAM instrument was implemented and a WCAM settlement was reached.2 After the 
settlement was declared binding, the cases in court kept coming due to the many opt-outs. This lack 
of finality was probably caused by the following two factors. First, during the opt-out period, some 
courts issued more favourable judgments compared to the individual compensation that would be 
obtained through participating in the WCAM settlement. Second, this judicial buoyancy played directly 
into the hands of representative organizations that had already started to compete with the repre-
sentative organizations that had realized the Dexia settlement.3 The competitors claimed that they 
would help class members to receive better compensation through individual litigation than through 
the WCAM settlement. In total, about 25,000 class members (approximately 8 per cent of the total) 
opted out. Although some individual Dexia cases are still pending, this number would probably have 
been larger in the absence of the WCAM. After this debacle, the WCAM regulation was amended. 
Nowadays, pending individual cases are suspended for the duration of the WCAM trajectory, including 
the opt-out period.4 In the DSB case (on the misselling of various financial products, inter alia, endow-
ment policies), at least one organization set out to assist individuals in obtaining more advantageous 
results by rejecting and challenging the 2011 settlement as it was pending before the court of appeal 
to be declared binding. However, this did not lead to many opt-outs; only 300 class members (approx-
imately 0.1 per cent of the total) opted out. It could be that the legislative amendment helped to 
achieve such a low opt-out ratio; it could also be the case that the DSB settlement was more legitimate 
than the Dexia one, and DSB’s bankruptcy undoubtedly played a role in the low opt-out ratio. In any 
event, apart from the Dexia case, all WCAM settlements achieved finality, which may have prevented 
an increase, however little or large, in regular cases to be dealt with by the courts. This would require 
further research, but as a start, I have presented the number of class members of each WCAM settle-
ment in Table IX. As the ‘Size of the class’ table row shows, a substantial number of people were com-
pensated on account of the settlements. 
 
Given the (active) role of the WCAM judges, combined with the possibility for ‘third’ representative 
organizations and individuals to raise objections, a settlement is not likely to be declared binding if it 
concerns a frivolous claim. Moreover, it is important or even essential to reiterate that the defend-
ant(s) act as co-initiator(s) of the request in order for the settlements to be declared binding. The 
power or position of a large corporation as a defendant, and its legal team, should not be overlooked 
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or underestimated, especially given the high stakes involved (see the ‘Settlement amount’ table row). 
So far, although no hard conclusions can be reached based on this study, the cases show no signs of 
frivolous ‘litigation’, nor does it seem likely that industrious entrepreneurial organizations have en-
couraged this within the framework of WCAM, or will do so in the future.  
 
Nevertheless, the following observations can be made within the context of ‘American situations’. To 
fund their activities, most representative organizations charge contributions and/or receive donations 
(see the ‘Funding of RO’s activities prior to settlement’ table row). In the Dexia case, for instance, the 
activities of the representative organizations were fuelled by class members that paid a contribution 
(€ 45) or an annual fee. As part of the settlement that followed, Dexia bore the representative organ-
izations’ costs. In the Shell, Converium and DSB cases, the defendants seem to have paid (also) the 
costs of the settlement negotiations. For parties such as the VEB, the recovery of costs ‘and something’ 
has turned into an important method of funding its activities; over the years, they have established a 
war chest for future activities. In a way, defendants financially contribute to such activities. This is 
probably not done out of altruistic motives; it is more likely, given that the WCAM settlement will 
result in finality, that these parties may want to reward the non-free-riders and the organization that 
‘helped’ obtain this finality. Or it could just be that the representative organizations were good nego-
tiators. However, the remuneration of parties such as VEB looks like pocket money compared to US 
principal counsel’s fees in the Shell and Converium case. As the ‘RO compensated in settlement’ table 
row shows, the fees were sizeable ($ 47 million in Shell and approximately $ 12 million in Converium). 
In the literature, a great deal of attention has been paid to these settlements due to their international 
character and (in Converium) the unfavourable settlement amount for non-US shareholders compared 
to that of US shareholders. It is somewhat odd that the size of the attorneys’ fees has hardly been 
discussed. Such a discussion is all the more pressing considering that counsel also received a fee for 
their US activities. However, the representative organization’s remuneration is not generally part of 
the court’s assessment of the settlement’s reasonableness (see the ‘Compensation RO assessed?’ ta-
ble row). Whether the costs and fees are examined depends on the design of the settlement agree-
ment. Tzankova and Hensler have observed that if parties base the payment of the legal fees on a 
separate agreement, there is no requirement for the court to approve the reasonableness of those 
fees.5 Based on the seven WCAM orders, it appears that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal always first 
considers that the WCAM settlements should be assessed in light of the fact that, in most cases, an 
individual procedure would have been costly and time-consuming, and would have resulted in insecu-
rity for the class members. As to the representative organizations’ costs, in the Vie d’Or, Shell, and 
Vedior cases, the court also stated that these costs would not be deducted from the compensation for 
the class members and, therefore, the interests of the class members were sufficiently represented. 
The only case in which the amount of the costs and fees was assessed explicitly is the Converium case. 
This assessment took place because the fees would be paid out of the settlement fund and would 
therefore considerably reduce the class members’ compensation. Among other things, the 20 per cent 
fee for US principal counsel was subject to the court’s judgment. The court applied Dutch law, but took 
into account US documents and standards of reasonableness, since the legal activities mainly took 
place in the US and were performed by US law firms. The court ruled that the costs and fees were not 
unreasonable and, therefore, did not render the remaining compensation unreasonable. 
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Finally, in the currently pending Fortis settlement, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s increasing aware-
ness of and attention to the risks of entrepreneurial organizations was noticeable. During the hearing 
in March 2017, the court spent a sizeable amount of the available time on examining the involved 
(entrepreneurial) parties’ remuneration, motives, and potential conflicts of interest, which might af-
fect the reasonableness of the settlement. Various objections to this effect were raised by two com-
peting representative organizations.6 Another observation on this settlement is that the ‘reward’ for 
active class members that have contributed to financially enabling the settlement is taken one step 
further: active class members receive larger compensation than non-active class members (also known 
as free riders). That is, if the Court of Appeal approves this – contested – construction. 
6.6 Summary: rules and features that shape Dutch entrepreneurial mass litigation 
In the following, I will summarize the main findings on the elements that affect the operation of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation in the Netherlands; the role and regulation of entrepreneurial parties and 
their funding arrangements, how they (might) function within the Dutch legal architecture of mass 
litigation and its costs, and how class members and/or defendant(s) are protected. From this overview, 
I will distil the rules and features that potentially mediate the beneficial or disadvantageous operation 
of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per addressed key issue. In Chapter 7, the rules and features of the 
three jurisdictions are assembled and analysed within the framework of the objectives of collective 
redress and the potential risks and benefits of entrepreneurial mass litigation. 
  
The quick scan of the Dutch civil justice landscape shows an increase in privatization and a focus on a 
negotiated settlement, also within the context of collective redress. Various initiatives aim to balance 
the protection of individual rights and the efficient settlement of mass damage, and collective redress 
can be initiated by both public and private parties, including entrepreneurial ones. Furthermore no-
ticeable is the increasing attention for case management tools in civil litigation, which are also em-
ployed to efficiently (timely and cost-effectively) yet justly settle mass damage. A third observation is 
the growing international attention to and the scope of the Dutch collective redress mechanisms, 
which appears to have attracted increasing activity by foreign (mainly US) legal practitioners in the 
Dutch market – see also hereafter. 
 
As to the Dutch legal services market, the main observation is that it can be qualified as a relatively 
open one. Although attorneys have retained their monopoly in a substantial portion of civil litigation, 
within the context of collective redress two additional types of (entrepreneurial) parties are allowed 
and are active: third-party litigation funders and special purpose vehicles, which in turn can be subdi-
vided into those that bundle assigned claims or mandates, and representative organizations. The en-
trepreneurial parties are active on the claimants’ side of collective redress. The level of the regulation 
and supervision of these legal (and/or financial) services providers varies. Attorneys are bound by con-
duct rules and the supervision of, inter alia, their remuneration or business model, in addition to being 
subject to professional (liability) rules. Third-party litigation funders and special purpose vehicles that 
bundle claims are ‘merely’ subject to general civil law, such as contract and property law, (professional) 
                                                             
 
6 See also Tzankova’s blog, available at <njb.nl/blog/de-fortis-schikking.22903.lynkx>. For case documents, including 




liability rules, and corporate law and governance. Representative organizations are, in addition, sub-
ject to admissibility rules in the collective action and WCAM regulation, and to the Claimcode (non-
binding self-regulation). The slowly increasing judicial scrutiny of entrepreneurial parties’ ability to 
sufficiently protect the interests of class members – see hereafter – has so far remained limited to 
representative organizations that act in (court-based) collective actions and WCAM settlements. Cor-
porate governance of, inter alia, foundations and associations in general might be enhanced after the 
adoption of the legislative proposal to that effect. So far, the extrajudicial activities of entrepreneurial 
parties have remained otherwise unregulated, and clarity is lacking as to whether financial regulation 
applies to their business models. 
 
The Dutch costs shifting system renders the litigation risk (that is, the adverse costs order) rather pre-
dictable and relatively low. An eye-catching feature is the limited shift of attorney fees at the end of 
civil litigation. A prevailing party in collective redress will recover a fraction of its costs, although some 
creative routes have been observed to increase recoverability. Under certain circumstances, the initi-
ators of collective redress can recover (part of) their own litigation costs, but it is questionable whether 
class members can recover contingency fees from the liable party. Case law on this matter has only 
recently started to develop and does not yet show a clear direction. Undue litigation conduct can be 
addressed with a costs sanction or damages, but case law on collective actions demonstrates that this 
is rarely invoked and seldom awarded. If an entrepreneurial party acts as a claimant, it is liable for the 
adverse costs order. Costs rules hardly enable a defendant to widen the scope of this liability to a non-
party such as an individual class member. Depending on the construction with individual class mem-
bers, the entrepreneurial party might be able to shift part of its litigation costs; however, this does not 
affect the capability of a prevailing defendant to do so. One entrepreneurial claimant has recently 
started to provide security for costs in specific cases, despite the absence of a legal obligation to do 
so, possibly incited by German case law on the validity of its business model (bundling assigned claims, 
see also hereafter). 
 
Increasingly, private initiators of collective redress are experimenting with different types of litigation 
funding. The overview shows that entrepreneurial mass litigation is a phenomenon that does not ef-
fortlessly blend in with current legislation. So far, except for attorney fees, general guidance on (the 
reasonableness of) litigation funding arrangements is lacking; for now, the legislator and the courts 
appear to leave it to the market, contractual freedom, and the circumstances of a particular case. 
Initially, the courts liberally approached the entrepreneurial parties that are testing the water. The 
growing body of case law on collective actions and WCAM settlements nevertheless demonstrates a 
stricter approach slowly beginning to take shape. This is also visible in the legislative proposal on a 
collective action for damages. The more cautious approach is incited by the increase of entrepreneurial 
parties in the past decades and, more specifically, the incidents caused by such parties and the growing 
attention thereto. This brings me to the legal framework for Dutch collective redress mechanisms.  
 
Three main routes to obtain collective redress have been distinguished and discussed: bundling as-
signments or mandates, collective action and WCAM settlement. The legislator’s horizontal approach 
– all routes apply to all types of civil cases – leaves the collective redress landscape relatively surveya-
ble. Traditional instruments such as joinder do exist, but are infrequently used for collective redress 
purposes. As mentioned, the bundling of assignments or mandates at the initiative of entrepreneurial 
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parties has not met with resistance from the courts, despite defence strategies directed towards dis-
mantling this route. However, the various legal requirements regarding the validity of assignments or 
mandates render the bundling thereof an administratively complex and legally risky route. On the 
other hand, the entrepreneurial party is able to gain control over the claims – unless contractually 
arranged otherwise. Moreover, in this way, it can initiate a collective claim for damages. The relation 
between a special purpose vehicle and an individual class member is governed by contract and/or 
property law and, so far, no incidents of abusive behaviour have been reported. 
 
This is different within the context of collective actions where, incidentally, entrepreneurial repre-
sentative organizations have been accused of abusive behaviour. The main safeguards against such 
conduct are the admissibility requirements and the courts’ assessment thereof. Although an entrepre-
neurial motive is not prohibited, since 2013 representative organizations are required to sufficiently 
protect the interests of individual class members. Nevertheless, representative organizations obtain 
standing relatively easily, even though defendants often raise objections and the courts’ scrutiny 
seems to have increased in the past year. The current collective action regulation does not yet include 
an assessment of the financial means of the representative organization, but this is introduced in the 
legislative proposal for collective action for damages. Furthermore, publicity and transparency re-
quirements are introduced and, to encourage initiating a collective action, a one-way full costs shifting 
rule in favour of (prevailing) representative organizations. In some cases, in particular those in which 
the aggrieved parties are consumers, the competition between various representative organizations 
has raised concerns. This is why the proposed collective action for damages also introduces the possi-
bility for the court to appoint an exclusive representative organization. 
 
The increasing scrutiny of representative organizations is also visible in the court’s assessment of 
WCAM settlements, in particular in the last one (DSB) and the one that is currently pending (Fortis). In 
two settlements, US counsel were involved, including their sizeable fees. The court disregarded this in 
the first one (Shell), and allowed it in the second, after an assessment of the reasonableness of the 
contingency fees (Converium). To increase efficiency, WCAM settlements can award damages through 
damage scheduling. To protect their rights, individuals can raise objections against the settlement 
and/or chose to opt out. An obstacle to employing these instruments is the (financial) threshold of 
having to undertake individual action. Competing representative organizations have entered this ‘mar-
ket’ as well, trying to incite individuals to opt out and pursue individual litigation on the basis of a 
contingency fee (Dexia, DSB and Fortis settlements). Nevertheless, the number of opt-outs has 
dropped substantially when comparing the DSB settlement to the Dexia one. Another observation on 
WCAM practices is that in some settlements, active class members have been able to recover their 
financial contribution to the representative organization they participated in. They might even be able 
– if the Fortis settlement is approved – to receive larger compensation than non-active class members 
(free riders). 
 
As mentioned, extrajudicial activities of representative organizations have remained largely unregu-
lated. However, one incident shows that there is a way to address abusive behaviour through corpo-
rate law: recently, participants of an entrepreneurial organization have successfully requested the 
court to discharge the foundation’s sole board member. The statutory provision to that effect is now 
subject to further improvement in the pending legislative proposal that aims to enhance the corporate 
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governance of, inter alia, foundations and associations. Finally, it has been observed that entrepre-
neurial parties might also be exposed to the scrutiny of various media, such as the broadcasts of pop-
ular consumer programmes, which warn consumers against bad apples that spoil the bunch.  
 
To conclude, Table X lists the rules and features that potentially mediate the beneficial or disadvanta-
geous operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per addressed key issue.  
 
 
Key issue Distilled rule or feature 
Essentials of the civil justice 
landscape 
- Increasing focus on the efficiency and joint responsibility of parties and court 
- Strong focus on negotiated settlement; including collective settlement 
- Increasing case management by courts 
- Increasing privatization 
- Increasing international attention 
The legal services market - Relatively open legal services market 
- Attorney monopoly in part of civil litigation, cooperate with two types of entre-
preneurial parties: third-party funders and special purpose vehicles 
- Clear and strict regulation and supervision of attorneys; less so for third-party 
litigation funders and special purpose vehicles 
- Claimcode (non-binding self-regulation): corporate governance of representa-
tive organizations on, inter alia, the composition, tasks, and remuneration of 
the organizations’ (supervisory) board 
- Corporate law: liability of individual board members, discharge of board mem-
bers 
- Professional liability rules 
Litigation costs and costs 
shifting 
- Relatively predictable adverse costs order 
- Partial indemnification of the extrajudicial and litigation costs 
- Limited court control of litigation costs 
- Lack of clarity on the recovery of contingency fees 
- Available cost sanctions and liability for damages due to abusive litigation con-
duct (yet rarely invoked/awarded) 
- Limited possibility to hold a non-party liable for adverse costs order 
- Security for costs not legally required but occasionally provided in practice 
Private litigation funding - Contingency fees allowed in limited circumstances only, and rarely entered into 
- Liberal approach towards result-based fees for entrepreneurial parties other 
than attorneys 
- No regulation or guidance on (the reasonableness of) litigation funding ar-
rangements 
- Little competition between third-party litigation funders 
- Competition between special purpose vehicles 
- Third-party litigation funders act as additional key player to the representative 
organization and its attorney 
256 
 
Specificities and safeguards of 
the collective redress mecha-
nisms 
- Rules on the standing of entrepreneurial parties 
- Liberal judicial assessment of rules on the standing of entrepreneurial parties 
- Development of a ‘claimants’ bar’ 
- Creative judicial interpretation of cost rules in collective actions  
- Relatively high fees as part of WCAM settlements 
- Limited but increasing judicial assessment of entrepreneurial parties’ remuner-
ation in WCAM settlements 
- Proposed legislation on the disclosure of the identity of the entrepreneurial 
party, its financial means and/or its funding arrangement (to the court only) 
- Proposed legislation on the appointment of an exclusive representative organ-
ization 
- Possibility to stay individual proceedings 
- Possibility to raise objections (professionally) against a WCAM settlement 
- Media control on representative organizations that represent aggrieved con-
sumers 
- Both ad hoc entrepreneurial parties and repeat players 
- Appointment of a trustee and/or claims administrator 
- Rewarding active class members 













7 Analysis and conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the findings of the previous chapters. By doing so, it addresses the main 
research question: what conditions are relevant in assessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties 
contributing to the chosen objectives of collective redress? This will be done in three steps. 
 
First, in section 7.2, the results of part I of the research will be reiterated: the policy objectives of 
collective redress mechanisms in the selected jurisdictions and the European Union (sub-question 1, 
Chapter 2), the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, and whether they positively 
or negatively affect the chosen policy objectives (sub-question 2, Chapter 3). The policy objectives 
have been distilled from policy documents from the respective legal regimes, supplemented by rele-
vant theoretical literature. The potential effects of entrepreneurial mass litigation (the benefits and 
drawbacks) have been drawn from the vast experience gained by the USA and Australia with entre-
preneurial mass litigation (contingency fees, third-party funding and class actions). This experience has 
been used as a source of inspiration to create a framework for entrepreneurial mass litigation that fits 
within the context of (the selected) European jurisdictions’ legal culture and traditions. The policy ob-
jectives serve to qualify the effects of entrepreneurial mass litigation, that is, they determine which 
particular effects that have been described in the literature are favourable and can thus be qualified 
as a benefit, and which are not – the drawbacks. The benefits and drawbacks will serve as touchstones 
to qualify a specific rule or feature as an opportunity or a threat (see hereafter). 
 
The second step, presented in section 7.3, presents the results of the legal studies in part II of the 
research. As the actual functioning of entrepreneurial mass litigation depends on the specific features 
of a national legal system, part II has examined the key issues that affect the operation of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation in Germany, England and Wales, and the Netherlands (sub-question 3, Chapters 
4-6).1 The section summarizes the main findings from these legal studies and presents the rules and 
features that are closely connected with and shape entrepreneurial mass litigation.  
  
The two former steps lead to the third and last one in section 7.4, which brings together the findings 
of both parts of the research. The varying legal strategies that the selected jurisdictions have so far 
employed provide a mine of information on the – potential – regulation and operation of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation. In this third part, the rules and features that have been described in the previ-
ous part are abstracted from their national context. In that sense, the country reports have also served 
as case studies, from which information has been collected on whether specific benefits and/or draw-
backs might or indeed do take place. Does a specific rule or feature (potentially) amplify or reduce the 
benefits or drawbacks, which, in turn, positively or negatively affects the objective(s) of collective re-
dress, and thus qualify as an opportunity or a threat to the functioning of entrepreneurial mass litiga-
tion (sub-question 4)? This third part then presents an overview of the potential threats and opportu-
nities in relation to the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, the objectives of 
collective redress, and the manner in which all are intertwined. It aims to answer the main research 
                                                             
 
1 On the specific key issues, see section 7.3.1. 
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question and to provide a framework for weighing and balancing the benefits and drawbacks of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation. The framework displays the three sets of building blocks of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation: a) the rules and features, qualified as either an opportunity or a threat to b) 
the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, c) modelled within the policy objectives 
of collective redress. It shows whether a specific rule or feature forms a threat or an opportunity to 
the beneficial or disadvantageous effect of entrepreneurial mass litigation, which in turn can positively 
or negatively affect the chosen objective(s) of collective redress mechanisms. The overview also 
demonstrates the potential trade-offs of specific rules or features. For instance, competing entrepre-
neurial parties might initiate various actions that concern the same mass damage event. Such compet-
ing actions harm the objective of efficiency, and can thus be considered a drawback. It has been ob-
served that appointing a lead representative might reduce this drawback. Hence, the ‘lead representa-
tive rule’ can be qualified as an opportunity for the drawback of inefficient competition that, in turn, 
positively affects the policy objective of efficiency. However, the same rule can also be qualified as a 
threat to the benefit of (price) competition, as it might reduce the number of competing entrepre-
neurial parties. Normally, such competition positively affects the objective of compensation; if re-
duced, it does not. 
7.2 Policy objectives and potential benefits and drawbacks 
7.2.1 The policy objectives of collective redress mechanisms 
 
The overview of the collective redress mechanisms that have been developed since the 1970s shows 
that various routes can lead to the settlement of mass disputes.2 Currently, 11 instruments are avail-
able in the three selected jurisdictions to obtain collective redress, and two new ones are in the mak-
ing. Although the German, English, and Dutch mechanisms vary significantly, three common main pol-
icy objectives have been identified: i) to modify – potential – wrongdoers’ behaviour (prevention and 
deterrence), ii) to restore the damage suffered by individual class members (compensation), and iii) to 
promote procedural economy (efficiency). These objectives follow from the need to settle mass harm 
disputes in an effective and efficient manner, more so than individual dispute resolution has been able 
to achieve. Unlike some policy documents, this research has not considered access to justice as a sep-
arate objective of collective redress, but rather as an overriding objective or a means to an end in order 
to achieve the aforementioned objectives. Inasmuch as access to justice is not yet addressed by the 
mere existence of a collective redress mechanism (effective access to a remedy) and its design (fair 
process), the procedural side of access to justice is considered part of the objective of efficiency (timely 
and affordable access, rectitude of outcome). The substantive side of access to justice can be recog-
nized in the objective of compensation (fair redress). Access to justice has also been addressed within 
the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, as entrepreneurial parties potentially 
                                                             
 
2 See Chapter 2, Table I. 
Part I of the thesis, which consists of Chapters 2 and 3, has established the foundation for the research. Within this 
part, Chapter 2 has addressed the first sub-question: which policy objectives underlie the collective redress mecha-
nisms in the selected jurisdictions, as well as the European Union policy on collective redress? 
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enable claimants to file a claim, and might improve or deteriorate fair dispute resolution (equality of 
arms, respectively abusive litigation). 
 
The traditional mechanisms of collective redress mainly focus on addressing and modifying – poten-
tial – wrongdoers’ behaviour and incentivizing them to comply with, for instance, consumer law. This 
more abstract objective focuses on the interests of society at large rather than on individual redress. 
As of the 1970s until recently, prevention and deterrence have been the prime objectives of collective 
redress; this policy has developed in a rather similar way in the legal regimes researched. The primary 
chosen remedy to achieve such an objective was injunctive relief, brought by (semi-)public enforcers. 
It is relatively recently that providing individuals with the opportunity to obtain individual redress or 
compensation has gained ground as an objective of collective redress. Previously, the right to seek 
redress was an individual’s prerogative. Nowadays, deterrence is still considered an important objec-
tive, but one to be pursued primarily by (the enforcers of) public law. Within the context of collective 
redress, it is regarded as a positive side effect that occurs when wrongdoers compensate aggrieved 
parties and therewith internalize the damage that they have caused. The third objective, efficient dis-
pute resolution, has developed independently from the former two, incited by inefficient rather than 
ineffective enforcement. It has been a constant objective, aimed at by most mechanisms that have 
been designed over the years. Efficiency or procedural economy is a broad term, and entails adminis-
trative efficiency to protect scarce judicial resources: a large number of claims, or essential questions 
that relate to these claims, are adjudicated en masse, overflowing court dockets are therefore avoided 
and the uniformity of judgments is improved. Moreover, the aggregation of claims aims to result in 
adjudication within a reasonable period of time at decreased costs and efforts due to economies of 
scale. Third, it provides closure, peace or finality for all parties involved. Hence, this objective serves 
both individual and public interests. 
7.2.2 The potential benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation 
 
Entrepreneurial mass litigation has been defined as the non-recourse financing of (all or part of) the 
costs of mass litigation by a private party that is otherwise unconnected with the mass damage event, 
in return for a share of the proceeds of the action or an uplifted fee; either way, only payable upon 
success. Such funding can take various shapes. This research has distinguished three types of entre-
preneurial parties that operate within the context of mass litigation: attorneys, ad hoc special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) and third-party litigation funders.3 They can be subdivided into passive and active ones, 
although in practice the dividing line is not always easily drawn. Passive entrepreneurial parties’ main 
role is to fund the action; they are regularly informed but not actively involved in litigation strategies 
and decision-making. An active entrepreneurial party is involved in litigation strategies and decision-
                                                             
 
3 On their funding techniques, see section 7.3.4. 
The second part of Part I of the thesis, Chapter 3, has concentrated on entrepreneurial parties that (might) operate 
in the collective redress market. The chapter has described the – potential – benefits and risks that are associated 
with entrepreneurial mass litigation (sub-question 2). In Chapter 3, they have been presented as more or less oppo-
site sides of the same coin (see also Table XI in section 7.2.3). In the following, both sides have been paired and 
summarized under five themes. 
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making, searches for potential claims, screens cases, invests in developing the action on its own initi-
ative, approaches and informs potential claimants, and possibly initiates mass litigation itself. Both 
types have in common that they provide or endorse a platform to assemble class members and in-
crease leverage to pursue collective redress, in order to, eventually, profit from the action in the case 
of success. 
 
Access to justice 
Entrepreneurial parties can fuel access to justice and reduce the free-rider problem that is said to be 
an impediment to the functioning of collective redress. They might actively find and approach poten-
tial claimants (or their attorneys), and inform them of the opportunity to join the action. Furthermore, 
as the threshold to participate is low (no costs unless the action is successful), class members will be 
more easily incentivized to participate in the action. This increases access to justice, and benefits the 
objective of compensating aggrieved parties. Furthermore, it might benefit the objective of deterrence 
as the number of participants increases, and, thereby, the potential internalization of damage is high. 
On the other hand, increasing access to justice might create or sustain a claim culture, in which citizens 
claim for damages on a regular basis and for high amounts. Claim culture is a broad and somewhat 
vague concept, but in the legal atmosphere this risk is said to entail an increase in (the size of) claims. 
Such culture might impose high costs on industry. The fear of litigation might have a deterrent effect, 
but might also lead to defensive behaviour, the costs of litigation or compensation being redistributed, 
high insurance costs, or have a negative impact on innovation. These effects might increase courts’ 
workload (inefficiency), deteriorate a jurisdiction’s business climate, lessen trust in its judicial and legal 
system, and impose disproportionate costs on industry (overdeterrence and unfair compensation). 
 
Market mechanisms 
The inclusion of entrepreneurial parties adds another player in the market that might compete not 
only with other entrepreneurial parties, but also with traditional legal services providers such as attor-
neys and (semi) public organizations. In such a competitive market, aggrieved parties have more choice 
and might get a better deal. If more parties detect and try cases, and a better or best possible fee 
arrangement and quality of litigation are available for class members, this is beneficial to the objectives 
of deterrence, compensation and efficiency. However, competition between entrepreneurial parties 
might lead to a race to the bottom, that is, when insufficient transparency creates confusion for con-
sumers as to whom to trust or in which organization to participate, and defendants see themselves 
confronted with various parties that all state that they are protecting the interests of the class mem-
bers. Competition is also disadvantageous if various entrepreneurial parties bring various actions after 
a single mass damage event. Such a multiplicity of proceedings negatively affects the objective of effi-
ciency as it leads to more cases, increased costs for parties and society, possibly inconsistent adjudi-
cation and finality problems. 
 
Quality of claims 
The screening of cases and due diligence assessments by entrepreneurial parties are said to improve 
the quality of claims that are brought before the courts. Entrepreneurial parties thoroughly investigate 
the claims as well as the financial means of the defendant (whether a settlement award can be recov-
ered), and whether negotiation rather than litigation can lead to the resolution of the dispute. This 
benefits the objectives of compensation (fair compensation), deterrence (reducing frivolous claims 
and therewith overdeterrence) and efficiency (no excessive, frivolous litigation). Nevertheless, the 
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thorough screening of cases might also lead to adverse selection or cherry picking: only particular cases 
are selected. Entrepreneurial parties might not select the low value yet high merits claims, or claims 
that fail to acquire sufficient media coverage due to the relatively low return on their investment or 
litigation risks. They might also only target the – most – creditworthy defendants, the ones with the 
deepest pockets. This can only be considered a risk, however, if alternative routes or initiators to ob-
tain (collective) redress are unavailable. Hence, the benefit of improving access to justice (and there-
with the objectives of compensation and deterrence) might be limited to certain types of cases. 
 
(E)quality of arms 
Closely related to the previous theme is the professionalism of entrepreneurial parties and the quality 
of their representation or assistance. In addition to the attorney, they might manage the litigation 
(budget), assist or instruct lawyers, and assist and inform claimants. They are often repeat players and 
have a team and a network of experts to help build and litigate the claim. As an entrepreneurial party 
might have a handsome war chest, strategic tactics from defendants to try and subdue or intimidate 
claimants are less likely or ineffective. This creates a more level playing field between claimant and 
defendant (equality of arms). Hence, the professionalism of entrepreneurial parties might enhance 
the objective of efficiency in various ways. On the other side of the coin, a risk exists that an entrepre-
neurial party engages in abusive behaviour. It might pursue an unmeritorious claim with the intention 
of coercing the alleged wrongdoer into a settlement in order to prevent a worse scenario, such as high 
litigation costs or reputational damage. Abusive conduct can, furthermore, be displayed by way of 
aggressive marketing/selling tactics to try to find claims and claimants in every possible way (ambu-
lance chasing). Third, an entrepreneurial party might put forward an empty shell or not have sufficient 
financial means to completely fulfil its promise. This risk entails three aspects. From the side of the 
defendant, there is the risk of not being able to enforce the costs award in case he wins. From the side 
of the class members, a settlement or award paid to the entrepreneurial party or empty shell might 
evaporate in the case of insolvency or fraud, or the entrepreneurial party might lack the financial 
means to fully pursue or support the action. Abusive behaviour affects the objectives of (fair) compen-
sation, deterrence (overdeterrence), and efficiency (excessive, frivolous litigation). 
 
Interests, control and monitoring 
Finally, the contingency aspect of a litigation funding arrangement aligns the interests of the entrepre-
neurial party and its clients. They both prefer an award that is as high as possible in a speedy, inexpen-
sive and efficient way. If the entrepreneurial party is an additional party, such as a third-party funder, 
it can also monitor the attorney’s or representative’s actions. All this mitigates the problem that the 
individual or group does not have perfect information on or cannot fully monitor the actions of the 
funder, and thereby improves the objectives of compensation, deterrence and efficiency. However, 
there is a risk that the interests are not sufficiently aligned. The size, complexity and costs of mass 
litigation might still incentivize an entrepreneurial party to act in its own interest: to ensure a – suffi-
cient – return on its investment, possibly at the expense of class members’ interests. This conflict of 
interests might enhance the risk of an inadequate settlement: a premature or collusive settlement. In 
both situations, the amount of the settlement is set too low, and therewith obstructs the objectives 
of (fair) compensation and/or deterrence (underdeterrence; such a settlement does not force the de-
fendant to internalize all of the damage caused), while it benefits the entrepreneurial party. 
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7.2.3 The first overview: the beneficial or disadvantageous effects of entrepreneurial mass 
litigation 
The benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation can be presented as more or less oppo-
site sides of the same coin, which can positively or negatively affect the objective(s) of collective re-
dress mechanisms: deterrence (a), compensation (b), or efficiency (c): 
 
 
Potential benefits Affected 
objective(s) 
(+) 
Potential drawbacks Affected 
objective(s) 
(-) 
1. Facilitate access to justice a, b 6. Fuel a claim culture a, b, c 
2. Competition a, b, c 7. Inefficient competition c 
3. Increase the quality of claims a, b, c 8. Adverse selection / cherry picking a, b 
4. (E)quality of arms c 9. Abusive behaviour a, b, c 
5. Alignment of interests a, b, c 10. Conflict of interests a, b 
Table XI Effects that positively (+) or negatively (-) affect the objectives of collective redress mechanisms 
 
7.3 The selected jurisdictions’ rules and features that are related to entrepreneurial mass 
litigation 
 
7.3.1 Setting the scene: some essentials of the civil justice landscapes 
In the past two decades, the three jurisdictions have all engaged in civil justice reforms. Not uncom-
monly, these reforms went hand in hand with austerity measures, such as decreasing government 
expenses on public legal aid and increasing court fees. In general, the reforms emphasize efficiency, 
more specifically with regard to the duration and costs of dispute resolution. The emphasis on effi-
ciency is visible in various aspects of civil justice and procedure. One of the main features is the chang-
ing role of the judiciary. Courts have been given more discretionary powers, that is, more focus is 
placed on case management and tools to, where possible, speed up litigation and reduce costs. For 
instance, the English overriding objective dictates that courts deal with civil cases justly and at a pro-
portionate cost, and as a derived case management tool the court can prompt parties to prepare liti-
gation costs budgets – which are then subject to court approval. It has been argued that such powers 
have limited or even diminished party autonomy; a more neutral vision is that, nowadays, litigation is 
a shared responsibility between courts and litigants. The emphasis on efficiency is also visible in the 
Part II of the research has investigated the legal rules and features that are closely connected with and shape the 
operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation in three European legal regimes: Germany (Chapter 4), England & 
Wales (Chapter 5), and the Netherlands (Chapter 6) (sub-question 3). After a brief introduction into some of the 
jurisdiction’s civil justice settings, each chapter has addressed the relevant national regulation and case law on the 
following key issues of entrepreneurial mass litigation (on the selection, see also section 3.6): the legal services 
market in which entrepreneurial parties (might) operate, the litigation funding regime, the litigation costs and costs 
shifting, and the specific features of the collective redress mechanisms that affect the functioning of entrepreneurial 
mass litigation. In the following sections, the main findings of the country studies are summarized. Subsequently, 
section 7.3.6 presents the rules and features that have been found to – potentially – affect the operation of entre-
preneurial mass litigation. 
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growing attention to ADR and, within judicial dispute resolution, the various incentives to settle ami-
cably rather than to continue litigation. For instance, German litigants might receive a ‘bonus’ costs 
award if they settle. 
 
The extent to which efficiency has become an accepted aspect of dispute resolution and, more specif-
ically, has shaped collective redress, nevertheless varies between the three investigated jurisdictions. 
The Netherlands and England and Wales seem to have been more receptive towards developing col-
lective redress mechanisms and accepting the inherent trade-offs between the objectives of efficiency, 
deterrence and/or compensation. For instance, in both jurisdictions, a court can declare a settlement 
between one or more model claimant(s) or representative organization(s) and the defendant(s) to be 
binding. If such a settlement is declared binding, all class members are bound, unless they opt out. 
This settlement is the result of the involved parties’ negotiations and their assessment of the potential 
litigation proceeds and risks, and generally focuses more on an efficient settlement (as to time, costs 
and finality) rather than the full compensation of the individuals’ – alleged – damage. A difference 
between the two jurisdictions is that the Dutch, as of 1994, have taken a horizontal approach towards 
collective redress (the collective action and WCAM both apply to all types of civil cases), whereas the 
English instruments are more scattered, and the ones that provide for compensatory relief only apply 
to consumer and competition law cases. Germany, too, has implemented a mechanism for a court-
approved collective settlement (KapMuG), for capital investors’ claims. However, so far, Germany has 
maintained its strong(er) focus on the protection of individual rights such as party autonomy and the 
right to be heard. This is visible in the design of the scattered collective redress mechanisms as well as 
in the courts’ application of rules of both substantive and procedural civil law. Two notable cases are 
the Deutsche Telekom case (KapMuG) and the CDC case (assignment of claims to an SPV). These cases 
show a more formal and strict (application of) civil law and less use of case management techniques, 
in contrast to comparable Dutch and English cases. In the latter cases, the courts have displayed more 
flexibility, with a strong(er) focus on efficiency and their discretionary case management powers. The 
German combination of liberal individualism, the (courts’ interpretation of) specific rules of civil law 
that concern (entrepreneurial parties’ involvement in) collective redress, and a strong industry lobby 
seem to have created a less fertile breeding ground for entrepreneurial mass litigation as compared 
to the other two jurisdictions. German collective redress instruments do exist and cover various sec-
tors, but the objective of controlling and modifying – potential – wrongdoers’ behaviour remains the 
leitmotiv, rather than that of compensation. 
7.3.2 The legal services markets 
Important for the development and functioning of entrepreneurial mass litigation is the organization 
of the legal services market. Entrepreneurial parties will not (easily) participate in this market if the 
entry barriers are (too) high, that is, for those that – also – provide legal services. In addition or alter-
natively, entrepreneurial parties might be governed by financial services regulation. As mentioned, 
within the context of mass litigation, three types of entrepreneurial parties have been distinguished: 
attorneys, special purpose vehicles and litigation funders. The country studies show that the jurisdic-
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tions are still somewhat struggling with the qualification of the various types of entrepreneurial par-
ties, as it is not always clear cut whether they are acting as legal or financial services providers. Often, 
it simply boils down to the specific circumstances.4  
 
Regular professional liability rules aside, attorneys are governed by professional standards on, inter 
alia, integrity and independence, publicity, and funding arrangements, pursuant to European and na-
tional regulation regarding the legal profession. Furthermore, public bodies fulfil supervisory roles. A 
comparison between the three jurisdictions shows that the German legal services market is the most 
strictly regulated one for providing legal services both in and out of court. Although German attorneys’ 
market powers have been slightly reduced in the past decades, there is still little room for other types 
of representatives to engage in legal services. Within the context of collective redress, the main ex-
ception is the authority of (non-profit) consumer organizations to represent consumers if the action is 
necessary to protect consumers. Furthermore, the professional debt collection of assigned claims is 
considered a legal service, and a party may provide such a service within the limits of the Legal Counsel 
Act. This includes authorization by a public body in advance as well as judicial scrutiny during litigation. 
However, such parties’ involvement (as an SPV) in collective redress is restricted.5 In comparison, the 
Dutch legislator and the courts have been rather liberal towards (entrepreneurial) representative or-
ganizations that are active in the collective redress market as SPVs (and, normally, are represented by 
an attorney and possibly backed by a litigation funder). Nevertheless, in past years, the collective ac-
tion regulation has been refined, and recent evidence demonstrates the Dutch courts’ growing scru-
tiny of (entrepreneurial) representative organizations – possibly limiting their access to the collective 
redress market.6 For providing legal services within the context of collective redress, both in and out 
of court, representative organizations might also be regulated by the Dutch Claimcode. This is a self-
regulatory initiative that aims to provide consumers with more clarity and guarantees on the organi-
zations that act on their behalf. The code consists of governance provisions on, inter alia, the compo-
sition, tasks, and remuneration of the organizations’ (supervisory) board. So far, however, not all or-
ganizations comply with the code (nor do they explain why they do not do so), and there is no super-
visory body other than the courts that deal with a specific collective action or WCAM settlement. In 
England and Wales, solicitors and barristers no longer have a full monopoly over legal representation. 
Within the context of collective redress, Claims Management Companies (CMCs) are alternative legal 
services providers, mainly in the area of personal injuries and financial products and services. CMCs 
are licensed by the public authority Claims Management Regulator (CMR), which also has supervisory 
powers. The CMR has issued ethical and professional rules and guidelines for CMCs that cover, inter 
alia, rules on advertising, advice, representation, claims referrals, and the handling of complaints.  
 
So far, third-party litigation funding is a small, but growing market. Both in England and Wales and in 
Germany, third-party litigation funders have become accepted entrepreneurial players in the legal ser-
vices market, whereas third-party litigation funding in the Netherlands is still in its infancy. The pres-
ence of third-party litigation funders within the context of mass litigation is less observable. However, 
                                                             
 
4 See also section 7.3.4. 
5 See also section 7.3.4. 
6 See also sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.6. 
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it appears to be a growing market as well. Illustrative is the Volkswagen case, in which various types 
of entrepreneurial parties from various jurisdictions are active, including third-party litigation funders 
that cooperate with law firms.7 In none of the three jurisdictions are third-party litigation funders gov-
erned by legal or financial services regulation. So far, they are governed, if at all, by self-regulatory 
instruments and, in specific cases, are overseen by the courts. This is the case in England and Wales, 
where the Association of Litigation Funders (ALF) has issued the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders 
to regulate its members. The code addresses the capital adequacy of funders, the termination and 
approval of settlements, and control over litigation or settlement negotiations. However, not all litiga-
tion funders that are active in the English market are members of the ALF.8  
7.3.3 Litigation costs and costs shifting 
The operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation is also affected by the following two key factors of 
civil litigation: a legal regime’s system of litigation costs and the way these costs are shifted between 
parties at the end of litigation. In all three jurisdictions, court (or tribunal) charges are statutorily fixed, 
and the loser pays rule applies, which dictates that, generally, the losing party pays the prevailing one’s 
litigation costs. The similarities between the jurisdictions with regard to litigation costs and costs shift-
ing end there, however. As the country studies have shown, various differences exist between the 
three jurisdictions with regard to the regulation of attorney fees, the complexity and predictability of 
the costs shifting system, and its safeguards against abusive litigation.  
 
First, differences exist with regard to the regulation of attorney fees. In Germany, just as the court 
charges, these legal expenses are fixed by law. Both court charges and attorney fees are tied to cate-
gorized amounts in dispute, and the litigation (cost) risk can thus be calculated in advance. By contrast, 
in England and Wales and in the Netherlands, attorney fees are unregulated and, thus, are freely ne-
gotiable between attorneys and clients. Furthermore, various differences exist with regard to the ef-
fect of the loser pays rule. In the Netherlands, save for exceptions that are irrelevant here, only a part 
of the successful party’s attorney fees will be reimbursed by the losing party. The amount recoverable 
depends on the amount in dispute, the number of procedural actions, and the nature of the services, 
and may vary between 25 to 90 per cent of the actual costs. In mass litigation specifically, the costs 
award will often be a fraction of the actual costs incurred. By contrast, a full indemnity rule applies in 
England & Wales and in Germany. Normally, all litigation costs are shifted. In Germany, the calculation 
(in advance) of the costs order – and thus the cost risk – is a relatively simple matter. This is rooted in 
the regulatory fixation of both court charges and attorney fees, and the strict (application of the) rules 
for the distribution thereof at the end of litigation. At the other end of the spectrum, English book-
shelves bulge with fancy-covered lengthy tomes on civil litigation costs. The main elements that shape 
its complexity and unpredictability are the freely negotiable attorney fees and the courts’ discretionary 
power as to whether costs are shifted from the prevailing to the losing party, and if so, which costs 
and what amount. The legal system of England & Wales is therefore not only notorious for its high 
litigation costs (and inherent cost risk), but also for its satellite litigation over costs.  
 
                                                             
 
7 See Chapter 3, Tables II and III. 
8 On the judicial oversight of third-party litigation funders, see section 7.3.4.  
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For collective redress, various specific rules on costs and costs shifting apply. This is related to the high 
litigation costs (both the court charges and the attorney and expert fees), and the difficulty of redis-
tributing these costs between the class members. In Germany, in competition law cases the possibility 
exists for a court to take the claimant’s economic situation into consideration and it may lower the 
recoverable charges and fees if it deems this to be necessary. By reducing the litigation costs risk, this 
provision aims to stimulate private enforcement. In the Netherlands, the complexity and inherent 
costs of collective actions have given courts cause to increase the recoverable costs award for prevail-
ing claimants. Furthermore, the recent legislative proposal for a collective action for damages entails 
a one-way full indemnity costs shifting rule in the claimants’ favour (only the defendant can be ordered 
to pay the full adverse costs). An important safeguard in jurisdictions with a high cost risk, such as in 
England and Wales, is the security for costs that covers a potential adverse costs order. A related safe-
guard is the ATE insurance that – also – covers a potential adverse costs order, which is available in 
England and Wales as well. However, given the high litigation costs and the inherent high insurance 
premium, such insurance might not be readily available for mass litigation. In the Netherlands, the 
cost risk is (relatively) low. Nevertheless, in practice, the instrument of security for costs has been used 
in mass litigation, even though a claimant is not legally required to provide such security.  
7.3.4 Private litigation funding 
In the USA, entrepreneurial litigation or lawyering usually refers to attorneys that operate under a 
contingency fee arrangement. Within the context of mass litigation (class actions), such an arrange-
ment is not allowed, but it has been ‘reconstructed’ into the common fund doctrine. This doctrine 
ensures class counsel’s ‘reasonable fee’, which is paid out of the class action’s proceeds (the common 
fund) and is assessed by the court. Generally, save for some exceptions that are irrelevant here, in all 
three European jurisdictions attorneys are not allowed to operate under a contingency fee arrange-
ment. The main reason for this ban is that such an arrangement would generate perverse incentives 
that conflict with the attorney’s independence. However, since the 1990s, all jurisdictions have al-
lowed different but rather similar kinds of funding arrangements. This development has been stimu-
lated by the considerably high litigation costs, particularly in mass litigation, and the ‘loser pays’ costs 
shifting rule,9 as well as by the decreasing possibilities for individuals to apply for public legal aid fund-
ing. Consequently, incited by the potentially large return on investment and using the umbrella of 
promoting access to justice to justify their business models, various types of entrepreneurial parties 
have started to test the water in the collective redress market: attorneys, SPVs and third-party litiga-
tion funders. All of these parties have in common that they operate under contingency fee-like ar-
rangements. They finance the costs of mass litigation, in return for i) a share of the proceeds of any 
award or settlement regardless of the amount of time spent on the case, or ii) an uplift, in terms of a 
percentage, of their normal, hourly fee (conditional fee). Either way, the (uplifted) fee is only payable 
upon success. In this way, all three types of entrepreneurial parties fund mass litigation, and some are 
also actively involved in the proceedings and inherent decision-making processes.  
 
More specifically, the following funding techniques have been distinguished in the three country stud-
ies. First, entrepreneurial parties can enter into a settlement agreement with the defendant(s) and 
negotiate their fee to be paid out of the action’s proceeds, either as a percentage of the proceeds or 
                                                             
 
9 See also section 7.3.5. 
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as a fixed amount. Such a common fund-like technique has been used in the Netherlands by (US) at-
torneys, SPVs and third-party litigation funders in several WCAM settlements. A notable finding in 
these cases is that the court’s assessment of such payment, if controlled at all, is only marginal. Some 
non-entrepreneurial Dutch SPVs have been found to conclude such a payment as well, which they then 
use to bolster their reserves (war chest). In Germany, consumer organizations might be able to nego-
tiate such a payment; however, they cannot use it to bolster their war chest since any proceeds from 
their actions need to be turned over to the federal purse. It is not inconceivable that settlements as 
described here are concluded out of court as well. Evidence thereof, however, is difficult to detect 
and, thus, such practices would remain largely under the radar of legislators and/or courts. This is 
different if the settlement acquires – positive or negative – media coverage, of which some examples 
have been presented. A notable example is the Dutch Woekerpolis case, where various (entrepreneur-
ial) SPVs have set out to represent aggrieved consumers, with varying results and, not uncommonly, 
have been accused of mainly focusing on their own interests rather than those of the consumers.  
 
A second type of funding technique is constructed as follows. An SPV or third-party litigation funder 
can act as or be involved in a representative organization that represents its members – individual 
class members – who are required to conclude an individual participation agreement with the repre-
sentative organization.10 Such a contractual arrangement then includes a contingency (like) fee agree-
ment. This, too, has been observed in the Netherlands, both in collective actions and in WCAM cases. 
Such a construction has remained unregulated by law or otherwise, unless an attorney is involved. An 
important safeguard against abusive behaviour is the judicial scrutiny of the (professionalism and)11 
remuneration of entrepreneurial parties. In the Netherlands, so far, hardly any court control of the 
payment has been observed. The Dutch courts seem to have increasingly grown accustomed to case-
managerial tasks, but appear less prone to assessing the remuneration of entrepreneurial parties. It 
has been argued that in the Netherlands, freedom of contract applies to settlements and, thus, to the 
ways of financing that settlement, as long as it is not an attorney who receives the percentage of the 
claim awarded. By contrast, in England & Wales, a funder’s fee arrangement (and the recoverable 
fee)12 might be thoroughly assessed, also at separate cost trials.  
 
Third, individual class members can transfer their claim or right of action to an SPV or a third-party 
litigation funder, which then bundles the claims and pursues the action in its own name. Such a (con-
tractual) arrangement can include a contingency (like) fee arrangement. This construction has been 
tried in all three jurisdictions. An important legal aspect here is the alienability of claims or causes of 
action.13 As the relevant rules in the three jurisdictions diverge, so have the results in specific cases. In 
England and Wales, due to the remains of the common law torts of maintenance and champerty, such 
a contract might be found to be contrary to public policy and, thus, it will be unenforceable.14 Entre-
preneurial parties are only allowed to conclude such a contract if they have a ‘genuine commercial 
                                                             
 
10 On the representative action, see also section 7.3.6. 
11 See also section 7.3.6. 
12 See section 7.3.5. 
13 On the subsequent amalgamation of the claims into one action, see also section 7.3.6. 
14 Maintenance is ‘intermeddling’ in the litigation of a third party with no other interest than its own: profiting from 
another man’s claim. Champerty is a species of maintenance, and refers to the situation in which a third party helps 
pursue the litigant’s claim in exchange for a share of the proceeds. See section 5.3.2. 
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interest’. A genuine motive, a concern for the litigant’s right or a genuine interest in the outcome, is 
one that does not ‘stir up strife’, that is, encourage litigation that would otherwise not have been 
commenced. Nevertheless, recent case law shows that English courts are progressively narrowing the 
scope of the rules, shifting in favour of third-party litigation funding. However, this case law mainly 
concerns individual litigation. Moreover, for the collective proceedings in competition law cases, the 
legislator has explicitly excluded private parties such as legal firms, funders, and special purpose vehi-
cles from bringing such proceedings. A similar development is visible in Germany. Although German 
law does not recognise the aforementioned torts, and to a certain extent has accepted individual liti-
gation funding, the bundling of contractual assignments as a method to fund mass litigation has met 
with resistance from the courts. In Germany, the question of who can bring (amalgamated) assigned 
claims is related to the strictly regulated legal services market and the fundamental principle that civil 
justice should serve the protection of individual rights. Normally, only a person whose individual rights 
are at stake has standing to bring the ensuing claim. Only by way of the aforementioned regulated 
exception in the Legal Counsel Act can a third party enforce such a right in its own name. Notably, in 
the cement cartel case brought by an SPV that represented several class members, the court declared 
the assignments at hand void due to a violation of public policy. They were found to infringe the – 
constitutional – principle of an even distribution of the cost risk. In light of this principle, assignments 
should not be (ab)used in a manner that deprives the defendant of forfeiting a costs award; it should 
be avoided that a party without sufficient funds is pushed forward as a litigant. It has been argued, 
however, that the dismissal of this method is mainly attributable to the German hesitance towards 
collective redress. In the Netherlands, the courts have so far allowed assignment as an instrument to 
obtain collective redress. Dutch law does not recognise the torts of maintenance or champerty, and 
the courts have also not found that these constructions infringe public policy – even if German law 
was applicable, as was the situation in the paraffin cartel case that was brought before a Dutch court. 
Aside from the aforementioned more liberal approach towards collective redress, it might have been 
relevant here that the SPV at hand had provided security for litigation costs to address a potential 
costs award, and that the cost risk (the potential costs order) is much lower in the Netherlands than it 
is in Germany.15  
7.3.5 Specificities and safeguards of the collective redress mechanisms 
Three types of collective redress mechanisms have been identified in which entrepreneurial parties 
can play a role. The routes vary in the sense that the formal parties to litigation differ. Furthermore, 
they only concern those mechanisms that – eventually – will lead to compensatory relief, as an entre-
preneurial party will only engage in mass litigation if it can obtain a return on its investment. It depends 
on the type of route which safeguards exist to protect the (absent) class members and/or defendants 
against the risks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, such as unfounded claims or a conflict of interest 
between an entrepreneurial party and the class members. 
 
The first suitable mechanism is a representative action. There are two variations of this action. In both, 
the entrepreneurial party acts as or is involved with the representative, which is the formal party to 
the litigation, rather than all class members. First, the entrepreneurial party can (in)directly establish 
the ‘statutorily allowed’ representative organization. This organization is the claimant that represents 
                                                             
 
15 See also section 7.3.5. 
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or protects (a part of) the class, but is not a class member itself. Although representative actions might 
only provide for declaratory (or injunctive) relief, the aftermath – negotiations or individual litigation 
for damages – of a declaratory judgment can ensure the proceeds of which the entrepreneurial party 
can claim its stake. Currently or theoretically (not all jurisdictions allow an entrepreneurial party to 
share in the proceeds),16 the national mechanisms that fall within this category are the Dutch collective 
action and WCAM, the English enforcement order, the opt-in and opt-out collective action and the 
opt-out collective settlement regulation for competition law cases, as well as the German Gewinnab-
schöpfungsklage and Einziehungsklage. These statutorily-based mechanisms have been specifically de-
signed for collective redress. The second variation of the representative action has been created in 
practice, through the underlying mechanism of bundled assignments. This ‘opt-in’ instrument can be 
employed by a third-party funder or an SPV, which becomes the owner of the claims or causes of 
action and, thus, brings the action in its own name. Through the underlying construction, however, 
the class members still have a stake in the action and are thus represented by the entrepreneurial 
party that ‘merely’ steps in as a third party to obtain compensation for the original claim owners, the 
class members – and acquires part of the proceeds for itself. So far, the instrument has been used by 
entrepreneurial parties mainly in competition law cases, which can be explained by the fact that such 
cases usually concern a limited number of aggrieved parties which can be relatively easily identified. 
 
For the statutorily-based representative actions, the following safeguards against abusive behaviour 
have been found: the qualification of the representative organization in advance, the rules – and the 
interpretation thereof – on standing, the distribution of the litigation costs and risk, and the regulation 
on the protection and distribution of the proceeds. In England and Wales and in Germany, only quali-
fied representative organizations can act as such. The relevant regulation leaves little room for entre-
preneurial parties to act as a representative. In Germany, some possibilities exist, but the regulation 
entails a strict assessment of the professionalism of the organization, the number of members they 
represent, and the organization’s financial means. In both jurisdictions, however, the presence of en-
trepreneurial parties in the shadow of the action remains unclear. In England and Wales, claimants are 
not required to disclose the identity of third-party funders; nevertheless, in some cases the courts 
have ordered a claimant to do so. In the Netherlands, representative organizations are not designated 
in advance by a public authority, but are assessed in a specific case before the court. As mentioned, 
the Dutch legislator and the courts have displayed a rather liberal approach towards (entrepreneurial) 
mass litigation,17 which is also visible in the rules on standing in a representative action and the courts’ 
assessment thereof. Few conditions apply for an entrepreneurial party to establish a representative 
organization and pursue collective redress also for its own profit. Where possible, courts seem to focus 
on the merits of the claim rather than the admissibility of the representative organization. Only re-
cently, the judicial scrutiny has slightly increased, more specifically on the quality (professionalism) of 
the representative organization. This increased scrutiny has been incited by the legislative amendment 
in 2011 that has raised the bar for the admissibility of representative organizations. Nevertheless, an 
entrepreneurial party is not obliged to reveal its participation in the action, and the representative 
organization is not required to reveal the origin of the funds that it is going to use to support the action, 
nor is it subjected to criteria with regard to its financial means to meet any adverse costs should the 
                                                             
 
16 As discussed in section 7.3.4, see also hereafter.  
17 See section 7.3.3 and 7.3.4.  
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action fail. Finally, a safeguard that has been detected in WCAM settlements is that the proceeds are 
placed in a trust account and are distributed by an independent claims administrator.  
 
The second variation of the representative action, bundled assignments, are mainly safeguarded by 
the rules on alienability as discussed in section 7.3.4.  
 
The second route of entrepreneurial mass litigation is the involvement of an entrepreneurial party in 
a group action. Either a representative group member is appointed, or all – active – group members 
are the formal parties to the proceedings. The entrepreneurial party operates behind the scenes 
through contractual arrangements. Forms of such group actions are the German KapMuG and the 
English representative18 action (CPR 19.6) and GLO. These mechanisms have been designed specifically 
for collective redress. For the group action, too, a second variation has been created in practice to 
obtain collective redress without a formal device: the group can be formed by the underlying mecha-
nism of (bundled) powers of attorney or joinder. An entrepreneurial party might form such a group; 
however, it will not become a formal party to litigation. The third route is similar to the second one, 
and one that has been created in practice too: the involvement of an entrepreneurial party in bringing 
or supporting a test case. The verdict in such a case can serve as a precedent and might lead the way 
for others to reach a settlement with the liable party or to bring their own claim, whether or not col-
lectively. In this way, potential claimants can save costs and await the outcome of the test case before 
deciding to file an action or enter into a settlement. Here too, an entrepreneurial party might be re-
sponsible for assembling the group, but it will not become a formal party to the litigation. The differ-
ence with the aforementioned group action is that one class member is the formal party and one case 
is brought, the test case. Here too, the involvement of an entrepreneurial party is not always easy to 
detect.  
 
For the second and third route, as well as for the non-statutorily-based routes to obtain collective 
redress, the safeguards mainly lie in the regulation of the legal services market (section 7.3.2) and the 
construction of the funding arrangement (section 7.3.4). If, for instance, a code of conduct for entre-
preneurial parties is lacking or does not address capital adequacy requirements or how to prevent or 
deal with conflicts of interests, instruments might be lacking to prevent (or punish) abusive behaviour 
by the entrepreneurial party. Class members (or defendants) are then forced to turn to more general 
rules of civil law. Two notable examples are the English defendants that successfully argued that a 
number of entrepreneurial parties were responsible for an abuse of rights by bringing a flagrantly un-
founded claim, which was sanctioned by the court through the costs order (to be paid only by the 
entrepreneurial parties), and the Dutch case of an entrepreneurial SPV where class members success-
fully requested the court to dismiss the foundation’s board. 
7.3.6 The second overview: the distilled rules and features 
From the three country studies, I have distilled the following rules and features that potentially amplify 
or reduce the beneficial or disadvantageous operation of entrepreneurial mass litigation, per key issue 
addressed. 
 
                                                             
 
18 Here, representative refers to one or more class members that are appointed to represent the other class members.  
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Key issue Distilled rule or feature 
Introduction to the jurisdictions’ civil jus-
tice landscapes 
- Case management techniques 
- Collective settlement and damage scheduling 
- Protection of individual rights 
The legal services market - The development of a claimants’ bar 
- Legal or regulatory restrictions on the legal services market 
- Supervision of the legal services market 
- Entry barriers for entrepreneurial parties 
- Availability of legal expenses insurance 
- Professional rules for entrepreneurial parties 
o Corporate governance 
o Audit committee for claim selection 
o Publicity and transparency 
o Capital adequacy requirements 
- Professional liability rules 
- Civil liability for an abuse of rights 
- Extrajudicial qualification and control of entrepreneurial parties 
o Qualification in advance 
o Media control 
Private litigation funding - Liberal or strict rules on result-based fees  
- The entrepreneurial party acts as an additional key player (in addi-
tion to the legal representative) 
- The entrepreneurial party acts as a repeat player 
- Activity/passivity of the entrepreneurial party 
- Active judicial assessment of the funders’ remuneration 
- Financial bonus for active class members 
Litigation costs and costs shifting - Predictable litigation costs (risk) 
- Exponential litigation costs (risk) 
- Level of indemnification of the litigation costs 
- Court control over the litigation costs 
- Cost sanctions for abusive behaviour 
- Liability (of non-parties) for adverse costs order 
- Security for costs or after-the-event insurance 
Specificities and safeguards of the na-
tional collective redress mechanisms 
- Rules on the standing of entrepreneurial parties 
- Judicial assessment of the standing of entrepreneurial parties 
- Disclosure of the identity of the entrepreneurial party, its financial 
means and/or its funding arrangement 
- Technique of including class members (opt-in or opt-out) 
- Possibility to stay individual proceedings 
- Possibility to file a competitive collective action 
- Appointment of a lead representative  
- Appointment of a trustee and/or claims administrator 
- Trust account 




7.4 The relevant conditions for the contribution of entrepreneurial parties to the chosen 
objectives of collective redress  
 
7.4.1 Objective A: deterrence 
Alternatively or complementary to the objective of compensation, policy makers might focus on the 
objective of deterrence. An important feature in that respect is a collective redress market in which 
entrepreneurial parties actively search for and detect claims, assemble and organize the claims and 
class members, and enable the pursuit of such claims. Such activities might follow public enforcement, 
such as a decision from a competition authority. They facilitate access to justice, which is not only 
beneficial to the objective of compensation but also to that of deterrence, as it might increase the 
wrongdoer’s internalization of the damage it has caused. This is particularly so in negative value claims, 
where the amount of individual damage does not outweigh the individual investment in litigation.  
 
At the same time, the entrepreneurial parties’ activities might increase the number of actions and 
create or sustain a claim culture, which negatively affects the objective of deterrence, in particular if 
it entails an increase in unmeritorious claims (creating overdeterrence, defensive behaviour and neg-
atively impacting business). Rules on admissibility, to be addressed at the earliest occasion, can be 
implemented and/or strictly applied, as an opportunity to address or mitigate such a drawback. How-
ever, this does not address the extrajudicial activities of entrepreneurial parties. Excrescences can be 
prevented through implementing extrajudicial regulation and control of the legal services market, such 
as (supervision of the compliance with) a code of conduct and/or the qualification or designation of 
entrepreneurial parties in advance. Furthermore, internal monitoring tools, such as the existence of 
an audit committee (‘wise elders’ who assess the suitability of an action) can be implemented. Exam-
ples such as these are visible in England and Wales, the jurisdiction in which third-party litigation fund-
ing has developed into the most mature market for this specific type of entrepreneurial parties. Pro-
fessional liability and the aforementioned governance rules on screening cases can also be considered 
an opportunity for the benefit of increasing the quality of claims. As observed, however, the thorough 
screening of entrepreneurial parties might lead to adverse selection, that is, they favour certain sizes 
or types of claims. The availability of alternative, competing types of funding and/or cross-subsidiza-
tion in the costs and fee regime, such as in Germany, can be considered as opportunities to mitigate 
this risk.  
 
In this last section, the aforementioned rules and features (Table XI) are qualified in light of the benefits and draw-
backs of entrepreneurial mass litigation and the objectives of collective redress. Can the specific rule or feature be 
qualified as an opportunity or a threat, that is, does it amplify or reduce one (or more) benefit(s) or drawback(s) of 
entrepreneurial mass litigation, which, in turn, positively or negatively affects the objective(s) of collective redress 
(sub-question 4)? The threats and opportunities will be discussed per objective of collective redress. They are also 
included in the summarizing, third overview (Tables XII-XIV in section 7.4.4), which brings together the first and the 
‘qualified’ second overview. Therewith, this section also answers the main research question: what conditions are 




As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, an ‘exclusive representative’ rule can be qualified as 
a threat, as it might diminish the benefit of competing entrepreneurial parties. Competition is benefi-
cial for, inter alia, the objective of deterrence, since it increases detecting and enforcing claims.  
 
Monitoring rules for courts might alleviate conflicts of interest between class members and an entre-
preneurial party (due to the formers’ lack of knowledge, skills or opportunity to control and evaluate 
the activities of the entrepreneurial party) and improve the accountability and transparency of entre-
preneurial parties. Other opportunities to do so are more general rules of civil law, such as the possi-
bility in the Netherlands (for defendants) to hold entrepreneurial parties liable for an abuse of a (pro-
cedural) right, or (for class members) to invoke corporate law rules.  
7.4.2 Objective B: compensation 
Let us now assume that the main objective of a specific collective redress mechanism is to provide for 
compensatory relief. Such a mechanism will probably also focus on efficiency, which might partly 
erode the objective of full compensation. To ensure that entrepreneurial parties can contribute to the 
objective of compensation, a policy maker should pay attention to, inter alia, the regulation of the 
legal services market and the rules on standing and result-based fees. If these rules are designed or 
applied in such a way that they restrict entrepreneurial parties in bringing or being involved in such 
action, they can be qualified as a threat to the facilitation of access to justice. An example thereof has 
been observed in Germany, where entrepreneurial parties were not allowed to bring bundled assign-
ments. Similarly, in England and Wales, the – remains of the – common law torts of maintenance and 
champerty might prevent an entrepreneurial party from engaging in collective redress. If these rules 
or the interpretation thereof are too liberal, they can be considered a threat to the risks of a claim 
culture and abusive behaviour. However, with liberal rules, entrepreneurial parties might also create 
a competitive market. Furthermore, if they can operate under a result-based fee, it creates an align-
ment of interests. The emergence of such a market is visible in the Netherlands, where entrepreneurial 
SPVs are increasingly engaged in collective redress.  
 
A competitive market can have a downward pressure on the fees and/or percentages charged, posi-
tively affecting the objective of compensation (the individual’s remaining compensation after the de-
duction of the litigation costs). However, such fees should be properly monitored, as otherwise they 
might be excessive, disproportionate and/or create the risk of collusive settlements, as was observed 
in some situations of English and Dutch entrepreneurial mass litigation. To help secure the alignment 
of interests, some (regulatory, judicial or supervisory) control over the entrepreneurial party’s remu-
neration is important. However, this depends on the chosen objective. If the main objective is com-
pensation, the risk of the entrepreneurial party’s remuneration being ‘too large’ should be avoided or 
mitigated, but if the main objective is deterrence, it is less relevant which part of the proceeds are 
taken by the entrepreneurial party. If the entrepreneurial party acts as a repeat player and is an added 
player (a third-party funder), the alignment of interests is also amplified, as it can monitor the attor-
ney’s behaviour and vice versa.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, governance rules (and some form of supervision of the entrepre-
neurial parties’ adherence to such rules) can be considered an opportunity for the benefit of increasing 
the quality of claims. Here, too, the risk of adverse selection by way of a thorough screening of entre-
preneurial parties can be mitigated by the availability of alternative, competing types of funding 
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and/or cross-subsidization in the costs regime. A threat to access to justice but an opportunity to di-
minish the risk of a fraudulent or insolvent entrepreneurial party are capital adequacy requirements, 
entry barriers, and allowing a defendant to apply for security for costs. To aid such an application, the 
court can order the claimants to disclose the identity of the funder. 
7.4.3 Objective C: efficiency 
As discussed in the previous section, if the regulation of the legal services market and the rules on 
standing are (applied) liberal(ly), they can be considered a threat, as they might amplify the risks of a 
claim culture and abusive behaviour. This negatively affects the objective of efficiency as well, as (un-
necessary) excessive litigation increases courts’ workload and imposes higher costs on defendants and 
the judiciary or society at large. If such liberal application is combined with (supervised) governance 
rules, however, the quality of the claims of competing parties might be amplified, which might mediate 
the aforementioned negative effect on the objective of efficiency. Furthermore, case management 
techniques such as bundling competing actions can cure excessive litigation, and applying costs sanc-
tions or full liability for costs in the case of abusive behaviour will repair the higher costs for defend-
ants, and can thus be considered as opportunities.  
 
Within the objective of efficiency it is furthermore important that entrepreneurial parties can act as 
repeat players and that a ‘claimants’ bar’ is developed next to the – already existing – defendant’s bar. 
If the entrepreneurial party acts as an ‘extra’ key player, fully independent from the attorney, it can 
monitor the attorney’s behaviour and fees, and neutralize the information asymmetry between attor-
ney and individuals. In a way, an entrepreneurial party can thus turn ‘one-shot’ consumers into repeat 
players. This is also beneficial for the quality of representation and equality of arms. The alignment 
between the entrepreneurial party and individual class members can take place through a contingency 
fee arrangement.  
 
Entrepreneurial parties might also induce inefficient competition. For instance, an entrepreneurial 
party might only serve part of the class and the competing entrepreneurial parties might initiate vari-
ous actions that concern one mass damage event. This inefficient competition harms the objective of 
efficiency and can thus be considered a drawback, and the open, unrestricted collective redress mar-
ket poses a threat, as it worsens such a drawback. To mitigate the drawback of inefficient competition 
(and thus positively affect the objective of efficiency), rules on the appointment of a lead representa-
tive could be designed, as has been done in the recent legislative proposal for a Dutch collective action 
for damages. Such an ‘exclusive representative’ rule can thus be qualified as an opportunity. An op-
portunity for competition is a predictable litigation costs (risk) regime, as it helps entrepreneurial par-
ties to calculate their risk.  
 
A last threat to the risks of abusive litigation and claim culture is the full indemnification of litigation 
costs, as was the case in England and Wales for a decade. This increased excessive (satellite) litigation, 
and so affected the objective of efficiency.  
7.4.4 The third overview: the building blocks of entrepreneurial mass litigation 
To summarize (and organize the plethora of) the objectives, potential effects, and rules and features 
in the aforementioned sections, the answer to the research question ‘What conditions are relevant in 
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assessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties contributing to the chosen objectives of collective 




















Potentially beneficial effect 
of entrepreneurial mass liti-
gation for the objective 
(benefit) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect 
(opportunity) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially reduces the effect 
(threat) 
Potentially disadvanta-
geous effect of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation for 
the objective (risk) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect 
(threat) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially reduces the effect (op-
portunity) 
Facilitate access to justice Public enforcement (e.g. de-
cision by the competition 
authority); Active EPs that 
detect claims and organize 
the claims and class mem-
bers; Liberal rules on stand-
ing and result-based fees; 
Calculable costs; Full costs 
shifting; Bonus to partici-
pants 
Opposite elements of those 
listed as opportunities; capi-
tal adequacy requirements, 
security for costs, and other 
entry barriers;  
Fuel a claim culture Over-enforcement (fine + 
compensation); Active EPs 
that detect claims and or-
ganize the claims and class 
members; Liberal rules on 
standing; No extrajudicial 
control; Ad hoc judicial con-
trol of funder;  
Public authorization or court 
control on standing; Costs 
sanctions; Full costs shifting; 
Deontological rules; (super-
vision of) governance rules; 
internal monitoring rules 
Competition Allowing ‘closed’ collective 
actions; predictable costs re-
gime 
    
Quality of claims Governance rules; internal 
monitoring rules 
Opposite element of the 
ones listed as an oppor-
tunity 
Adverse selection (cherry 
picking) 
Thorough claim screening Availability of alternative 
funding; cross-subsidization 
in costs/fee regime 
   Abusive behaviour 
(blackmail settlement, am-
bulance chasing, insufficient 
means) 
No rules on solicitation and 
barratry; Opposite element 
of the ones listed as oppor-
tunity 
Capital adequacy require-
ments, security for costs, 
and other entry barriers, 
trust account, rules on solic-
itation and barratry; high-
calibre defence attorneys; 
media control 
Alignment of interests Allowing result-based fees; 
Monitoring rules for courts 
on activities and fees of EPs, 
accountability and transpar-
ency 
No (extra)judicial control of 
settlements or fees  
Conflict of interests No extrajudicial control of 
settlements or fees; Ad hoc 
parties 
High-calibre defence attor-
neys; Governance rules for 
funders; Opposite elements 
of those listed as threats 























Potentially beneficial effect 
of entrepreneurial mass liti-
gation for the objective 
(benefit) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect 
(opportunity) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially reduces the effect 
(threat) 
Potentially disadvanta-
geous effect of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation for 
the objective (risk) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect 
(threat) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially reduces the effect (op-
portunity) 
Facilitate access to justice Public enforcement (e.g. de-
cision by the competition 
authority); Active EPs that 
detect claims and organize 
the claims and class mem-
bers; Liberal (application of) 
rules on standing and result-
based fees; Predictable 
costs (risk);  
Capital adequacy require-
ments, security for costs, 
and other entry barriers 
Fuel a claim culture  Liberal (application of) rules 
on standing and result-
based fees; 
Rules on solicitation and 
barratry; Governance rules;  
Competition Liberal (application of) rules 
on standing and result-
based fees; 
Lead representative; Capital 
adequacy requirements, 
high entry barriers (e.g. ALF),  
   
Quality of claims Governance rules (e.g. audit 
committee) 
 Adverse selection Opposite elements of those 
listed as opportunities 
Availability of alternative 
funding; cross-subsidization 
in cost/fee system 
   Abusive behaviour 
(blackmail settlement, am-
bulance chasing, insufficient 
means) 
No rules on solicitation and 
barratry; Opposite element 
of the ones listed as oppor-
tunity 
Security for costs, disclose 
identity of EP, capital ade-
quacy test, and other entry 
barriers; ATE insurance, 
class members liable for 
costs order, trust account 
Alignment of interests Result-based fees; Judicial 
assessment of settlement 
and funder’s fee; EP as re-
peat player and added 
player 
Lack of monitoring  Conflict of interests (prema-
ture or collusive settlement) 
No or marginal judicial as-
sessment; no extrajudicial 
control; Bonus to partici-
pants; Competing actions 
(reverse auction);  
Media control; code of con-
duct; opposite elements of 
those listed as threats 




























Potentially beneficial effect 
of entrepreneurial mass liti-
gation for the objective 
(benefit) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect (op-
portunity) 
Rule or feature that po-
tentially reduces the ef-
fect (threat) 
Potentially disadvanta-
geous effect of entrepre-
neurial mass litigation for 
the objective (risk) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially amplifies the effect 
(threat) 
Rule or feature that poten-
tially reduces the effect (op-
portunity) 
   Fuel a claim culture Active EPs that detect claims 
and organize the claims and 
class members; Liberal (ap-
plication of) rules on stand-
ing and result-based fees; 
Case management tech-
niques, bundling competing 
actions; Applying costs sanc-
tions or full liability for costs 
in case of unnecessary litiga-
tion; 
 
Competition Predictable costs regime Lead representative Inefficient competition Open, unrestricted collec-
tive redress market; Allow-
ing ‘closed’ collective ac-
tions; Lenient interruption 
of limitation period 
Lead representative 
Quality of claims (Supervision of) governance 
rules (e.g. audit committee) 
    
(E)quality of arms EP as repeat player and added 
player; 
 Abusive behaviour Active EPs that detect claims 
and organize the claims and 
class members; Liberal (ap-
plication of) rules on stand-
ing and result-based fees; 
Full costs shifting in combi-
nation with discretionary 
powers 
Applying costs sanctions or 
full liability for costs in case 
of abusive behaviour 
Alignment of interests Contingency fee; EP as repeat 
player and added player; Fi-
nancial incentives in costs sys-
tem to settle a case 
Lack of control in decision-
making process 
   
Table XV Overview of the benefits, risks, opportunities and threats of entrepreneurial mass litigation (Objective C: efficiency)
7.5 Envoi 
With the analysis presented in section 7.4, the conditions have been presented that are relevant in 
assessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties contributing to the chosen objectives of collective 
redress. Although the overview presents concrete, existing rules and features, they have been 
abstracted from their national context. Therewith, the overview presents various specific routes to 
approach, regulate and/or review entrepreneurial mass litigation. Depending on the chosen normative 
framework – the pursued objective(s) of collective redress – the other building blocks might be 
balanced differently. 
  
I recognize that abstracting the rules and features from their natural habitat is a risky enterprise, as 
the functioning of a rule or feature depends on the context in which it functions. I have done so in 
order to map and paint a bigger picture of entrepreneurial mass litigation. Nevertheless, the map 
should be approached with caution; thus, I have labelled the rules and features as potential threats 
and opportunities. To a certain extent, the country studies have tested the listed rules and features, 
and have sometimes revealed whether specific benefits or drawbacks have indeed taken place. Obvi-
ously, entrepreneurial mass litigation is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe; it is a moving target 
in a market that has not yet sufficiently matured. Thus, it is impossible to paint a complete picture. 
However, by mapping the (potential) scenarios of entrepreneurial mass litigation and exploring the 
German, English, and Dutch legal and practical context in which such scenarios would take or have 
taken place, the research project has aimed to appraise the potential benefits and drawbacks of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation within the context of (these) European jurisdictions’ legal traditions.  
 
The primary aim of the research project was to contribute to the academic, legislative or judicial 
process of weighing and balancing entrepreneurial mass litigation within its appropriate context, also 
in order to avoid ad hoc responses to incidents or scandals. Various ‘situations’ were passed in review: 
American, Australian, European, German, English and Dutch. Sometimes parties have stumbled over 
the building blocks, at other times legislators, courts or the public have done the same. It remains to 
be seen how they will develop in the future, but it is clear that the building blocks are available. Some 
might require fine-tuning, others restructuring or control. At all times, however, observing their place 




8 Summary  
In modern society, events occur in which the rights of large numbers of people are infringed, causing 
mass harm and disputes that concern various areas of private law and various types of aggrieved 
parties. Illustrative examples are the Volkswagen emissions scandal, the illegal dumping of toxic waste 
from the Probo Koala tanker, or the trucks price-fixing cartel. Mass litigation is a relatively new phe-
nomenon in Europe, yet it is gradually developing into an important area of the law. Nowadays, most 
European member states have introduced some type of court-based collective redress mechanism. 
For the pursuit of collective redress, member states and the European Union primarily rely upon (semi-
)public or private, non-profit representative bodies such as consumer organizations – as a more 
trusted alternative to the US entrepreneurial lawyer. Nevertheless, various types of commerce-driven 
parties are mushrooming, incentivised – also – by the potential large earnings that mass litigation pro-
vides. Attorneys, special purpose vehicles and third-party litigation funders increasingly engage in the 
already existing collective redress mechanisms and explore hidden or new pathways. Regardless of 
their type, their mere presence adds a key actor to the litigation who is – also – pursuing its own 
entrepreneurial interest. This innovation in private law is two-faced. Entrepreneurial mass litigation 
has the potential to stimulate and improve access to justice and private enforcement, but also to fuel 
a compensation culture and encourage abusive behaviour. This PhD project has addressed the ques-
tion of what conditions are relevant in assessing the likelihood of entrepreneurial parties contributing 
to the chosen objectives of collective redress. It has done so by way of a theoretical and comparative 
legal study. The study has sought to appraise the potential benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial 
mass litigation within the context of three European jurisdictions’ legal traditions (Germany, England 
& Wales, and the Netherlands), and to inventorise the particular rules and features that might affect 
entrepreneurial mass litigation. Therewith, the study has aimed to contribute to the academic, political 
and/or judicial process of accurately weighing and balancing the benefits and drawbacks of 
entrepreneurial mass litigation.  
 
Part I of the thesis, which consists of Chapters 2 and 3, has established the study’s foundation. Chapter 
2 has described the collective redress mechanisms in the three selected jurisdictions and has investi-
gated the policy objectives that underlie these mechanisms, as well as the European Union policy on 
collective redress. Although the German, English, and Dutch mechanisms vary, three common main 
policy objectives have been identified: i) to modify – potential – wrongdoers’ behaviour (prevention 
and deterrence), ii) to restore the damage suffered by individual class members (compensation), and 
iii) to promote procedural economy (efficiency). The latter is a constant goal, aimed at by all mecha-
nisms that have been designed over the years. As of the 1970s until recently, prevention has been the 
prime objective of collective redress; this policy developed in a rather similar way in the researched 
legal regimes, where the mechanisms mainly provided for injunctive relief. Currently, deterrence is 
still considered an important goal, but one to be pursued primarily by (the enforcers of) public law. It 
is relatively recently that providing individuals with the opportunity to obtain individual redress or 
compensation has gained ground as a goal of collective redress. It remains controversial, however, 
given its association with US class actions and the – alleged – adverse effects thereof.  
 
Whereas Chapter 2 has focused on collective redress mechanisms, Chapter 3 has concentrated on 
entrepreneurial parties that (might) operate within that field. Based on American and Australian ex-
periences with class actions, entrepreneurial lawyering and third-party litigation funding, and on law 
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and economics literature, the project has mapped potential scenarios of entrepreneurial mass litiga-
tion. Entrepreneurial mass litigation has been defined as the financing of (all or part of) the costs of 
mass litigation by a private party, in return for a share of the proceeds of the action or an uplifted fee; 
either way, only payable upon success. The research has distinguished three types of entrepreneurial 
parties: attorneys, ad hoc special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and third-party litigation funders. They might 
‘merely’ fund the claim, but might also be actively involved in mass litigation by searching for potential 
claims, approaching and informing potential claimants, screening cases, participating in the (strategi-
cal) decision-making process, and initiating mass litigation themselves. Subsequently, the chapter has 
listed the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation as more or less opposite sides of 
the same coin, positively or negatively affecting the objective(s) of prevention/deterrence (a), com-
pensation (b), or efficiency (c):  
 
Potential benefits Affected 
objective(s) 
(+) 
Potential drawbacks Affected 
objective(s) 
(-) 
1. Facilitate access to justice a, b 6. Fuel a claim culture a, b, c 
2. Competition a, b, c 7. Inefficient competition c 
3. Increase the quality of claims a, b, c 8. Adverse selection / cherry picking a, b 
4. (E)quality of arms c 9. Abusive behaviour a, b, c 
5. Alignment of interests a, b, c 10. Conflict of interests a, b 
 
The extent to which the aforementioned effects indeed occur interacts with the specificities of a na-
tional legal system. Therefore, part II of the research (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) has explored the German, 
English and Dutch legal and practical context in which such scenarios (might) take place. It describes 
the legal rules and features that are closely connected with and shape the operation of entrepreneurial 
mass litigation, by addressing the following key issues: 1) essentials of the civil justice landscape, 2) 
the regulation and supervision of the legal services market, 3) litigation costs and costs shifting, 4) 
private litigation funding, and 5) essentials of the collective action mechanisms. The findings have been 
summarized at the end of each chapter and comparatively observed in Chapter 7. The country studies 
show, for instance, that the German legal services market is the most strictly regulated one, for provid-
ing legal services both in and out of court. Moreover, the German legislator and courts appear to be 
more hesitant towards compensatory collective redress as compared to the Dutch and English ones. 
Consequentially, the development of entrepreneurial mass litigation differs considerably in the three 
jurisdictions. Whereas in Germany, entrepreneurial mass litigation has mainly – yet cautiously – taken 
place within the context of securities litigation, in the Netherlands, different types of claim vehicles 
are increasingly pursuing various types of mass harm disputes. The English experiences provide inspi-
ration for the potential regulation thereof. The country study does not only show a growing market 
for entrepreneurial mass litigation, but also an increase in the (self-) regulation thereof. The UK gov-
ernment, for instance, has banned the practices of certain claim vehicles, and the litigation funding 
sector has issued a code of conduct.  
 
Chapter 7 has also distilled various legal rules and features – abstracted from their national context – 
that potentially amplify or reduce the beneficial or disadvantageous effect of entrepreneurial mass 
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litigation,1 and can thus be qualified as threats and opportunities against the backdrop of the 
objectives of collective redress mechanisms.2 This framework brings together the findings of both 
parts of the research and presents the conditions that are relevant in assessing the likelihood of en-
trepreneurial parties contributing to the chosen objectives of collective redress. It displays the three 
sets of building blocks of entrepreneurial mass litigation: a) the rules and features, qualified as either 
an opportunity or a threat to b) the benefits and drawbacks of entrepreneurial mass litigation, c) mod-
elled within the policy objectives of collective redress. The overview shows the manner in which the 
conditions are intertwined and the potential trade-offs. To give an example: competing entrepreneur-
ial parties might initiate separate collective actions that concern the same mass damage event. Such 
competing actions harm the objective of efficiency, and can thus be considered as a drawback of en-
trepreneurial mass litigation (inefficient competition). Appointing a lead representative might reduce 
this drawback. Hence, the ‘lead representative rule’ can be qualified as an opportunity to the drawback 
and, in turn, positively affect the policy objective of efficiency. However, the same rule can also be 
qualified as a threat, as it might diminish the benefit of competing entrepreneurial parties. For in-
stance, a competitive market can have downward pressure on the fees and/or percentages charged, 
positively affecting the objective of compensation (the individual’s remaining compensation after the 
deduction of the litigation costs). A decline in the number of competing parties will reduce this positive 
effect.  
 
The book closes with a call for a balanced approach. In the study, various ‘situations’ have been passed 
in review: American, Australian, European, German, English and Dutch, and specific routes have been 
presented to approach, regulate and/or review entrepreneurial mass litigation. In this process, the 
chosen normative framework – the pursued objective(s) of collective redress – determines the place 
and design of the other building blocks. The study shows that this process sometimes results in inci-
dents which might require (further) regulation, the fine-tuning thereof or control thereon. At all times, 










                                                             
 
1 See also table XII in Chapter 7. 
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